(EST PUB DATE) IRAQI BALLISTIC MISSILES DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: IRAQ
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0000364474
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2011
• Case Number: F-2010-01212
• Publication Date: July 1, 1990

Directorate of
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Iraqi Ballistic Missile
Developments
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
APPROVED FOR
RELEASEL DATE:
21-Jun-2011
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July 1990
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 [*ertorate of
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Iraqi Ballistic Missile
Developments F-1
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 Iraqi Ballistic Missile
Developments 7l
Key Judgments Iraq has the most aggressive and advanced ballistic missile development
information available program in the Arab world. It already possesses two missiles-Iraqi-
as 199 mart. modified Soviet Scud B's called the Al Husayn and the Al Abbas-capable
of reaching Tel Aviv or Tehran, targets some 600 km away. Seeking an in-
digenous missile production capability, Iraq also has development well
under way of five other missiles capable of greater ranges and payloads.
Foreign assistance is critical to Iraq's effort. With it, production of one or
more of Iraq's new missiles could possibly begin during the early 1990s.
Otherwise, production could be delayed into the mid-to-late 1990s. Iraq
realizes this dependence and is working to become self-sufficient and to
wean itself from foreign support-including Moscow, its only supplier of
Scud B missilesa
Iraq has acquired most of its missile development and production infra-
structure in less than three years. With West European design and
technical assistance, it has built over 70 buildings needed to produce and
test major missile components and to develop and produce subcomponents.
At the heart of this effort are two extensive construction projects, Project
395 and Sa'ad 16, which include facilities for solid-propellant production,
for rocket motor production and testing, for guidance and control systems
development and production, and for missile integration. Iraq still depends
on foreign suppliers for some raw materials but is pursuing production
facilities for these materials in its drive for self-sufficiency. Several
government organizations--especially the Technical Corps for Special
Projects and the Nassr State Enterprise for Mechanical Industries-
continue to seek additional equipment and materials to support Iraq's
missile program.F__1
Iraq has based its missile program on a diversified acquisition strategy,
with low-risk and high-risk development projects running in parallel. At
the low-risk end, three of the five missiles under development-the
domestic variants of the Al Husayn and the Al Abbas and the Tamuz I-
are derived from basic, proven Scud B technology. The other two-the
Condor II and the Al Hamza-use more advanced Western propulsion and
guidance technology. All of these developments are based on foreign
technology and design. We believe Iraq will not be able to design its own
missiles for a least five to 10 years.F-1
SW 90-10045JX
Ju
el 12 aIi
 Conducting these five missile projects at once is costly and undoubtedly
stretches Iraq's financial and manpower resources. The multiple develop-
ments, however, provide a safety net and give Iraq something to fall back
on if one or more missile projects fail. Working with several generations of
technology, some of which Iraq will grasp very easily, reinforces this safety
net.
We believe Iraq could begin indigenous production of its variants of the Al
Husayn and the Al Abbas by 1991. Both should be able to reach 600-km
targets, with 300- or 660-kg warheads, respectively. In addition, some Al
Abbas missiles could be equipped with a 200-kg warhead to reach targets
at 900 km. In the meantime, Iraq will push to complete development of the
Condor II, with production possibly beginning by the early 1990s if foreign
assistance continues. If the flow of assistance is interrupted, production
could be delayed until the mid-to-late 1990s. Iraq could operate develop-
ment and production facilities on its own, possibly within five years of the
beginning of missile production.)
We judge that, in addition to high-explosives warheads, Iraq will develop
and manufacture chemical and possibly biological warheads for all of its
missile systems. Chemical and biological warheads are more cost effective,
result in greater numbers of human casualties, provide a psychological
edge, and make the missile a more effective deterrent. Iraq currently has
the ability to weaponize its chemical and biological agents. It may already
possess a chemical warhead for its modified Scuds.)
We also judge that, depending on the level of foreign assistance, Iraq may
also be able to develop a nuclear warhead before the end of the decade. It is
procuring equipment, materials, and technology that strongly suggest a
nuclear weapons program exists. But it will not be a simple task to fit a nu-
clear weapon into a missile's warhead. Also, there are weaponization
problems-how to ensure that a nuclear device will survive missile flight-
that must be solved. If these problems are not readily solved, Iraq could
face two or more years delay in fielding a nuclear payload.)
In our assessment, the high-priority status of Iraq's missile program will
continue to command the necessary personnel and financial resources. Iraq
probably has placed some of its most capable engineers, technicians, and
managers on missile projects. Iraq will continue to fund development,
probably using a combination of Iraqi and foreign-probably Saudi
Arabian-monies. In the future, Iraq may sell missile-related technology
to garner prestige as the emerging technology leader in the Arab world.
Top , et iv
 In our judgment, current Iraqi missile projects will be difficult, if not
impossible, to stop. Impeding the flow of foreign assistance, however, could
slow development considerably. This would best be achieved by thwarting
Iraqi attempts to secure technology in areas such as guidance and control,
in which Iraq has limited, but growing, capabilities. Iraq has, however,
proved itself capable of tapping into Western and other nations' aerospace
industries for technology support, despite attempts by some governments to
prevent it. It has effectively exploited a consortium of Western firms
known as the Consen Group and has organized a covert procurement
network of its own. There almost certainly is no way to block such
assistance entirely. The Missile Technology Control Regime will have
limited success as Iraq taps nonmember nations like China, India, or Brazil
for assistance with its program. Iraq probably will also use its space
program as a conduit to gain dual-use technology for its missile program.
 Introduction: A Commitment to Self-Sufficiency 1
Iraq's Missile Program: A Multiple Approach 2
The Condor II: Iraq Takes the Lead 2
The Al Hamza: Probably Building on Condor II Technology 5
Modified Scud B's: A Quick Fix 7
The Al Husayn 7
The Al Abbas 8
Scud B Technology: More Innovations 8
Domestically Produced Al Husayn and 8
Al Abbas Missiles
The Tamuz I/Al Abid 10
Warhead Options: Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear 10
The Chemical and Biological Threat 11
A Nuclear Payload 14
Iraq's Missile Production Infrastructure: Procuring Equipment and 15
Constructing Sites
Acquiring the Infrastructure 15
Technical Corps for Special Projects 15
Nassr State Enterprise for Mechanical Industries 15
Production and Test Facilities 17
Project 395: The Road to Self-Sufficiency 17
Sa'ad 16: The Al Kindi Research Center 18
Foreign Assistance Worldwide 19
From Sources in Europe ... 19
... And Other Third World Missile Developers 20
The Iraqi Procurement Network: Resourceful 21
Outlook 23
(REVERSE BLANK)
vii -T-0D--Se=9t Searet
 o t
 Scope Note We have examined Iraq's rapid progress in developing ballistic missiles and
have attempted, with available information, to evaluate where the program
stands at present and what future options might be available. We do not
discuss the effect these missiles will have on the stability of the region.
 Iraqi Ballistic Missile
Developments F-1
Introduction: A Commitment
to Self-Sufficiency
He who launches an aggression against Iraq or the
Arab nation will nowftnd someone to repel him. Uwe
can strike him with a stone, we will. With a missile,
we will ... and with all the missiles, bombs, and
other means at our disposal.
Iraqi President Saddam Husayn
18 April 1990-]
Iraq has made indigenous missile production one of its
highest priorities. This priority is driven by two major
goals. First, Iraq wants to demonstrate to its allies and
enemies that it has operational missiles with sufficient
ranges to threaten Middle Eastern cities. These mis-
siles could be used to deter Israeli attacks and estab-
lish Iraq's leadership in the Arab world as a military
power and a technologically advanced nation. Second,
it wants to end its dependence on foreign support-
both for operational missiles and related technology.
Only by building its own missile R&D infrastructure
of people and facilities can Iraq wean itself of this
dependenceF_~
Iraq has come a long way in pursuing these goals. In
the past five years, Iraq has moved from third-hand
participation in the Argentine Condor II program
(inset) to implementation of a diverse, indigenous
capability to develop missiles. It has also developed a
large procurement network to amass the technology
needed for its missiles.)
Iraq's current missile development program began to
take shape in 1987. The most pressing need at that
time was for a ballistic missile capable of reaching
Tehran-a distance of about 600 km, or twice the
range of Iraq's Soviet-supplied Scud B missiles. We
believe that in early 1987 Iraqi engineers started on a
project to produce a missile with this range capability.
Iraq modified some of its Soviet-origin Scuds to fly to
twice the nominal range-at least 600 km. These
missiles, which it called Al Husayn, were used during
Argentina-Egypt-Iraq: A Cooperative Venture
In 1984, Iraq. restricted by a limited missile develop-
ment and production infrastructure and the -financial
burden incurred during the war with Iran, focused on
funding Argentina's and Egypt's missile-development
program for the Condor II missile. Iraq transferred
funds to Egypt as partial financing for the missile,
then under development in Argentina. We do not
know the exact terms of the agreement, but we believe
Egypt and Iraq provided fundingfor the Buenos Aires
program in return for some of the first missiles to be
produced. In addition, both Egypt and Iraq eventual-
ly were to gain a production capability
Iraq also began construction of its own Condor II
production facilities in mid-1987. Over the next two
and a half years, we believe Iraq continued to fund
development of the missile in Argentina, while seek-
ing and acquiring materials needed to produce the
Condor II in Iraq. The Condor II program, however,
ran into difficulty in mid-1989. International pres-
sure, the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR), and technical setbacks subsequently
brought the program to a virtual standstill in Argen-
tina and Egypt. Repeated Argentine attempts to
conduct the firstfight test of the missile have failed,
largely because of technical difficulties with guidance
and control. The lack of progress in Argentina threat-
or II development in both countries seems to be on
hold, at least for the time being.F____-]
o t
nc v],T1
 the "war of the cities" with Tehran in 1988. Iraq later
claimed to have developed and tested a 900-km-range
missile, the Al Abbas. This, however, still left Iraq
dependent on Moscow-its only missile supplier-for
missiles and parts.F__1
Seeking total indigenous production, Iraq also began
other parallel missile development projects. It now has
five missiles under development, all of which are
based on foreign technology and design (figure 1). We
believe that, concurrcrt with its 1987 decision to
modify the Scud B's, Iraq began mapping out a
second project for entirely Iraqi-manufactured copies
of the Al Husayn and Al Abbas missiles. It is also
pursuing parallel Iraqi development of the Tamuz,
and the more advanced Condor II and Al Hamza
missiles, capable of greater ranges (figure 2) and
payloads. Although development of the latter two
missiles will be slower, they will offer Iraq greater
flexibility. The solid-propellant Condor II, for exam-
ple, will be easier to handle, require less preparation
time before launch, offer more payload options, and
provide better accuracy and range than any version of
the Al Husayn or the Al AbbasV---]
We believe Iraq's success thus far is based on the
following factors:
? It has made a very determined commitment of
people and resources. We estimate well over a
billion dollars were invested in ballistic missile
development.
? It has learned how to tap into Western and other
nations' aerospace industries for technology support,
despite attempts by some governments to prevent it.
? It has a diversified missile acquisition strategy with
low-risk and high-risk development projects running
in parallel.
? It has relied on modest changes to mature, proven,
and available Scud technology as the low-risk
program.
? It proved in the "war of the cities" that the low-end
technology of the Scud is adequate to threaten
civilian populations. High technology is desirable,
but not critical; basic range capability, however, is
critical.)
Underlying Iraq's ballistic missile development pro-
gram is a strategy that incorporates several genera-
tions of missile technology. Three of its missile pro-
jects are based on liquid propellants and are
evolutions of Scud B technology-the domestic copies
of the Al Husayn and Al Abbas missiles, and the
2,000-km-range Tamuz 1, which is probably based on
the Iraqi space launch vehicle, the Al Abid. Iraq's
Scud derivatives show more imagination and creativ-
ity than that seen elsewhere in the Third World.
Meanwhile, Iraq also is pursuing development of more
advanced solid-propellant missiles, the 750- to 1,000-
km-range Condor II and the 1,200- to 1,500-km-
range Al Hamza. This multiple approach, although
costly, may be a well-calculated effort to help Iraq
achieve its goal of indigenous missile production.
Multiple developments give Iraq something to fall
back on should part of the program fail.
The Condor II is a two-stage ballistic missile designed
to have a range of 750 km and deliver a payload of ap-
proximately 500 kg. Original specifications called for
L
milt, ~ 11
 Figure I
Iraq: Characteristics of Ballistic Missiles
Payload
Warhead
Guidance
Length
Diameter
Weight
 Domestic a
Al Husayn
Domcshch
Al Abbas
Cbndo~ Ir"'
`. Al Siam?
600 km
900 km
750,-.
1,000; km
470 kg
370.kg
530.kg `'.:
300 kg
200 kg
320kg
Inertial
Inertial
Inertial
UnktEaQon
Uokobgd
10.9 m
12.2 m .
10.5 m
88 cm
88cm
80 cm
4.825 kg
6,650 kg
4,660 kg
-tu-
mid 1990s ;gi til99t1s` ~~ aat~ it
for Seeret---
 rairsmm"
Iraq could begin production of the Condor II missile
by the early 1990s with continued foreign assistance.
It probably will face problems in areas such as
guidance and control, second-stage configuration, and
flight-testing as it completes development of the mis-
second stage is unclear, although we believe Iraq has
engine designs for both solid- and liquid-propellant
configurations. When Iraq begins flight-testing the
Condor II, Iraqi engineers will need foreign help in
collecting and analyzing launch data
Iraqi production of the Condor II could be delayed
until the mid-to-late 1990s if the flow of foreign
technology or components is interrupted. Hindering
Iraqi procurement in these areas, however, may have
only a short-term effect. Iraq is seeking an indigenous
production capability for the bulk of the missile-
cannot procure missile-related raw materials and
guidance technology and components from Western
sources, it probably will turn to non-Western sources,
We believe Iraq will strongly resist any pressure to
delay or abandon development of the missile and will
press ahead regardless of the status of Condor II
development in Argentina or Egypt. Iraq, however,
almost certainly will seek continued cooperation with
Argentina and Egypt on Condor II development. It
would be to Iraq's advantage to exploit its partners for
the near future for the hands-on development and
testing experience they can nrovide.F
Egyptian program, but we now expect stronger links
between Buenos Aires and Baghdad as Ira taps
Argentina as a source of assistance.
Our growing concern is that Argentina and Egypt-
despite claims of withdrawing from the program-
will continue development of the Condor II through
Iraq. Argentine and Egyptian engineers may train at
Iraqi production facilities, which are similar to those
in Argentina and almost identical to ones in Egypt.
Argentina and Egypt could begin indigenous produc-
tion with little or no notice shortly after its engineers
return from Iraq. We believe Iraq will be the first of
the three to produce the Condor II. If production
technology is not transferred to Argentina and Egypt
by Iraq, Argentina and Egypt could purchase Condor
II missiles from Iraq once Iraqi production begins.
The Al Hamza: Probably Building
on Condor II Technology
Iraq is working on a second solid-propellant missile,
called the Al Hamza. According to a source of the US
defense attache in Iraq, it has two stages and a range
of 1,200 to 1,500 km. Al Hamza almost certainly is of
foreign design-Iraq probably will not be capable of
designing ballistic missiles on its own for at least five
to 10 years. Iraq reportedly is receiving Romanian
technical assistance on the project. Romania has only
a modest solid-propellant production capability, and it
is unclear if it could lend significant assistance in the
missile's development. Additional reporting on the Al
Hamza is sparse.)
With the Al Hamza, Iraq probably is building on its
Condor II technology. Through development of the
Condor II, Iraq will gain experience in producing solid
propellants, rocket motors, guidance systems, and
experience in technical areas such as stage separation.
Iraq undoubtedly realizes that all of this can be
applied to longer range missiles. It may prefer to build
 Figure 2
Estimated Range of Iraqi Ballistic Missiles
Iraq is interested in ballistic missiles which
bring targets such as Tel Aviv and TehrAn
within range. Iraq has several missiles in its
program which would provide this
capability. It reportedly is developing
missiles with longer ranges, probably in an
effort to assert itself as a leader in the
Arab world and to keep pace with Israeli
missile and space developments.
Soviet Union
Al Hanna
1,500 k lometers
, Condor fl
Caspian
S.
' ` 1cyptua ~' * Scud
Mediterranean ea
t 3OO kllome
Ners
Ethiopia
500 KOOmetere
600 Mnae
o et
Guff of Oman
&0 nrjI
 Figure 3. The Al Husayn and Al Abbas-Iraqi-Modified Scuds.
Iraq's Al Husayn and Al Abbas modified Scuds were displayed on
fixed launchers at Baghdad's Weapons Exhibition in 1989. These
photos show that the Al Abbas is roughly I meter longer than the
Al Husayn. Fixed launchers that would accommodate the longer
At Abbas are being constructed in at least nine sites in western
1raq.F___]
on solid-propellant technology. Producing a larger
solid-propellant rocket motor, such as one for the Al
Hamza, probably would be simpler and quicker than
producin a liquid fuel engine of an equivalent capa-
bility.
Modified Scud B's: A Quick Fix
In 1987, Iraq had a pressing need for a surface-to-
surface missile delivery capability against Iran. Iraq's
300-km-range Soviet-origin Scud B missiles fell far
short of the target. There were no systems with
greater ranges available for purchase, and indigenous
missile production was a prospect several years off.
We believe Iraqi engineers chose the quickest and
easiest way to fill this gap-greatly reducing the
payload of the Scud B missile to gain greater range. It
renamed the missile the Al Husayn and gave it at
least a 600-km range. Iraq also claims to have
developed a variant, called the Al Abbas, with a range
of 900 km (figure 3). In our judgment, Iraq may have
received foreign technical assistance for this project-
possibly to determine the scope and nature of the
The Al Husayn. The Al Husayn carries a very small
payload and is highly inaccurate. It, however, quickly
filled the Iraqi need for a missile capable of striking
Tehran in 1988. In less than seven weeks, Iraq was
 able to fire close to 200 Al Husayn missiles against
Iran during the "war of the cities," contributing to
bringing about an end to the Iran-Iraq war.
The Al Husayn is inaccurate because Iraq probably
did not modify the Scud's strapdown inertial guidance
system. Our analysis indicates the Al Husayn should
have a circular error probable (CEP) of about 2,300
meters, compared with a CEP of about 1,000 meters
for the nominal Scud B
In our judgment, it is unlikely that Iraq has done
more than stretch the propellant tanks on the Al
Abbas. Further changes would be more difficult and
more time consuming. Iraq may have exaggerated the
missile's capabilities for propaganda purposes. The
Iraqi announcement of the Al Abbas was well
timed-a few days after it called a cease-fire to the
"war of the cities" with Iran. Iraq probably wanted to
impress Iran with the idea that Iraq could strike back
with longer range missiles should Iran choose to
resume its own missile attacks.)
Scud B Technology: More Innovations
Iraq is getting the most mileage it can out of Scud B
technology. The Al Husayn and Al Abbas started as
modified Scud B missiles, but Iraq is taking this a step
further. It is reverse-engineering the modified system
and now will produce Al Husayn and Al Abbas
missiles domestically. Iraq is also working to take
Scud B technology even further-out to 2,000 km and
possibly into space. The Tamuz I, announced in
December 1989, probably is based on Iraq's space-
launch vehicle, the first stage of which consists of five
clustered Scud B airframes.)
Domestically Produced Al Husayn and Al Abbas
Missiles. Iraq is proceeding quickly with its plans to
reverse-engineer Scud components and produce Al
Husayn and Al Abbas missiles entirely within Iraq.
Iraq has obtained blueprints of the Scud. Since at
least June 1988, several West and East European
firms have produced parts from these drawings for the
components under Project 1728, a project through
which Iraq seems to be coordinating this effort.
8
 Figure 4. Iraqi Al Husayn Missile Parts. Iraq has been acquiring
missile parts, both foreign and domestically produced, in its
program to produce the At Husayn and Al Abbas missiles
indigenously. Some of these parts were displayed at Iraq's Weap-
ons Exhibition in 1989. They have been manufactured since mid-
1988 by East and West European firms using Iraqi-supplied
blueprints. Because Iraq is producing the missiles itself rather
than modifying existing systems, it can incorporate design changes
that carry the Al Husayn and Al Abbas to the same ranges as the
modified versions but with larger payloads.F__-]
Iraq also is manufacturing some of the missile parts
indigenously. Iraq now purchases the bulk of the parts
but almost certain) wants to ultimately produce all of
them domestically.
Iraq probably could begin producing the missiles as
early as 1991 by assembling a mix of foreign and
domestically produced parts. Since mid-1989, Iraq
has launched several Scud-type missiles-possibly
prototypes from Iraq's own assembly line for the Al
Husayn or Al Abbas. Iraq's rapid progress in this
project can be attributed to several factors. Scud B
technology is very basic and Iraqi engineers probably
have grasped it quickly. Iraq is shrewd in procuring
components. It has spread component blueprints out
among a large number of companies, reducing the
chance that any one company has enough drawings to
identify the true nature of the project. Our assessment
is that it will be difficult to impede Iraqi progress on
this project._-]
 In our judgment, Iraq's goal is to domestically pro-
duce its Al Husayn and Al Abbas missiles with the
same ranges as the original modified versions, but
with larger payloads. Because Iraq will produce the
missile itself, rather than modify an existing system, it
can make design changes to reduce the overall weight
of the missile without incurring such a large reduction
in payload. We believe Iraq will accomplish this goal
by using a high-strength aluminum alloy for as much
of the missile's structure as possible-including the
The Chinese Precision Machinery Import Export
Corporation (CPMIEC) is assisting Iraq on Project
1728. Since at least August 1988, Iraq has been
working with CPMIEC on the construction of a
liquid-propellant engine test stand facility in Iraq.
Iraq had previously sought the equipment from sever-
al other countries-including the United States-as
early as September 1987 and found a willing supplier
The Tamuz 1/A1 Abid. Iraq apparently is trying to
parlay Scud B technology into a medium-range ballis-
tic missile and a space launch vehicle. In December
1989, Iraq announced that it was developing a 2,000-
km-range missile, called the Tamuz I. The announce-
ment came shortly after Iraq's test of the first stage of
its space launch vehicle, the Al Abid, on 5 December
1989. We believe that these developments are related
and that Iraq probably intends to use some of the Al
Abid's technology in a ballistic missile.F__-]
The Iraqi space launch vehicle, however, would make
for a very ungainly ballistic missile. It requires a
large, fixed launchsite (figure 5), which could be
susceptible to air attack. Fueling the vehicle would be
time consuming. Even if Iraq decides to configure the
space launch vehicle as a ballistic missile, production
of the Tamuz I is unlikely before the mid-to-late
1990s. Iraq will have several hurdles to overcome,
including developing an adequate guidance and con-
trol system and successfully igniting and separating
the stages during flight.)
To date, Iraq has used its ballistic missiles only with
high-explosives warheads. It achieved great success
with its conventionally armed modified Scuds during
the "war of the cities" and probably will continue to
use conventional warheads on some of its missiles. We
believe Iraq is also interested in developing warheads
7R ~ii
 filled with chemical or biological agentsu The Chemical and Biological Threat
Because these warheads can disperse lethal concentra- Iraq almost certainly will produce a chemical and
tions over a larger area, they are more cost effective, probably a biological warhead for each kind of missile
result in greater numbers of human casualties, pro- it has or is developing (inset). Iraq currently has the
vide a psychological edge, and make the missile a ability to weaponize its chemical and biological
more effective deterrent. Chemical and biological
warheads are a more near-term option, but ultimately
Iraq may hope to produce nuclear warheads as well.
 F __ .,in
 Iraq'lr Chemical and Biological Warfare Programs
Iraq may be developing biological
Iraq now has the largest chemical warfare (CW)
nearing production of the persistent nerve agent VX
and to be researching production of the nerve agent
soman (GD) and the psychochemical BZ. According
to special intelligence, the organization responsible
for Iraqi CW-agent production is the State Organiza-
tion for Chemical Industries (referred to as SOd or
SEPP), formerly the State Establishment for Pesti-
Iraq's CW munitions include artillery shells, air-
craft-delivered bombs, and artillery rockets. A chem-
ical warhead on a surface-to-surface missile would be
highly attractive to Iraq, particularly in light of the
effect Iraq's conventional surface-to-surface missiles
had on Iranian morale during the "war of the cities"
in 1988.1
Biological
Iraq has a biological warfare (BW) program that we
believe is in full production. Iraq may already have
filled some fairly simple weapons, such as bombs.
with biological agents.
agents. It may already possess a chemical warhead for
its modified Scud Al Husayn or Al Abbas missiles
and probably could produce a biological warhead as
well. Iraq undoubtedly will exploit the Condor II's
submunition warhead design-one of the most effec-
tive ways to disseminate chemical or biological
agents-once it begins production of the missile.F
warheads for some of its surface-to-surface missiles.
The Technical Corps for Special Projects (TECO)
reportedly will be involved in constructing a plant
that will be used for production of BW agents. This
plant will be built at a facility already associated
with Iraq's missile program. Given TECO's coordi-
nating role in Iraq s missile program, this informa-
tion suggests that Iraq is planning a biological war-
head for its missiles.
A biological warhead would have an even greater
The area of contamination would increase pro-
portionally if these agents were used in missiles with
larger payloads, such as the domestic Al Husayn and
Al Abbas. Operational constraints would most likely
reduce the effective area of lethal contamination.
Biological weapons of modern design have not been
used in battle during the 20th century, except on a
small :tale or in clandestine experiments.F___1
Work is under way to manufacture chemical war-
heads for the domestically produced Al Husayn and
P qr.,A I
 Notwithstanding Iraq's Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) commitment, we believe the current
leadership judges a nuclear weapons capability to be
essential to meet Iraq's security needs and tofurther
Iraq's regional ambitions. Although we have not
identified a formal, coordinated nuclear weapons
program, we believe Iraq's activities, especially its
covert nuclear procurement, strongly suggest a weap-
ons program exists. Iraq probably has the technical
competence, when combined with clandestinely ob-
tained foreign technology or assistance, to develop a
nuclear weapon by the late 1990s. This foreign
assistance would be of the type Iraq has obtained
most recently, namely, individual experts assisting
Iraq's program rather than a country-to-country ex-
change.
Iraq continues to have an interest in reprocessing
spent nuclear fuel but is now apparently concentrat-
ing on establishing a uranium enrichment capability
and purchasing equipment suitable for weapons de-
enriched uranium production on a small scale. Nu-
clear weapons activities, so far unconfirmed, are
probably centered at Tuwaitha, near Iraq, which
houses Iraq's peaceful nuclear efforts.
Iraq, as a party to the NPT, is obligated to inform the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) before
nuclear materials are moved into new or existing
facilities. Iraq's flagrant disregard for the Geneva
Protocol prohibiting the use of chemical and biologi-
cal weapons in war, however, suggests that Saddam
Husayn would not refrain from conducting activities
in violation of Iraq's NPT assurancesF_~
Iraq probably would need to test a chemical or
biological warhead on each of its missile types before
bring confident that the warhead would function
properly on it. The missile's flight could produce
instability in the liquid fill, and physical extremes,
such as heat, could cause deterioration of the agent.
Iraq also will have to develop or purchase a different
fuzing mechanism because these agents are optimally
dispensed at altitude, preferably as an aerosol or in
bomblets.FI
has the technical competence to develop a nuclear
weapon by the late 1990s, with the aid of clandestine-
ly obtained foreign technology and assistance. Fitting
that nuclear weapon in a missile's warhead, however,
will not be a simple task. Unless Iraq solves weaponi-
zation problems-that is, engineering the nuclear
device so it can survive the missile flight-it could
face two or more years of delay in fielding a nuclear
payload.__~
ogy that strongly suggest that a nuclear weapons
program exists (inset). However, we have not identi-
fied a formal effort that would integrate and coordi-
A Nuclear Payload
We believe Iraq may hope to eventually deploy a
missile with a nuclear payload. We estimate that Iraq
TBVISee~
 Iraq's Missile Production Infrastructure:
Procuring Equipment and Constructing Sites
Acquiring the Infrastructure
Iraq is not content with its dependence on foreign
suppliers or with modifying existing systems for a
long-range delivery capability. Acquisition efforts
over the past several years strongly indicate a drive
for greater self-sufficiency in the military and indus-
trial sectors of Iraq's economy. To that end, several
Iraqi Government organizations-including the Tech-
nical Corps for Special Projects (TECO) and the
Nassr State Enterprise for Mechanical Industries
(NEMI)-are procuring much of the needed materi-
als, equipment, and technology for Iraq's ballistic
missile industry. F__1
Technical Corps for Special Projects. TECO appears
to be responsible for coordinating Iraq's ballistic
missile development program. The Corps is subordi-
nate to Iraq's Ministry of Industry and Military
Industries (MIMI) and was established in 1987, prob-
ably to expedite high-priority Iraqi military and civil-
ian projects. Once a project is identified, TECO
apparently marshals the efforts of individual Iraqi
TECO and Dr. Al Saadi also help to procure equip-
ment and technology needed to build Iraq's missile
production infrastructure.
is technology clearly directed at its current
development efforts. Some of the technology-such as
filament-wound rocket motor cases-would not be
used in production of either the Condor II or the
homegrown Al Husayn or Al Abbas. The equipment
may be intended for development and production of
longer range missiles, such as the Al Hamza.F
Through the efforts of TECO and NEMI, Iraq is
rapidly acquiring the necessary infrastructure for
indigenous production of surface-to-surface missiles
(figure 7). This capability requires production and test
r%c Al
ll
 lo~ 7r' 'r'i
 facilities for major missile components. such as rocket
motors and engines; guidance and control systems;
nosecones and airframes; and materials and subcom-
ponents, such as propellants, ablative materials, accel-
erometers, and motor cases. Iraq has gained facilities
to do most of the research, development, and produc-
tion through two extensive construction projects-
Project 395 and Sa'ad 16.' Progress, particularly on
Project 395 has proceeded at a surprisingly rapid
pace. Iraq continues to seek additional
equipment and production facilities and probably will
upgrade and use cdtisting plants to support its missile
Production and Test Facilities
Project 395: The Road to Self-Sufficiency. The con-
struction of the majority of Iraq's missile production
facilities has been coordinated under Project 395-
also known as Project DOT. In mid-July 1987, TECO
signed a contract with Condor Projekt Ag (CPAG) to
provide designs, drawings, and specifications for the
buildings; equipment; and raw materials needed for
the project. Condor Projekt Ag-later renamed Con-
chem Projekte Ag-is part of the Swiss-based Consen
Group responsible for coordinating the Condor II
missile program in Argentina and Egypt. Iraq's Al
Fao General Establishment probably organized the
construction forces for Project 395. The bulk of the
construction is for Condor II production facilities, but
we believe some of the facilities will support Iraq's
extended-range Scud project as well.
 Sa'ad 16: The Al Kindi Research Center. The Al
missile-related research and development.
Kindi research center, north of Mosul, will support
 na,AIf
 40.
 bwlp~
 The network services a wide spectrum of Iraqi needs.
Some of its acquisitions support the civilian industry,
but others, including that for anthrax samples, urani-
um enrichment technology and materials. and sophis-
ticated machine tool equipment, clearly have military
applications. The United States has received applica-
tions made through the network for equipment intend-
ed for Iraq's missile program, specifically for the
Central Tool Room Plant. These applications were
denied, but Iraq undoubtedly will turn to another
machine tool supplier to meet its need
The Iraqi network has suffered setbacks in the past
year, but shutting it down completely will be difficult.
In early 1990 part of the network was exposed in a
thwarted attempt to acquire components well suited
for nuclear weapons applications from the United
States. Key members of the network were arrested-
including Iraqi, British, and French citizens. Other
portions of the network remain, apparently un-
touched.)
Public exposure of the network-including names of
several of the cover firms-will make it more difficult
for the organization to operate in the near term. We
believe, however, that the network has the resources
available to effect a reorganization, possibly in anoth-
er country, in a very short period of time. Iraq used a
British registration agent to establish most of the
companies, a commonplace practice in the United
Kingdom. Through this agent, the network's compa-
nies have already changed names and addresses sever-
al times within the past two years and undoubtedly
could do so again quickly.F_~
In the 1990s, Iraq will continue to aggressively pursue
missile development and production capabilities. Al-
though its overlapping developments undoubtedly
stretch its resources, they provide a safety net, should
a project fail. Because of the basic nature of technol-
ogy used in its Scud B effort, we believe Iraq will
undoubtedly see success with these missiles first-
particularly the homegrown Al Husayn and Al Ab-
bas. Working with this basic. technology will give Iraq
some of the experience it needs for more advanced
missile development.F_~
Iraq will push for a more robust missile capability
over the next decade. This will involve technology
with which Iraq has little or no experience, such as
solid rocket propellants, improved guidance systems,
multiple stages, and reentry vehicles. Iraq's success in
these areas probably will be slower and more depen-
dent on foreign technical assistance. This pace, how-
ever, will not discourage or deter Iraq from seeking
improved missile capabilities. The solid-propellant
Condor II, for example, will be easier to handle,
require less preparation time before launch, offer
more payload options, and provide better accuracy
and range than any version of the Al Husayn or Al
Abbas. Iraq will be motivated as well by a desire to
assert itself as a leader of the Arab world and a
perceived need to keep pace with Israeli develop-
ments.__
We believe Iraq's program may be too far along to be
stopped. Iraq's missile production facilities are virtu-
ally completed and much of the equipment has been
received and installed. It also is seeking production
facilities for raw materials, such as ammonium per-
chlorate and carbon fiber, for which it now depends
on foreign suppliers. We believe Iraq will need foreign
 A 4 ,
assistance to operate and maintain its facilities initial- technology or operational missiles to other developing
ly but probably will be able to operate them indepen- nations. If Iraq chooses this route. in addition to
dently within five years of the beginning of missile funding its own program, it will increase our difficulty
production.F--] in hindering Third World ballistic missile prolifera-
Iraq's economy may have difficulty keeping pace with
its military desires. Although missile development is a
high priority, Iraq's resources eventually may be
stretched to the limit. Rather than abandon a portion
of its program, Iraq may opt to sell missile-related
In the coming years, improving our collection ability
inside Iraq will be necessary in order to keep abreast
of Iraqi missile developments. Our analysis is largely
based on Iraq's procurement list outside of its borders.
Although this information is invaluable, it frequently
imparts only a shadow of Iraqi activities and inten-
tions. Over the next 10 years, competition for collec-
tion and analytical resources will further frustrate our
ability to monitor Iraq's program.)
boo A