REPORT OF INVESTIGATION: SELECTED ISSUES RELATING TO CIA ACTIVITIES IN HONDURAS IN THE 1980'S

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0000159944
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 238
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2010
• Case Number: F-2001-01650
• Publication Date: August 27, 1997

Central Intelligence Agency
Inspector General
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
SELEC LED ISSUES RELATING TO CIA ACTIVITIES IN
HONDURAS IN THE 1980s
(96-0125-IG)
August 27, 1997
Frederick P. Hitz
Inspector General
Copy 24of 30
APPROVED FOR RELEASED DATE:
29-Jun-2010
A. R. Cin4uegrana
Deputy Inspector General
for Investigations
Selected Issues Relating to CIA Activities
in Honduras in the 1980s
(96-0125-IG)
August 27, 1997'
Errata
Paragraph 541
Paragraphs 568 and 569
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
GLOSSARY OF 1ERMS v
INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND
Overview of U.S.-Honduras Relations in the 1980s
1
6
6
7
8
11
11
11
12
12
14
15
15
15
CIA Policies Regarding Human Rights and Interrogations
Between 1976 and 1996 16
PROCEDURES AND RESOURCES 20
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 22
FINDINGS 24
WAS OR ANY OTHER CIA EMPLOYEE
PRESENT DURING SESSIONS OF HOSTILE INTERROGATION OR
TORTURE IN HONDURAS? 24
WHAT WAS THE OIANCHO OPERATION AND WHO WERE
REYES MAYA AND FATHER JAMES CARNEY? 30
WHAT DID REPORT CONCERNING
REYES MATA AND FATHER CARNEY? DID
TO FOLLOW-UP CIA REPORTING THA
RESPONSIBLE FOR KILLING REYES MAYA AND HIS
INSURGENTS-POSSIBLY INCLUDING FAT= CARNEY?
TO DEILRMINE CARNEY'S
FATE IN VIEW OF REPEATED QUERIES FROM CONGRESS AND
THE CARNEY FAMILY?
AIL
AS
41
WHAT DO EMBASSY AND CIA PERSONNEL RECALL
REGARDING REYES MATA AND CARNEY? 86
WHAT OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT REPORTED
RELEVANT INFORMATION REGARDING REYES MAYA AND
CARNEY? TO
FOLLOW-UP ON NON-CIA REPORTING CONCERNING REYES
MAYA AND CARNEY? WHAT DO CIA AND OTHER U.S.
GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL RECALL REGARDING THIS NON-
CIA REPORTING? 107
11
WHY DID HEAD QUARI ERS FAIL TO PROVIDE
COMPLETE TRACES ON
WHY DID
FAIL TO
mi 1989? 127
137
WAS TIEERE FOLLOW-UP ON THE ELA.CH REPORTING
PROVIDED BY ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF DCI
CASEY'S COMMITMENT TO CONGRESS? 163
REPORT MISTREATMENT OF
IN 1986 TO EITHER HEADQUARTERS OR
VISITING S S CI STAFF MEMBERS? 175
DID A CIA EMPLOYEE PROVIDE CONFLICTING STATEMENTS
REGARDING THE FATE OF FATHER CARNEY TO THE HOUSE
PERMANENT SELECT COMMI ii LE ON INTELLIGENCE AND THE
CIA? 193
WHAT WERE THE FINDINGS OF THE HONDURAS WORKING
GROUP DOCUMENTARY REVIEW RELATING TO POSSIBLE
ACCOUNTABILITY ISSUES? WHAT WERE THE RELEVANT
FINDINGS OF THE IG INVESTIGATION 1-1\I THIS REGARD? 197
CONCLUSIONS 204
RECOMMENDATIONS 211
111
AIC
AOG
Asset
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Atlantic Intelligence Command
U.S. Army Operational Group, U.S. Army
Intelligence and Security Command
Any individual or entity with whom CIA has an
operational relationship from which the U.S.
Government derives benefit.
AVS Asset Validation System
C-2 Honduran Military Intelligence
CATF Central American Task Force, Latin American
Division, CIA
CI Counterintelligence
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CIC Counterintelligence Center, CIA
ONC Commander in Chief
CINCUSACOM Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command
CLFL Clearance and Foreign Liaison Section,
Counterintelligence Center, CIA
Collaborating Agent An asset who has made a formal commitment to
collaborate with CIA and knowingly responds to
tasking.
Cooperative Contact
DCI
DCID
DDCI
DI
DIA
A person who wittingly responds to certain
tasking from CIA but is not controlled to the
point that he/she will accept all tasking. .
Director of Central Intelligence
Director of Central Intelligence Directive
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Directorate of Intelligence, CIA
Defense Intelligence Agency
DNI " Honduran Department of National
Investigations
DO Directorate of Operations, CIA
DoE Department of Energy
ELACH Honduran Anti-Communist Liberation Army
EYES ONLY A restrictive indicator used to signify that
infoTmation is for the exclusive attention of a
specific person.
FON Nicaraguan Democratic Force
FOIA Freedom of Infoimation Act
FUSEP
HPSCI
Honduran National Police Force
House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, U.S. Congress
HRF Hostage Rescue Force
H1NG Honduras Working Group, CIA
IG Inspector General
INAS Information Management Staff, DO
[NR Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department
of State
U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command
President's Intelligence Oversight Board
U.S. Joint Special Operations Command
Latin America Division, DO
INSCOM
IOB
JSOC
LA
MFR
NFN
Memorandum for the Record
National File Number - A unique number used
to reference an intelligence source.
NSA National Security Agency
NSC
OCA
OGC
OLL
OPS
PCH
PCS
PRT-250
PRTCH
National Security Council
Office of Congressional Affairs, CIA
Office of General Counsel, CIA
Office of Legislative Liaison, CIA
Office of Personnel Security, CIA
Communist Party of Honduras
Policy Coordination Staff, DO
Secure Voice Crisis Communications Network
Central America Revolutionary Workers Party -
Honduran Branch
SDC Honduran Superior Defense Council
Sensitive Memorandum A method of disseminating intelligence to a
limited number of specific senior U.S.
Government officials due to the extreme
sensitivity of the infoi.mation or source.
SFC
SSCI
USCINCSO
USCINCACOM
Special Forces Command, Honduran Armed
Forces
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S.
Congress
United States Commander in Chief, Southern
Command
United States Commander in Chief, Atlantic
Command
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
INVESTIGATIONS STAFF
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
SELEC1 ED ISSUES RELATING TO
CIA ACTIVITIES IN HONDURAS IN THE 1980s
(96-0125-IG)
August 27, 1997
INTRODUCTION
1. (U) Baltimore Sun Allegations. In June 1995, The Baltimore
Sun published a fo-ur-part series of articles based upon the results of a
purported 14-month investigation regarding the role of the United
States in Honduras in the 1980s. During that investigation, Baltimore
Sun staff correspondents reportedly obtained unclassified and
declassified documents and conducted numerous interviews of U.S.
and Honduran citi7ens. The Sun series alleged that:
? Hundreds of Honduran citizens suspected of subversion
had been kidnapped, tortured and killed in the 1980s by a
Honduran military intelligence unit, known as the 316th
Battalion, that was trained and supported by the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA);
? CIA knew of the crimes committed by the 316th Battalion,
yet continued to support the unit and collaborate with its
leaders;
? CIA participated in interrogations and torture of Honduran
military prisoners;
LsR
? U.S. Embassy, Tegucigalpa, human rights reports in the
early 1980s intentionally understated abuses by the
Honduran Government; and
? U. S. officials deliberately misled Congress and the U.S.
public about Honduran military human rights abuses in
order to maintain U.S. funding for Honduras in the war
against Communism in Central America.
2. SHonduras Working Group Findings and Unresolved
Issues. Congressional and National Security Council (NSC) interest
in The Sun's allegations prompted then-Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI) John M. Deutch to direct that a review be
conducted of all CIA files to determine CIA's role in Honduras and
whether its personnel were linked to human rights abuses there from
1980 to 1995. The Honduras Working Group was established in July
1995 to conduct this review and published its final report in'Aug-iist
1996. Based upon the written record, selected interviews that were
conducted by the Office of Personnel Security (OPS) on behalf of the
Honduras Working Group, and responses to questionnaires that the
Honduras Working Group prepared and distributed to 34 CIA
officers in an attempt .to resolve several issues, the review resulted in
the following findings:
? There is no information in CIA files indicating that CIA
officers either authorized or were directly involved in
human rights abuses;
? The Honduran military committed hundreds of human
rights abuses since 1980, many of which were politically
motivated and officially sanctioned;
? CIA reporting linked Honduran military personnel to
"death squad" activities;
?
to several
Honduran security units whose personnel were linked to
killings, torture, disappearances, and illegal detentions;
? CIA reporting corroborated the involvement in h
rights abuses of two Honduran military personnel
?
?
?
an
The CIA's record in reporting human rights abuses was
inconsistent. In some cases, reporting was timely and
complete. In other cases
information was not reported at all
or was mentioned only
in internal CIA channels and not disseminated to other
agencies;
eporting inadequaa.es precluded CIA
Headquarters from understanding the scope of human
rights abuses in Honduras and the culpability of
and
? CIA reporting to Congress in the early 1980s
underestimated Honduran involvement in abuses.
By the mid-1980s, CIA provided more detailed information
to Congress, but some of the notifications were inaccurate.
3
3. (U) The Honduras Working Group briefed House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) and Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) Staff members regarding its
findings on August 9 and September 17, 1996, respectively.
Honduras Working Group members also briefed selected officials of
the NSC, State Department, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the
President's Intelligence Oversight Board.
Based upon its review of only the written record, limited
interviews and questionnaire responses, the Honduras Working
Group reported to CIA Executive Director Nora Slatkin that it was
unable to resolve the following key issues:
? Whether
any CIA employee was present during sessions of
hostile interrogation or torture in Honduras;
?
Whether Failed to follow-up in
reporting that the Chief of the Honduran Special Forces
Battalion, had killed
insurgent leader Reyes Mata and other insurgents?
possibly including American'nest Father James Carney;
whether Headquarters taske to determine
what happened to Carney in view of repeated queries from
Congress and the Carney family; why Headquarters did
not provide with complete information
? Whether failed to report mistreatment
of an Agency asset, to
either or to visiting SSCI Staff members, and
whether there should have been follow-up reporting
4
on ELACH, a right-wing paramilitary organization
that allegedly committed human rights abuses, in view of
DCI Casey's commitment to the Hill to do so.
In July 1996, the Executive Director requested that the Inspector
General (1G) initiate an investigation to address these key issues. In
August 1996, she requested that the IG also investigate a leged
conflicts in the testimony given by a CIA employee to HPSCI Staff
members and to OPS officers regarding information about the death
of the American priest.
5. (U) In July 1996, the Executive Director also assigned a
series of potential accountability issues to the Deputy Director for
Operations (DDO) for consideration. The accountability documents
prepared by the Honduras Working Group for the Executive Director
and presented to the DDO identified several issues and stated several
conclusions based on the efforts of the Working Group. In August
1996; the DDO deferred these accountability issues pending the
completion of this IG investigation. The potential accountability -
issues that were deferred by the DDO are discussed at the end of this
Report. Another memorandum was sent to the Executive Director by
the head of the Working Group at the Executive Director's request.
This memorandum identified specific individuals whose actions
should be reviewed for accountability purposes. The Executive
Director also deferred action on that memorandum until this
investigation was concluded. That memorandum hae been sealed
and has not been reviewed by IG personnel, pending the completion
of this Report.
6.0,), Scope of the Inspector General Investigation. The IG
investigation has been limited to information relating to the three key
issues raised by the Honduras Working Group and the conflicts in
testimony that were referred to the 1G by the Executive Director in
July and August 1996.
5
BACKGROUND
7. (`S, Overview of U.S.-Honduras Relations in the 1980s. In
order to address the issues presented in this Report, it is necessary to
understand the political context
Honduras were conducted and how related to
the Honduran Government and its military services.
8. (U) The decade of the 1980s was a time of great turbulence
for Honduras, Central America's poorest country and the fourth
poorest in the Western Hemisphere. At the beginning of the decade,
the country was ruled by a military dictatorship that was beginning
to cede power to civilian political leaders. This difficult process was
complicated by an unsettled external environment. Bordered by
three stronger and sometimes hostile neighbors?El Salvador,
Nicaragua, and Guatemala?Honduras has lived with the threat of
foreign attack since becoming independent. This traditional sense of
foreign danger was heightened by the establishment of a
revolutionary government in Nicaragua in 1979 and the outbreak of a
leftist insurgency in El Salvador in 1981. The emergent threat
induced Honduras to cooperate with El Salvador?a traditional
adversary?and to support the expanding armed resistance to the
Nicaraguan regime. This deepening commitment strengthened
Honduras' traditional security ties to the United States and made it a
key player in U.S. Central American security policy.
9. (U) Expanding domestic leftist subversive activity in the
1980s added to Tegucigalpa's sense of vulnerability. Nicaraguan
support for militants of the Honduran Communist Party and several
like-minded radical groups were the main sources of this political
ferment. Beginning with minor bombings, these organizations
eventually progressed to hijackings and kidnappings. In July 1983, a
small unit of Nicaraguan-trained leftist guerrillas crossed the frontier
between Honduras and Nicaragua. However, it was ill-equipped,
lacked a domestic base of support and was quickly overcome by the
Honduran Army during what came to be called "the Olancho
6
Operation.' A similar incursion in 1984 also failed to incite the.
conservative Honduran peasantry. Although marginal, the perceived
leftist threat led to an internal security crackdown. According to
human rights organizations, a joint Army-police paramilitary unit,
the 316th Battalion, orchestrated a campaign of disappearances and
assassinations against Honduran leftists and Salvadoran exiles that
claimed at least 100 victims. -
10. (U) In 1983, under the leadership of Commander-In-Chief
of the Honduran Armed Forces (CINC) General Gustavo Alvarez
Martinez, the Honduran armed forces sought to expand cooperation
with the Salvadoran and Guatemalan militaries. Alvarez's increasing
militancy, however, as well as his blatant political ambitions, aroused
the hostility of his colleagues, who ousted him in March 1984. His
successor, General Walter Lopez Reyes, adopted a more reserved
stance toward regional military ties and U.S. policy aims. He dosed
the Regional Military Training Center, sought to scale back the scope
of joint military exercises, and demanded further increases in military
aid in return for Honduran cooperation with Washington. A new
military assistance accord signed in May 1985 generally scaled back
the Honduran commitment to assist U.S. regional military policy.
1
Th'-s.eizz,
13.
14.
15.
16.
17
SE
18.
19.
20.
10
21
29. Gustavo Alvarez Martinez. Alvarez,
attended an Argentine military
academy and various U.S. sponsored military courses at Fort
Benning, Georgia and Fort Bragg, North Carolina, during the 1950s
and 1960s.
23. SIn January 1982, Alvarez became the CINC of the
Honduran Armed Forces. During the period from 1981 through his
forced removal from office by rival officers on March 31, 1984,
Alvarez was heavily involved in, and a strong supporter of, CIA
programs in Central America. After his ouster from the position of
CLNC, Alvarez resettled in the United States. He later returned to
Honduras and was assassinated on January 25, 1989. A group known
as the Popular Liberation Movement claimed respon.Sibility for this
act.
24
25.
26.
2
28.
29.
30.
31.
13
- - ? t i . g 1_
-
32.
33
35.
14
36.
37.
38.
15
39
('S)NCIA Policies Regarding Human Rights and Interrogations
Between 1976 and 1996
40. CIA Human Rights Policies. The DO has issued
several sources of guidance since the mid-1970s that explained the
CIA's policies regarding human rights to CIA employees.
41. lSOn March 29, 1976, a Headquarters cable advised
employees
must be especially sensitive to the political and possible legal
ramifications of what the CIA does
cable also included a description of
were to be discovered
This
responsibilities if it
that a host or third country
intelligence or security service was about to undertake actions that
could reasonably be construed to be gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights, also were
advised in this cable that, as a general rule should
make appropriate efforts to prevent or delay such actions
42. DO policy guidance concerning
human rights also included dated November 11,
1976. This notice stated specifically that DO personnel were not to
participate, directly or indirectly, in violations of human rights.
43. CS A January 31, 1977 cable
indicated a continuing process to provide specific guidelines
field regarding the human rights factor
This cable stated, in part, that:
... Elements of the [DO] must be continually alert to indications
that foreign governments or individuals have taken, are taking, or
plan to take, actions that constitute gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights, including torture or
cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged
detention without charges and trial, or other flagrant denials of the
right to life, liberty and the security of the person....
44. `co, On June 29, 1978, then-DDO John M. McMahon
forwarded a memorandum to all DO division and staff chiefs
The purpose of this memorandum was to reaffirm Agency
policies on human rights and other -matters and to emphasize to DO
personnel that the policies were still in effect.
45. `S,1 A November 11 1.988 Headquarters cable
noted the importance o
uman righ
The cable stated, in part, that:
17
... We all must become sensitized to the importance of respecting
human rights, and we must ensure
are equally sensitive. The issue will only
become more important, and we serve our objectives best, if we
remember that if we ignore the importance of the human rights
issue in the final analysis we do great damage to our mission. We
are under great scrutiny.
Aside from the legal and policy considerations that are constant in
any allegation concerning violations of human rights, we also must
recognize a basic moral obligation. We are Americans and we
must reflect American values in the conduct of our business. We
are all inherently opposed to the violation of human rights. Those
who work with us in one capacity or another must also respect
these values.
46. The January 31, 1996 defines human
rights violations as acts of torture, cruel, inhumane, or degrading
treatment or punishment, or prolonged detention without charges or
trial. It also includes causing the disappearance of persons by
abduction and clandestine detention of those persons, or other
flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty and security of the person.
47. (`S, CIA Interrogation Policy. While statements of policy
regarding human rights were made available to personnel
in the late 1970s and 1980s, no explicit CIA policy statement
regarding interrogations has been found prior to 1985.
A Janu 14 1985 Headquarters cable appears to be the
first official notice egarding an interrogation policy. That
cable stated, in part, that:
... Interviewing and interrogation of suspects in custody is a
method routinely used by police, security and intelligence services
around the world. In many countries, the legal and basic rights of
the suspect in custody may not be given full consideration,
resulting in deprivation of his/her human rights.
18
CIA policy is not to participate directly in nor to encourage
interrogation that results in use of force, mental or physical torture,
extremely demeaning indignities or exposure to inhumane
treatment of any kind, as an aid to interrogation. CIA policy is to
actively discourage the use of these methods during interrogations.
CIA should play a positive role in influencing foreign liaison to
respect human rights.
48. '('S), Section 20 of the January 31, 1996
entitled Human Rights Violations and other Proscribed Acts,
provided guidance regarding CIA's interrogation policy. It stated, in
part, that:
... It is CIA policy to neither participate directly in nor encourage
interrogation that involves the use of force, mental or physical
torture, extremely demeaning indignities or exposure to inhumane
treatment of any kind as an aid to interrogation.
Such
participation includes being in the room during an interrogation,
sitting in an adjoining room monitoring the interrogation or
providing questions while an interrogation is in progress.
There must be firm
intelligence or operational justification for indirect participation in
interrogation and reasonable assurance that no human rights
violations will occur....
The January 31, 1996
an interrogation and a debriefing:
also distinguishes between
... Interrogation is questioning a person who is not free to refuse
to answer the questions or leave at will without fear of retribution.
A person being questioned who may refuse to cooperate or leave is
being debriefed, not interrogated.
49. SL Present and former DO managers and officers state that
these CIA human rights and interrogation policies are well known
throughout the DO. In support of this, they cite actions such as
briefings in the field by Headquarters representatives and inclusion
of these policies in the Career Trainee program as examples of the
DO's continuing effort to ensure that its officers are aware of these
policies.
PROCEDURES AND RESOURCES
50. Three Investigators, a Research Assistant and a
Secretary initially were assigned full-time to this investigation. The
team was supplemented by two additional Investigators from
January to May 1997 to assist with the research and interview phases
of the investigation. CIA components were requested to provide
copies of all internal and external documents that were relevant to
the issues under investigation. This included official and soft files,
finished intelligence, taskings, notes, letters, correspondence,
communications, cables, and briefing books; all information
reo-ardin0c, liaison, interaction and communication between CIA and
the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Department of State, Department of Defense, National Security
Agency, other federal agencies, and the Honduran Government and
its personnel; and all relevant information concerning liaison,
interaction, and communications between CIA and the U.S.
20
Cono-ress. The materials requested included all
and other limited distribution materials. Also included
were documents, electronic messages, disks, tapes, notes, and other
foi ins of recorded information. As a result of this request, the OIG
Team reviewed over 112,000 pages of material in pursuit of relevant
info' illation.
51. In addition, searches for specific records were
conducted.
Relevant financial
accountings from January to June 1986 were reviewed. CIA policies
and regulations governing human rights and participation in
interrogations were also reviewed.
52. Forty-five boxes containing the working files of the
duras Working Grou were examined.
U.S.
Army operational files were examined and Department of State and
Department of Defense documents were reviewed and summarized.
53. 4c3,, Eighty-four individuals were interviewed during the
course of the investigation, including current and former employees
of CIA and other federal agencies
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
This Report addresses the following questions:
? Was an IA employee present
during sessions of hostile interrogation or torture in
Honduras?
? What was the Olancho Operation and who were Reyes
Mata and Father James Carney?
? What did
Mata and Father Carney? Did
CIA repoiting that
report concerning Reyes
fail to follow-up
was responsible for
killing Reyes Mata and his insurgents?possibly including
Father Carney? Did Headquarters task to
determine Carney's fate in view of repeated queries from
Congress and the Carney family?
? What do Embassy
Reyes Mata and Carney?
personnel recall regarding
? What other U.S. Government assets reported relevant
information regarding Reyes Mata and Carney?
Headquarters task o follow-up on non-
?
?
?
reporting concerning Reyes Mata and Carney? What do
CIA and other U.S. Government personnel recall regarding
this non-CIA reporting?
Was there follow-up on the ELACH reporting provide
especially in view of DCI Casey's
commitment to Congress?
? Did
report mistreatment of
in 1986 to either Headquarters or visiting
SSCI Staff members?
? Did a CIA employee provide conflicting statements
regarding the fate of Father Carney to the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the CIA?
? What were the findings of the Honduras Working Group
documentary review relating to possible accountability
issues? What were the relevant findings of the IG
investigation in this regard?
23
FINDINGS
WAS 4NY CIA EMPLOYEE PRESENT DURING
SESSIONS OF HOSTILE INTERROGATION OR TORTURE IN HONDURAS?
55. The Origin of the Allegation. In January 1996, the
Honduras Working Group sent questionnaires tcrurrent and
former CIA employees who were deemed to be in the best position to
answer lingering questions regarding potential human rights abuses
by Honduran officials. One response contained an allegation that
been present during an abusive interrogation of a prisoner in the
early 1980s. According to the allegation
had told
interrogation in which a male prisoner was being tortured
56. `S.),Upon receipt of the allegation that a may
have been present during an abusive interrogation of a prisoner, the
Honduras Workinc, Grou forwarded a uestionnaire to the former
employee.
She also indicated that she could not be certain who
was present during the alleged interrogation and torture and that she
did not mentio to anyone
in the early 1980s. She had told a colleague about
it in the early- to mid-1990s, she said, and it was the colleague who
reported the information to the Honduras Working Group in 1996.
The foimer did not mention the name of any
in her response to the Honduras Working Group
questionnaire.
57. CS Further Details from the Source of the Allegation.
24
58
59.
0.
61
62.
63.
65.
66.
67.
68. ?In May 1996, at the request of the Honduras Working
Group, two Investicrators
interviewed e interview covered various topics relating to
the Honduras Working Group's inquiry. During the interview,
denied that he had ever been present during an interrogation
69. `S.,),continues to deny the allegation, states
that he never assisted the Hondurans in conducting interrogations,
either directly or indirectly, nor has he ever been involved in
inflicting torture on a prisoner. annot offer an explanation
for the allegation that he participated in an abusive interrogation.
70.
71.
CIA Records
cables generated by
and DO files
une 1983 were reviewed for a possible
This review of cables files produced no
relevant information. Furthermore, no indication has been found in
CIA records that any CIA employee participated in any interrogation
or torture session in Honduras.
CONCLUSION
73. No evidence has been found to substantiate the
allegation by that or all
CIA employee was present during sessions of hostile interrogation or
torture in Honduras.
29
SE
WHAT WAS THE 0 LANCHO OPERATION AND WHO WERE REYES MATA AND
FATHER JAMES CARNEY?
74. SThe 1983 Olancho Insurgency. On July 19, 1983, a 96-
member group associated with the Central America Revolutionary
Workers' Party (PRTC) marched from Nicaragua into the Olancho
Department of Honduras. The PRTC was a leftist extremist group
that was originally conceived in 1977 as a regional organization
comprised of representatives of the Central American countries and
was initiated by the Cubans as a vehicle to spread the Communist
revolution. The Honduran branch of the PRTC (PRTCH), led by Jose
Maria Reyes Mata, was almost entirely in exile in Nicaragua during
1983. In July 1983, the Honduran Government became aware that the
PRTCH and other leftist extremist groups had decided at a June
meeting in Mexico, attended by Reyes Mata, to begin rural guerrilla
warfare.
75. In early August 1983, the Honduran military became
aware that members of the Honduran branch of the PRTC, trained by
the Nicaraguans and Cubans, had entered Honduras and were
operating between the Coco and Patuca Rivers in Olancho
Department. This information came from two Hondurans who had
defected from the group. The defectors indicated that the group was
organized into three platoons of approximately 36 individuals each.
The members of the group reportedly had been issued uniforms
similar to those used by the anti-Sandinista Contras So as to fool
border residents into thinking that the members were Nicaraguan
counter-revolutionaries.
76. According to infoiiltation acquired by the Embassy's
and
Reyes Mata, the group's leader, intended to establish a base camp in
order to recruit and train personnel within Honduras and hoped to
obtain much of the support for this subversive movement from local
peasants. Offensive operations by the group were to begin during
September and October 1983. Reyes Mata was reported to have
$100,000 to finance recruiting, propaganda and resupply.
V/. Much of the tactical infoimation obtained by the U.S.
Government regarding the Honduran military operation against this
group was obtained from Early on,
advised Headquarters that it was limiting its coverage to unique
infolmation in order to avoid duplicative reporting by
and
78. On August 26, 1983, the Hondurans provided
with a list of the insurgepts who were in custody and those who were
reportedly still in the field. This list contained a reference to a
possible priest whose name was either Faust? Milia or Guadalupe
and was thought to be 60-65 years old. He was re ortedly still in the
jungle. Deserters who were interviewed by ersonnel stated
that they had been deceived into joining the PRTCH and that the
group suffered from a food shortage. The guerrillas who had been
captured and who had surrendered were suffering from severe ?
malnutrition and exposure to the elements. Honduran Special Forces
Command (SFC), aided by helicopters, patrolled the area searching
for the guerrillas:
79. The Honduran military found the guerrillas' base camp
on September 7, 1983, and, although there was conflicting
information, several guerrilla leaders were reportedly in custody and
being questioned. Reyes Mata reportedly had separated from this
group prior to September 2. In mid-September, the Hondurans
provided ith an analysis of insurgent debriefings. This
document cussed the infrastructure of the guerrilla group and
noted that "Father Carney" had facilitated contacts between the group
and the civilian population.
80. N,Although the local media reported Reyes Mata's
capture on September 15, 1983, this was not confirmed by Honduran
authorities. Honduran officials subsequently reported to at
Reyes Mata had .been killed on September 18, 1983, along with four of
his fellow insurgents, during an encounter with the SFC. On
September 19, 1983, the SFC briefed members of the national and
international press on the operation and displayed several captured
gueuillas and equipment.
81. Involvement of the Hostage Rescue Force. In
September 1982, prompted by hostage incidents, discussions between
CIA, State Depai Lment and senior Honduran Armed Forces officials
had been initiated to develop a quick reaction Hostage Rescue Force
(HRF) in Honduras.
82. CINIC Alvarez and the then-Chief of Intelligence for the
Honduran Armed Forces General Staff (G-2), who was
desired that a new organization be created
within the Army to serve as the HRF. The new HRF was known as
the "Special Squadron" or "Commando Operaciones Especiales"
(COE). The unit was subordinate to the then-newly created SFC that
was led b a Honduran military officer who
other Honduran military officer
as the commander of the "Special
Squadron", although eporting reflects that
commanded this sub-unit. HRF training was held at La Venta
military camp, which also served as SFC Headquarters.
83.
During the
first two weeks of August 1983, all SFC officers, including those who
were undergoing HRF training, were deployed to Olancho
Depar Lnent in order to participate in the counterinsurgent operation
there. This included
CINK
Alvarez had strongly supported the HRF unit and it was believed
that kept him abreast of
developments within the unit. Beginning in early September 1983,
periodically obtained intelligence from
members of the SFC concerning the status of the Olancho Operation
and the debriefing of a captured guerrilla, and inspected equipment
confiscated by the Honduran military.
84. `S,,1 Who was Reyes Mata? According to CIA records, Jose
Maria Reyes Mata was a Honduran physician and long-time pro-
Cuban who used the aliases of "Chema" and "Pablo Mendoza." Reyes
Mata attended medical schools at the Autonomous University of?
Honduras and Havana University. He joined the Communist Party
of Honduras (PCH) in 1956 and received guerrilla training in Cuba in
1962. In 1964, he supplied food, medical supplies and infolutation
concerning the Honduran military to guerrilla groups in Guatemala.
In 1969, Reyes Mata was involved with guerrilla activities in Bolivia.
85. '5,Reyes Mata was arrested in Nicaragua for attempting to
buy arms but was later released. He also was reported to have
arranged guerrilla training for Hondurans in Nicaragua at a training
camp staffed by Cuban paramilitary instructors. Reyes Mata
returned to Honduras and was imprisoned in connection with the
April 1980 kidnapping of a U.S. cit-i7en working in Honduras. Reyes
Mata had also participated in the firebombing of a San Pedro Sula
textile factory.
86. CS In September 1980, Reyes Mata was freed under an
amnesty program in Tegucigalpa and subsequently became the
leader of the PRTCH. In early August 1983, the Honduran
intelligence service notified U.S. Embassy personnel that Honduran
guerrillas, led by Reyes Mata and trained in Cuba and Nicaragua,
had entered Olancho Department with the intention of establishing
an encampment. in October 1983 and June 1995
indicate that Reyes Mata was captured in the course of the Olancho
Operation and executed by while in the custody of
the Honduran military.
87. (U) Who was Father Carney? According to media
accounts, James Francis Carney was born in 1.924 in Chicago, Illinois
and served in World War II. In his 30's, Carney entered the
priesthood and joined the Jesuit order. In 1964, Carney became a
parish priest in the Honduran town of El Progreso and decided to call
himself Padre Guadalupe, or Padre Lupe. Carney became committed
to the plight of peasants, known as campesinos, and an activist for
their cause. This resulted in his becoming a controversial figure
within Honduras, including accusations that he was a Communist.
In mid-1968, the Honduran Government attempted to deport Carney
because of his activism. Then-U.S. Ambassador to Honduras John
Jova reportedly interceded and Carney was allowed to continue his
activities in the country.
88. On December 14, 1973, a decree was issued
naturalizing Carney as a Honduran. He renounced his U.S.
citi7enship on May 14, 1974. In 1979, Carney had a dispute with the
leadership of the National Campesino Association (ANACH) that he
accused of using strong-arm tactics, engaging in corruption and
receiving support from the U.S. Embassy and CIA. Carney
supported an insurgent candidate for ANACH president. The
Honduran Government considered Carney to be a radical leftist
agitator and he was stripped of Honduran citizenship and deported
on November 17, 1979.
89. (U) After a short stay in the United States, Carney began
working in Nicaragua. According to media reports, Carney and an
insurgent force of 96 individuals led by Reyes Mata crossed the Coco
River from Nicaragua in mid-July 1983 in the hope of launching a
Honduran revolution. During a September 19, 1983 Honduran ?
Government press conference, it was announced that "Padre
Guadalupe," who was known to the insurgents as "Companero
Mario," had apparently died of starvation after the guerrillas ran out
of food.
SEC
90.
91. The Embassy arranged for the Carney family to meet
with the second-ranking officer in the Honduran military?the Chief
of Staff?and approximately 20 of the captured guerrillas. The
captured insurgents interviewed by Carney's family and
according to the DoS, indicated that the priest had become
progressively weaker during the march through the jungle and that
individual guerrillas had been assigned to assist him. He was
reportedly last seen alive on August 30, 1983.
92. (U) During U.S. Consul General interviews with the
captured g-uerrillas.--all of whom claimed that they had deserted from
the insurgency?it was learned that the priest was known to them as
"Companero Mario." Many of those interviewed knew of "Padre
Guadelupe" from his work, including educational radio broadcasts.
One individual had recognized the priest from a Honduran
newspaper article and one knew him from past association at a
parish in El Progreso. The Consul General presented a newspaper
photograph of Carney to the captured guerrillas and all confirmed
that this was the priest who had accompanied them.
93. (U) One of the guerrillas who deserted on August 20 stated
that Carney had said that he could not proceed much further and that
the march was killing him. Another deserter who saw Carney on
35
August 30, 1983 described the priest as "cadaverous" in appearance
and requiring the assistance of others to continue. Several captured
insurgents commented that they did not know how he could still be
alive, but none could confirm Carney's death or atLibute it to the
harsh jungle conditions. None of the interviewed guerrillas had
witnessed any combat with the Honduran military. _
? 94. (U) The U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa obtained from the
Honduran Government and provided to the Carney family religious
items believed to have-belonged to the priest, and continued to seek
answers to the family members' questions after their departure from
Honduras. In mid-October 1983, the Honduran Government advised
in a diplomatic note that it had not located Carney's body, nor did it
accept responsibility for the welfare or whereabouts of the priest ?
since he had not entered the country legally.
95. (U) The August 4-11, 1984 edition of 77ze Nation magazine
published an article entitled "The Mysterious Death of Father
Carney" that described the efforts by the Carney family to learn
details surrounding his fate. The article also contained allegations
that U.S. intelligence and military personnel took part in the. .
counterinsurgent operation and may have been present when Carney
died. It was alleged that a deserter from the group, who was
subsequently "shot trying to escape," had talked to his relatives
during a prison visit regarding certain events that were alleged to
have taken place at El Aguacate Air Base. His story Was provided to'
the Christian Human Rights Commission of Honduras. That group
later released this information and alleged that U.S. advisers
identified as "Lieutenant West Blank" and "Major Mark Kelvi" were
directly involved in torture and interrogation that culminated in the
murder of Carney and other revolutionary leaders. These actions
were purported to have occurred in underground cells at El
Aguacate. According to The Nation, no further evidence had come to
light about the CIA's presence at El Aguacate and U.S. officials
declined to make any comments.
96. (U) In response to an October 1, 1984 letter to DCI Casey
from Carney's family, the Agency's Director of Public Affairs sought
to assure the family members that CIA had no involvement in the
fate of the priest as alleged in The Nation. With reference to the
purported involvement of 'West Blank" and "Mark Kelvi," the family
was advised that it was CIA policy not to confirm or deny the
employment of specific individuals. In a January 3, 1985 letter to the
Carney family, the Agency's Director of Public Affairs advised that
"Blank" and "Kelvi" were not employed by CIA.
(U) Previous CIA Investigations Regarding Carney
97. CIA's Office of General Counsel's 1988 Investigation.
A March 24, 1988 report prepared by CIA's Office of General Counsel
(OCC) summarized its review of the circumstances surrounding the
1983 disappearance of Carney and the Agency's handling of his
family's 1984 Freedom of Lnfoiiliation Act (FOIA) request. This
review was prompted by a January 4, 1988 letter to then-DCI William
Webster suggesting that CIA had been involved in Carney's
disappearance and that CIA had infonitation in its possession
concerning his fate. On February 4, 1988, Carney's family filed a
lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Central District of
California against CIA and several other agencies alleging violations
of the FOIA.
98. OGC's inquiry was based upon a reviei of documents
and conversations with DO personnel who were familiar with the
issue of Carney's disappearance. The review found that information
in CIA's possession concerning Carney was obtained from a
debriefing of deserters in Honduras,
conversations with Honduran military officials and press reports.
One of the deserters who talked with
mentioned that a priest was with the group and was in especially
poor physical condition due to starvation. The deserter offered his
opinion that the priest did not live much longer after the deserter had
left the group.
99. 4S.,1, reportedly was informed by
the Honduran military that it had found a badly decomposed body in
the jungle with religious effects nearby. The Honduran military did
not attempt to recover this body, and that of two others found in the
vicinity, reportedly because of the terrain and the Honduran
military's desire to pursue the group. It had been concluded that the
body near the religious articles was that of a priest, presumably
Carney.
100. The 00C review also indicated that a representative of
in response to
several inquiries from Congress, had
and queried for infolutation on Carney. The
reportedly understood that most
infoimation came from The
infonnation from these sources was consistent with infolination
obtained by and
indicated that Carney died of starvation. This infollnation had
reportedly been shared with interested members of Congress.
101. N. The OGC review concluded that CIA was not involved
in planning or carrying out the Olancho Operation, had no?
connection with Carney and had learned of his fate after the fact. The
OGC review further concluded that the infounation that had been
reviewed strongly suggested that Carney died of starvation. Finally,
the OGC review concluded that CIA's handling of the Carney
family's FOIA requests was consistent with standard CIA procedures,
FOIA and applicable case law. ?
102. (U) DCI Webster advised the Carney family in an April 7,
1988 letter of the OGC conclusions that CIA did not know exactly
what became of Carney and that he most likely perished in the
Honduran jungle from starvation and exposure. The DCI's letter also
advised that CIA had no evidence or infolutation indicating that
Carney had been tortured or murdered. The Carney family replied in
an April 26, 1988 letter that they continued to believe that Carney
38
was executed at El _Ag-uacate with "... CIA knowledge, complicity, if
not actual involvement.. . ." and that the DCI should further
investigate the matter.
103. (U) CIA's Office of Inspector General's 1988
Investigation. In response to a June 5, 1988 New York Times Magazine
article containing allegations by Florencio Caballero, a former
member of the Honduran military, CIA Inspector General William
Donnelly initiated an investigation on June 9, 1988. Caballero alleged
CIA complicity in human ;i.ghts abuses perpetrated by the Honduran
military. In one specific claim, Caballero indicated that he had been
trained in interrogation techniques by CIA and had interrogated
Carney. Additionally, Caballero claimed that the priest and 70
captured guerrillas had been executed.
104. CSIn the course of the 1988 investigation, OIG personnel
interviewed 21 individuals, including CIA Officers
CIA responses to congressional inquiries also were reviewed, as was
the March 1988 OGC report concerning the circumstances of Carney's
disappearance.
105. (U) The August 24, 1988 Report of Investigation that was
issued at the end of the OIG inquiry concluded as to the Carney issue
that CIA learned of Carney's fate only after the fact and that the
priest's death resulted from starvation. The OIG Repbrt also
indicated that irtfoimation available to CIA concerning Carney's fate
had been provided to Congress in 1983-1984.
106. (U) The SSCI was not satisfied with the 1988 OIG
investigation's findings regarding CIA's alleged complicity in human
rights abuses in Honduras and subsequently conducted its own
investigation into that issue. During this process, follow-up
questions were directed to CIA and Caballero testified before the
SSCI. Transcribed testimony before the SSCI in November 1988
indicates that Caballero told the Committee that, contrary to the
statements attributed to him in the June 5, 1988 New York Times
article, he ". . . did not see Father Calliey, meet him, nor interrogate
him."
40
SE
VVH_AT D IL
AND FATHER CAR'? DID
REPORTING THAT
EPORT CONCERNING REYES MTA
AIL TO FOLLOW-UP CIA
TiVAS RESPONSIBLE FOR _EC-LL1TN0 REYES
IVLATA AND HIS INSURGENTS?POSSIBLY INCLUDING FATHER CARNEY72
TO DETERMINE CARNEY'S FATE .EV
VIEW OF REPEA1.ED QUERIES FROM CONGRESS AND THE CARNEY FANITLY?
(U) Relevant Reporting, Follow-up and Tasking Regarding Reyes
Mata and Father Carney.3
107.
forwarded
September 21., 1983
an article from the September 20 1983
issue of El Tiempo
The article re orted the death in an ambush of Reyes Mata
and, according to
the "... presumed death by starvation
of another leader of the group, former Jesuit priest Guadalupe
Carney."
108.5.k.The El Tiempo article also cited an unspecified
Honduran Army spokesman who was located in Nueva Palestina
and involved in the Olancho Operation as reporting that Reyes Mata
had died in combat. His body could not be recovered since the
location was inaccessible and the patrol that had killed him had not
yet left the jungle. Reyes Mata, described as thin due to the shortage
of food, was identified by the patrol as he was well known and had
unmistakable characteristics. Pictures and fingerprints of the
insurgent leader were taken for use in the media.
109. According to the El Tiempo article of September 20,
1983, deserters said that "Father Guadeloupe Carney" had died of
3 (S) The communicationssummarized in this section are only those that include information
relating to Reyes Mata or Father Carney. An annex to this Report of Investigation contains
Cables/Memorandum. These
as
additional summaries of 32
relate to the Olancho Operation the insurgency, and
but do not include information regarding Reyes Mata or Father
Carney.
41
starvation at the end of June 1933 in an area called Soinoti_nes
between Bocay and Tablazo. The deserters further indicated that
They had to carry Father Guadeloupe for two days but finally he
died, given his serious condition due to inanition." The article gave a
synopsis of Father Guadalupe's service in Honduras, his deportation
from that country, his eventual travel to Nicaragua, and his return to
the United States in 1979 where he recovered his U.S. citi7enship.
110. According to 26 guerrillas had been killed
in encounters with tha-Honduran Army, 23 had been captured or
deserted, 10 were reported to have died of starvation in the
mountains and one was reportedly executed by the guerrillas.
Another guerrilla was believed to have returned to Nicaragua.
111.S September 21, 1983
of an Associated Press (AP) story of
the same day concerning "an American priest who had joined leftist
guerrillas [and] died of exhaustion while trying to flee Honduran
troops." The AP story stated that "Colonel Cesar Elvir Sierra said that
James Francis Carney, 48, a Roman Catholic pries't from St. Louis,
died while trying to escape with a rebel force in the jungles of
Olancho Province during a government sweep of a mountainous area
near the Nicaraguan border." Elvir also reported that Reyes Mata
had been killed during the operation.
112. The AP story stated that Carney, a Jesuit priest, had
been expelled from Honduras in 1979 after being accused of trying to
organize a peasant revolt. Sources at the Jesuit Missouri Province in
St. Louis were cited as saying that their records showed Carney was
still a member of the Jesuits and had been reassigned to the Central
American Province.
to confirm the facts surrounding Carney 's fate
so might respond to anticipated
congressional queries.
113. cS September 22, 1983
advised
that available infoimation concerning Carney led to the
presumption that he died of starvation. On September 21, 1983
who confirmed that
Carney's body was not found, that authorities did not know where to
look, and that there was very little likelihood that the body would be
found. What was known of Carney's fate had reportedly been
provided by one of three deserters who were involved in a news
conference at Nueva Palestina on September 19, 1983.
114. The deserter reported at Nueva Palestina that Carney
had been weakened by starvation to the point that he had been
unable to walk for two days. As a result, he was being carried in
relays by the stronger of the remaining guerrillas.
commented that it was unlikely that this could have continued for
long since all in the group were near starvation. The three deserters
reported last seeing Carney deep in the Cordillera Entre Rios.
115. advised that the bioara hical information
contained in the September 21, 1983 able was the
extent of its knowledge concerning Carney indicated
that, under the name of "Guadalupe," Carney had written a book on
the Honduran peasant movement that was published in Nicaragua
and Cuba. In September 1981, Carney reportedly attempted to obtain
gueiiilla training but was denied the opportunity, possibly because
of his age. referenced a DoS message stating that
Carney's sister had inquired about her brother and gave his birth
year as either 1927 or 1930. The Embassy had no information that
Carney had reacquired his U.S. cit-i7enship.
116.
'
117.`c.3, indicated that it did not have the resources
to devote to the task requested by Negroponte and that the U.S.
military had devoted-the full attention of three officers to report on
the Olanc_ho Operation, had stopped extracting and
refining key infoimation from the voluminous material because the
U.S. military had already reported the same information.
118. September 23, 1983 Cable.
dvised that it agreed in principle to the idea of
carrying out a more focused analysis of the Olancho guerrilla
movement.
Once
that task was accomplished, a decision would be made regarding
whether additional efforts were warranted.
119. (`S,1 September 28, 1983 Headquarters Memorandum.
CIA's OLL forwarded a memorandum to the Directorate of
Operations advising that
Chairman Edward P. Boland of the HPSCI was personally interested
in CIA information concerning the fate of Carney. HPSCI Chief
Counsel Michael O'Neil reportedly advised that the DoS had
indicated that the Honduran Government claimed not to know about
Carney's fate.
120. October 3, 1983 Headquarters Memorandum. The
Acting Chief of DO/LA prepared a draft response to Boland's
inquiry. The draft indicated reporting substantiated
4
the press accounts of Gainey's death and that Honduran debriefings
of deserters revealed that Gainey had been weak and died of
starvation. The Hondurans also believed that there was little
likelihood that his body would be recovered. The draft response,
whose final disposition is unknown, was forwarded through DO
components to OLL.
121. October 6, 1983 In response to
September 22, 1983 request for analytic assistance
concerning the Olanc.ho_insurgency
traveled to Tegucigalpa. On October 6, he reported his findings
reviewed documents
consisting of photocopies of unmarked maps; general lessons on
guerrilla warfare; lists of medical supplies; inventories of equipment
carried by some members of the group; guides to explosives and
incendiary devices; books and other material on Marxism-Leninism,
capitalism and political economics; pamphlets on how to reconcile
Marxism and Christianity; the diary belonging to Reyes Mata; lists of
radio frequencies; an apparent code; lecture notes; and personal
material such as poems and songs.
122. tS noted in the cable that the 88-page diary found
on Reyes Mata was missing pages 75-82 and recorded the hardships,
lack of food, desertions, and personal disappointments of the author.
ad the opportunity to interview several of the deserters and
deScribed them as young, uneducated and sornewhat.disoriented..
They all claimed to have been tricked into participating in the
guerrilla operation.
123. SIn summary dicated that the documents,
debriefings, local studies, and the deserters themselves all
demonstrated little cause to devote time and resources to a more in-
depth analysis. Although it was likely that additional attempts at
guerrilla infiltration would occur, he believed that there were
insufficient documents or high level deserters to warrant additional
resources at that time. According to the Hondurans, only three
SE
45
of the original guemllas remained at large. Another aims cache had
been discovered and would continue to
check for any additional documents that might be uncovered in this
or other caches.
124.
125.
was asked to advise as to what actions. were
being taken to address the Ambassador's request.
126. October 12, 1983
stated that the Olancho
insurgency was so quickly crushed that it failed to become a crisis.
This was in part due to bad planning by the guerrilla, but ". . . also
reflected very well upon the performance of the Honduran Airmobile
Squadron,
127. SOctober 15, 1983
that it had received infoimation indicating that PRTCH
gueiiillas who had been captured by the Honduran Armed Forces in
46
Olancho DeparLment had been suirumarily executed by Honduran
Army officers after being debriefed. Among those executed was
Reyes Mata, his Deputy Commander "Commandante Zaata," and a
Nicaraguan advisor who had accompanied the guerrilla force. The
executions reportedly were initiated after the "field commander" in
Olancho?not otherwise identified?received an order from the
Honduran Armed Forces General Staff to "search and destroy." This
order was construed as meaning that no prisoners were to be taken
alive. The order came after 23 prisoners had been captured and
evacuated from the area.,--
128. CS The executions reportedly were carried out by officers
in an isolated area away from the enlisted troops. The deaths were
later reported to the media as having occurred as a result of the
guerrillas resisting capture. stated that
the justification within the Honduran military for the executions was
that the initial 23 low-level and ideologically uncommitted guerrillas
who had deserted or been taken prisoner were sufficient for
exploitation purposes. The remaining guerrillas were judged to be
dedicated revolutionaries who were beyond rehabilitation. It was
also reasoned that the combination of impotent Honduran law and
the protestations of leftist peace groups would result in the early
release of the guerrillas who would then resume their activities.
129. This information
the
was disseminated as a Sensitive
Memorandum report
to:
130. October 17, 1983
additional infoiniation
execution of nine PRTCH guerrillas
provided
relating to the
sometime between September and early October 1983, nine PRTCH
guerrillas were captured and then executed by the Honduran Armed
Forces. Three of these guerrillas had been debriefed and displayed
for the international news media at a press conference held in Nueva
Palestina: The families of the three guerrillas were beginning to
inquire about their family members' whereabouts. As a result, the
Honduran military hierarchy recognized that it now would face the
threat of a disastrous international scandal for human rights
violations. ?
131. `co, CINC Alvarez had reportedly told officers involved in
the counterinsurgent operation that he did not expecf any more
deserters from the remaining guerrillas in the area. The CINC
further stated that any guerrillas turning themselves over to the
authorities at this stage of the operation would be doing so because
they were dying of hunger. It was not known whether the CINC had
ordered the executions or lower ranking officers had taken it upon
themselves to issue such an order.
132. N, After being executed, some of the guerrilla bodies
were deposited in the Patuca River and were beginning to wash
ashore in populated areas. The Honduran military disclaimed
knowledge relating to these bodies.
133.),The infolination was
disseminated as a Sensitive
Iviemoranditm report
to:
reportedly believed that
Reyes Mata was held for a couple of days before being executed, but
he had no evidence to support this belief. Regarding the documents
found on Reyes Mata stated that the diary had been
found intact. He assumed that the missing pages were removed by
high-level officers before the diary was provided to U.S. officials.
did not know the contents of the missing pages, but
indicated that the document was closely held by CINC Alvarez
135.
49
136. Octob-er 19, 1983 Based on the
reporting from concerning
prisoner executions in Olancho, CIA included on this topic in
the President's reported that at least three, and
possibly as many as nine, prisoners had been executed after
Honduran field units captured and interrogated members of the
- Cuban-trained guerrilla force that infiltrated from Nicaragua in July
1983.
137. '5-)The Carney family was noted to be pressing the U.S.
Embassy in Tegucigalpa and local officials for information on the
priest's fate and planned to bring the case to congressional attention.
An analytical comment indicated that exposure of the incident would
focus sharp criticism on Teg-,ucigalpa, which had one of the region's
best human rights records.
138.
50
SE
139.
51
SE
140.
52
141. Additionally, the Alvarez correspondence addressed
issues relating to Carney family requests for a chronology of the
insurgents' activities, tactical and administrative infolination
regarding the insurgents and more details on the death of Reyes
Mata. With regard to Reyes Mata, it was indicated that he was killed
in a confrontation with the "Patuca Task Force" on September 18 near
Piedras Az-ules. Alvarez indicated that the Hondurans did not have
confirmation that Carney participated in the insurgency although the
gueilillas at the press conference mentioned that he may have died of
hunger. Alvarez indicated that he would meet with the Carney
family, without the presence of the media, if a request were properly
submitted.
142.
November 23 1983
with an evaluation of its reporting
from October 16 to 31, 1983 and advised that the reports
concerning the executions of PRTCH insurgents addressed a topic of
considerable interest to the intelligence community and were graded
as "excellent" and "good."
reports highlighted the need for
particularly in light of U.S. involvement in joint
military exercises in Honduras.
143. November 25, 1983
provided information that appeared in a November 25, 1983 Lfi
Tribuna newspaper article. The article reported that some parents of
the guerrillas were beginning to protest because the Honduran
authorities wOuld not allow them to visit their sons. Additionally,
the article indicated that three of the guerrillas who had been
presented to the news media previously had been killed on
October 3, 1983 when they reportedly attempted to escape.
14/. November 29, 1983 Intelligence Report.
reported that, as of mid-November 1983, CINC Alvarez had initiated
53
a foimal investigation of the alleged theft of approximately $25,000
that had been confiscated during the Olancho Operation.
145.
146.
SE
147.
148.
149.
150. CSMarch 1,1984 Headquarters Memorandum.
According to a March 1984 OLL Memorandum for the Record, a copy
of a February 23 letter addressed to Congressman William S.
Broomfield from Virginia Smith, Carney's sister, had been forwarded
to DO/LA and DO/PCS, for comment in preparation for a response
to Broomfield. The lettep-alleged that Carney was interrogated,
tortured and died or was executed at El Ag,uacate. The letter further
alleged that Carney's interrogation was witnessed by U.S. military
and CIA personnel and CINC Alvarez. Ms. Smith detailed her
family's efforts in deteimining the circumstances of the priest's fate
and asked that Broomfield investigate the incident.
.131. March 2,1984 Headquarters Memorandum. An OLL
Memorandum for the Record described a meeting between HPSCI
Staff member Steve Berry and LA Division Chief Duane Clarridge.
Berry reportedly advised that the minority members of the HPSCI
and House Foreign Affairs Committee were concerned about the
February 23, 1984 letter from Carney's sister to Broomfield.
According to the memorandum, Clarridge explained that DO/LA
was collecting information concerning Carney. Clarridge also told
Berry that the letter was not accurate and that insurgents who
deserted the group had stated that Carney was emaciated and in a
weakened condition. The Honduran Army had subsequently
discovered a badly decomposed body of a non-Central American that
was lying in a hammock with religious literature near the corpse.
Puffing all the known facts together, Clarridge reportedly stated, the
Hondurans concluded that the body was that of Carney. No efforts
were made to recover the body at the time of discovery and later
efforts to locate it were unsuccessful. Clarridge offered to allow
Agency office who had interviewed three of the deserters, to
brief Broomfield on what he had learned about Carney's fate.
152. March 2, 1984 Headquarters Memorandum. In an
apparent response to inquiries by DCI Casey, CATF's Special
Assistant provided Chief, DO/LA with info' illation concerning the
Olancho Operation and Carney. The memorandum, drawn from
September 22, 1983 and October 6, 198 eports concerning
Carney and the Olancho Operation, stated that reviews of captured
documents, debriefings of the insurgents and Honduran studies
demonstrated little cause for devoting time and resources to a more
in-depth analysis. Regarding Carney, the memorandum stated
had substantiated press accounts that Carney had
died of starvation. Additionally, prisoner debriefings conducted by
the Hondurans revealed that the priest had been carried in relays by
the stronger members of his group. Finally, it stated that the
Hondurans believed that there was little likelihood that the priest's
body would be found.
153. 1N.March 13, 1984 Headquarters Memorandum. On
March 13, 1984, a meeting was held betweer Congressman
Broomfield, House Foreign Affairs Committee Minority Staff Director
Everett Bierman an e purpose of the meeting was to
discuss Carney. A March 13, 1984 OLL Memorandum for the Record
nasre red by an OLL representative who also attended indicated that
poke for about 20 minutes based on his travel to Honduras,
and advised that the deserters had said that the group ran out of food
and became primaril concerned with survival rather than anti-
regime activities baid he learned from the deserters that, three
days before the deserters left the group, the priest was in such poor
physical condition that he had to be carried. The deserters, said
doubted that Carney had survived.
154.S According to the Memorandum for the Record
also said he had learned from the Honduran military that it had come
across a body of a non-Central American lying in a hammock. The
body was badly decomposed and it was difficult to determine the
individual's identity. As some religious materials were found near
the hammock, it was assumed that the body was that of the priest.
57
Because access to the area was very difficult, the Hondurans made no
effort to recover the body. When the Honduran Government realized
that the priest was an American and that his family was seeking his
body, it made an unsuccessful effort to relocate it.
155. Broomfield reportedly explained that he had
attempted to obtain from Smith the evidence of U.S. Government
complicity in Carney's death that she claimed to have in her
possession. However, she had refused to provide such information.
156.
Auoust 24 1984
a copy of an article entitled 'The
Mysterious Death of Father Carney", from the August 4-11, 1983
edition of The Nation newspaper. stated that the article
indicated that two U.S. military intelligence officers--one named
'Wes"?allegedly were involved in the Olancho Operation and that a
CIA officer at Aguacate was called 'Wescito," meaning "Little Wes."
requested
157. '%(*Sk December 31, 1984 Prompted
by a second letter from the Carney family to DCI Casey, dated
December 5, 1984, was asked whether it was aware of
"Colonel, Major, or Lieutenant West Blank, in charge of U.S.
Intelligence at Aguacate, where [Carney] was held; and Major Mark
Kelvi, second in command there." It was requested that
notify immediately if anyone fitting these descriptions
during the period Of Carney's
death.
158. `S,), January 1, 1985 li_l_response to the
December 31,1984 advised that
Carney was never held specifically at El Aguacate or anywhere else.
did not comment on the individuals referenced as "West
Blank" and 'Mark Kelvi."
159. January 3, 1985 Headquarters Memorandum. In
response to the Carney family's December 5, 1984 correspondence to
58
SE
DCI Casey, the Director of Public Affairs wrote that the perception
that CIA had infointation that it was unwilling to share with the
family was incorrect. The family was infoiated again that CIA was
not involved in Carney's disappearance. Moreover, the family was
told that "Blank" and "Kelvi" were never employed by CIA. The
family was referred to DoS for assistance in seeking information from
the Honduran Government.
160. SMarch2O,1985 was
informed that CATF continued to receive congressional inquiries
concerning the alleged commission of human rights excesses by the
Honduran Government and FllN. Asa result, CAI-1, was attempting
to deteinline the validity and scope of these reported abuses by
surfacing as many specific cases as possible. Relevant Headquarters'
files and press items since January 1, 1981 were being reviewedIj
as much infoimation as possible
regarding a number of individuals, including several clergymen who
had been killed in Honduras. Carney's name was not included.
161. No reporting relevant to the fate of Father Carney or
Reyes Mata has been found to have been generated between March
1985 and May 1995.
162. May 26, 1995
were provided by Headquarters with
.detailed background infoxiltation concerning Carney,. based on CIA
records and press reports were advised that there were
indications that the Carney family had submitted an FOIA request in
the past and would be further
advised when more information was obtained.
163. 1S,I, June 9, 1995 Electronic Messages.
'vision requested a status report and search for records
relating to the family's 1988 FOIA Litigation. A response from the
Directorate of Administration's Information, Privacy and
Classification Review Division indicated that 19 documents,
consisting of 87 pages, had been released to the family. The FOIA
litigation initiated by the family in 1988 had been closed on May 30,
1991.
164. N, June 12, 1995 Headquarters Draft Response. DO/LA
prepared a draft reply to certain allegations made in a jt.me 8, 1995
letter from Congressman Robert G. Torricelli, HPSCI, to the National
Security Advisor. Torricelliis letter asserted that information he
received indicated that Carney had been captured, held at El
Ag,uacate for interrogation by the 316th Battalion, flown by helicopter
to mountains near the Patuca River, and thrown out. Torricelli's
letter also alleged that the Honduran military officer responsible for
Carney's execution was a paid CIA agent. Additionally, the letter
indicated that U.S. intelligence officers were present at the meeting
when CINC Alvarez ordered Carney captured and also at Carney's
interrogation. Torricelli had also posed questions concerning Carney
to CIA officers during a May 23, 1995 briefing of HPSCI members on
Guatemalan issues.
165. ("co, The DO/LA draft reply indicated that the DO had no
relevant information after 1987, but that the DI was being tasked to
review its records for additional infoiutation. The Torricelli
allegations had not been corroborated by a DO/LA review of the
1988 OIG Report of Investigation.
The National
Security Council had previously been provided with a background
paper on the 316th Battalion, according to DO/LA, and DO/LA
considered the Torricelli allegations to be a restatement of charges
that had been made on several occasions since 1984. DCI Deutch
advised the National Security Advisor on June 23, 1995 regarding the
Torricelli allegations that CIA only learned of Carney's death after it
occurred.
60
166. (`S,, A June 28, 1995 letter to Torricelli from CIA's Director
of Congressional Affairs foimally responded to the questions that
had been posed by Torricelli at the May 23 briefing and in his June 8,
1995 letter. The response, based on the DO/LA draft, stated that a
review of available infoimation indicated that CIA had no knowledge
of any plans to capture Carney, only learned of his likely death after
it had occurred, and had no direct or indirect involvement in his
death. The letter also stated that the circumstances surrounding
Carney's death remained uncertain, but that the 1988 OIG
investigation had found-no CIA involvement in the matter. The letter
further noted that the 1988 OIG Report of Investigation had been
reviewed by both the Senate and House Intelligence Committees and
that they did not take issue with the sections relating to Carney.
Finally, the letter stated that CIA had been directed by DCI Deutch to
undertake a review of all CIA records that might bear on possible
allegations of human rights abuses during the relevant period.
167. ("co, June 23, 1995
advised that
to follow-up on information concerning the death of Reyes
Mata. reportedly provided details of the 1983 Olancho
Operation, indicating that the insurgents were tired, hungry and too
weak to offer resistance and that captured insurgents were
interrogated by members of the SFC
also indicated that Father Carney was not with the
guerrilla group when it encountered the SFC.
168.'S
stated
that was acconi anied b
? t -
officers, possibly
The officers
were
including
asked to participate in the execution of insurgents to prove their
mettle, but some refused to take part. The SFC reportedly executed
70 of the insurgents in the vicinity of the Pat-uca River, 20 more
"disappeared" and the rest were presented to the press.
reportedly had shot Reyes Mata in the forehead with
a .45 caliber pistol.
61
169.
indicated that had recently reported.
that, according to a Honduran military report written at the time of
the Olancho Operation, Carney was suffering from malaria.
170.
171.
The information concerning the death of
Reyes Mata, Carney's absence from the group when it encountered
the SFC, and the Honduran military's belief that he was suffering
from malaria was viewed
as new.
requested to comment to this effect to inform consumers
as to why they were being advised of information regarding a 1983
event. ?
172. Si)l` June 29, 1995
62
173. CSJune3O,1995
174.(c?J,)July 3,1995 Intelligence Report.
That analysis,
indicated that both Reyes Mata and Carney had died of starvation
and malaria and that there had been no confrontation between the
insurgents and SFC. The analysis was based on information that
initiaily appeared in the press and did not draw upon first-hand
accounts from the participants in the Olancho Operation.
175. The infointation was
on and disseminated as an Intelligence Report
63
176.'S
had aLso
claimed that he did not know of Carney's fate, but thought that the
priest had separated from the main group as was reported by the
official Honduran version of the incident.
commented that it was probable that the analyst had been given
instructions as to the conclusions he should reach and that Honduran
Military Intelligence intended to use the analysis to influence public
opinion.
177. IS), July 13, 1995 because of the
research requirements of the Honduras Working Group,
of human rights abuses in general;
for any indication
for
additional information relating to Carney; and
background infoimation regarding the 316th Battalion.
for
178. July 14, 1995 Intelligence Report
an additional account of Carney's death
who had reportedly told
captured, tortured to death and then
that Carney had been
mem ered by the Honduran
Armed Forces. Pieces of the body were then reportedly buried in
various locations near Nueva Palestina in the area of the Patuca
River. had told that
she had received this infoimation from insurgents who were with
Carney at the time of his capture. It was not specified whether these
insurgents actually witnessed the killing of Carney or had only heard
about it. had also reportedly indicated that Reyes Mata
had been captured and killed while in Honduran custody.
were persistent
critics of the Honduran military for alleged human rights abuses.
This infoimation was
disseminated as an Intelligence Report
65
180: July 20, 1995 Intelligence Report.
according to a 1984 ethics complaint, Reyes Mata and
Carney had been killed-during an encounter with Honduran Special
Forces. The 1984 complaint, filed an alleged participant in the
encounter, accused of removing approximately -
$15,000 from the bodies of several insurgents and not submitting the
money to his superiors, believed
that all documents related to the encounter, including the ethics
complaint, had probably been destroyed.
181.
182.
66
183.S.
stated that his knowledge of the event was based on
the ethics complaint and that the "Special Unit" had killed both Reyes
Mata and Carney. He said he had been told by friends in the military
that Carney was killed. indicated that
infoimation corroborated and added to that
regarding the ethics complaint.
184. 1S August 15, 1995 Intelligence Report The information
regarding the deaths of Carney and Reyes Mata that had been
obtained
was combined!with November
1983 U.S. Army. Intelligence and Security Command
(INSCOM)/Artny Operations Group (AOG) infoimation4 to form a
single intelligence report. The intelligence report indicated that
rNscom had no record of disseminating the 1983 AOG information.
This infoimation concerned the execution of Reyes Mata by
and Carney's body being covered by leaves and left
in the jungle by a young guerrilla. Additionally, the combined
intelligence report indicated that the Honduran Inspector General
was investigating for dividing among his troop
money seized in the course of the Olancho Operation. Headquarters
The AOG information is discussed in detail in the next section of this Report of
Investigation.
67
commented that the AOG reporting and earlier
it appear that Reyes Mata was executed
commented that Carney's fate was still
unclear.
reporting made
185. The combined infoimation was disseminated as an
Intelligence Report
186. September 14, 1995 Congressional Notification.
Members of the SSCI, HPSCI, Defense Subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on Appropriations, and the National Security
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations were
notified by CIA officials on September 14, 1995 regarding CIA
reporting relating to the death of Carney. According to a
September 14, 1995 Office of Congressional Affairs (OCA)
background paper, the CIA had received one report,
indicating that Carney was kiEed during
encounters between the military and the insurgent group. A second
report indicated that Carney was tortured to
death and dismembered by the Hondurans. Other scenarios in
earlier CIA reports were that Carney had starved to death or was
thrown from a helicopter. The CIA officials reportedly indicated that
the Agency had not been able to establish or rule out any of these
68
SE
192. July 2,1996
The leftist had
reportedly told that, after carrying Carney in
a hammock for two days, the insurgents awoke on the third morning
to find that Carney had died in his sleep. The insurgents left
Carney's body in the hammock.
193. N.), The
the helicopter that was
dispatched to look for Carney's body after captured insurgents
reported his death were unable, according to
to sa exactly where they had searched for the body.
lso reported that a
who was originally scheduled to travel with Carney's
? group a described Carney as being in poor physical condition
prior to the start of the journey.
194. (c3, July 9, 1996 Intelligence Report. This report was
issued by CIA as an addendum to the May 31, 1996 Intelligence
Report It provided the recipients of the
previous intelligence report with the additional information
indicating that Carney
had died in his sleep and his body left in a hammock.
195. CS February 10, 1997 Intelligence Report_
related that Honduran Special Forces had
captured an aide to Carney who was in possession of the priest's
stole and chalice. The aide said that he had left Carney in a hammock
in the jungle. The guerrillas reportedly had not eaten for more than
20 days and were too weak to carry Carney, who was unable to
continue the march. said that the Special
Forces backtracked with the aide, and found a decomposed body,
71
identified as Carney by the aide, in the hammock
estimated that Carney had been dead for several days. The body was
neither recovered nor buried.
196. The information
was disseminated as an Intelligence Report
197. CSL February 11 1997
reporting
concerning Carney should be corroborated as quickly as possible. ?
72
accounts. The CIA officials also noted that a full report of the review
of CIA activities in Honduras I,vould be provided to the Committees
when completed.
187. October 11, 1995 Congressional Notification.
Members of the SSCI, HPSCI, Defense Subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on Appropriations, and the National Security
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations were
notified by CIA officials on October 11, 1995 regarding the
involvement of , in the execution
of Reyes Mata. The Committees were infoimed that a recent CIA
report indicated that the execution had occurred. This report
corroborated 1983 AOG information that had been provided by an
AOG source but was not disseminated.
188. IS), The CIA officials reportedly indicated that an October
1983 CIA intelligence report had included the same infoimation and
identifieo The CIA
officials filIilTher indicated that the Honduras Working Group was
reviewing all information related to to
corroborate the reports of his involvement in the execution of Reyes
Mata and to identify any link might have had to the
death of Carney.
189.'S1 May 23,1996
had provided
mfoiutation regarding the disappearance of Carney.
been told that the
SFC never saw Carney. Several of the captured insurgents reportedly
recovered a pistol and piece of clothing that they said belonged to the
priest and these items were turned over to Honduran Military
Intelligence.
had indicated that Honduran helicopters were unable to locate
Carney based upon infoi.mation from captured insurgents.
69
SE
190
The leftist told
that he had entered Honduras with Carney and that the
priest was in poor physical condition before the border crossing. The
leftist reportedly said that he and others had to carry the priest for
two days in a hammock before leaving him behind in the jungle.
said he did not obtain the leftist's last name and
that this individual had since returned to Nicaragua
191.`c,o, May 31, 1996 Intelligence Report_
comment was added to the original report, stating that the
did not say whether the leftist had
indicated that Carney was alive or dead when left behind. The
information was disseminated as an Intelligence Report
198.
199.
/five patrols that were deployed by helicopter from
the Nueva Palestina base camp for the primary purpose of tracking
down the gueiiillas. The patrols set off from sandbars in the Patuca
River in five roughly parallel colu_mns in the general direction of the
Nicaraguan border. The aide to Carney was discovered by one of the
patrols.
200.
notified the base camp via radio that Carney 's
body had been found and then continued patrolling for another
week. did not prepare a written report
of this event
201. l<
73
no
one ever asked him about Carney nor does he remember telling
anyone about finding the priest.
202.
203. February 14, 1997 Intelligence Report
former Honduran soldier had told a close confidant that he had
participated in a patrol led by in 1983. This patrol
reportedly traveled to the location of Carney's body and
ordered the body to be buried at the site. The former
Honduran soldier indicated that the burial site was in Olancho
Department on Congolon Mountain. reportedly
commented that the patrol led by was probably a
follow-up patrol that had been sent to confirm that Carney's body
had been found.
204. `S,1 The information was
disseminated as an addendum to
205.
206.
75
207
208
209.
210.
captured a g,-ueililla carrying a wooden chalice
and stole. The guerrilla claimed to be Carney's aide and advised
them that he had left Carney lying in a hammock that was protected
by dense vegetation. Carney was described by the guerrilla as being
too weak to continue with the march.
211. SThe aide reportedly had led the two patrols to Carney,
who had obviously been dead for a few days. The aide identified the
body as being Carney and the Lieutenant communicated this to the
base camp. the body showed no signs
of trauma or violence and it was apparent that Carney had died of
natural causes.
headed back to the base camp while
patrol continued to search for an arms cache.
Carney's body was left in the hammock. commented
that the lieutenant probably killed Carney's aide as he was not
needed after finding the cache.
212. Subsecuent to Carney's body being located,
ChNIC Alvarez advised that
enough prisoners had been taken. accompanied four
or five captives who were returned to Nueva Palestina from
Tegucigalpa. There, and other officers marched the
g-ueiiillas into the jungle and executed them.
also had executed another captured guerrilla in a separate, but
similar, incident.
213. N, estimated that Honduran Special
Forces executed between 30 and 40 of the captured guerrillas who
were returned to the jungles. In addition to other executions that
said he witnessed, he reported that he observed an
individual, killing a
Nicaraguan advisor to the guerrillas.\ also was
reported to have participated in the executions
77
and another officer
was in charge of the executions. Although Initially identifying a
as having executed Reyes Mata
later admitted that he did not know who had perfoinied this act and
that Reyes Mata was shot and not drowned.
214. CS March 3, 1997 Recall/Reissue of Intelligence Reports.
CIA recalled the February 10, 1997
Intelligence Report and the related
February 14, 1997 addendum. The report and addendum were
reissued on March 4, 1997 with the following Headquarters caveat:
The following report is a reissue.... (S)ince issuing the report, we
have learned that the source may not have been honest in his
account of the events detailed in the intelligence report....
Consumers will wish to ensure that any finished intelligence
publications that drew on this report are edited as appropriate.
215. February 27, 1997 Intelligence Report_
information concerning the planned
excavation by the Hondurans of a mass grave that purportedly
contained the remains of Carney.
The
Honduran citi7en claimed that he had been part of an insurgent
group that included Carney and Reyes Mata. The citi7en claimed
that he had evaded the Honduran military and witnessed them
prepare a mass grave for between 70 and 90 of his deceased comrades
in the Nueva Segovia region.
216. SThis information was
disseminated as an Intelligence
217. NI 1G Interview of
says that the SFC reported directly to ONC Alvarez
and was based at La Venta Military Base.
218. S3 During training, recalls that SFC
officers were ordered to participate in an operation to capture the
gueiiillas after two had deserted the group
orders were to search and, stop the group?
"capture" as opposed to "search and destroy." All SFC officers and
approximately 120 soldiers-attached to the Air Mobile Unit quickly
deployed to Nueva Palestina.
219. After finding a guerrilla during a routine supply
mission, more guerrillas were located, captured and sent to
Tegucigalpa for questioning and propaganda purposes. According to
most of the guerrillas were in poor physical
condition and suffering from starvation, states that
these individuals, numbering approximately 20, were not tortured.
He notes that torturing them would not have served the Hondurans
well as the guerrillas were to be presented to the press.
. 270. After approximately 20 days of being in the field,
four guerrillas to Tegucigalpa
and three or
met with C1NC
Alvarez privately. After the meeting,
and the guerrillas headed back to Nuieva Palestina in
a helicopter.
told
that "We have to make them disappear."
said that the guerrillas were to
"die in combat or be executed after we get infoimation from them
and in a place they can't be found." Only officers were to be involved
in carrying out the executions and each officer had to participate so
that they would not disclose their actions.
individual- was given overall
responsibility by for ensuring that the executions
were performed by each officer.
80
221.
an SFC Lieutenant
that he had captured and executed Reyes Mata.
states that Reyes Mata was interrogated by senior SFC officers,
including says
he was not present for the interrogation or execution.
722 1S,Z The two original deserters had indicated that Carney,
referred to as "Father Guadalupe," was traveling with the insurgents.
states that Honduran military intelligence had a large
file on Carney and that CINC Alvarez was eager to use him for
propaganda purposes. This desire stemmed from pressure the
Catholic Church had applied on CINC Alvarez for his perceived
mistreatment of the Church and its representatives.
indicates that there was never an order to kill Carney, only to capture
him alive and bring him back to the camp.
emphasized the importance of capturing Father
Guadalupe alive and offered a week of leave to the patrol that found
and returned the priest to Nueva Palestina. .
723
At some point in the operation,
ordered to assemble
a patrol and assist another patrol that was in the field.
collected approximately 15 men, located the first
patrol, and they then came into contact with an individual who
identified himself as the aide to Carney. The individual had in his
possession, a carved wooden chalice and a stole
and indicated that Carney was weakened by a lack of food, was
unable to continue the march, and was left hanging in a hammock in
the jungle. The individual led the patrols to the hammock,
where a badly decomposed body was found and
presumed to be the body of Carney due to the story told by the
individual, believes that the leader of the primary
patrol radioed back to the base camp and reported the find.
81
274. After observing the body, the
patrols departed the area and the first group continued its mission of
seeking out ann caches while traveling towards Nicaragua. This
patrol may have taken along and executed the individual claiming to
be Carney's aide.
225.
did not return Carney's
body to Nueva Palestina because it was badly decomposed.
The first patrol did not return
Carney's body to the base camp as it was ordered to continue
276. SSubsequently,
Alvarez that
and that
CINC became u set,
advised CNC
had stolen money from the guerrillas
had received some of the proceeds. The
and reassigned
because of this theft.
vas the "field commander" for the operation.
227. S,), does not recall any CIA personnel
specifically requesting information from him regarding the Olancho
Operation or the fate of Carney until 1997: added
that, after approximately a two-month period in 1983, interest in the
Olancho Operation diminished quickly?there were other issues to
address and the operation was considered a military success.
278 N, May 30, 1997
CONCLUSION
929. produced timely and substantial
intelligence on the Olancho Operation, including relevant
information regarding Reyes Mata and Carney:
?
An October 15, 1983 indicated that
said that prisoners captured during the
Olancho Operation had been executed by Honduran Army
officers and that Reyes Mata was among those executed.
The executions reportedly were initiated after the "field
commander" in Olancho?not otherwise identified?
received an order from the Honduran Armed Forces
General Staff to "search and destroy." An October 1.7, 1983
indicated confirmed the
earlier report and added that Reyes Mata was held for a
couple of days before being executed. Neither of these
reports Contained the identities of the alleged executioners
or any infoimation regarding the fate of Carney.
? On November 23, 1983,
to report on any repercussions related to the
83
?
prisoner executions. to collect
on the Olancho Operation were
hampered
relevant information was acquired
time.
Thus, no further
was _told in late 1994 or
early 1995 that,Carney was either dead or near death when
happened upon him while patrolling the
jungle during the 1983 Olancho Operation.
confirmed the accuracy of the reported infoilltation.
additional infolutation from
regarding
the fate of Father Carney.
230.
information regarding Carney on three occasions between September
1983 and July 1995:
for
?
+
84
r
information
July 1995.
Despite these efforts, however, the precise fate of Carney remains
unknown to CIA.
85
231.S.
232.
233.
235.
236. 154.
237. (r'S),
238.
87
239.
He was under
the supervision
recalls that the relationship\
was cordial' and
relationship
enjoyed an excellent
240. SIn AUg-ust 1983 sought
assistance and advised him that they would be traveling to Nueva
Palestina as two PRTC auerrillas had turned themselves in to
Honduran authorities. r ecalls that advised
him before their departure that it was possible that the guerrilla
group might include a U.S. citi7en.
241.
-ecalls that the Honduran SFC
had been charged with finding an neutra mg
auerrillas, says he interviewed six to eight captured
insurgents, but is uncertain whether these guerrillas had deserted.
They were interviewed in a coercion-free environment. Two
guerrillas d.airried t at they were the last to have seen
Carney, whom they referred to as "Padre Guadalupe," alive.
Two insurgents indicated that Carney had made it, in
the company of the PRTC insurgent group, to a base camp on top of a
hill between the Coco and Patuca Rivers after eight days of marching.
Traveling down the hill in a northwesterly direction, Carney was
described by the two guerrillas as being so weak that he could only
cover approximately 100 meters in the triple canopy jungle before
requiring rest. Before reaching the Patuca River, Carney reportedly
had to be assisted, sometimes carried, by the two insurgents. The
insurgents reportedly expressed a fear of capture and Carney urged
them to continue without him. They then placed the hest in a
hammock and left. The guerrillas believed, says that Carney
had died of exposure and starvation.
243. In addition to suffering from lack of food and the
elements, Came was described by the guerrillas who were
interviewed by sbeing spiritually broken ecalls
learning from the captives that Carney had ministered to the
insurgents but came to odds with Reyes Mata who rolubited Carney
from performing religious services. According to Carney was ?
also emotionally affected by Reyes Mata's execution of a member of
the group.
244. Sjnitially, it was hoped that Carney was alive and
would be captured. Afte interviewed the deserters, however,
he recalls that the conclusion within the Embassy was that Carney
had died of starvation. There was never any indication, says
that the Hondurans had captured or killed the priest. By the end of
1983, no inforniation had been identified that contradicted this
conclusion and the began to focus on other matters.
245. CS says he prepared several intelligence reports
based on his findings and the subsequent discovery by the
Hondurans of religious articles that apparently belonged to Carney.
recalls that and
made inquiries of the Honduran military at the time
concerning the fate of Carney.
74.6. SAfter initial involvement,
reportedly assumed full responsibili for reporting on matters
relating to the Olancho Operation. uspected, but never had
Honduran Army confirmation, that Reyes Mata may have been
captured and subsequently killed by the Hondurans. These
89
suspicions arose after a picture of the dead Reyes Mata appeared in
the media wearing a unifolm that appeared to have been surprisingly
fresh and clean for someone who had been on the run in the jungle
dvised that these pictures appeared after he was
would have
subsequently was
for weeks.
assigned other duties and, thus
followed-up on the suspicions
killed in an automobile accident
?247. says that the Embassy was cautious in not
reporting street rumors or unverified infoimation on issues that
might be politically volatile, has no reason to believe that the
Embassy or its components, including the suppressed any
intelligence reporting.
248.4c.2, indicates that the
Olancho insurgency was not of crucial interest or viewed seriousl
because the 0.-rou did not present a threat to U.S. or
Honduran interests was consumed with the Contra
program, and was interested in the insurgency and
intense' involved m reporting related details. The insurgency was
viewe a broad sense?an ill conceived, badly
implemented operation, wherein the insurgents paid the price for
self-destructive behavior. Many of the insurgents and Carney were
thought to have succumbed to exposure and starvation.
249. Is),
Embassy but
recalls that the Carney family Visited the
was not involved with them.
believes that Tegucigalpa Embassy's Consular Section would have
been responsible for pursuing Carney's fate, (=riven his ?resumed
status as a U.S. citi7en.
the Embassy did not
also indicates
for further collection
on the fate of Carney or Reyes Mata.
as it was thought that Carney had vanished in the jungle and
died of starvation and disease.
90
250. states that the Hondurans provided
with the official account of the Olancho Operation and
did not question that version.
Questioning them further would have indicated a lack of trust and
not necessarily resulted in the truth. did not do
more in this regard because the Olancho Operation did
not seem to be a major:issue.
251.
252. `c3,, had
indicated that Father Carney was left to die in a hammock because he
was suffering from starvation and was too weak to continue. Carney
was reported to be by far the oldest member of the insurgent group
and the account of his fate appeared to be plausible.
assumed that he was dead, that other
individuals, mainly Contras, had suffered the same fate in the
Honduran jungles and this added to the credibility of the account
interest in Carney
was equal to its interest in the fate of Reyes Mata, but there was no
information left to pursue in the Carney matter.
reported everything it knew about the Olancho
Operation.
253. viewed the Olancho
Operation as a large-scale overt military operation. As such,
was largely responsible for reporting on the event.
the infolutation concerning Carney dying of natural causes was
credible then and now. As a result, there was no further reporting on
the priest's fate after it was detelmined that he had likely died of
starvation.
254.'S did not
purposely exclude the identity of the "field commander" who was
referred to in October 15, 1983 report as responsible for
prisoner executions, reports on the
executions were damaging to Hotiduras and did not protect anyone.
255.
did not have a significant interest in the Olancho Operation as there
was not a great amount of policy interest.
256.
257. became aware of the 1983
Olancho Operation from accounts carried in the Honduran media.
SFC officers were
summoned to ursue the insurgents. During the short-lived
operation ecalls that insurgents surrendered and gave details
of the group's history and make-up. This included a description of a
priest identified as Father Guadalupe. did
not realize that this priest was Carney until after his family contacted
the U.S. Embassy for assistance and media articles described his
participation in the PRTCH guerrilla penetration.
258. that infoimation relating to the
Olancho Operation
'personnel
and that
rovided infoxmation
regarding the operation personnel were described as
being very enthusiastic about collecting information concerning this
military action and were considered to be the reporting focal point
for it within the Embassy.
259. Z's,
traveled by vehicle to an unspecified
location outside of Tegucigalpa and talked with captured guei iillas.
The guerrillas appeared to be in good health and told of being trained
in Cuba and sent through the jungle of Olancho. Once in the jungle,
they ran out of food and the leader of the group sent two or three
individuals to a village to obtain supplies. These guerrillas were
detected and the Hondurans mounted a military operation. The
captured guerrillas, also mentioned
that a priest accompanied the group and died of starvation.
says he can no longer recall the name the prisoners used to
refer to the priest.
260.
93
recalls visiting
and sorting through bags of
seized documents and photographs taken by the guerrillas. He says
the photographs were worn, dirty and greasy. Among the
photographs were pictures of guerrillas who were obviously starving
and in bad physical shape. says that some
of these individuals appeared to be dead and he atnibuted their
death to starvation.
261. recalls one photograph,
possibly black and white, that pictured the body of a male lying in a
hammock. The individual was approximately 50-55 years of age,
with grayish hair and a long face. he
concluded at the time that the individual had died of starvation. The
photograph also showed a "purple stole," although ioes not
_recall whether this item was on the hammock, the individual, or the
ground. he believed this
individual to have been Carney, although he is unsure of how he
Came to this conclusion.
262. sc4) recalls that the Hondurans
were not showing an interest in the seized items and he pointed out
the photograph of the individual in the hammock to a Combined
Military Intelligence (C-2) officer. He recalls doing so because he was
aware that the Carney family had expressed its suspicions to the
Embassy concerning the priest's fate and its belief thalt it was not
receiving adequate cooperation from U.S. representatives. He
believes that the photograph indicated that the priest had died of
starvation and emphasizes that it would have forced the family
accept
accept that Carney had died of natural causes in the jungle.
believes that this photograph was provided to
Carney's relatives by DoS personnel at the Embassy.
263. has no specific recollection
of reporting or recording the infoimation relating to the photograph
he thinks may have been of Carney. However, he says he regularly
passed such information to Embassy officials, given the high profile
of the case. He believes that this infoimation was used to brief the
Carney family. maintains that neither
nor Embassy management ever sought to suppress the dissemination
of any infoimation on this or other events
264. NI was not able to identify
photographs of Carney from the Honduran media as bearing a
resemblance to the individual he recalls was photographed lying in
the hammock. Nor can explain how a photograph
of a deceased Carney could have been taken and developed by the
Honduran guerrillas in the Olancho jungle. He believes that it is
possible that he is mistaken in his identification of the individual as
Carney. recalls that there was a lot of?-
misinforn-Lation concerning the Olancho Operation.
265.
266.
He was assisted in this
assignment by locally-hired Hondurans who referred to him as 'Wes"
and "Cornmandante Wes."
267. `c3, When the Olancho Operation began i ecalls that
the Honduran Armed Forces set up a staging area at the Air Base
where supplies were stored and then trucked to the Tinto River. The
staging area consisted of a few tents and was staffed by logistical
personnel from the Honduran Armed Forces. He says he -
discouraged his personnel from interacting with the individuals
assigned to the staging area and indicates that there was no reason to
have contact with them.
268. CS After the staging area was established, one of
Honduran assistants advised him that a truckload of guerrillas had
been brought to the area and then transported to Comayagua.
says he never saw these prisoners and advises that the staging area
did not have any detention facilities. He also says he is unaware of
what happened to the prisoners. Upon completion of the
counterinsurgent operation, the staging area was disassembled.?
269. CS Prior to the Olancho Operation dvises that a
group of U.S. newspaper reporters traveled to Lepatenque looking
for an American known as "Commandante West.' believes
that the inquiry related to him and opines that the reporters had ?
apparently confused the name of "Wes" with 'West." -In reaction to
this inquiry says he returned to
does not recall any additional references to an individual called
'West." He also says he has no knowledge of a "West Blank" or
"Mark Kelvi" serving in Honduras.
270.
say that they were not aware of prisoners being held
or interrogated at El Ag-,uacate Air Base during the Olancho
96
Operation. further indicates that the only support
provided by the U.S. military in the Olancho Operation was when
two U.S. helicopters delivered C-rations to Nueva Palestina from
Palmer?la, an Air Base in Comayagua. He says the U.S. helicopters,
sent by the U.S. Military Group, stayed on the ground for
approximately one hour while delivering the food and departed the
area without providing further assistance.
271.
272. i ecalls a discussion with ?etween
August 1994 and August 1995 regarding Carney's fate ecalLs
that he had previously learned from local newspapers that Carney
allegedly had been murdered. According to
indicated that he had not participated in the Olancho Operation, but
that had been involved. ? -
had come upon Carney
while on a patrol and that Carney was either dead or near death at
the time. If the latter, the Honduran patrol had left him to die,
is not certain whether told him
that Carney was dead or left to die, but does not recall being
provided any infolination that would indicate that Carney was
murdered.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
98
278.
279.
280.
?
281.
282.
283.
284.
100
285.
286.
287.
288.
101?
recalls that Carney had reportedly
died of exposure and that most of the guerrillas had also suffered the
same fate prior to the Hondurans finding them.
says he was not privy to the October 15 and 17, 1983 Reports
regarding prisoner executions and does not recall executions having
taken place during the insurgency or what specific actions were taken
to clarify the priest's fate.
289
290. `c3, to be
forthcoming and willing to assist him with whatever avenues he
decided to pursue. There were no restrictions placed on
pursuit of info' mation. Initially vas provided with seized
documents for his review. The most substantive document was a
copy of the diary belonging to Reyes Mata. The other. materials were
considered to be mostly propaganda and of little use. traveled
to the Olancho Department for one day and was accompanied
291. `c3,, During the trip to Olancho,
where 15 to 30
captured insurgents were seated in a circle of chairs. He says the
prisoners were clean, lacking visible signs of physical mistreatment,
well fed, without chains, and dressed in military fatigues. There was
SE
an aimed guard present during this general questioning session and
only a few of the prisoners talked. They spoke of being starved while
in the field and of wanting to surrender. They surrendered when the
Hondurans encouraged such action with leaflets and messages
broadcast from an airplane.
292. he could
talk with any of the prisoners as he desired and this resulted in his
interviewing three or four insurgents individually. During
discussions about the group's leadership says he learned that
the group had included a "Guatemalan priest." The priest was not
identified by any name, nor was he described as a U.S. citi7en. The
priest was said to be accompanying the group's leader, Reyes Mata,
and suffering from malnutrition. He was further described as being
in the worst physical state of all members of the group. Reyes Mata
reportedly ordered that the priest be carried and one insurgent
indicated that the priest would die because of his failing state of
health indicates that he did not have prior information
concerning the priest, nor did he develop enough information during
the interview to cause him to focus on this individual.
293. says that, he was
infoimed that Carney's family had made inquiries at the U.S.
Embassy. It was at this time that made the association between
the priest described by the insurgents and Carney. alyzed
the diary of Reyes Mata, but says he did not find any noticeable
references to Carney. found the diary to be consistent with the
prisoners' stories in regard to the hardships that the group endured.
ays he was provided with infoimation to
assist in his review, also obtained additional seized
documents, some of which were signed by "Father Guadalupe," but
these, says were not helpful in his review as they were
considered to be propaganda.
294. IS,1
recalls questioning
about the bodies of Carney and Reyes Mata.
advised that the bodies were not
recovered due to the inability of the patrols to carry the bodies
through the rough and inaccessible terrain while also carrying their
own equipment. Additionally, believes the patrols probably
were not inclined to recover the decomposing bodies of individuals
who had threatened the security of their country.
also advised that Reyes Mata had died in a firefight and that it
was believed that Carne had starved, answers
made sense, says oes not recall seeing any pictures of
the bodies of Carney or-Reyes Mata.
295. was asked to meet with Congressman
Broomfield several months after completina the October 1983
analysis of the Olancho Operation. As emembers it,
Broomfield had been contacted by Carney's family which was
seeking an appointment with the President. The family claimed that
it had a signed affidavit, and ossibly a tape indicating that CIA had
ordered the priest's death. ays he had no knowledge of any
prisoner executions at the time and that he advised Broomfield of
what he had learned about Carney. - _
296. vas shown the October 15 and October 17, 1983
reports regarding prisoner executions. He says that he had
not seen the documents before and believes that "[CIA] had this
infaLutation [regarding prisoner executions] before I went to
Congress and no one told me. I should have been told as the
designated expert [on Carney]. cautions that this information
may not have been purposely withheld from him, as CALF-' was an
extremely busy place. states that, even if all the information
had been shared with him, it would not have changed his conclusion
that Carney starved to death, but would have created "a little doubt
in my mind" concerning the fate of Carrie and Reyes Mata
says that he did not sense thai had deliberately
withheld information on this subject from him emphasizes
that every piece of infoimation that he had collecte or reviewed
indicated that Carney had died of starvation.
104
SE
297.
recalls that efforts
were made by CIA to collect infoimation on the circumstances
surrounding Carney's disappearance in order to answer anticipated
questions from the oversight committees. He believes that relevant
information was provided only by After initial
reporting by CIA, he recalls that DoS was responsible for follow-up
reporting on matters relating to Carney since he was a U.S. citi7en.
298. `c4/
notes that
there was significant interest during his tenure in alleged human
rights abuses. This resulted in an experience epresentative
being assigned as with responsibility for
monitoring human rights. He says this allowed CATF to review
human rights allegations prior to the receipt of official inquiries from
senior CIA management and Congress :lad no
recollection of matters relating to Carney arising during his tenure in
299. ZS).
was the individual primarily responsible for
preparing congressional testimony and correspondence that
originated in CA 11-. She recalls tremendous scrutiny of the Contra
initiative and a politically charged atmosphere. As a result,
took great care in drafting congressional responses
as she did not want to take any action that could negatively affect
covert action funding. Thus, she says congressional inquiries were
interpreted and answered narrowly.
300. During the winter of 1983, she recalls that HPSCI
Chairman Edward Boland requested infoiination from CIA
concerning the fate of Carney. initiated
Headquarters traces and queried It was deteimined, she
recalls, that Carney had died from starvation while marching through
105
the jungles. According to all information
available within CIA at the time was provided to Boland. She says
there was never cause to believe that Carney had been executed.
301. During her tenure in
recalls receiving several additional congressional inquiries
concerning Carney's fate that were substantially identical to previous
requests. She says that the Agency responses to these requests were
based on previous Agency responses. If the substance of the
questions differed from-previous requests, then additional research
was perfoimed before providing an answer.
says she was never limited in the amount of research that she could
do to answer congressional inquiries.
302. The Directorate of Intelligence (DI) analyst who was
responsible for Honduran issues recalls reviewing a report
in October 1983 concerning executions that
occurred during the Olancho Operation. She recalls that the
Operation had ended prior to her assignment. Based on at least this
CIA report and DoS reports, she says she prepared the October 19,
1983 article concerning prisoner executions in
Honduras. From an analyst's perspective, she says the identities of
the executioners were not necessary in order to ensure that policy
makers understood the event. The DI analyst does not recall there
being any issues regarding Carney's fate during her assignment.
106
WHAT OTHER REP 0 R 1ED RELEVANT
LNIFORMATION REGARDING REYES MATA AND CARNEY?
TO FOLLOW-UP ON NON-CLA.
REPORTING CONCERNING REYES MATA AND CARE'? WHAT DO CIA.
AND OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT PEIZSONNEL RECALL REGARDING THIS
NON-CIA REPORTING?
(U) Relevant Reporting and Follow-Up Regarding Reyes Mata and
Carney
303. INSCOM, Army
Operational Group (AOG), Fort Meade Maryland, maintained a
the 1980s.
relationship with during
while attending the
initially came to AOG's attention in July 1980
having been selected to assume a position on
the
304. After a six-month period of assessment and
development, agreed to function as
The relationship was fully coordinated with CIA
Headquarters
with
305.
Additionally,
CIA was to be kept fully ix-donned of all intelligence production and
significant developments in the operation
Also during 1981,
107
306. 1S During the first half of 1982,
307. In October 1982, the
briefed on the its
intended goals and infounation obtained from debriefings. At that
time reportedly advised the fficer of".. .
subjects that were sensitive in the eyes of [Ambassador Neg-roponte]
and asked that if picked up anything regarding
anti-Sandinista activities, corruption and terrorism, could they please
let know
308. `S,1
Initial Reporting.
108
309.
310.
311. `S.,1
provided an officer with information relating to the Olancho
Operation indicating that had shot insurgent leader
Reyes Mata with a service pistol after his capture and CNC Alvarez
had probably been consulted. This infoilltation was sent for
infoimational purposes
an intelligence report.
to numerous organizations,
However, it was never disseminated as
312. provided vith additional
infoiniation regarding executions durino the Olancho Operation
Accordino to
for reports tha
Reyes Mata. Regarding Father Carney,
this infoimation provided a
ad personally killed
dicated that
only a young g-ueriilla who had accompanied the priest saw Carney
dead, purportedly covered his body with leaves and left it in the
jungle. According to the pen-ilia was subsequently
kill.ed indicated was under
investigation for the theft of money from the guerrillas. This money
was reportedly split between and his troops each
time they killed or captured a guerrilla.
313.
314. Between October 1983 and June 1984,
provided infoimation to in response toj
315.
In the
110
following month prepared, fully coordinated and published
first intelligence report at the Embassy. During this
same month, the handling expressed his
belief that he ".. detected a reluctance on the part of the Embassy
personnel to publish infoimation regarding
discontent/turmoil within the [Honduran] alined forces for fear of
political repercussion [affecting funding votes in Congress] in the
U.S."
316. Subsequently, three reports obtained from
in August 1984 were deteithined to be
inaccurate and were precluded from publication by
317. In November 1984, DLA analysts praised
reporting continued to be met by the officer .
during 1985 and draft intellicrence resorts based upon his information
were provided to
for coordination within the
Embassy. Accor records, several of
reports during 1984 and 1985 were identified as "politically sensitive"
by the Embassy, which requested either their non-publication or
restricted dissemination.
318. %CIA Response to Reporting A November 21,
1983 to a
November 18, 1983 Joint Chiefs of Staff message disseminating a
draft intelligence report concerning the capture and execution
of a Honduran o-uerrilla. originally sent the draft report for
comment to d USCNCSO, and for information
to DIA, on ovem er 17, 1983. On November 18, 1983, the joint
Chiefs of Staff sent the draft, for infointational purposes, to elements
within CIA, State Department, Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps,
and NSA. Within CIA, the draft was electronically distributed to
various components within the DI. Additionally, copies of the draft
were distributed to elements within the Directorate of
Administration, the Directorate of Science and Technology and the
DO.
319. CS The draft telligence report specifically named
having killed Reyes Mata some days after his
capture in Olancho. It also indicated that CINC Alvarez was
consulted before and after the execution. Reyes Mata reportedly had
$500,000 in his possession that had confiscated and
split with the CNC.
320.
had
had disseminated two
Sensitive Memoranda regarding prisoner executions during the
Olancho Operation on October 19, 1983, but that
could neither name the executioner nor state
whether a higher authority was aware of or had approved the
executions. belief that some Honduran
military officers were not supportive of CINC Alvarez and that some
of the information contained in the draft report might have been
designed to smear him: However, the basic information conveyed in
the draft report?that prisoners had been executed?
could not be refuted, according to]
321. `S,1
aid he had obtained the information that
was included in the dra eport from an unspecified officer
who witnessed the execution. The drafi report said
would not elaborate on the specific rumor that he
had executed Reyes Mata, although that ?
CINC Alvarez had commended him on a job well done in the
Olancho Operation. Alvarez was reported to be fearful that Reyes
Mata would seek revenge against him because of a mid-1970 incident
during which Alvarez, then commanding the 4th Infantry Battalion,
purportedly threw Reyes Mata from a cliff. Reyes Mata survived the
fall and developed a strong hatred for Alvarez.
3-
323. Response. On November 25, 1983
sent its comments to the ommander with
informational copies to DIA, INSCOM and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It
indicated that the Honduran military had advised that Reyes Mata
was killed in combat on September 18, 1983 while operating in
Northern Olancho. Two days prior to Reyes Mata's death, according
to the omment, the local press carried articles alleging that he
had been captured. Although this was denied by Honduran
authorities, the press stories led to unsubstantiated rumors that
Reyes Mata had been captured, interrogated and then shot by
members of the Special Squadron. According to these
rumors had not been confirmed
324. response also indicated that it had learned
that Reyes Mata had been in possession of
approximately 525, 000 in local currency that had been, at the
? direction of Cil\TC Alvarez, divided among all members of the Special
Squadron said it was unable to locate in its files any
reference to CINC Alvarez having thrown Reyes Mata off a cliff. In
summary, :omment noted that the remoteness of the
Olancho region and the secrec of the o eration generated a number
of rumors. IT opinion, did not have direct access
to the infoimation concerning Reyes Matas death and probably was
repeating rumors.
325.
326. NI
1984, DO
Additional Reporting. On Febru 16,
received a photocopy and English translation of
produced by and transcribed on
November 23, 1983
had talked with an individual,
indicated in the message that he
According to
advised that had
personally killed Reyes Mata after his interrogation provided no
significant info'. uiation.
327. CS. In regard to Carney stated only that a
young guerrilla who accompanied the priest had seen him dead. The
guerrilla covered the priest with leaves and left him in the jungle.
The guerrilla was subsequently killed. also said that
split money confiscated from Reyes Mata with his
officers and troops each time they killed or captured a guerrilla. The
Honduran Inspector General was reportedly conducting an
investigation into the theft of the confiscated money. This
information was forwarded to on
February 17, 1984.
398.
additional details concerning
opinion of
provided
reporting of prisoner executions during the Olancho Operation. The
included comments reportedly made by
between March and April 1984:
At the request of CIA, did not follow-up on
[the Intelligence Infonnation Report regarding capture and
assassination of Re es Mata] during the Olancho anti- errilla
operation.
far as
told
was concerned
that as
eporting was right on
track except for the amount of money that they calculated to be in
the neighborhood of 580-90,000 . .
They considered it an internal
matter that had been taken care of by the Armed Forces Command;
had been replaced and changes in policy had
. been made. The principal interest was to avoid any recurrence of
the abuses that had taken place during Olancho.
further indicated tha
raised the subject of prisoner executions again during a
subsequent meeting with t that time advised
that had admitted to killing Reyes Mata and was
upset about
indicated that the general speculation concerning the confiscated
money was that it was split between the Honduran
Forces Chief of Staff and C1NC Alvarez.
(U) Recollections of Relevant Personnel
The
responsible for handlin
who was
during the relevant time frame
says that all matters concerning
115
SE
were coordinated with
including travel approval, the eventual submission of
reports and briefincYs on collected infonnation. He specifically recalls
dealing wi n issues relating to
331. `S,1 Diu-ingr, mid- to late 1983,
says
During a November 1983 visit to Tegucigalpa while details of the
Olancho Operation were appearing in the local media, the
debriefed on this event, reportedly
said executed Reyes Mata and had stolen money
obtained from the captured gueirillas. CINC Alvarez was thought to
have received some of the money and to have ordered the' executions.
When briefed unrecalled individuals
he was advised that this infonnation was not consistent with
332. As a result of this
says he recontacted
reported information was not accurate
another meeting and brought with him a Honduran
who said he had witnessed the execution of Reyes Mata by
and confirmed the infoimation that the
and advised him that the
requested
ad been provided previously by
On this basis,
re ared a draft intelligence report that was
provided
for further infoiniation on the Olancho Operation and this later
resulted in the November 1983
or coordination, was tasked
333.
advising him that could not support
dissemination of the draft intelligence report as it would disrupt
inte
says he
reted these initiatives as being Contra-related.
says he believed that he had fulfilled his reporting obligation
in this matter. Thus, he did not further address the dissemination
issue because
334. says he did not 'mow until 1996
that the draft 1983 report had not been disseminated. He
believes that the Embassy Country Team in Honduras wanted
reports on subjects such as this to be benign "as to avoid Congress
looking over its shoulders" and to keep Congress satisfied with the
ongoing implementation of U.S. policy.
says he believes that the draft 1983 report was "suppressed" by
elements within the Embassy, including for
political reasons. Reporting murders, executions and corruption,
says would reflect negatively on Honduras
and not be beneficial in carrying out U. S. policy. He still believes
that the infoi.cnation he obtained from was accurate.
335. The says he did not have the
opportunity to review reporting on the Olancho
Operation at the time. After receipt of the November 1983
and a possible follow-up meeting witl-
to discuss the infoimation it contained, says he
was not tasked to collect further infoimation relating to the
insurgency. The major focus for ?n 1983, according to
was on collecting foreign intelligence
on human rights abuses.
336. N,
and not
during 1983 recalls the general subject matter
of the draf eport?executions and stolen money?and indicates
that sending it to the Embassy for comment was routine
says he believes that the Embassy in Tegucigalpa was sensitive
to all reporting on matters internal to Honduras due to the political
climate at the time.
337. believes tha eporting did
not receive fair treatment from components within the Embassy, to
include personnel. He recalls that
reporting, in most instances, were merely a
recalls a
omments on
mirror of State's negative sentiments.
discussion with
circa 1983 wherein the latter
indicated that unspecified individuals at the Embassy did not want
infoimation concerning human rights abuses during the Olancho
Operation to be disseminated because it was viewed as an internal
Honduran matter.
338. 'N says he viewed the coordination
process as a method of while coping with
political sensitivities at the Embassy. The coordination process
allowed I eports to be widely distributed, albeit in draft form.
loimally would not disseminate a report if the coordination
process resulted in negative comments, yet consumers already would
have been made aware of the infoimation in draft form.
339. notes tha eceived similar
negative reactions to its reports from other Embassies during 1983. A
contributing factor may have been the lack of expertise on the part of
340. N,
provided by
recalls that the initial reporting
was general in nature and that CIA and
expressed concerns in that regard. He says that
reporting became more specific and substantial over time. The
generality of the early reporting may have been caused by
118
attempts to solicit information regarding internal Honduran matters
before became comfortable
341. N, DIA Personnel. DIA's Honduran Analyst from 1982
through 1987 says there existed an informal arrangement wherein
officers met with him to discuss future debriefings of sources.
also would provide draft copies of its intelligence reports to the
DIA Analyst for his comments. The DIA Analyst recalls meeting
with the intermittently during 1983 and 1984
concerning reportedly was not
bona fides and periodically consulted with the
sure of
DLA Analyst about information he had obtained.
also sought out issues to explore with
attempt to assess his credibility and to obtain information of interest
to intelligence consumers. The DIA Analyst recalls that
appeared to have the access he claimed and generally provided
substantive infolutation.
man
343. `S?),
The DIA Analyst does not have any
recollection of any comments by and USCINCSO
and says that he was unaware of any efforts to suppress reporting in
this or any other matter.
344. tS According to the DIA Analyst, the focus for analysts
during the Olancho Operation was on how well the Hondurans
reacted to the first insurgent penetration from Nicaragua. Analysts
were impressed that the Honduran military could mobili7e and
effectively address the threat. The Honduran response was viewed
as sending a message-to future groups that were plotting similar
actions. In addition; analysts were interested in learning whether the
population within Olancho supported the insurgents. Carney was
not of primary analytical concern to the DIA Analyst as other
interests took priori
345. N, The DIA Analyst recalls the 1.983 draft AOG report
and believes that certain details in it were inaccurate. Specifically, he
says CNC Alvarez was not believed to have ordered the executions
because Alvarez was too smart to leave evidence of his involvement
and knew that such acts would never remain a secret. The DIA
Analyst believes that had a negative bias against
0
Alvarez. In addition, the DIA Analyst believes that the Hondurans
had observed human rights issues being addressed in El Salvador
and knew that it made sense to use Reyes Mata for propaganda
purposes rather than execute him. Nonetheless, the DIA Analyst
considered to be corrupt and capable of splitting the
insurgents' money with CINC Alvarez.
346. The DIA Analyst recalls talking with
in 1.983 concerning Reyes Mata's fate. He says that
understanding was that Reyes Mata was wounded in
combat, would not talk when interrogated and was then left to die.
Analytical attention was focused on the Olancho Operation for only a
two- to three-month period and, by April 1984, the issue was
forgotten at the Embassy.
120
347. The DLA. Analyst says he was not privy to the two
October 19, 1983 CIA Sensitive Memorandum reports concerning
prisoner executions. In regard to the identity of the "field
commander," the DIA Analyst maintains that this was not the officer
but his superior. He describes
as commanding the SFC units that were split up and
used to supplement other military elements in the Olancho
Operation.
348.
349.
350.
121
351.
Personnel.
recalls that, upon his arrival
in Tegucigalpa, the Olancho Operation was coming to a close.
the vas
concerned with issues relating to the Honduran military.
352. N, recalls that there were "no
requests to tone down, suppress, stifle, withhold, or manage
information" in regard to the 1983 draft report or any other
instances during his tenure in Honduras. does
not recall Negroponte having particular sensitivities to issues, nor
does he recall Embassy personnel seeking to Limi eporting.
He recalls rumors that prisoner executions had taken place during
the Olancho Operation, but that
substantiate them
comment on the 1983 draft
who subsequently died
did not have eVidence to
believes that the
report was repared by
353. has no recollection of
the 1983 draft report or the exchange of related messages
He says that several U.S.
military representatives visited the Embassy on temporary duty and
that their reporting was not balanced or placed in the proper context.
354.
355.
concerns were shared, he says,
with First, the AOG report was redundant in that the prisoner
executions already had been reported by CIA
In this respect, he says, the AOG report would have added
importance to the event and focused excessive attention on it.
Second, there were concerns regarding the objectivity and credibility
of the draft AOG report and whether the details concerning C1NC
Alvarez's involvement were accuxate.
not in a position to know readily whether
Alvarez was involved in a decision to execute the prisoners. The
third area for concern related to the amount of money that was cited
in the report as having purporteciiy been stolen
says that the amount reported was absolutely wrong.
356.
says that the November 77 1983
report
had
a "phrasing problem." While it was factually correct, it failed to
emphasize Negroponte's concern over reporting on an event that had
previously been repbrted by CIA in two disseminated intelligence
reports acknowledges that the Ambassador was sensitive to
123
political ramifications that might have resulted from such reporting
and its possible effect
However, he indicates that this was not a factor in the absence of
further reporting regarding the executions and emphasizes that CIA
had previously reported on that issue.
337.
discussed the 1983 draft
AOG report with
While he agrees that the
regarding that discussion is
essentially accurate, he-says that it does not emphasize the basis for
no further reporting on the prisoner executions?the event had been
reported previously and there was concern on the part of Negroponte
that over-emphasis would create an unwarranted human rights
problem for Honduras.
the executions had
occurred and had been reported and there was nothing new to report
that would be of importance to consumers. Although the October 15
and October 17, 1983 reports did not contain specific names
or military units involved in executions
provided sufficient information to permit identification of the
perpetrators by cross-referencing of other reporting. The fact that
executions took place was not an issue being addressed by the
Hondurans. The focus of Honduran officials was on investicratina
359. believes that his actions and Negroponte's
concern were parts of "a legitimate effort to manage the perception of
Honduras." He notes that infoimation concerning the Olancho
Operation and the executions was not suppressed.
acknowledges that the amount of reporting that should have been
developed regarding the executions is debatable, but states
124
states that the Embassy was not worldng in a
political vacuum, although it did not delay, withhold, or suppress
intelligence reporting."
360.
emphasizes that the
Embassy did not want to change or stop an AOG report from being
published, but only wanted the opportunity to comment.
not aware of any attempts by Negroponte or to withhold
human rights infoimation from Washington.
361
362. A DI Analyst with responsibilities for Honduras at the
time recalls the 1983 draft AOG report regarding prisoner executions
and explains that one of her assigned duties was reviewing message
traffic and forwarding it with comments to DI branch and division
management. The analyst says the significance of the draft AOG
125
report was that it implicated CNC Alvarez in the executions.
Although she does not recall the disposition of the draft AOG report,
she says that AOG's reporting was not considered reliable by CIA
analysts.
CONCLUSION
? 363.
on November 5, 1983 that had lcilled Reyes Mata.
to review this AOG report on
November 21, 1983 and reminded of the two October 1983
reports that
indicated that unnamed Honduran Army officers had executed
prisoners.
364. CS on November 22, 1983 that the
Ambassador was particularly sensitive regarding the issue and was
concerned that earlier CIA reporting on the same topic might create a
human rights problem for Honduras. Based on the Ambassador's
reported concerns, actively discouraged
source.
from following up the information reported by the
365. ? justified this action by noting that the
infonnatdon regarding executions by the Honduran Army had
already been reported in the two Octol?er 1.983 reports.
While these reports did not contain the names of the executioners or
specific Honduran military units that were involved
believed that receiving these identities in the AOG re
have made a difference to intelligence consumers.
believes provided sufficient infointation to permit
identification of the perpetrators by cross-referencing of other
reporting.
ort would not
366.
367.
368.
127
369.1-
370.
371.
128
1
37._.
373.
374. October 15, 1953 The *first document
was an October 15, 1983 indicating that a number of
PRTCH guerrillas, including insurgent leader Reyes Mata, had been
executed during the Olancho Operation. The executions were
reportedly initiated after the "field commander" in the Olancho
Deparlment received an order from the Honduran Armed Forces
General Staff to "search and destroy." This order reportedly was
construed as meaning that no prisoners were to be taken alive. The
executions were carried out by "officers" in an isolated area away
from the enlisted men. No further information relating to the
identities of the "field commander," the "officers," or the specific
129
aimed forces elements that conducted the executions was contained
375.
376.
document
October 17, 1983
The second
and indicated that captured PRTCH guerrillas in the Olancho
Department were executed by "the Honduran Armed Forces." No
further identifying information regarding who had performed the
executions was contained in the report or an accompanying
operational cable.1
377. 1983 Draft AOG Report On November 18, 1983, CIA
Headquarters received the 1983 draft AOG report from
indicating that Reyes Mata had been executed by
Electronic copies were sent to components within CIA's DI and to the
DI's electronic records storage system.
received the report in paper form only
378.
379. November 23, 1983 AOG On
February 16, 1984, unknown LNISCOM representative(s) provided
with a a er copy of the November 23, 1983
fTom reiterating that "
had executed Reyes Mata. The message also indicated
that was under investigation for the theft of funds that
had been confiscated from the PRTCH guerrillas in Olancho and noted
that Carney had died of natural causes had
reportedly shared the money with officers and soldiers each time the
killed or captured a guerrilla.
380. November 21, 1983
document was a November 21, 1983
that the 1983 draft AOG report from names
as having killed Jose Maria Reyes Mata some days
after his capture in Olancho Department, and says that
The final
Alvarez]."
conferred before and after the execution with [CNC
October 15 and 17 reports that resulted in the October 19,
1983 reports related to
executions, but noted that the could
neither name the executioners nor state whether higher authorities
were aware of or had approved the executions.
381.
382.
383.
384.
132
SE
385.
386.
387.
133
SE
SE I:
388.
389.
390.
134
391.
CONCLUSION
39?.
response indicated that there was no
derogatory information regarding and did not make
reference to indications that as "the field
commander" ?may have participated in the 1983 Olancho Operation
and prisoner executions. Factors that appear to have contributed to
Headquarters' failure to locate and provide this information
included:
?
failed to document the specific identities of the
alleged Honduran Army executioners, including "the field
commander," who were referred to in the two October 1983
CIA reports.
? Thus, the October 1983 reports that implicated "the
field commander" in prisoner executions did not contain
,
any reference to
identify "the field commander/
135
SE
also failed to
failed to request additional infoimation
regarding the identities of the Honduran Army
officers who were referred to in the two October 1983 CIA
reports as having been involved in prisoner executions.
Thus, the two AOG reports that were received by
the Agency in November 1983 and February 1984 and
identified as one of those implicated in
the executions were not retrievable by CIA.
Since none of this information was indexed or retrievable
it did not come to the
attention of Headquarters personnel
136
SE
393.
394.
395.
396.
1 37
ET
S
397.
(U) Relevant Cables and Correspondence
393
399.
328
SE ET
S ET- -
400.
401.
402.
403.
S
404.
405.
406.
407.
-11c SE ET
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
47')
474.
SE
^
4251
426.
427.
428.
145
SE ET
SE
429.
431.
433.
S- Er
438.
439.
440.
441.
N:cS ET
m
\
^
/M2.
443.
4_11.
415.
S
149
SE
446.
447.
443.
/119.
450.
SE
451.
45?.
453.
454
455.
456.
457.
458.
1132
SE ET
SE
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
,1153
N
S ET
464.
(U) Recollections of Relevant Personnel
465.
466.
467.
154
SE
468.
469.
470.
471.
155
472.
473.
474.
156
SE
S EET
475.
476.
- - 477.
157
S ET
478.
479.
480.
r-1Z - ?
481.
48?.
484.
485.
486.
487.
488.
CONCLUSION
489.
?
?
+
490.
491.
49?.
493.
163
Hondurans who were considered to be leftists
with a request
that the reports be converted to Sensitive Memoranda dissemination
foimat due to the sensitivity of the subject matter. One report
addressed the structure and function of ELACH. The second report
identified the victims of ELACH.
494. dated November 25, 1985,
indicated that Mario Izaguirre had been the Director of ELACH since
1980. Izaguirre reportedly maintained direct contact with DNI
Director Colonel Guilleimo Pinel Calix, who provided Izaguirre with
the identities of individuals who were to be placed under
surveillance. It was reported that ELACH members
also maintained an infoimal liaison with members of the DNI and the
316th. Among the names of those in the 316th Battalion who were
contacted by ELACH members to discuss ELACH operations was
Captain Siro Pablo Fernandez Cuevas, also known as "Captain
Urquia."
495. had reported on July 14, 1983 that Urquia
was responsible for the overall command of a FUSEP interrogation
site and that he conducted kidnappings for ransom.
496. `S\I On November 26, 1985,
the second report on ELACH based upon
This report identified Honduran leftists
who were allegedly executed by ELACH between 1980 and 1984:
Pablo Moran, Tomas Nativi, Fidel Martinez, Angel Manfred?
Velazquez, Hermino Caceres Castellanos, Samuel Perez, Nelson
Makay, Jose Ernesto Velazquez, and Eduardo Lanza Becerra. It was
reported that Izaguirre participated with DNI operatives Carlos
Alfredo Martinez, Marcos Hernandez and Tranquilino Campos in the
164
SE
kidnapping of leftist student activist Omar Gustavo Vazquez Amaya,
who died during interrogation. Consequently, Martinez was
separated from the DNI and DNI Director Major Juan Blas Salazar
Mesa was fired. The report also included a list of Honduran leftists
who had been placed under ELACH surveillance
497.
all-persons reported as killed
or missing in 1981 and 1982 were identified in the book Human
Rights in Honduras" that had been published by the Honduran
Documentation Center in 1984.
498.
according
during the 1980 to 1984
period when executions had been carried out, each execution had to
be approved by the Honduran Armed Forces Commander and the
President of Honduras. comments indicated, however, that
no requests for approval of executions had been made since Brigadier
General Walter Lopez Reyes assumed command of the Armed Forces
in April 1984.
499. The infolulation contained in the two
reports regarding ELACH was disseminated in a
December 1985 Sensitive Memorandum to the DirectOr of Intelligence
and Research of the Department of State, the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs, the U.S. Ambassadors at Tegucigalpa and ?
Panama City, and the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Southern
Command.
and noted that it was important to
165
ET
continue to collect infonnation in order to obtain more details about
the past and present operations of ELACH.
cr ea s or ther investigation of ELACH activities.
indicated that it would be useful to
determine the identities of the individuals who were aware of the
existence of the ELACH operation and its victims.
501. Congressional Notification. On February 27, 1986, a
letter was prepared by
for DCI William Casey's signature and transmittal to
the Chairmen of the HPSCI and SSCI. The letter described the
November 1985 reporting regarding ELACH and
the January 1986 reporting that the 316th Battalion
had ordered ELACH to mount surveillance on several Honduran
leftists. The letter noted that, prior to making the ELACH
information available to the Committees, every effort had been made
to verify its authenticity and the reliability of the source.
502. CSThe letter also stated that Casey was personally
committed to investigating fully any additional information the CIA
received in this regard and that CIA would acquire
reporting regarding ELACH. The letter indicated
and asserted that,
over time, many of the individuals who were implicated in human
rights abuses had been reassigned out of positions of responsibility in
the Honduran intelligence services. The letter expressed Casey's
concern that ELACH would continue to be a viable organization with
high level contacts in the Honduran Government. The HPSCI and
SSCI Chairmen were assured by the Casey letter that CIA would
examine possible measures to resolve this problem and would bring
166
SE
the matter to the attention of the appropriate senior Honduran
Government officials, including then-President Azcona. Casey
signed and forwarded letters containing these statements to
Representative Lee Hamilton and Senator David Durenberger on
February 27, 1986.
503. On March 14, 1986 repared a response to a
White House request for infoimation concerning an inquiry from
Congressman Gerry E. Studds regarding what CIA knew of the
Honduran Governmer_ajs involvement in death squad activities. The
response indicated that had been allocated to
deteimine whether any information was available that confirmed the
allegations. The response also noted that the CIA had not tried to
cover up or discourage the publication of infoimation regarding
death squad activities and that no CIA officer had tried to influence
assignments, promotions, or continued military service of officers in
the Honduran Army. This response was signed by
and forwarded to the White
House on March 21, 1986.
504. An April 24, 1986 CIA response to a question raised by
the SSCI regarding Honduran human rights abuses was also
prepared The question focused on what the CIA knew
about human rights violations in Honduras prior to 1986. The
response indicated that CIA had been investigating allegations of
Honduran Government-sponsored human rights abuses
information regarding allegations that the
Honduran Government was directly involved in human rights. :
violations. The response noted that, prior to the late 1985 receipt of
the infolination regarding ELACH activities, the CIA did not have
specific infoi.u.iation that linked Honduran officials to death squad
activity and had only unsubstantiated allegations of official
involvement. This response was signed by
on May 8, 1.986 and forwarded to Keith Hall of
the SSCI Staff.
505. SS CI Staff Members Visit Tegucigalpa. An SSCI Staff
delegation visited Honduras from March 14 to March 17, 1986. A
Staff member prepared a March 18, 1986 Memorandum for the
Record (MFR) stating told the visitors that he was
"absolutely certain that since 1984 there had been no murders,
kidnappings, or torture of any Honduran leftists."
said that he could not
cruaran ee at ere was no s arina of information between the 316th
0 0
Battalion and ELACH because of the high level contacts ELACH
maintained with members of the Honduran Armed Forces.
According to the MFR said that the 316th Battalion had
continued to conduct surveillance operations against Honduran
leftists and that President Azcona had not yet been apprised of the
high level contacts ELACH had in the Honduran Government.
506. The MFR noted thai informed the Staff
members that the 316th Battalion had been scheduled to be
disbanded in January 1986 and converted to the counterintelligence
component of a new Honduran intelligence service
The MER also
indicated that told the Staff members that there had been a
delay, and it was now anticipated that the 316th Battalion would be
disbanded in March or April 1986.
(U) Recollections of Relevant Personnel
507. CS Headquarters Personnel.
notes in an April 23 1997 letter that, during the period under
investigation,
were instructed specifically to report any and all
508.
recalls that ELACH was not an issue that Casey would have
concerned himself with, nor would he have raised it as an issue.
states that, while there were conversations of Casey's to
which he was not privy, a discussion of ELACH would not have been
one of them.
follow-up action that is referred to in Casey's February 27, 1986 letter
to the HPSCI and SSCI.c.ould easily have been forgotten because of
more important issues. The focus at the time, according to
was the Contras
says that then-DDO Claire George
never mentioned ELACH, nor had ever heard of
ELACH.
509.
He also describes
being fully committed to keeping the oversight committees well
infoi rued of CIA activities, also
as
repeatedly advised
congressional interest in human rights issues and abuses.
says that asked him personally to address the human rights
issues
510.
presence added an independent White House
review of the human rights issue in Honduras.
511. IN
suggests that it was in part a response to congressional
interest in human rights issues in Honduras as a result of the ELACH
reporting and Casey's commitment to follow-up.
512.
513.
170
514.
515.
516.
517.
518. `c.J, were tasked routinely
to report on human rights violations. He believes it was not unusual
that no information would be reported
ELACH since had no information to report.
about
519. Is,1
discussed
recalls that Contra-related issues were
but he does not recall
discussing ELACH in such a setting.
does not recall being infoimed
at the time that CIA had notified the Congress of the existence of
ELACH and had promised to follow-up on the issue.
52O.S says
tried to verify information on ELACH. He does
not believe that ELACH was so secret that
would be ignorant of it.
says that others who would
have been in a position to know whether ELACH existed had never
heard of it. questions whether ELACH ever existed
521.
says that there was a constant and pervasive requirement to
collect information regarding human rights abuses
he recalls
that emphasized the significance of human rights reporting
and its importance to the oversight committees and CLA.. He says
that the Embassy was required to report on human rights abuses
522.
523. ?(?EQ
knew that
attempted to collect additional information about
ELACH, but were "coming up dry." This,
applied to other issues as well as ELACH.
524.
173
SE
CONCLUSION
525.
526.
6 (U) The basis and nature of this agreement is discussed in the next section of this Report.
174
5?7.
528.
529.
175
S
SE
530.
531.
532
53
176
SE T
535.
536.
177
ET
537
538.
178
SE T
540.
541.
179
SE
542.
543.
51/1.
180
ET
545.
546.
547.
54$.
549.
550.
551.
?
SE
552
ET
554.
555.
556.
557.
558.
559.
560.
561.
185
562
56
564.
565
186
S
566.
567.
568.
187
ET
T
L
569.
570.
571.
188
ET
572.Li
573.
574.
189
SE
575.
576.
577.
578.
579.
190
S
580.
531.
582.
191
CONCLUSION
584.
DID A CIA EMPLOYEE PROVIDE CONFLICTLNG STA] EMEN. TS REGARDING
THE FA1 E OF FATHER CARNEY TO THE HOUSE PER_IVLANENT SELECT
COMMMEE ON INTELLIGENU AND THE CIA?
535. NI
provided information regarding the fate of an American priest and
Reyes Mata that he said he had failed to report
1985.
when he obtained the information
said that it was not until 1995 and
1996 that he learned that the American priest was Father Carney.
586.
587.
588. Potential Conflicting Statements.
several discrepancies were identified by the Honduras
Working Group between the information provided by
in December 1995 and January
1996 and that which he provided to the HPSCI Staff members in July
1996. The specific discrepancies, and responses to the IG
regarding them, are as follows:
?
?
tatement records do not indicate that
attributed any statements regarding Father Carney's fate to
HPSCI Statement. The record indicates that
stated that had said that the priest was
dead when found by the Hondurans.
1G Statement. says that did not
say that he personally had found the priest, but only that
the priest had died of malnutrition.
Statement_ According t records said
that a fanner member of the
Honduran Special Forces Unit that participated in
searching for the guerrilla band with which Father Carney
entered Honduras, claimed that he had been present when
the priest was found dead and decomposed in a hammock
in the jungle and that he placed the skull of the priest into
his backpack.
HPSCI Statement. The indicates that
said that claimed that the Honduran troops
carried the priest's head in a knapsack.
1G Statement. states that laimed to
have placed the skull of the priest into his own backpack. .
Statement. According to ecords, said
that had provided him with infoimation in 1985
or 1986 regarding the fate of the insurgents during the
Honduran military operation to locate the group in 1983.
also reportedly said that claimed that he
was aware that captured prisoners had been pushed from
helicopters as part of the interrogation/intimidation
campaign against the guerrillas.
HPSCI Statement. Th record indicates that
said that he had heard rumors in 1985 from junior
Honduran military officials that some guerrillas were
thrown from helicopters during the Olancho operation.
1G Statement. states that rumors of people being
thrown out of helicopters were common
also states that it was in 1988
or 1989 that he had heard street rumors that the
Hondurans may have thrown individuals out of
helicopters to their deaths. He states that
mentioned anything about this to him.
CONCLUSION
589. rSThe record of
statements to the 1-louse Peimanent Select Committee on
Intelligence and the record of statements to
contain slight discrepancies. However, none of
the discrepancies appear to be significant.
never
590.
591.
592.
593.
SE
`'tSL Possible Involvement of
Interrogations.
in Torture or Hostile
594. HIVG Finding: The Honduras Working Group
received an allegation that may have been
present during a hostile Honduran interrogation of a prisoner. On
behalf of the FPNG, investigators from
interviewed this regard. He denied that he had
ever been present during any interrogation, hostile or otherwise,
conducted
595. 1G Finding: The IG investigation found no evidence
to substantiate the allegation that
was present at a hostile interrogation or participated in torture
of a prisoner
596.
597.
598.
599.
600.
199
601.
(U) Failure to Notify Congress of Significant Developments.
602. HWG Finding: The Honduras Working Group found
that a February 1986 letter from DCI Casey infoimed Congress of his
comialitment to investigate fully any additional infoimation the CIA
received regarding ELACH, the right-wing paramilitary organization
that was allegedly implicated along with Honduran officials in death
squad activities. The Honduras Working Group noted that
failed to provide additional
information on ELACH and failed to advise a visiting SSCI Staff
delegation in March 1996 of
603. cS 1G Finding:
sought additional information on ELACH from but
none could provide additional information. Furthermore, they say
that none could confirm the
alleged existence of ELACH. Information regarding the alleged
existence of ELACH and the identities of its members was reported
In February 1986, DCI Casey infoimed the SSCI and the HPSCI by
letter that CIA would investigate fully and
provide additional information
regarding ELACH.
604.
605. l'S?
Since
impossible for
1986 that
did not learn of
until April 1986
it would have been
to report to the SSCI Staff members in March
had been mistreated by a
606. N HWG Finding: The Honduras Working Group
concluded that Headquarters managers failed to devote sufficient
attention to routine support activities
607i
SE
608
(U) Other HWG Issues.
609
(a)
(b)
\
(c)
(d) Potential politicization by the Directorate of Intelligence
(DI) in 1984 in that DI analysts allegedly revised their
judgment in a memorandum to Congress
(e) Potential politici7ation by the DI in 1988 when a DI
manager allegedly told subordinates that he was reluctant
to disparage the Honduran Government in an intelligence
(f)
report
610.
611. the two issues identified
by the Honduras Working Group relating to alleged politicization of
DI analysis be investigated by the 1G. In a September 11, 1996
response to the Executive Director, the IG recommended that the two
potential politicization issues be reviewed by the DI's Ombudsman
for Politicization.
CONCLUSIONS
612. Nz WAS ANY CIA EMPLOYEE
PRESENT DURING SESSIONS OF HOSTTLE ERROGATTON OR TORTURE IN
HONDURAS?
No evidence has been found to substantiate the allegation
that or all CIA
employee was present during sessions of hostile interrogation or
torture in Honduras.
613. WHAT DID
REYES MATA AND FATHER CARNEY? DID
UP CIA REPOR ING THAT
REPORT CONCERNING
FAIL TO FOLLOW-
WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR KILLING
REYES MATA AND HIS INSURGENTS-POSSIBLY INCLUDING FATHER
CARNEY?
produced timely and substantial intelligence on the
Olancho Operation, including relevant information regarding Reyes
Mata and Carney:
An October 15, 1983 indicated that
said that prisoners captured during the
Olancho Operation had been executed by Honduran Army
officers and that Reyes Mata was among those executed.
The executions reportedly were initiated after the "field
commander" in Olancho--not otherwise identified?
received an order from the Honduran Armed Forces
General Staff to "search and destroy." An October 17, 1983
204
SE
indicated that confirmed the
earlier report and added that Reyes Mata was held for a
couple of days before being executed. Neither of these
reports contained the identities of the alleged executioners
or any information regarding the fate of Carney.
efforts to collect
human intellicrence on the Olancho Operation were
hampered by
Thus, no further
relevant information was acquired
was told by in late 1994 or
early 1995 that Carney was either dead or near death when
happened upon him while patrolling the
jungle during the 1.983 Olancho Operation.
205
SE
?
collected additional infoimation from
in February 1997 regarding
the fate of Father Carney.
subsequently shed some doubt on the source's credibility
in this regard.
614. TO DETERMINE
CARNEY'S FATE IN VIEW OF REPEATED QUERIES FROM CONGRESS AND THE
CARNEY FAMILY?
?
?
Despite these efforts, however, the precise fate of Carney remains
unknown to CIA.
206
SE
ET
Sr. ...
615. WHAT OTHER U.S. Go VERNMENT ASSETS REPORTED
REV-YVAN-I" INFORMATION REGARDING REYES MITA AND CR'?
FOLLOW-UP ON NON-CIA
REP ORTTNG CONCERNING REYES MATA .4ND CARNEY?
An Army Operational Group (AOG) source reported on
November 5, 1983 that had killed Reyes Mata
616.
SE
failed to document the specific identities of the
alleged Honduran Army executioners, including "the field
commander," who were referred to in the two October 1983
CIA reports,
? Thus, the October 1983 reports that implicated "the
field commander" in prisoner executions did not contain
any reference to
identify "the field commander
also failed to
regarding the identities of the Honduran Army
officers who were referred to in the two October 1983 CIA
reports as having been involved in prisoner executions.
Thus, the two AOG reports that were received by
the Agency in November 1983 and February 1984 and.
identified as one of those implicated in
the executions were not retrievable by CIA.
Since none of this infoilltation was retrievable
it did not come to the
attention of Headquarters personnel who conducted the
June 1989 file review
617.
618. WAS THERE FOLLOW-UP ON THE ELACH REPORTING
ESPECIALLY ml VTEW OF DCI CASEY'S
COMMITMENT TO CONGRESS?
provided information regarding the existence of
ELACH in November 1985
none could provide additional infolutation.
Furthermore, none could confirm
the alleged existence of ELACH.
619.
620. Dm A CIA EMPLOYEE PROVIDE CONFLICTING
STATEMENTS REGARDING THE FATE OF FATHER CA_RNEY TO THE HOUSE
PERMANENT SELECT COMM11 i LE ON INTELLIGENCE AND THE CIA?
The record of
statements to the House Peimanent Select Committee on Intelligence
and the record o statements to the Office of Personnel
Security contain slight discrepancies. However, none of the
discrepancies appear to be significant.
RECOMMENDATIONS
2. (U) The findins of this Report of investigation should be
reviewed in any individual accountability detelminations that are to
be considered on the basis of the Honduras Working Group (H1/VG)
findings.
3. (U) As recommended by the Inspector General on
September 11, 1996, the Directorate of Intelligence Ombudsman for
Politici7ation should be instructed by the Executive Director to
review the two potential politici7ation issues that were identified by
the HI/VG.
CONCUR:
rederick P. Hitz Date
Inspector General
SE
211
SL.i4z-i' ?
ANNEX
(U) Additional CIA Reporting Regarding the Olancho Operation
1. N July 11, 1983 Intelligence Report.
that a meeting was held in Mexico City in late June 1983 that was
attended by representatives of various Honduran leftist extremist
groups. The PRTCH was represented by Reyes Mata. The groups
agreed to faint the ReKolutionary Unity Movement (MUR) and to
begin implementation of the initial phase of rural guerrilla warfare.
The groups were in the process of studying potential targets within
Honduras.
l'S, August 10, 1983 Intelligence Report.
Honduran debriefings of two individuals who had deserted from the
PRTCH guerrilla force located in the mountains of Olancho
Department. The two individuals described being infiltrated into
Honduras from Nicaragua beginning in mid-July 1983 after being
trained in Cuba. The leader of the group and a political officer were
identified, respectively, as Reyes Mata and "Father Fausto Milla,
known as Mario." The guerrillas had planned to consolidate with
other guerrilla fronts and recruit new members until either
September or October 1983. This group was one of four distinct
fronts, all of which were to be unified under the command of Reyes
Mata.
ugust 10 1983
During the briefing, a close-up photograph of a M-16 rifle,
obtained from a guerrilla, was presented. The markings on the rifle,
among other identifiable information, indicated that the equipment
was the property of the U.S. Government.
2
7. August 10, 1983
sweep of
the Cordillera Entre Rios area was planned. The purpose of this
effort was to confirm that the guerrillas, who had infiltrated from
Nicaragua, were establishing base camps in Honduras.
8. August 11, 1983 National Intelligence Daily. CIA
reported in an item published in the National Intelligence Daily that
the Cuban-trained insurgents were present near the Pat-uca River in
the Olancho Department and planned to begin unspecified guerrilla
operations in September 1983. A commentary noted that the
Sandinistas were following through on their threat to increase
subversive activities against Honduras. The difficult terrain was
predicted to be a factor in the outcome of the counterinsurgent
operation.
9. August 11, 1983
the Honduran Armed Forces intended to
launch a sweep operation against the guerrilla force affiliated with
the PRTCH. The operation was planned to begin on August 11. Due
to the difficult terrain, it was predicted that the operation could last
10 days.
10.
11
17.
ugust 16, 1933
August 15 Honduran television program that
documented the history of the PRTCH guaiiillas who deserted.
During the show, the guerrillas talked about their recruitment,
training in Cuba and return to Honduras via Nicaragua for
subversive purposes.
13. 4S,1 August 17, 1983 Intelligence Report.
the
organizational structure of the PRTCH in Honduras as provided by
guerrillas who deserted. The PRTCH consisted of four major
commands that were broken down into various sub-command
centers that were further broken down into operational cells. The
PRTCH's Central Command was located in Tegucigalpa and was
divided into three sub-commands. ?
14
I
16. CS August 19 1983
The Honduran
Armed Forces were prepared to continue patrolling the area where
the guerrillas were believed to be operating.
17. zs,1 August 24 1983
seven guerrillas had turned themselves in to the
Honduran Army in Olancho. These individuals complained about
having been recruited by the PRTCH under false pretenses and the
lack of food and supplies.
18. August 26, 1983
that 14 guerrillas had turned themselves in to
Honduran authorities and it was believed that others had deserted.
Deserters advised that one of their officers had been executed by a
fellow insurgent officer for defeatist statements and at least two
members of this group had died of starvation.
19. `S,,), August 30, 1983 National Intelligence Daily. CIA
reported in an item in the National Intelligence Daily that the
Hondurans had captured several guerrillas who all advised that they
had been trained in Nicaragua and Cuba. In a commentary, it was
noted that the apparent attempt by Cuba and Nicaragua to start an
insurgency in Honduras was doing poorly. The remaining guerrillas
were believed to pose little threat to the internal security of
Honduras, although it was believed that the Sandinistas were likely
to continue sending trained insurgents into the country to put
pressure on the government.
20 4S,t August 31, 1983
asked
what the Honduran authorities should do with the g-,uerrilla deserters
once they had been debriefed and he noted that some of the deserters
were sincere although some had turned themselves in because of
starvation, recommended that the
Honduran Government treat all members of the group as being
sincere while giving them clothing, food and shelter in a military
facility where they had the liberty of the base but would be under
recommended that the deserters
observation
be allowed visits by their families.
21. IS,1 reportedly advised that
the deserters would be sent to the Artillery Camp at Zamorano.
indicated that the Honduran
Government understood the importance of treating the captured
guerrillas well. However, the Honduran Government also reali7ed
that some members of the group presented a counterintelligence
problem and could not be monitored if all members were released
immediately.- On the other hand, some of the deserters appeared to
be genuinely hostile to the Nicaraguan and Cuban Governments for
the deception reportedly used to recruit them into the insurgency.
22. cS September 2, 1983 Intelligence Report.
the results of the Olancho operation
Without firing a weapon, the
Honduran Army reportedly had taken 16 insurgents into custody.
The insurgents, suffering from malnutrition, disease and low morale,
continued to desert and surrender to the Army.
23.
believed that there were three reasons for the Honduran
Army's success in the counterinsurgent operation. First, the Army
responded before the guerrillas were able to consolidate. Second, the
Army won over the civilian population that had originally been
sympathetic toward the insurgents. Third, the Army treated the
prisoners humanely--evacuating them to Nueva Palestina where they
were fed, provided medical treatment, debriefed, and then taken to
Tegucigalpa. These factors had encouraged others to desert.
24.
25.N, September 3, 1983 Intelligence Report.
PRTCH guerrilla by Honduran authorities. The guerrilla was taken
into custody by a crew aboard a Honduran helicopter that was
resupplying counterinsurgent forces in Olancho Department. He
reportedly stated that he joined the group because the recruiter
promised him training in accounting and was subsequently told that
the school was in Nicaragua. When he arrived there, he was
informed that he would receive political and military training in
Cuba. He spent one year and six months in Cuba being trained as a
platoon leader before being infiltrated into Honduras.
26. The guerrilla also reportedly indicated that the group's
leader was Reyes Mata and that its mission was to recruit and train
sympathizers before conducting raids on Honduran military
installations. He believed that the principal reason for the group's
failure to accomplish its mission was its early discovery before it
could consolidate its position in the countryside. Additional
guerrillas were reportedly waiting in Nicaragua to be infiltrated:
27.
28. September 6, 1983
concerning
Honduran counterinsurgent activity near El Ag,uacate Airfield. On
September 4, 1983, a 26-member insurgent group reportedly had
engaged Honduran troops on the outskirts of the village of Rio Tinto.
In this first actual military engagement of the counterinsurgent
operation, one guerrilla reportedly was killed.
29. September 6 1983
The
insurgents were armed with M-16 rifles that were dean and
maintained, fatigues that were probably manufactured in Cuba, and
U.S. jungle boots. Medical supplies included products from West
Germany and the USSR. Many of the grenades that were confiscated
were armed with fuses having a zero or one second delay as
indicated on the detonators. The captured guerrillas stated they were
not aware of the timing capability and would have injured
themselves if the grenades had been used.
30.
31.
32. NI September 14, 1983 Exclusive Intelligence Report.
radio communications had been received by the
Sandinistas from the PRTCH guerrillas in Ola_ncho Department. One
message reflected that Reyes Mata had ordered the execution of a
lieutenant for allowing,the defection of subordinates. In another
message, Reyes Mata asserted that the members of his group who
were being held by the Honduran Aimy were not deserters, but a
reconnaissance platoon that had been captured. Several messages
complained about the lack of logistical support to the group.
33.
34
35.
36. September 21, 1983 National Intelligence Daily. CIA
reported in an item in the National Intelligence Daily that the
Honduran Army was ". .. mopping up remnants of the insurgent
group. . ." and that Reyes Mata had died in a battle. Operations
against the insurgents were continuing and the Hondurans planned
to follow-up with a civic action plan. A comment stated that the
success of the counterinsurgent operation was athibuted to the
effectiveness of the Honduran Army and the ineptitude of the
g-,ueidllas. The decimation of the group and death of Reyes Mata,
considered a capable guerrilla leader, were envisioned as possibly
prompting the Sandinistas to reevaluate their efforts to promote an
active insurgency in Honduras.
37.
S
38.
39.
40.
41. CS. October 1, 1983 Intelligence Report.
noted that most of the seven
Honduran leftist extremist organizations had been relatively inactive.
One exception was the PRTCH insurgency in Olancho Department
that was quickly neutralized by the Honduran Armed Forces. As of
late September 1983, onl five of the original force of 96 (ruerrillas
were still in the field.
42.
12
SE
43. November 2, 1983 Exclusive Intelligence Report.
as of late October, about 20
PRTCH members were in Managua preparing to infiltrate Honduras
to establish an insurgent front.
13
SE
46.
47. S,),December 28, 1983 Exclusive Intelligence Report.
commented that Reyes Mata had been well informed of the
treacherous nature of the Olancho terrain and the limited
organizational support that was available. Reyes Mata could have
saved himself and his men by returning to Nicaragua but, in the
opinion of the official, opted to play a martyr role.
14
48. Z'S, A PCH leader reportedly had counseled Reyes Mata
against the operation during its planning stages. Reyes Mata replied
that he could not back out as he was under too much pressure from
the Nicaraguan Sandinistas and that he believed the time was right,
especially with the presence of the U.S. troops in Honduras.
49.