IRAQ'S CHEMICAL WARFARE PROGRAM; MORE SELF-RELIANT,MORE DEADLY(SANITIZED)

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• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0000072254
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• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2011
• Case Number: F-2010-01212
• Publication Date: August 1, 1990

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
La
Directorate of
Intelligence
10--100- ~-Ijx-.
Iraq's Chemical Warfare
Program: More Self-Reliant,
More Deadly
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 National Security
Information
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions
 Directorate of
Intelligence
Iraq's Chemical Warfare
Program: More Self-Reliant,
More Deadly
Office of Scientific and
OSWR.,I office of
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis.
Division, OSWR
-rup-xcrec
.CW 9l1-1/)OjJX
 Summary
Information available
as of7 August 1990
was used in this report.
Iraq's Chemical Warfare
Program: More Self-Reliant,
ture will lend an air of legitimacy to the program.
The Iraqi chemical warfare (CW) program, by far the largest in the Third
World, is rapidly becoming self-sufficient. By 1993 Iraq will have complet-
ed several facilities that will supply nearly all of the precursor chemicals
needed to support large-scale nerve agent production using raw materials
acquired in the country. With optimum use of their CW facilities, the
Iraqis may then be able to achieve combined nerve and blister agent
production levels of about 4,000 tons per year-twice the 2,000 tons per
year they were producing by the end of the Iran-Iraq war-without having
to worry about foreign embargoes of most essential precursors. In addition,
the apparent integration of pesticide production into Iraq's CW infrastruc-
credible CW capabilities.
Apparently Iraq believes it needs chemical weapons for deterrent pur-
poses-primarily against Israel's nuclear option-and as a key weapon
supporting its professed role as military "protector" of the Arab world. In
conjunction with CW. Iraq also has aggressive biological warfare and
ballistic missile development programs in which self-sufficiency is a
primary goal. The high priority enjoyed by the CW program probably also
reflects Iraq's pleasure with the results of massive nerve agent strikes
against Iranian forces in 1988 and subsequent CW use against Kurdish
insurgents. However, Iraqi willingness to initiate use of chemical weapons
in any future conflict undoubtedly will be tempered if its opponents possess
bombs, shells, and artillery rockets.
Since the cease-fire with Iran, Iraq has stressed development of advanced
CW agents and delivery systems. It is pursuing persistent nerve agents
such as VX that are much more toxic than the blister agent mustard and
the nerve agent Sarin-the principal agents now in Iraq's arsenal. In
addition, Iraq probably is developing binary chemical weapons with a
longer shelf life, enabling it to maintain a sizable stockpile. Iraq also is si-
multaneously developing five types of short- to intermediate-range ballistic
missiles that may be fitted with chemical warheads. Missile-delivered CW
agents will offer Iraq greater standoff capability and deterrent value. In
concert with developing a more sophisticated CW stockpile, the Iraqis are
maintaining a wide range of battlefield-proven delivery options, including
The Iraqi CW program poses a serious threat to US forces and interests in
the Middle East. There are strong indications that Iraq is prepared to use
chemical weapons in a potential invasion of Saudi Arabia, even if the
sw
August 1990
 United States or other countries intervene. Iraq most likely would use the
nonpersistent nerve agent sarin-possibly in binary form-in artillery
rockets and aerial bombs on the battlefield but might also use the
persistent blister agent mustard against rear-area targets, such as airfields.
 Summary
Background
Indigenous Precursor Production-Key to Eliminating Dependence on
Foreign Suppliers
Pesticide Production-An Air of Legitimacy 5
New CW Agents and Production Methods-Developing a More Potent Arsenal 7
Advanced Agents
Improved Production Methods
Longer Shelf Life
Delivery Systems-Maintaining a Wide Range of Options
Bombs, Shells, and Rockets-Tried and True _
Ballistic Missiles-The Long-Range Option
CW Protection and Training
Outlook-Deterrence, Self-Sufficiency, First-Use Considerations, and
Threat to the United States
Iraqi CW Agents Used During the Iran-Iraq War
8
 Iraq's Chemical Warfare
Program: More Self-Reliant,
More Deadly
Lt. Gen. Mahir Abd al-Rashid
Commander, Iraqi VII Corps
circa F98~~
Now, Iraq is in possession of the binary chemical
weapon. According to our technical, scientific, and
military calculations, this is sufficient deterrent to
confront the Israeli nuclear weapon.
Saddam Husa n
I Jul, 19901 1
After nearly two decades of work, Iraq has developed
the most extensive chemical warfare (CW) program in
the Third World.
CW program in the mid-1960s but did not establish
an R&D effort until 1972.
onstruction of a CW pilot plant facility at
a man Pak (see figure 1) and a full-scale chemical
weapons complex near Samarra (see figure 2) began in
1975. (See appendix A for a description of key CW
facilities in Iraq.) The outbreak of war with Iran in
1980 provided the impetus for Iraq to accelerate its
CW program. Large-scale production of the blister
agent mustard probably began at Samarra in early
1983; by August of that year, Iraq was using this
agent against Iran (see inset for a summary of Iraqi
CW agents used against Iran and appendix B for
details of Iraqi use of chemical weapons).
Iraq's concerted CW effort during the war enabled
the Iraqis to establish a sizable and sophisticated
infrastructure for R&D, production, testing, and stor-
age of chemical weapons. (See appendix C for a
summary of Iraq's CW program organization.) By the
war's end, Iraq was able to produce about 1,000 tons
each per year of blister and nerve agents. Although
Iraq had little difficulty obtaining the raw materials it
needed to support such production, it began develop-
ing an indigenous precursor production capability
after the United States and other Western nations
began controlling sales of key precursor chemicals.
Construction of three facilities began near Habban-
iyah in 1984 as part of this precursor production
Iraq also has aggressive biological warfare (BW)' and
ballistic missile programs that, in many ways, parallel
its CW effort. As with CW, the BW and missile
efforts are striving for self-sufficiency. Also, all three
high-priority programs play a key role in Iraqi deter-
rence against Israel's unconventional and superior
conventional weapons capability. F__~
The 1988 cease-fire with Iran did not diminish the
importance of Iraq's CW program, but it did signifi-
cantly alter the program's focus. The demands of the
war necessitated that Iraq's CW program dedicate
much of its resources to large-scale production of
chemical weapons. Following the cease-fire, however,
production of chemical weapons with a limited shelf
life was no longer practical or even necessary, freeing
Iraq to enhance its CW effort in preparation for
future conflicts. Iraq apparently also is seeking ways
Indigenous Precursor Production-Key to
Eliminating Dependence on Foreign Suppliers
Iraq is constructing several facilities that, when com-
pleted by 1993, will supply nearly all of Iraq's precur-
sor chemical needs using indigenously acquired raw
Top Sperm
SW 90-100S3Jx
August 1990
 UK=
materials. Iraq embarked upon this effort in the mid-
1980s, shortly after international export controls on
key precursors were first enacted. If the project is
successful, the Iraqis almost certainly will be able to
produce several G-series nerve agents (particularly
sarin and its derivatives)-and perhaps mustard as
 The blister agent mustard and the nerve agent satin
(GB) were produced in large amounts at Iraq's
Samarra facility and used against Iran during the
Iran-Iraq war. We believe that lesser amounts of the
nerve agents tabun (GA) and GF and riot control
agent CS were used as well. Iraqi mustard attacks
severely strained Iran's medical infrastructure and,
in conjunction with the use of riot control agents.
disrupted several Iranian offensives. Large-scale use
of nerve agents in 1988 inflicted significant Iranian
casualties and greatly supported Iraqi offensive oper-
In addition to lessening dependence on foreign suppli-
ers, construction of precursor production lines at
Habbaniyah II may permit precursor lines at Sa-
marra to be dedicated to agent production. This could
nearly double Iraq's total wartime capacity, to as
much as 4,000 tons of CW agents per year. In
addition, similarities between buildings at Habban-
iyah II and agent production buildings at Samarra
lead us to believe that
CW agent production lines eventually could be built
at Habbaniyah II. At present there is no evidence of
such a plan, but Iraq might proceed with this possibil-
ity if it felt redundancy in its CW program was
' Elemental phosphorus is found in three primary forms, two of
which-white and red-may be used for the production of nerve
agent precursors. White phosphorus, sometimes labeled yellow
phosphorus when impure, is very highly reactive. It ignites sponta-
neously on contact with air, and therefore often is used in incendi-
ary munitions. Because of its reactivity and toxicity, special
precautions must be taken when handling this material. As a result,
the less reactive (and easier to control) red phosphorus is, in many
cases, preferred when producing phosphorus-based compounds,
such as phosphorus trichloride. However, use of red osphorus
necessitates higher operating temperatures.
 We believe that Iraq has used imported thionyl
chloride as a chlorinating agent in sarin production
but could produce this precursor or a substitute
indigenously. For example, phosphorus pentachloride
(PCI,) is easily produced by combining chlorine from
the chlorine-alkaline plant with PCI,. In fact, PCI, is
often produced inadvertently at PCI, plants when
operating conditions are not carefully controlled. If
necessary, Iraq probably could use hydrogen chloride,
which-although not the optimum chlorinating agent
in sarin production-is an extremely common indus-
trial chemical. (S NF)
We have not identified specific Iraqi efforts to pro-
duce the alcohols needed in the manufacture of Sarin
and related G-series nerve agents, but such production
could already be taking place as part of Iraq's exten-
sive petrochemical industry. Methanol, a precursor
common to these agents, is a basic industrial chemical
and may well be produced in an Iraqi petrochemical
plant using methane from natural gas as a feedstock.
The production method for the sarin precursor isopro-
panol is nearly as straightforward. In addition, the
United States and Western Europe produce over 2
million tons of this chemical annually, and it is readily
available on the open market. The alcohols required
for soman and GF-pinacolyl alcohol and cyclohex-
anal, respectively -arc somewhat less common, but
Iraq should be able to produce at least the latter from
indigenously available petrochemicals.
 'Pesticide formulation is a process more basic than pesticide
production. Formulation entails the addition of solvents and emulsi-
ficrs to the relatively pure technical grade pesticide. The formulat-
ed product is the rcady-to-mix pesticide "concentrate" available in
stores, which may contain only a few percent active ingredient
In addition, the formulation facility could also be used
to conceal efforts to improve the dissemination char-
acteristics of CW agents. One technology potentially
being investigated by Iraq is microencapsulation-a
process in which small droplets of pesticides, CW
agents, toxins, or other materials are coated with a
layer of protective material such as gelatin. The
resulting product can be disseminated more evenly,
and the protective coating can be customized to
release the contents under specific conditions of light,
moisture, temperature, or other environmental fac-
tors. Because of the dual-use nature of this technol-
ogy, microencapsulation equipment purchased for use
in a pesticide formulation facility could be applied to
CW as well. A formulation facility might also pur-
chase equipment for production of granulated or
 dusty CW agents.
New CW Agents and Production Methods-
Developing a More Potent Arsenal
the process, and rely on indigenously produced or
Improved Production Methods
Since the cease-fire with Iran, the Iraqis apparently
have been optimizing their CW agent production
processes and searching for new routes of manufac-
ture. The goals of this effort probably are to simplify
the production of CW agents, reduce bottlenecks in
The Iraqis
probably also have been experimenting with various
' The United States and other nations have pursued binary chcmi-
cal weapons to minimize hazards associated with handling and
storage of highly lethal agents. We believe that Iraq is developing
binaries primarily to lengthen the shclf life of its chemical muni-
tions, although safety concerns may have played a small role in its
 Delivery Systems-Maintaining a
Wide Range of Options
Bombs, Shells, and Rockets-Tried and True
The Iraqis have the capability to fill a variety of
munitions systems with chemical agents. During the
Iran-Iraq war, they delivered a large amount of
agents with 250-kg aerial bombs, 90-millimeter (mm)
air-to-ground rockets, and helicopter-mounted aerial
spray devices Iraq also
has chemical rounds for its 82-mm and 120-mm
mortars and its 122-mm and 130-mm artillery. It also
has used 122-mm artillery rockets filled with CW
agents, particularly in the final year of the war. These
rockets were loaded with multiple plastic canisters of
Ballistic Missiles-The Long-Range Option
Iraq is developing a long-range CW delivery capabili-
ty to augment its extensive short-range tactical capa-
bilities. Most obvious, and probably of greatest con-
cern, is the development of chemical warheads for
ballistic missiles.' Iraq probably will develop and
' Iraq presumably may also have planned to develop a chemical
round for its planned "big gun"-the extremely long-range artillery
piece that achieved notoriety in early 1990 with the seizure by
British Customs of barrel segments and the assassination of Gerald
Bull, the gun's developer
manufacture chemical warheads for each kind of
missile under development.' F__~
' A missile's range can be extended by reducing the weight of the
warhead or airframe. Iraq probably will use lightweight materials
in the manufacture of its Al Husayn and Al Abbas missiles to
reduce the weight of the airframe. This will give the domestic
variants greater range/payload capabilities than the existing modi.
fied Scuds. However, such structural changes to the airframe would
 Is=
There are cheaper ways for Iraq to deliver chemical
munitions than a ballistic missile. Artillery and air-
craft can do the job and with more precision, at least
at present. Ballistic missiles will be the preferred
delivery system, howcver, because they provide great-
er standoff capability, cannot be easily defended
against, and offer more prestige and higher deterrent
value. Although Iraq has had great success using
ballistic missiles armed with conventional high explo-
sives against cities, the inaccuracy of its missile
systems makes the use of chemical warheads very
attractive. Because chemical warheads can disperse
lethal concentrations over a larger area, they are more
cost effective, result in a greater number of human
casualties, and provide a psychological edge. F_
Iraq will have to take several important factors into
account when developing a chemical warhead. It
probably will need to flight-test a chemical war-
head-at least with a simulated agent fill-before
being confident that the warhead would function
properly. Iraq also will have to develop or purchase a
different fuzing mechanism because these agents are
optimally dispensed above ground level (no more than
several meters for nonpersistent agents like sarin,
somewhat higher for persistent agents like mustard
and VX). Dissemination is best achieved as an aero-
sol-either instantaneously by a burster or more
gradually through ports by an explosive-driven piston-
type mechanism. The missile's flight could produce
instability in the liquid fill; for this reason, bomblets
are often preferred. When the warhead is bulk-filled,
a void must be left to allow for heat expansion during
flight. In extreme cases, heat can cause deterioration
of the agent fill- sarin is more susceptible to this
Iraq gradually built up a protective CW capability
during the Iran-Iraq war, primarily to minimize Iraqi
casualties from inadvertent exposure to its own chemi-
cal attacks. However, protection against Iranian CW
attacks became necessary toward the end of the war
as Iran began limited use of its vastly inferior chemi-
cal arsenal. Iraq has continued tocxpand its protec-
tive capability following the cease-fire, probably with
the realization that future use of chemical weapons in
conflicts involving potential adversaries like Iran,
Israel, and Syria probably would not be so strongly
skewed in Iraq's favor.
 Outlook-Deterrence, Self-Sufficiency, First-Use
Considerations, and Threat to the United States
In our judgment, Iraq believes it needs chemical
weapons for deterrent purposes, primarily against
Israel, and as a key weapon supporting its professed
role as military "protector" of the Arab world. The
Iraqis believe their chemical weapons are suitable
deterrents against Israeli nuclear weapons and devel-
oped this theme in an early 1990 press campaign.
Continued emphasis on developing new or improved
strategic systems-such as longer range surface-to-
surface missiles and the "big gun" long-range artil-
lery project-probably is tied to Iraq's desire to
improve the lethality and range of its chemical threat.
We believe that Saddam Husayn takes great pride in
Iraq's weapons programs and uses them to tout Iraqi
power and prestige. Iraq often highlights its advanced
 military capabilities to promote its bid for leadership
of the Arab world. Completing development of mod-
ern, self-sufficient CW production and delivery sys-
tems is a key element in Iraq's quest for recognition as
the "protector" of the Arab world.F____-]
Iraq will continue to give high priority to development
of its CW production facilities and delivery systems.
The trend toward self-sufficiency and redundancy in
these areas parallels Iraq's efforts in other top-priority
programs, such as the surface-to-surface missile pro-
gram. We assess that Iraq seeks self-sufficiency in
these programs to ensure immunity from supply dis-
ruptions like the embargoes Iraqi procurement en-
countered during the Iran-Iraq war. Likewise, redun-
dant production and delivery capabilities are a
response to the lesson learned from Israel's 1981 air
attack on the Osirak reactor that, by bombing the key
element in Iraq's nuclear program, crippled Iraq's
nuclear efforts for at least several years.
We judge that tactical use of chemical weapons in
support of conventional offensive and defensive opera-
tions has been incorporated into Iraqi military doc-
trine. Iraq utilized chemical weapons primarily during
the last half of the Iran-Iraq war, which led to
battlefield develeFtnent of Iraq's CW doctrine. The
decision to use chemicals during the war, however,
was undoubtedly influenced by the lack of a signifi-
cant Iranian countercapability. We believe Iraq will
be less likely to initiate use of chemical weapons in
future scenarios if its opponent is armed with a
credible CW capability. (S NF)
We assess that Iraq's extensive CW capability poses a
serious threat to US forces and interests in the Middle
East. Iraq has the capability to deliver large amounts
of CW agents on the battlefield and has shown a
Recent activity at Iraqi chemical weapons production
and storage areas strongly suggests that Iraq's expedi-
tionary forces have ready access to a fairly sizable
CW stockpile. The presence of trucks in the munitions
filling and storage areas at Samarra and of canisters
adjacent to a special weapons bunker at Tallil airfield
in August 1990 is similar to chemical weapons ship-
ping activity seen in 1988. At that time, such activity
usually was indicative of imminent use of CW, be-
cause Iraqi nerve agents had a very limited shelf life.
However, Iraq may by now have developed binary
sarin weapons with a much longer shelf life. As a
result, Iraqi forces probably now can maintain signifi-
cant stocks of chemical weapons and use them at its
In our judgment, the CW agents Iraq is most likely to
use in an incursion into Saudi Arabia are sarin
(probably in binary munitions) and mustard. Sarin
would be the agent of choice for targets that Iraq
wants to occupy quickly-including oilfields and oth-
er key objectives-as well as on battlefield defenses.
Mustard might be used to protect Iraqi flanks and,
against key transportation nodes, to hinder movement
and resupply of opposing forces. The semipersistent
nerve agent GF could be used in place of sarin if the
target need not be captured immediately. Agents less
likely to be used-but still potential threats-include
the nerve agents VX and soman, nitrogen mustard,
and perhaps even nonlethal tear gas and vomiting
agents.
Of the many CW delivery systems available to Iraq,
we believe that artillery rockets and aircraft-delivered
bombs are the most likely to be used by Iraq. It is
possible that Iraq has already produced a few chemi-
cal warheads for its Scud-type missiles; if it has
indeed done so, Iraq would greatly increase its capa-
bility to strike Saudi population centers, airfields, and
staging areas with CW agents.
 M~
 Appendix B
Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons
Iraqi use of chemical weapons against Iran can be
divided into three distinct phases. The first phase,
which continued until 1986, involved the use of CW
agents in a strictly defensive role, to disrupt or halt
Iranian offensives. In a transitionary phase lasting
from late 1986 to early 1988, Iraq used chemical
weapons preemptively against staging areas prior to
Iranian offensives, while continuing to rely on CW to
disrupt these offensives. Finally, and most significant-
ly, Iraq used massed nerve agent strikes as an integral
part of its well-orchestrated offensives in the spring
and summer of 1988. The success of these offensives
prompted Iran to accept a cease-fire in August 1988.
We assess that Iraq decided to use chemical weapons
as a force multiplier, to compensate for Iran's man-
power advantage. Iraq's use of CW helped to mini-
mize Iraqi personnel and land losses by stalling
Iranian human wave attacks. Iraqi CW use was
enhanced by the limited Iranian CW protective capa-
bility and Iran's inability to retaliate in kind on any
During the early days of the war, Iraq's use of CW
agents was often ineffective. Many of these early
problems can probably be attributed to poor Iraqi CW
employment techniques. In some cases the Iraqis
would use agents under unsuitable weather condi-
tions, such as when the wind was blowing toward their
own troops. In the case of aerial CW bombs, Iraqi
pilots would release chemical munitions from alti-
tudes too high to permit accurate, concentrated
strikes.)
As the war progressed, the Iraqis became much more
proficient in the use of chemical weapons. We believe
that one contributing reason for this was the delega-
tion of CW release authority to Iraqi corps-level
commanders in 1986. This permitted better integra-
tion of CW into battlefield planning. Before 1986,
release for CW was held at the highest levels of the
Iraqi Government.F__~
 Reverse Blank 27 T-Sp et
 IN=
Chemical Warfare Agents
and Field Employment
In general, the amount of CW agent delivered deter-
mines the extent of contamination and the number of
casualties. A rough rule of thumb is that 1 ton (or
about four 55-gallon drums) of agent is enough to
effectively contaminate 1 square mile of territory if
properly disseminated. The number of resultant casu-
alties depends on the number of people in the contam-
inated area, length of warning, degree of protection,
and persistency and toxicity of the agent used. The
persistency of a specific agent (length of time it
remains effective) varies, depending on the type of
munition used and the weather conditions. For exam-
ple, the persistency of sarin under hot, windy condi-
tions is much less than one hour; the persistency of
mustard or VX may be several days to weeks under
cool, calm conditions. In all cases, given sublethal
doses of an agent, incapacitation will occur to varying
degrees.
Blister Agents
Blister agents are primarily used to cause medical
casualties. These agents may also be used to restrict
use of terrain, to slow movements, and to hamper use
of materiel and installations. Blister agents affect the
eyes and lungs and blister the skin. Sulfur mustard,
nitrogen mustard, and lewisite are examples of blister
agents. Most blister agents are insidious in action;
there is little or no pain at the time of exposure except
with lewisite, which causes immediate pain on
contact.
Mustard is preferred over lewisite because lewisite
hydrolyzes very rapidly upon exposure to atmospheric
moisture to form a nonvolatile solid. This conversion
lowers the vapor hazard from contaminated terrain
and decreases the penetration of the agent through
clothing. Lewisite is less persistent than is mustard;
however, the persistency of both is limited under
humid conditions.
Blood Agents
Blood agents are absorbed into the body primarily by
breathing. They prevent the normal utilization of
oxygen by the cells and cause rapid damage to body
tissues. Blood agents such as hydrogen cyanide (AC)
and cyanogen chloride (CK) are highly volatile and in
the gaseous state dissipate rapidly in air-generally
within minutes. Because of their high volatility, these
agents are most effective when surprise can be
achieved against troops who do not have masks or who
are poorly trained in mask discipline. In addition,
blood agents are ideally suited for use on terrain that
the user hopes to occupy within a short time. Blood
agents rapidly degrade a mask filter's effectiveness.
Therefore, these agents could also be used to defeat a
mask's protective capabilities when combined with
other agents.
Choking Agents
Choking agents are the oldest CW agents. This class
of agents includes chlorine and phosgene, both of
which were used in World War I. In sufficient
concentrations, their corrosive effect on the respira-
tory system results in pulmonary edema, filling the
lungs with fluid and choking the victim. Phosgene is
more effective than chlorine because it is slowly
hydrolyzed by the water in the lining of the lungs,
forming hydrochloric acid, which readily destroys the
tissue.
These agents are heavy gases that remain near ground
level and tend to fill depressions such as foxholes and
trenches. Because they are gases, they are nonpersis-
tent and dissipate rapidly, even in a slight breeze. As a
result, these are among the least effective traditional
CW agents. They are useful for creating a short-term
respiratory hazard on terrain that is to be quickly
occupied.
Nerve Agents
Nerve agents, including tabun (GA), sarin (GB), Bo-
man (GD) and VX, are members of a class of
compounds that are more toxic and quicker acting
than is mustard. They are organophosphorus com-
pounds that inhibit action of the enzyme cholinester-
ase. In sufficient concentration, the ultimate effect of
 no=
these agents is paralysis of the respiratory muscula-
ture and subsequent death.
Nerve agents act rapidly (within seconds of exposure)
and may be absorbed through the skin or through the
respiratory tract. Exposure to a lethal dose may cause
death in less than 15 minutes. They are stored in
munitions as liquids and are generally disseminated as
aerosols.
Traditional nerve agents fall into two main classes: G-
series and V-series. The G-series consists of GA, GB,
GD, GE, GF, GH, and a number of similar experi-
mental agents. These agents, particularly GA and
GB, tend to be less persistent than their V-series
counterparts and consequently present less of a skin
hazard. These less persistent agents are used to cause
immediate casualties and to create a short-term respi-
ratory hazard on the battlefield. The more persistent
and generally more toxic V-agents, including VE, VG.
VM, VS, VX, and related experimental agents, pre-
sent a greater skin hazard and are used to create long-
term contamination of territory.
Psychochemicals
Psychochemicals, also considered incapacitants, in-
clude hallucinogenic compounds such as lysergic acid
diethylamide (LSD), 3-quinuclidinyl benzilate (BZ),
and benactyzine. These agents alter the nervous sys-
tem, thereby causing visual and aural hallucinations,
a sense of unreality, and changes in the thought
processes and behavior. Psychochemicals are general-
ly characterized by a slightly delayed onset of symp-
toms and by persistence of symptoms for a period
greatly exceeding exposure time.
The advantage of psychochemicals is their ability to
inactivate both civilian and military personnel for a
relatively short period with essentially no fatalities.
Thus, their use may prove advantageous in areas with
friendly populations. One drawback, however, is that
the effects of many of these agents are unpredictable,
ranging from overwhelming fear and panic to extreme
belligerence in which exposed personnel attack with
little regard for personal safety.
Tear Gas Agents
Tear gas agents fall under the broader category of riot
control agents. They are not considered by the US
Government to be CW agents because they are
nonlethal in all but the highest concentrations. Exam-
ples of this type of agent include orthochlorobenzyli-
dene malononitrile (CS), chloroacetophenone (CN),
chloropicrin (PS), and bromobenzyl cyanide (BBC).
These agents are highly irritating, particularly to the
eyes and respiratory tract, and cause extreme discom-
fort. Symptoms occur almost immediately upon expo-
sure and generally disappear shortly after exposure
ceases.
In military situations, tear gas agents are used to
temporarily reduce the effectiveness of enemy person-
nel. In tactical operations, they can be used to pene-
trate fortified positions and flush out the enemy. Also,
these agents are useful for disrupting human wave
assaults by breaking up formations and destroying the
momentum of the attack. Because tear gas agents are
nonlethal, they can be used near friendly troops
without risking casualties; thus, their use is more
flexible than with conventional CW agents.
Vomiting Agents
Vomiting agents are often considered to be riot
control agents because, under field conditions, they
cause great discomfort but rarely serious injury or
death. Characteristic agents include adamsite (DM)
and diphenyl chloroarsine (DA). In addition to caus-
ing vomiting, these arsenic-based agents may also
irritate the eyes and respiratory system.
The action of vomiting agents may make it impossible
to put on, or continue wearing, a protective mask.
Therefore, in military situations, vomiting agents may
be used in conjunction with lethal CW agents to
increase casualties. They may also be used by them-
selves in proximity to friendly troops and in other
situations well-suited for tear gas agents.
 Kim
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