MEMO FROM RICHARD HELMS TO DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING MILITARY TH
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
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PROGRAM
JUNE 2017
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25. D. C.
2 8 MAY 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT
MILITARY THOUGHT: "Preparation and Conduct of
a Front Offensive Operation on a Maritime Axis
in the Initial Period of a War", by Colonel-
General G. Khetagurov
1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which
appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the
Journal "Military Thought" "Voyennaya MYs1") published by the
Minis*y of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of
Army Commander.
2. For convenience df reference by USIB agencies, the
codeword IRONBARK has been assigned to this series of TOP SECRET
CSDB reports containing documentary Soviet material. The word
IRONBARK is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is to be used only among
persons authorized to read and handle this material.
3. In the interests of protecting our source, IRONBARK
should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office.
Request for extra copies of this report or for utilization of
any part of this document in any other form should be addressed
to:the originating office.
Enclosure
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
3 0 JUN 1992
Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)
LetV
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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence
cc: The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for intelligence,
Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
The Director, National Security Agency
Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy.Commission
National Indications Center
-Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics.
Intelligence Committee
Deputy Director for Research
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Assistant Director for National RAtimates
Assistant Director for Current Intelligence
Assistant Director for Research and Reports
Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence
Director, National Photographic interpretation. Center
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COUNTRY: ?/ USSR
r
SUBJECT 111MILITARY THOUGHT: "Preparation and Conduct
of a Front Offensive Operation on a Maritime
Axis in the Initial Period of a War", by
Colonel-General G. Khetagurov
DATE OF INFO :
APPRAISAL OF
CONTENT
?
?
October 1961
Documentary
SOURCE A reliable source (B).
Following is a verbatim translation of an article
titled "Preparation and Conduct of a Front Offensive
Operation on a Maritime Axis in the Initial Period of a
War", written by Colonel-General G. Khetagurov.
This article appeared in the 1961 Fourth Issue
of a special version of the Soviet military journal
Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This jourhal is
published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by
the Soviets. The 1961 Fourth Issue went to press on
20 October 1961.
Headquarters Comment: The articles cited on page 2
were disseminated as (Gorbatov),
MIUMMEMENUMEN (Gusakovkiy), (Babadzhanyan).
The Yield Service Regulations cited on page 11 were
disseminated as The Malykhin article
cited on page 14 was disseminated as and
the M. Ivanov article on page 19 as
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Preparation and Conduct of a Front Offensive Operation on
a Maritime Axis in the Initial Period of a War
by Colonel-General G. Khetagurov
The theoretical elaboration of the actual problems
of preparation and conduct of front offensive operations
on a maritime axis is not possible without thorough
analysis of the general nature of the initial period of
a nuclear/missile war. Without a clear-cut definition
of the types of military operations to be conducted on
the ground, in the air and on the sea, not taking into
consideration the influence of the weapons of mass
destruction on the utilization .of the types of armed
forces in the first days of a .war, and many other factors
of basic significance, it is impossible to carry out
preparation of troops purposefully and understand the
situation in which the initial operations of maritime
fronts will be conducted.
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As concerns the general nature of nuclear/missile
war, we agree with the opinion given in the pages of the .
Collection in the articles of Generals Gorbatov, Gusakovskiy
and Babadzhanyan*. Th a strategic aspect of the initial
period of a war will be determined above all by the nuclear/
missile strikes delivered by both sides for strategic
purposes. .11-a6-..elaboration'of the theory andjhe. Implementation
of such strikes,;in practice, are npt4a,;01.4,91)04.3:0.-fs. operational
pi.epsrstiOn-and.* mission of the frOntrdt*OVelit .C5,4:..
be incorrect to be silent'aboui-this, because these stakes
In particular will set the operational-strategic situation' .
in theaters of military operations, and consequently, will
also determine the nature of the tasks facing the maritime
fronts.
In the operationgl7strategic.s?ct_ivities_ofjhe missile
troops, in our Opinion, it is essential to differentiate
betWe'en two types of nuclear/missile strikes: intercontinental
delivered by large-.unit-Or-fhe misii-e-troop of strategic
designation, in the interests of the wax as a whole
strikes carried outthe missile troops, long-range ? ssile-.
carrying aviation, an by the forces of the missile-carrying
(.1)
fleet, bringing in, n some cases, the missile weapons of
* Special Collection Of Articles of the JourharWilitary
ssue
, and
an
rst ssue
respectively
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the fronts to assist in armed combat in a given theater of
military operations. Apparently, the latter will be very
closely tied in with the utilization of all types of armed
forces. In actuality, they will be the basis of a strategic
offensive on the TVD (theater of military operations -
teatr voennykh deystviy). Therefore, the thox'oxighconsideration of
all aspects of the concept according to which they are
conducte44-their makeup, and.oftle:results expected, will
be the foremost condition for the correct and purposeful
planning of the front operation on a maritime axis.
It should be assumed that, under the conditions of
the Western Theater of Military Operations, the attainment
of the basicstrategic goals will depend on the destruCtion
of the iia411 mTI?i;ound and air groupings of the enemy
in the internal areas of the European continent,'Wherea
large part of the most important military-economic and
administrative-politidal centers of ZATI) are located..
However, as experience of many exercises shows, it is only
possible to attain these goals by means of simultaneous
destruction of the troop groupings.operating on maritime
axes, most of which lead to important industrial areas.
A series of political centers, large cities, centers of
communication, military-naval bases and ports, and
considerable stocks of materiel means in the :areas_ofthe
bases, are located on the maritime axes. The.most, '
important routes, that connect the armed forceS'of_,NATO
with their main military-economic base and reserVeS:acrOsS
. the. ocean, pass through ,them
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The significance Of maritime axes increei3eSjieinbr,;:
because our probable enemies have .a powerful'naval21:1-eet,_
supplied with the latest combat equipment. FOr
it is not accidental that in a TVD the situation will
to a large extent, on the degree to which it was pipsfiflal.e
to disrupt the enemy's plan on the sea and in.:the CoeSial
zone; to hamper his utilization of missile and air bases
located in maritime areas; prevent strikes by carrier
large units, missile-carrying vessels and submarines;
disrupt naval communication route i; and isolate the enemy
troops located in the theater from the flow of adclitional
forces and means from other continents.
In the fulfilment of these missions, an important role
can be played by front formations operating on maritime axes.
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In coordination with the missile troops and the means of
the fleet they will protect the strategic flank of the armed
forces on the scale of the entire theater of military operations,
to execute the deep envelopment of the basic groupings of
the enemy, disrupting the forming up of his reserves in the
maritime areas, and their transfer and forward movement to
the main axis. The end result of the offensive operations
carried out by the maritime fronts will be that more
favorable condition:Mir-be created for the rapid destruction
of the most important enemy ground troop groupings and for
the establishment of active operations by our fleet on the
broad ocean. *
The Anglo-American command, not without reiSon, supposes
that the naval fleet, in comparison with the other types
of armed forces, will suffer relatively smaller:lOSSes,during
the first days of a war and will retain its :cavakilitY, for
immediate operations. This should be remembered'constantly.
The NATO command will apparently use the strike forces
of the fleet primarily to deliver strikes against groupings
of troops and important operational-strategic objectives on
the land sectors of the theater of military operations,
where the fate of the war will be decided. The force and
depth of the fire effect of the fleet in a case of this,
kind can be very significant. By using carrier Strike
large units, missile-carrying surface vessels, _and Submarines,
the fleet is able to deliver Strikes not onlyag4inStabaStal
against thousands of kilometers from the coast.
_
In this respect the NATO exercise carried out in.,
October 1960 was quite characteristic, durInhh,I?
the first 27 hours of military* operations,.24Ualear
. strikes were de14eled bY'the:means.of oneCir4e7rT.Strike
large unit, including 69-according to theplaiiksa the
high command, 96-for the counteratomic offenSii/4-1474o
prevent the deployment of ground troops,'anc116T-StrikeS
to prevent the deployment of naval forces.- A total of
more than nine-tenths of all the nuclear weapons were used
to destroy ground targets removed up to 500 to 600 km from
the coast.
Hence it becomes evident that under modern conditions
the basis of an enemy nuclear grouping on a maritime axis
may consist not only of the missile weapons of the ground
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troops but basically of the weapons of the fleet. That is
why the situation on the sea, to a greater degree than before,
will influence the development of front offensive operations,
and its influence will spread over a considerable zone,
having widened the area boundaries of the maritime axes.
Of course, not all the maritime axes will be equal
in importance. Their role will be determined in accordance
with operational capacity, the composition of enemy forces,
the presence of important operational .objectives, and other
factors. However, in all conditions, by dint of a11 the
above-mentioned circumstances, in the initial period of a
war, an extremely tense struggle will ensue within the
borders of the maritime axes in order to fulfil extremely
vital and complex operational-strategic missions.'
As shown by the experience of exercises, the basic
principles of conducting an offensive on an ordinary
axis are retained in an offensive operation of a maritime
front. However, the special conditions for developing
combat operations also present special requirements for
conducting operations: the need to take into consideration
all aspects of the situation at sea; determining the concept
of the operation according to the nature of the adjoining
naval theater, the location of naval bases, ports and other
coastal installations. The scope of the operation is
influenced by the depth of the continental part of the
TVD and the balance .of the forces in the naval theater.
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-'Under such conditi9ndis:fi%rst .Of all
operational missions dc'd64Pliblied by the front troops is
widened. In particular, the need arises to seize straits,
islands and peninsulas, to _organize combat operations
with the goal of capturing 'ports and military-nair-alsbases,
to aid the fleet in the destruction of carrier strike large
units, and to destroy coastal missile weapons of the enemy.
The fulfilment of these missions requires special organization
of control, joint utilization of the various types' of armed
forces, application of distinctive methods of operations
of the troops, organization of landing operations, and,
mainly -- close operational and, to a certain degree,
tactical cooperation between the ground troops and the .
naval fleet.
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The nature of the cooperation will depend on the
general conditions for conducting war at sea. For example,
it is known that the decisive role in naval operations is
passing to the submarine fleet, to missile-carrying vessels,
and to missile-carrying aviation, operating in dispersed
formations and delivering strikes from great distances
with nuclear/missile warheads and homing (samonavodyashchiysya)
torpedoes.
Of course, under such conditions there is no :need
to "attach" the fleet to the flanks of the ground troops.
However it is completely apparent that together with the
utilization of its basic forces on the open seas and
oceans, on the sea communication routes of the enemy, as
before, the direct goorteration of thejleet _
matitime_front will have great significance 1,i3;::.deN.ielciPing
the offensive in the entire deptria?the theiterThe
flem.iably cover the maritime flank of the front,
to protect it from strikes from the sea, prevent the
commitment of additional forces of the enemy fleet through
straits into internal bodies of water, ensure the disruption
of his sea transport, etc. Undoubtedly, the participation
of the forces of the fleet will be essential in the
neutralization by fire of enemy installations located on
land, moreover, not only in the coastal zone, but also.
at a considerable distance from the sea.
We are convinced that the reduction of the fOrce.s.
of the fleet, the:cOntractionifjt0,missionsial
in closed seas, thiyplace thea max1tine frit in1iemeiy
'difficult position. In sucii'k'CSe;-ttie
major advantage's. Any possibility of carrying out landing
operations or sea transport.to assist the frontWill :be
almost completely eliminated. The wiping out of :enemy'
groupings pressed up against the sea will be made more
difficult. The front must be constantly aware Of. 11::
possible enemy ,intrusion from the sea, because it. may
be obliged to commit considerable forces to cover the
maritime flank, and to organize along the coast a powerful
system of . dritilanding and antiair defense,,radio counter-
measures, and intelligence, .which will undoubtedly influence
the tempo of development of the operation into the depth.
Therefore, in our opinion, the fleet of a closed sea,
even in modern times, must be strong enough. Its
qualititiVe composition is another matter. We do not
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attempt to make any recommendations on this score, but
consider that the conclusions made on this subject in
the article of Admiral V. Kasatonov deserve serious
attention .4
The mission of securing the maritime flank will have
to be fulfilled by means of a broad maneuver of nuclear/missile
strikes in combination with the swift movement of troops
by air and the creation of operational barriers (including
the placement of nuclear, mines) on the threatened axes.
The pivotal element of the system of cover of a maritime
flank, obviously, must be the mobile coastal missile units
of the fleet, armed with short-range Cruise missilestems
and reinforced as necessary by motorized rifle subUn06:,--
as well as by air obstacle detachments -(vcodushnyy.,Otryad
zagrazhdeniya) and separate antiaircraft misSile(ZURW?
units. ? ?
The most important condition for ensuring the stability
of the maritime flank is maximum exertion in combat not. only
with the ground enemy, but also with the sea enemy, striving
to inflict destruction on the carrier strike large units
before they reach the line of launch of the carrier aviation,
and also the disruption of landing operations being prepared,
at the moment the landing force embarks on the ships or
during their sea passage.
The framework framework of the operation and the actione.o v;the
?
.front troops_will_be greatlyAnTluenced,not.:04 '
openmaritime location
of inlets, islands, and the nature of the'OjAira444.1i
objectives located in the Coastal zone. In-many'.407S
these factors may greatly influence the choice:of;thefOrm
.of operational maneuver, the utilization of nuclear/missile
weapons, and the assigning of missions, to thejr.OtOPCith
the purpose of splitting up and liquidating enemy groupings
pressed up against the sea.
Inasmuch as the ultimate goal of
in most cases, will be related to the
the front operation,
completion of the
the Journal "Military
*Special C ollection of Articles of
Thought", Second Issue, 1960
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destruction of the maritime groupings of the enemy, the
capture of harbor areas, supply bases, and the movement of
troops to the coast, it is expedient to plan and conduct
an offensive on a maritime axis in the entire depth of the
theater of military operations --under the conditions of
the Western TVD, to 1000 to 1200 km. Here it is extremely
important, utilizing the results of strategic nuclear/
missile strikes, to reach the Atlantic coast on the
9th or 10th day of the war, i.e., before the main reserves
of the enemy begin to arrive from the American continent.
The arrival of strike groupings on the coast during
this time period will be realistic withjIdegliate-effectiveness
of massed strategic nuclear:*erikes agaiWt#e eneiyr-- ?
the preservation of the forces of the front and their
immediate transition to vigorous operatioiis
very beginning of t4p.*kif4t. deny theTeneiriy-:**oeSe'_to
our territory; the serious weakening of tWebeMY, fleet,
after which it will not be able to give effective support
to its troops on the continent and the latter will not
be reinforced at this time from bases across the ocean.
On a maritime axis the missile weapons, ground troops,
aviation., and naval fleet can be utilized in various ways.
However, in all cases, it is extremely important to prevent
the enemy from deploying forces on the ground and at sea,
and to start vigorous offensive operatio0 . as, soon as.
possible. As experience Of exercises shoigle.marit*m0
front is extremely interested in_hay0,nikalLeAriti)46:0-*, /
weapons of the-:fieet'fliiiailWdobijeratiOgArth'A'eUSe
vigorously, 'xrdfensivelY, 'and that sue-cediiive-Strikes'
delivered against the enem-y at sea and it ViSeti.
,
On the whole, joint operations of a front, and a
fleet must, in our opinion, be examined as:a single operation
conducted under a joint command with the purpose of _
simultaneously destroying the enemy on the ground axes
and in the adjoining areas of the naval theater. Moreover,
it is expedient to have the fleet of a closed sea, before
it captures the straits area and exits its main forces
into the ocean, under the direct operational subordination
of the front. In the future, most often it will be utilized
independently, but in this case it is essential that the
commander of the front be able to assign missions to the
fleet for supporting the offensive and to coordinate the
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operations of the forces on the ground and at sea.
The unified plan of the offensive operation, conducted
jointly with the fleet, must determine the methods for
destroying missile, ground, and air groupings and groupings
of the naval forces of the enemy. In accordance with the
plan, the system of the front operation provides for the
delivery of a series of successive joint massed nuclear/
missile strikes by the means of the front and fleet;'
the conduct of a swift offensive by small operational
groupings of the ground troops on isolated axes toward
vitally ithportant..areas.and installations of operational
significance on.the coast; the systematic landing.of.:tactical
air and combined amphibious landings; fire support:fdr.the
ground troop:offensiye by the weapons of. missile:units,:
aviationaiii;OW-fleet; the 'organizatioalq,'OMbat:i4th
the naval fokOtiCof the enemy .that :are hal'assi440,:front
troops; screening the maritime flank and thel'riaYal:::
communication routes, and finally, the disruption of enemy
sea transport.
Joint, massed nuclear/missile strikes are planned
jointly by the commanders and staffs of the front and the
fleet. As a rule, it is advisable to conduct a. large part
.of the strikes on behalf of the front from the Calculation.
of the use of their results by, the ground troops. Moreover,
the means of the fleet can be:brought in to destroy the
most important coastal installations, airfields, and
groupings of theenemy However, sometimes 04:0:;1:Vo 4,t4,-,0
will r 613 h (030it t
stAkes-Ori'beha47i5fAhe'flein such-i:b.4707*.71:_
aviation an&miSpile weapons of the front willbe:Utilized,
for 'example?forr:'4he annihilation of enemy .navallbaSes,-for
destroying. his coastal defense units, for "supporting the
penetrationpf.:;_04.Saile7carryinkaviation of:;:thefleetand
for facilitating he breation'of-a favorable !Atuation
at sea.
The basis of ground troop operations is made up of
swift, deep strikes on separate axes with the simultaneous
delivery of enveloping strikes from areas distant from the
sea against important maritime objectives. It is possible
to create 3. to 5 independent tank strike groupings in the
front, consisting of 2 or 3 divisions each, and also a
grouping of forces for utilization as a combined amphibious
landing. In a number of cases, one of these groupings will
advance right along the coast. The main forces, because
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of the indentations in the coastline and the difficulty
of forcing numerous rivers in the estuary sectors. will,
as a rule, operate at a certain distance from the sea.
The maneuver to the sea is possible with limited forces,
because the action of the troops in a solid front along
the entire coast is not expedient at the present time. In
the coastal zone it is only necessary to capture the most
important areas (ports, supply bases, and main road .
junctions), first breaking up the enemy groupings covering
them, pressing them up against the sea and destroying
them piecemeal. The basic objectives in the other areas
should be suppressed or destroyed by nuclear/missile .strikes,
creating zones with high radioactive contamination.
? It is expedient to combinesystematically.the
_ . v,.
envelopment of enemy maritime groupings from.the'groiind with
the sudden 'landing, ()It the flank and in the reirofjhe-: ?
enemy, of combined (naval, air, and tank) landing fordes.
Some consider that in a modern war amphibious landing
forces, because of their great vulnerability lose their
significance. But this conclusion is correct only if it
is based on the old principles of organizing amphibious
landing operations. Obviously, the dispersed formation of
the landing detachments during the sea passage, and the
higher tempo of the landing, will make their viability no
lower than the viability of regular troop groupings..
It should not be forgotten that the utiljzati?npf
,nuclear_weapons,will_grepyga014itate,t4,0044.,..0f;
the iiltil4n4ing -clef " pe-rmit. "
;iMiteefordes and in-i-Shorttime4?to fulfil missions
to a great-a-61)th and with decisive goals. Therefore
we propose that Csmbin0 lEgA4i.n0 (if the fleet gets
fast landing craft for their landing) can and niutb?d
widely in the initial operations Of a futureykar4itThey,
will permit the holding down of eneMyFee67:on'il:
front, will make it difficult to utilize missile.WeaPons:
deployed in'-the maritime areas, will permit more rapid .
transfer?of ground troop efforts into the depth andWill
eliminate the need to pull in forces of the front from
the main axes to capture coastal objectives.
In planning a front offensive operation being conducted
on a:maritime axis, special attention should be given to
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the correct assignment of the missions. The recommendations
of the existing Field Service Regulations (Corps-Division)
concerning this, in our opinion, are outdated. In keeping
with the requirement of the Minister of Defense to carry
out an offensive with an average speed of up to 100:-km
per 24-hour period, the 40.0.,Jgf-the-tas.k41 of the formsutionAL
and largR ITAIgi, in comparison with the norms given in
the Regulations, should be sharply increased. In our
opinion, it is expedient to coordinate the immediate tasks
of the troops with the range of fire of the missile weapons
which are correspondingly. available to the division, army
and front. For example, for the tank divisloa the immediate
task can now be assigned for a ftpth of 25 119Ig_hol.t.he
follow-up task for 5Q.to 69. km,, and the task of, the day
for 109-kM or more. A combified-arms (tank) ann57;.,c,011,4uq.4ng
an offensive on a maritime axis, usually will:gek'
immediate task to a depth of up to 200 to 250 km, and
fulfilment is calculated to take 2 to 3 calendar days
Tasks for groupings conducting an offensive along the
coast should be assigned, and the method of operation,.'
should be pointed out, in the greatest detail, especially
if they have to capture a strait zone in order to achieve
maximum coordination of their efforts with the utilization
of the forces and means of the naval fleet.
The great depth of the tasks and the necessity of .
continuous development of the offensive of the, p,aritilipat?
fleet requirei: constant concern regarding the preservation ?
iof.,thecombat effectiveness of the strike_groppiiltOZ4fthe tr?ops,,
- -
At the moment it is hard to count on the.abilito
the motorized rifle division to conduct continuoij
operations for more than two, and a tank divisiOnfOrMOre.
than three to four, calendar days. Under su6115400j0nO'i_
great skill is necessary to prevent the premature weakening
of troop efforts. The commanders of the front:and-ih
armies must take the most energetic steps for ihe'cont:
maintenance of the most important strike groupings at the
minimum necessary combat strength. This pertains especially
to the troops operating apart from the main forces, on
islands, or those being used for amphibious landings The
maintenance of their combat effectiveness, obviously may
be attained not only by committing to combat the reserves.
coming up from the zone of interior, but first of all by
having friendly large units that have lost their combat
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effectiveness, put back into service quickly. For this
the time limits for bringing a division to full strength
must be drastically reduced: for a motorized rifle division,
up to three, and for a tank division, up to four, calendar
days.
The restoration of troop combat effectiveness must be
executed according according to the unified plan of the front in
accordance with the actual concept of the operation.
Moreover, in some cases it is expedient to give the salvaged
materiel and, personnel of the large units taken out of Combat
to the other troops in the first echelon, and:stoutilize
the staffs that have been relieved thereby.as.reserye.organs
of control temporarily. In other casesp'itjs *posElible to
create -from*a division a composite detachm.entrregimen,_
'designated for the continuation of combat7a4iorls;and
to conduct the remaining units to the rear ai.ea-to.':bking
them up to strength as fast as possible by centralized
maneuver of the stock of rehabilitated vehicles in routine
maintenance and the bringing up Of personnel brought in
by aircraft from the depth of the country.
* * *
The conduct of the first front offensive operation on
the maritime axes demands all-round training of troops,
great combat efficiency and deep insight in the work of
all the organs of control,' the ability of_the'co*itn4ere
and staffs , to resolve iC01010i0flicl.74ems 1-pkAo:oihyl4;,_
arise for the troops, in it:'Sfibit:petiod-15-miTSP
*mobility in operations is necessary during 16e. period w1
the forces are brought to increased combitTieidineSs]dn4
at the moment the troops are :Withdrawn from und.**i*clear/
missile strike being preparedlak:the enemy.
In short periods of time the location of=the anti-
aircraft missile troops, radiotechnical equipment, land
missile units of the front and army must be completely
changed, aviation has to be dispersed; control points have
to be moved, pontoon-bridge cover of the most important
crossings must 'be organized; the dispersal of materiel
reserves is carried out, etc. At the same time, in
coordination with the fleet, screening measures should be
carried out for antiair and antilanding screening of the
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maritime flank, and also aerial reconnaissance of the enemy
should be organized in the direction of the sea. Subsequently,
every 10 to 12 hours it is necessary to move not less than
half, and after a 24-hour period, all,units and fire deans,
without exception,to new areas, taking into consideration
that in the maritime zone the enemy reconnaissance may
be most active.
In our opinion, the dispersal of the rear services
will present the greatest difficulty because of the lack
of time and transport. Therefore, so as not to take on
too much work, it is expedient to plan therfUlfilment of
this, task in certain phases: the first - in 2 or3 hours,
the second - in 10..to 15 hours and the third - 1 to 1.5
calenda daysiist,of.all, missile warheads and supplies
of aircraft fuW0tored'in the open at airfieldshOUld,be
dispersed. Then 'beginsthe dispersal of the other types
of ammunition and fuel, i.e.,. to unload part of them on
the ground and keep the rest in the motor vehicle transport
of divisions, armies, districts (groups of forces), on
ships at sea and at railroad freight relays (zheleznodorozhnaya
"letuchka") at small stations and runs.(peregon). It is
advisable in the beginning to leave materiel maintained in
underground storage areas-in place, because its destruction
with the first strike is unlikely.
The development of the first front offensive operation
on a maritime axis,will,usuallybejied inwith_themoying
12'1Y4PffOrce0-40;104f0:1P.P.WAOrY2..4A0R90,010.,A40-1:
with the initiii#W44:144#.04.144-04ti**Z044
the ConcentratiOn7oltiOaps with their b'eing:brpugh:0)Ut:
to a line 200 to 300 km from the border and_theeploident
of troops withthe,immediate creation of operational groupings
During concentration 'the_large:Unit6 andfunitsnjnibst
cases, will Iave:to.bel3rought.outin extremely dispersed
formations, in a brCad zone and over a large number' Of .
routes, utilizing all types of transport. In the process
of deploying,the troops ilst move out to the 'tOcis designated
to them mainly under their own power, in a specific grouping
and in full readiness to go into battle precipitately.
The maximum increase of the speeds of march in order to
approach the enemy attains great significance here because
this will sharply reduce troop losses.
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It should be expected that on a maritime axis the
enemy, using the capabilities of his fleet, will apply
the maximum efforts to disrupt the moving out of our troops.
For this purpose, on a number of lines and at large water
barriers he can create "nuclear fire barriers", extensive ?
zones of radioactive contamination, and also destroy
permanent bridges over rivers such as The Western Bug,
Vistula, and Oder.
As shown by the experience of many exercises for
the timely creation of strike groupings it is essential
that, under such circumstances, the troops moving out
from the depth not be dependent on bridge crossings. In
tank divisions, to be exact, for each tank regiment it
is expedient to have a company of tracked, self-propelled ,
ferries, to switch the motorized infantry to amphibious
armored troop carriers; and in the combat-engineer battalion
of the division, to have a landing-crossing company instead
of one of the combat-engineer companies.
13(a)(4)
1?
Besides, on the estuary sectors of the most important
rivers that intersect the maritime axes, already inF-peacetime,
we Inv:at_ carry out advance preparation of components for
the construction of underwater bridge crossings, and mainly,
for setting up 3 or 4 underground tunnel crossings for
through railroad and motor vehicle traffic. With this
purpose in mind, golonl-General F. Malykhin,proposesthe.
construction of duplicate bridges ..(mosty7dubler)",:.*?AloW0er,
su60.468:,are:,:ii.O,JeSS vpineriblgithanTAhe'r..balicC-000,ings,
while'tthe-destruction'of tunnels' entails great difficulties.:
One of the special features of moving the troops?out
will be the utilization of seati-ansport The use of, sea
transport may Play an important role.in Closed seas, and,
also when land communication routes of the maritime 'front
are disrupted. Unfortunately, because of the?lack?of
transport ships and the inability to concentrate them in
advance at loading points, the movement of large units
of ground and missile troops at full strength by sea is
.improbable in the first operation:? The transport of materiel,
combat equipment, and replacements may be carried out on
quite large scales.
ecial Collection of Arti les of the,Journal "Military.
T oug econ ssue, ..e
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imairaw 'am)
The capture of the straits zone will be a very important
mission of a maritime front in the operation of the initial
period of a war. This will permit the fleet to exit swiftly
into the open sea, to put into effect operations on enemy
sea communication routes, and mainly, to assure more effective
support of the advancing groupings of the ground troops
over the entire depth of the theater.
The capture of the straits zone must be predecled by Powerful
nuclear/missile suppression of the enemy system of defense
in the maritime zone, on islands and peninsulas,. and also
the weakening of the enemy fleet by striketh again'ethis,
vessels at bases and on the sea. It is 'alsotOMportant,
to prevent the planned withdrawal of enemy troops from
land axes, for which it is necessary, in th0:40riestji0Ssible
time, to break through to the approaches of ith?traits,
at least with separate tank large units.
The basic method for capturing the straits zone will be
a determined offensive by the tank grouping of the combined-
arms army combined with the landing of joint air and amphibious
landings in the areas.that ensure control oirer the straits.
It is expedient to carry out the special landing operation
taking into account the simultaneous capture of all islands
and peninsulas in the zone of the straits. However, with
a shortage of forces it is possible to use the method of
their subsequent capture. ,
?_
Experience shows that for the successfihxdu
a landing operation it is necessary to increaSe
maximum the rate of embarkation, of the sea pasqage, an_
especially the debarkation, of troops on thejiihOie',_eiist!re
effective fire support for the landing troonbLthe means
of the front or army missile units, aviaioriild'Vegs0114
of the fleet, and also their constant reinfb$006t-Wthe
forces and weapons subsequently delivered by air
In our opinion, the basis of a combined landing, when
landing at considerable distances, must consist mainly of
an amphibious landing, and in closed seas over limited
distances (up to 25-30 km)--of a tank landing with individual
means of flotation (type RSTU). It is true that at the
preseht time the execution of a tank landing entails great
difficulties because amphibious tanks, and even mor& so
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T-54 and T-55 tanks, do not have navigational instruments,
are not sufficiently seaworthy, and require a considerable
amount of time for demagnetization. But these deficiencies
can be remedied.
.3(a)(4)
It is expedient to execute tactical and, even more so.
amphibious landings over a broad front in several (at least
4-5) points at the highest possible speed, avoiding the
gradual buildup of forces on the shore. For this, simultaneously
with the start of the amphibious landing, it is necessary
to disembark a helicopter landing force at a distance of
3 to 5 km, and an airborne landing force 25 to, 30 km, from
the shore. With the support of the 'missile units of the
front and the fleet, the subunits that have landed must
develop the offensive swiftly on the designated axes, or
they will be wiped out.
In the course of an offensive operation on a maritime
front, the main efforts must be concentrated on the
destruction of Ate means of nuclear attack, and also the
ground and air groupings of the enemy, with missile/nuclear
and chemical strikes, operations of the aviation, and of
missile-carrying vessels. Together with this it is
necessary to organize the swift movement of tank troops
to the siting areas of enemy missile weapons.
. .
In the initial operation of. a .maritime front,i combat
with the groupings of enemy grOunforce*.wiIi"*St:Oten
take the form::4J:144-ge:.Meeti4g.W440*iii.OigthattWOW.47e-
arise Vari-6-404Feiv,IiiriarU*PPt
Success achieved in these engagements M:Uisi_15041-UZ64:-
decisively. Enemy forceS that were able to survive niUSA
be split up, pressed back to the Coast, forced into zones
of radioactive contamination ifia, by blockade from the sea,
be destroyed with joint strikes by nuclear weapons, aviation,
and the fleet.
For the decisive destruction of,enemy maritime groupings,
the high tempos of troop offensives will have special
significance. In the maritime zone, the achievement of
this, in the light of the complexity of the military-geographic
conditions, entails great difficulties. But nevertheless,
even here, it is completely realistic to bring up the question
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of speeds of up to 100 km per 24-hour period. This requires
a further increase in the effectiveness of nuclear-fire
support and the use of more expedient methods of operation
of the ground troops, including increasing of the speed of
the attack, reducing the time for deploying large units,
the decisive utilization of intervals and gaps in the combat
formations of the enemy.
It is known that in the past the average speed of a
tank attack was approximately 8 to 12 km/hour. This was
conditioned by the possibilities of conducting aimed fire
from the old type tanks, and also by the need to maintain
constant fire coordination between the. NPP (close infantry
support-nePosredstvennaya podderzhka pekhoty) tanks and
.the infantry following them. At the present'tiMethi#2,
method of operation becomes unacceptable, The'attiOlcShould
not be *carried out on a solid front but on axes, wherein
the speed of the attack should attain up to 15 to 18 km/hour,
because only in this way is it possible to avoid the destruction
of troops at the lines of deployment by nuclear weapons and
the fire of guided missiles of the enemy antitank means.
In practice the possibility of conducting an attack
at a speed of 15 to 18 km/hour is predetermined by the
presence.of two-plane stabilizing devices for tank armament
and the feasibility of operations of the motorized infantry
when precipitately breaking through the hastily assumed
,defense,inarmored:personnel_carriers.withc4441ismOUntin_g.,,
In any case, as showby the experience24*AYPYOWO" -
exercisesh J0,20.471 t 4t WISkapi
Northern Group of For? it is now possible toensure
fairly high effectiveness of destroying targets when Moving.
For example, at the autumn divisional tactical exercises ?
of 1960, at an attaCk-speed of up to 18 kM/houi_theta.nk.
battalions, operatidg.in'the first echelon/r:8ucCe4tti1.32y
fulfilled all firp tasks, having ensured the destruction
of 83 to 92 percent Ofthe gun and 81 to 86 percent of
the machine gun targets.
The decisive utilization of gaps and breaches in the
combat formations of the enemy may play a big role in
increasing the speed of the offensive. However, such a
method of operations cannot be stereotyped. The strike
groupings or large units that have entered the breach may
often find themselves in a "pocket" (v "meshke") and will
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103(a)(4)
be subjected to a mass enemy nuclear strike. Therefore,
the offensive in the gaps of combat formations should be
conducted in more dispersed formations, and mainly - with
maximum speed.
The correct organization of fire support,and mainly
constant coordination of the missile weapons of the front
and fleet at their full range, attain primary significance.
In particular, we consider that the fleet, using its high
maneuverability, must give effective fire support to the
strike groupings of the maritime front, not only the ones
advancing along the coast, but also those operating at a
distance from the sea. In our opinion, the basis of such
support must consist of destroying the missile weapons :_
of the enemy fleet with the forces of the navy, and also to
destroy important ground objectives and.reserves with nuclear
warheads from great_distances, in the entire depth of the
maritime axes.
The complex nature of modern offensive operations
requires fundamental improvement of the entire system of
troop control of a Maritime front. The principle of
simultaneous direction of the combat operations of troops
on the ground, in the air:, and at sea from great distances,
by technical means, electronic-computing and .automatic
devices, should be incorporated in the basis of control.
It is also necessary to increase sharply the operational
.,efficiency ..of the ..work of commanders and,,qtaffs and to
,asspre,..V;tp.':p9SP1_1443,:_ril9t.:,.,pi3O.1,:iinmediti:tizi.!::,0;:iii
it.00t9 the
lightest changes ofthiperational
. .
and naval situation.
Unfortunately, the existing system of control, as has
been pointed out in print several times, does. not fulfil
the indicated requirements in many ways. Even before complex
automatic systems of control are created, it is necessary
to carry out a reorganization of the control points, put
in order the collection, processing, and routing of operations
and intelligence information at the operational and tactical
levels, work out the system of "flash (tranzitnaya)
information", create calculating-analytical and computing
centers in the staffs, and ensure the quick assignment of
tasks, and monitoring of the results of the strikes inflicted.
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IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII
In the light of what has been said, let us examine
the proposals given by Major-General M. Ivanov in his
article.* The idea of creating centers (command, operations-
intelligence, nuclear/missile, and VVS and PVO control),
as elements of the command post (KP) and the forward command
post (PKP) of the front, was already worked out in the
Northern Group of Forces in 1959, and was carried out in
practice in three front operational command-staff exercises
locally which were described in the Information Bulletin SM.
No. 1 (Northern Group of Forces - Severnaya Uruppa Voysk)
in the beginning of 1960. The recommendations of. General
M. Ivanov resemble this system in form, but in subs#4?
distort its meaning and are proposal "
to unite all the directorates and departments, all
services and staffs of the arms of troops which areT
concerned with the direction of troops4nt0iiii4edeontrol
centers" in practice means the elimination:Of:stiff
which is unrealistic and wrong.. NO:dentekS7dan.4CSsinue
the full volume of the functions of staffs'idireCtOrtes
and departments. In our-opinion, it is Impossible to.
replace the staffs with any kind of centers, either now
or in the future. Centers should be created, not as
replacements, but based on the staffs, as their organic
elements, as combat teams called in to performtasks of
immediate direction of an engagement and the utilization
of the means of the front.
1.3(04)
It is also impossible to agree with .theprOppsal-
to create a main command-planning center whereas
,
General Ivanov maintains, "the entire planning of thi
operation" must "take place". The operatiOnil7ttlanhing
will be carried out, not by the center,. but by the staff
of the front and all the directorates of the arms of
troops. Therefore a command center is necessaiy,''iandno
a ebmmand-planning center, as the working areacifth'erOilt
troop commander for simultaneous unified direction of all
means of combat, where, in the decisive moments of the'T'
Operation, the chiefs of the missile troops and PVO troops,
the commander of the air army and a representative of the.
fleet may be located, connected to their operating apparatus
by selector and television communications.
* Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military
Thought", First Issue, 1961.
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inumminii3(a)(4)
Finally, it is necessary to note that the centers
justfly themselves only in the event they are prdperly
equipped. For example, in the command center created in
the Northern Group of Forces there are electkified registers
(tablo) of the readiness of missile weapons and nuclear
warheads, of fighter aviation and antiaircraft means;
a signal-code device for transmitting commands, and also
a screen of the operational situation and radiation situation
and of the situation at seat the air and PV0 situation and
the situation of the control of missile troop fire. In a
semialltomatic manner the screen gives the data about the
situation of friendly and enemy troops. Moreover these
screens are not used for obSOrVation, as General.M,Oyanov
recommends, but for making specific decisions based an'
them and for giving orders to the troops. ,The 'principle
of organizing and equipping the command center is shown
on the diagram.
One of the most important questions of control is the
organization of coordination with the naval fl-:et.:; Under
the conditions of the Western TVD, this coordination, in
our opinion, must be organized mainly on behalf of the ,
troops of the maritime front. Moreover, the joint operations
of the fleet and front for the nuclear-fire Suppression
of the enemy on land and at sea, the conduct of joint,
massed nuclear/missile strikes, support of the amphibious
landings, and also all questions of intelligenoS,:10.Vglkaaio
countermeasures, and operational camouflage MUittbe:,coordinated
with specia?00roUgliheSEr--- - ? _
-
A strict method of Mutual exchange Of::operatiOAS:and
intelligence information-mustjpe established between the
staff of the front of of_ the_fle,tAn_orrly
system for directing oOratio
ensure-the fasteSt1S64611516-ieSolution OfallinatterS:. -
concerning joint operations of the ground troops and the
naval fleet during their simultaneous fulfilment of overall
operational tasks. ?
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Fundamental Scheme of the Organisation and Equiiiing of the Command Center
9
9
99
ET - of the readiness EE No. 2 - of the control' EE No. 1 - of the operational,
of missile artillery and of missile troop fire .- radioactivity situation and
of nuclear marheads the 'situation at sea
To artillery
Co center
0
4 E
E.15
1 0
Chief of missile
0 eel
t troops and
artillery
ray
Tocome center
of combat unit
Naval
representation
TKO - Signal - coda device
?1(1 - Selector ooMmunications
- Television souipsent
- to commo canter
(!)
rrant (distrint) troop com,ander
oreenewooneeneenowononee ew e
?
eau - to radio.suitchboard
EE Wo. 3 - of the Air and
FVO situation
Cage of
PVC troopu
ET - combat readi-
ness of fighter
aviation, anti-
aircraft guided
missiles and anti-
aircraft asesunitioi
Air Army
Commander
H43110-4, remote copying device for the semiautomatic entering of the situation
9- Plane table operators (planshetist).
Er- Islectrified register
&C.. Electrified screen