MEMO FROM RICHARD HELMS TO DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING MILITARY TH
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CENTRAL INTELUGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 2.1, D.C.
1 2 DEC 1961
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
SUBJECT
MILITARY THOUGHT: "The Utilization of the Forces
of the Navy in a Missile/Nuclear War", by
Rear-Admiral V. Lisyutin
1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which
appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the
Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya mysin) published by the -
Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of
Army Commander.
2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material
should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office.
Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of
any part of this document in any other form should be addressed
to the originating office.
FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:
RICHARD BELMS
Enclosure
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Original: The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
cc: Military Assistant to the President
Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
Director for Intelligence
The joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Headquarters, U. S. Air Force
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
Director, National Security Agency
The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission
Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Assistant Director for National Estipates
Assistant Director for Current Intelligence
Assistant Director for Research and Reports
Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence
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' COUNTRY
SUBJECT
USSR
DATE OF INFO:
APPRAISAL
OF CONTENT :
1.3(444
ILITARY THOUGHT: "The Utilization of the Forces
of the Navy in a Missile/Nuclear War", by
Rear-Admiral V. Lisyutin.
January 1961
Documentary
SOURCE A reliable source (B).
Following is a verbatim translation of an article
titled "The Utilization of the Forces of the Navy in a
Missile/Nuclear War", written by Rear-Admiral V. Lisyutin"-.?
This article appeared in the 1961 First Issue of a special
version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl
(Military Thought). This journal is published irregularly
and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. The 1961 First
Issue was consigned to the press on 13 January 1961.
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The Utilization of the Forces of the Navy
in a Missile/Nuclear War
by
Rear-Admiral V. Lisyutin
1.3(a)(4)
. Each type of armed forces has its strong and weak
aspects. By combining the strong sides of the different
types of armed forces,combat missions can be accomplished
in the most effective way under various conditions. There
cannot be an absolute weapon, capable of accomplishinC
every mission in the most effective way under all
possible conditions. For this reason the different
types of our armed forces are developed according to
their combat characteristics and capacity to accomplish
the main missions in a war in a concrete historical
situation.
. .
One of the main strategic misisions in contemporary
warfare is the disorganization of the enemy's economy.
Itis accomplished mainly by missile troops of strategic
designation who can take action successfully. against
stationary economic targets, most of WhiCh7aie:kiOin-in
advance-. However, besides the latter, then e aid-alsd
mobile economic objectives, in particular transport
ships. It IS known that the aggressive capitalist
countries have at their disposal about 80 million.
registered tons of dry cargo-carrying tonnage and more
than 20 million registered tons of tankers.. .It can be
surmiSed, naturally, that the probable enemy, preparing
to launch a missile/nuclear war, could have all this
tonnage fully loaded in advance and under way at sea or
AispersecLfarialtay from large economic centers. .The
economic supplies on these mobile Objectives are very
considerable and could have a bigr influence on the
course' of armed combat, especially in its initial period.
Missile troops of strategic designation cannot yet strike
at such mobile .objectives effectively. This is a mission
for aviation and the Navy.
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Another most important mission facing the. armed
forces - the destruction of the enemy's means of
nuclear attack - is even more complicated as, besides
the fact that most of these means will be dispersed,
under cover and camouflaged, a'considerable part of
them will prove to be, at the beginning of a war, not
on land, but on the seas and oceans carried on mobile
means - aircraft carriers, missile carriers, submarines
and in maneuvering supply detachments (manevrennyy
otryad snabzheniya).'
If one calculates, on the basis of the norms
adopted in the United States Navy for supplying vessles
with nuclear weapons, intended for operations against
shore and sea objectives, then it will turn out that
not less than 5 or 6 percent of all 'available nuclear
warheads will be concentrated on vessels. In the
seagoing supply bases there will also be not less
than one complete unit of fire, so that altogether
at the beginning of a war, vessels and Supply skips
may be carrying up to 10 to 12 percent of all the
probable enemy's available nuclear warheads, which
cannot be attacked by surface-to-surface (nazemnyy)
ballistic missiles, but must be destroyed by the
forces of the Navy. Thus, a considerable part of
the second basic mission - destruction of the enemy's
mobile nuclear means of attack - must also be
accomplished by the Navy in cooperation with aviation.
. . .
In comparison with other types of armed forces,
the Navy has very important combat characteristics
and possibilities peculiar to itself. These
possibilities are, considerably enhanced by the
introduction of.missile/nuclear*weapons'and atomic
power plants invessels.
In conditions of a sudden outbreak of a missile/
nuclear war, the Navy has greater combat stability than
the other types of armed forces, owing to the_pOssibility
of being at dispersed bases on a long stretch of
coastline, and also of being able to put to sea in
advance. Dispersed naval forces will not present an
attractive target to an enemy for strikes by the
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enemy's multi-megaton nuclear charges (zaryad), the
use of which is most likely at the beginning of a
war, at the time when the large units of other types
of armed forces, though dispersed over large areas,
can be subjected to great destruction as a result of
such strikes.
1.3(a)(4)
If the problem of withdrawing these or other
forces from the enemy's first missile/nuclear strikes
has not been solved successfully, their employment
in the war is very problematical. The possible dispersion
of and partial cover for such forces will not enable
them to avoid losses, and consequently, to retain
their full combat effectiveness. Even the most mobile
type of armed forces - aviation, which, under certain
conditions can be withdrawn directly from a strike,.
will,. if deprived of airfields, lose its combat
effectiveness to a considerable extent. On the other
hand, naval forces deployed at sea, with their main
arm - submarines, cruising submerged, can be withdrawn
most successfully from a strike, and can, therefore,
be used with full .combat effectiveness during the
first strikes at the enemy.
The most Important quality, peculiar to the Navy,
is its ability to deliver powerful strikes at moving
objectives at sea. The forces of the Navy, armed.
with modern missile/nuclear weapons, possess a high
degree of operational-combat capacity. Thus, .the
operational-strategic exercise conducted by the
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy in August 1960 showed
that even one submarine with an atomic power plant .
can make repeated attacks on a. carrier strike large
unit at set and destroy one or two large vessels. A
brigade of such submarines can Successfully. accomplish
the mission of destroying a carrier strike large unit
consisting of several aircraft carriers.and.operating
in .a definite direction occupying', along the front
or three words missinE7.' The destruction of. a
'airier strike large unit-Farrying 100-120 nuclear
warheads means that the enemy is deprived .of these
nuclear warheads for use against our, Installations.
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If one considers the possibility of repeated employ-
ment of the carrier strike large units, then their
destruction will save us from many hundreds and even
thousands of nuclear strikes. -
In the near future the United States will have
up to 40 atomic submarines, armed with 16, and
possibly more, "Polaris" type ballistic missiles with
nuclear warheads. In the course of one cruise
these submarines will be able to use up to 640 and
more nuclear warheads'against our installations, and?
if resupplied twice at sea - up to 2,000 nuclear
warheads. It is mairay the Navy that can conduct
combat against such submarines.
The arming of our submarines with ballistic
missiles with nuclear warheads makes them a very
effective weapons in the accomplishment of the mission
of disorganizing the enemy's economy and destroying
his means of nuclear attack. It is true that in some
respects submarines armed with ballistic missiles.
are inferior to surface-to-surface ballistic.
missile installations (lower accuracy of fire,
reduced readiness in view of the necessity to deploy
and take up firing positions, etc.), but they also
have important advantages.
While surface-to-surface missile installations
?
cannot fire a significant number of salvos in
present-day conditions from the same position without
suffering retaliatory action, a submarine, especially
in launching missiles when submerged, can successfully
make use of.its whole unit of fire. of missiles from
one'positions'remaining.under_wak all the time.
Possessing high maneuverability and concealment,
a missile-carrying Submarine. will, in the initial
period of war, prove'to?be the least vulnerable and
most stable combat means, capable of delivering '
sudden and powerful nuclear strikes in important
directions.
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In modern conditions all ground means are vulnerable
to effective action from enemy nuclear weapons. Moreover,
if they are not destroyed, they will be in the zone of
radioactive contamination, which will reduce considerably
their combat effectiveness. On the other hand, a
missile-carrying submarine, being under water, is not
vulnerable to radioactive contamination, and can always
bypass dangerous zones.
Missile-carrying submarines, being least vulnerable
to a sudden missile/nuclear attack by the enemy, can '
become a special weapon in the hands of the Supreme
High Command. It is not mandatory to use them immediately
on the outbreak of a war; they can be held in reserve
for accomplishing missions directed toward the
successful completibn of the initial period of war.
With the possibility of resupplying missile-carrying
submarines at sea, use can be made of them repeatedly
(both at the very beginning of a war, as well as
.during its initial period and subsequently).
Thus, the Navy possesses important operational-
combat capabilities and advantageously complements
the missile troops of strategic designation in the
accomplishment of the most important strategic missions
with which the armed .forces are faced. However, the
methods of using these capabilities of the Navy and
the methods of. conducting naval operations require,
in our opinion, further serious elaboration.
Even during the most ,important exercises and
games, we have hitherto, in essence, considered the
operations of the Navy only at the very outbreak of
.? a War, and not during the whole of its initial
period, which has afforded possibility for. studying
only questions connected with.delivering the first
strike. It is essential to .work out, the'complete
accomplishment of the basic.missionsAuring the initial
,period of a war, and foremost in the-theoretical-field.
. Let us examine, briefly, .the main 'missions of the
Navy, the possible conditions, and the methods for their
accomplishment.
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The destruction
Navy, nc us ng s r
Trarvessels, and, in
missile carriers, is
Navy.
of the strike forces of the enemy's
e a rcra carr ers, m ss e-carry-
the near future, atomic submarine
one of the priority tasks of the
. At the beginning of a war the probable enemy is
able to deploy up to seven carrier strike large units
(AUS), each consisting on the average of three
aircraft carriers, three cruisers armed with missiles,,,
and 12 to 18 destroyers, armed partly with antiaircraft
missiles. It is most probable that these carrier strike
large units will be distributed in theaters in the
following way: North Atlantic - 3, Pacific Ocean - 2,
Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean - 1 each.
1.3(a)(4)
Combat with carrier strike large units must be
conducted in three directions; destruction of the AUS
themselves, destruction of their mobile supply
detachments at sea, and destruction of the naval bases
at which they are based.
The destruction of the AUS at sea (in the ocean)
must be the main mission of submarines, missile
aviation, of the Navy and long-range aviation. The
destruction of mobile supply detachments at sea, insofar as
they are beyond the range Of aircraft, will be the mission
of submarines. Finally, the destruction of the bases
of carrier strike large units (including the shore bases
of carrier aircraft) must be accomplished by missile
troops of strategic designation. The use of missile-
carrying submarines for the latter mission is also not
excluded.
'Taking into acCount the striving of the. probable
enemy to unleash a war suddenly, it may be expected
that at its outbreak all strike aircraft carrier and
missile-carrier large units will not'be'at bases, but
at sea, at the takeoff lines of.deck-based.aircraft
for strikes. So long as the AUS remain beyond these
lines before the beginning of military operations, there
would in most cases be no grounds for action against
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them before they approach these lines. Consequently,
our forces should be deployed on the probable lines
where. the enemy's deckbased aircraft will take off.
Here, too, should be concentrated the main efforts
of atomic and diesel-battery submarines and missile
aircraft using nuclear weapons, for the most part.
The complications involved in deploying forces
when repelling a sudden nuclear strike by the enemy
at the outbreak of a.war, and the striving to employ
strike aircraft carriers in accordance with the
principle of swift approach, strike, and rapid
withdrawal, cannot always create conditions for the
complete destruction of carrier strike large units
with the first strike, which will require
continuation of operations until the mission is fully
completed. In such circumstances, missile aircraft, .
after reloading, prepare for a repeated strike at
the AUS when the latter makes a new attempt to approach
the line for launching deckbased aircrat, while 'atomic
submarines pursue the enemy and inflict repeated blows
on him. An especially advantageous time for such
strikes will be the period when the vessels are being
resupplied and refueled by the mobile supply detachments,
which must also be objectives for strikes by atomic
submarines.
At the beginning of combat operations, diesel-
battery submarines, disregarding the lines of takeoff:f
for deckbased,air'crattl,.should move farther ahead
with a view to inflicting preventive strikes on
aircraft carriers before the carriers repeat their
approach to the line of takeoff for deckbased aircraft.
Naturally, after the beginning of combat operatiOns,
the lines where the main efforts are to be concentrated
should be Selected with a:view to delivering strikes on
the AUS before they approach to within range of deckbased
aircraft. Atomic submarines, making use of their great
maneuverability, can deliver strikes on AUS.inAhe
ocean wherever they overtake. them.
Such can be the general scheme for the complete
accomplishment of the mission of destroying each AUS.
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Combat with missile-carrying submarines which, on
the outbreak of war, will also be deployed in lines
from which missiles can be launched, should take form
from operations for the destruction of the submarines
themselves, their shore bases, andtheir mobile supply
bases at sea.
Themost probable areas of deployment of missile-
carryinesubmarines will be the Northern Arctic Zone
and the Norwegian Sea, which open up the shortest route
to targets which are in the depth of our country, and
are for that reason least accessible to the enemy's
main carrier of nuclear weapons - aircraft (hence the
most important strategic significance of combat with
missile-carrying submarines, especially in the Northern
Arctic Zone). This is fully confirmed by a study of
the operations of United States atomic submarines mainly
in the Northern Arctic Zone. At the same time, the
possibility of operations by missile-carrying submarines
from other important directions is not excluded. ?
According to the system adopted in the United
States for the distribution of targets among the
different types of armed forces, targets for the Navy
are situated at a depth of up to .1,000 kms from the
coast. Taking the maximum range of fire of submarines
with ballistic missiles of the "Polaris" type as
2,800 kms, the main efforts against submarines :in .the
initial period of a war must be concentrated on the
lines from which they would launch their missiles,
i.e., at a distance of 1,800 kms and more (1,000 miles)
from the coast.
The main forces that will be involved in
accomplishing the mission o/ 'destroying submarines
in distant areas will be submarines, antistbmariA4:.
aircraft, and antisubmarine vessels. As positional
means of detecting and destroying submarines cannot
be set up in peacetime in neutral waters, reliance
should not be placed on their wide use in the
initial period of a war.
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1.3(0(4)
Maneuvering antisubmarine forces could be concentrated
without hindrance before the beginning of combat operations
on the lines of operations of missile-carrying submarines,
and after detecting the submarines they could maintain
hydroacoustic contact with them until an order for using
weapons is received or until they make their first
attempt to launch missiles.
Accomplishing the mission of detecting submarines
in the extensive areas of seas and oceans demands an .
excessively large expenditure of existing forces and!
weapons, which calls for the creation of new means :
permitting the surveillance of extensive water areas
in short periods of time. In this respect, the greatest
capabilities are possessed by long-range seaplanes making
use of small sonar buoys, and also by antisubmarine ,
vessels carrying antisubmarine helicopters. Armed with.
antiaircraft missiles, surface antisubmarine vessels
could considerably extend their zone of operations.
Combat against missile-carrying submarines can be
conducted most successfully by antisubmarine submarines ?
in all conditions, especially in areas of pack and
drifting ice. In areas of clear water and broken ice,
use can be made to some extent Of antisubmarine aircraft
and helicopters. An automated system of lines of
radio-hydroacoustic stations and cable-hydrophone lines
set up on the ice can significantly facilitate.,the
detection of submarines in conditions of ice."
The destruction in the ocean of mobile supply
bases for missile-carrying submarines should be carried
out .by our submarines operating:against the mobile
supply detachments of,carrier,,strike.large,unitsor.by
specially allocated submarines, if the.areiLs of '
operations of the missile-carrying submarines and the
AUS of the enemy do not coincide.
The destruction of the stationary bases of-submarines,
as well as of the bases of carrier strike large units,
must be accomplished by the missile troops of strategic
designation.
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1.3(e)(4)
Submarines have now become the principal striking
force at sea. In accordance with this, combat against
them must inevitably change from being a type of
?e ense o ?e as c o ens ve m ss on o ?e avy in
destroying the enemy's forces at sea. Combat at sea
is going under water. Forces operating against submarines
will eventually become the basic strike forces of the
Navy.
The existing antisubmarine forces and weapons of
the Navy, with the exception of submarines, can in
fact carry on combat with enemy submarines only in
the coastal zone. This is far 'from adequate. Anti-
submarine forces, as the basic means of combat against
the future main strike forces of the enemy Navy, have
a great future, and special attention must be paidto
their development.
Combat against missile-carrying submarines presents
a new problem. Ways of solving it are still under
investigation. It is possible that in the future they
will turn to some extent into combat between "two of a
kind" (between submarines) under water.
The probable enemy, intending to carry on an
aggressive war against the countries of the Socialist
Camp across the ocean and not relying on holding the
bridgeheads now occupied by him on the Eurasian continent,
will inevitably attempt to make major landings in order
to seize new bridgeheads or to reestablish the situation
on them, and also to undertake sea shipping in order to
supply the groupings established in these areas. In
this connection the question arises: where, how, and with
what forces can combat with landing forces(and also
with convoys on communication lines) of the enemy be
conducted most effectively?
The view is expressed that: "Enemy landing operations,.
while enroute at sea, do not merit expensive-and.cumbersonr
operations.against.them by the Navy and long-range aviation.
The basis of their annihilation can be by missile strikes
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in embarkation and debarkation areas; while enroute
at sea, it is again more expedient to annihilate
landing forces by strikes with missiles having
nuclear charges of several megatons".4'
1.3(0(4)
There are, of course, many ways in which any
mission can be accomplished. In selecting them, the
aim should be to accomplish each mission as quickly
as possible, using the minimum forces and suffering
the smallest losses. In a more detailed examination
of the questions of combat against enemy landing 7
forces, we come up against the following circumstances
which militate against accomplishing the mission in
the way outlined above.
A landing force at embarkation ports cannot as
yet, be a&objective for missiles with nuclear and,
even less; with conventional warheads. As experience
in the Second World War has shown, landing detachments
are formed at many ports which are not even situated
on the same continents (Sicilian and Normandy landing
operations, landings in northwest Africa, etc.). At
present the enemy is working toward a system of
operational and combat training of embarking landing
troops where there are no. ports, and he is building
ships adapted for this. Consequently, the embarkation
of allanding force will most probably take place on
a very wide front on an undeveloped coast. The simplest
calculations show that an enormous expenditure of
ballistic missiles will be required to achieve even
some effect in strikes against a landing force while
it is boarding its ships.
It is most Orbbable that It large enemy landing
force will proceed in the forl of many small detachments
from various directions in dispersed combat formations
and orders. Therefore, one can hardly consider that a
landing force at sea will present a suitable target for
missiles with nuclear warheads of several megatons.
1. "The Theory of Military Art Needs Review", by
Colonel-General A. Gastilovich, Special Collection of
Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", First Issue,
1960, page 12 .
?
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To deliberately rely in all cases on destroying
enemy landing forces on our coast after their disembarkation
or while they are disembarking,would mean to make it
possible for the enemy to accomplish the preliminary
mission of his operation unhindered and to put our
defense in a very unfavorable situation. Landings
have always been made, and apparently will be made,
when there is great superiority in forces over the
defenders. It must be surmised that in the first
place the enemy will aim at ensuring his superiority
in nuclear weapons in the landing area. Moreover,
a landing will be preceded by a preliminary and direct
neutralization in the full depth of our defensive
forces. It is, therefore, in our view, manifestly
disadvantageous to deliberately postpone combat with
the landing forces until this period.
Moreover, another fundamentally important
circumstance is involved. Would it be right to
transfer the zone of nuclear combat to our territory?
We believe not. The course of turning one's own
territory into a desolate wilderness can obviously
be followed only in certain directions, and then only
in the most exceptional cases.
Consequently, it'is clearly inexpedient and
dangerous to accept the scheme outlined above for our
operations in combat with enemy landing forces.
An entirely different situation is created when
the Navy operates against the landing force at sea.
Calculations and experience during combat training
of recent years show that even one atomic submarine .
armed with torpedoes can destroy more than 20 ships
with troops and supplies (approximately one division
of the landing force). One atomic submarine is also
capable of destroying one or two large surface vessels
of the Screening forces, including strikecarriers,
which carry 60 to 100 nuclear warheads. Is this .
"expensive!' compared with the price we shall pay if the
enemy uses the indicated nuclear power against objectives
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on our territory, and after that makes a landing?
Other calculations could also be put forward to show
that destruction of the enemy forces at sea will
always be cheaper and more simple than combat with
him when he is already on our territory.
. Thus, until missiles attain the capability of
destroying mobile sea targets at long ranges, there
are no reasons for abandoning.action.against a landing
force at sea, and even less for transferring nuclear
.combat with it to our territory.
Figures were given above regarding dry cargo-
carrying and tanker tonnage which could be loaded
by the beginning of a war. If stocks of strategic
raw materials are laid down in advance, this transport
fleet can be Used in the first instance for shipping .
having military significance. It is known that up
to.three-quarters of the probable enemy's resources
in materiel and personnel are across the ocean.
Calculations show that 80 to 100 transports must arrive
daily in European ports alone. If one estimates ten
days for crossing the North Atlantic and returning
in ballast, it can be surmised that on this communication
line, 1,500 to 2,000 ships, excluding escort vessels,
will be at sea at the same time.
By stopping, holding lap, or reducing to the...
minimum this flow of troops and supplies to the Miin,
theater of war, even for a short time; eSpeCially'
during decisive periods of combat, we would put the
enemy into a difficult situation and create the most
favorable conditions for our own armed forces. This
. determines the strategic significance of the mission
of destroying the enemy's sea communication lines.
For the accomplishment of this task the Navy has far
greater operational-combat capabilities in comparison
with other types of armed forces.
Study of the experience of the operational training
,of NATO navies, as well as elementary calculations, 'Show
that the problem of giving'security to such strained.
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communication lines cannot be fully solved by the
probable enemy, owing both to the shortage of existing
forces and means as well as to the impossibility of
replenishing and restoring them under conditions of
the disorganization of the shipbuilding industry.
1.3(a)(4)
It is known that besides the system of ordinary
convoys, the probable enemy is looking for new ways
of accomplishing the mission of protecting communication
lines. Thus, he has studied the question of "monster-
convoys", which permit a lesser ratio between the.screen-
ing forces and the escorted transports. It is possible
to accomplish the mission of securing the most crowded
communication lines by the method of "patrolled zones",
.with ships moving in them without escorts, which provides
not only economy of escort forces buts-what is
especially important, a quicker turnaround. on the part
of the transports. This method springs directly from
the zonal system of defense in sea theaters adopted
by NATO. Single use (without escort) may also be
made of fast liners on communication lines, mainly
for the transportation of troops (some of them can
carry up to 6 to 8 thousand persons), wounded, radio-
electronic, medical, and other equipment and other
materiel in short supply.
The striving for more reliable security of sea
transport can be seen from the proposed new line of
development in the building Of transports by the main
capitalist countries. It finds its expressiah in -
the building of container (konteynernoye) and trailer
(traylernoye) ships which can be unloaded and loaded
quickly, in the building of. ships with their (MU means'
of loadingAmd.unloading /-two or three words missife
capability of loading and-unloading Without tying-up, -
and with a considerable increase of the speeds of all
transport vessels. The use of submarine transport '
vessels, especially tankers with atomic propulsion, is
Contemplated in the future. As in the past, great .
attention is given to the development of transport-
landing and ,debarking means.
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The probable enemy's great dependence on sea and
ocean communication lines and the impossibility of.
securing them reliably during a war give rise not
only to the necessity of taking action against his .
sea and ocean communication lines, but also create
favorable conditions for the accomplishment of this
mission by the forces of the Navy.
The disruption of sea and ocean communication lines
cannotsin our view, be an urgent task immediately on
the outbreak of a war, for the enemy apparently counts
on ensuring accomplishment of the missions of the
initial stage of a war by laying in supplies in
advance at the planned bridgeheads. Some time is also
required for the organization of communication lines.
The forming of convoys and their movement from ports
in the United States to Western-European ports will
take two to three weeks. There is information that
the Anglo-American command is going into the question.
of sending "monster-convoys" from ports on the eastern
coast of the United States to Western-European ports
one month after the beginnineof a war. It is most
probable that the enemy will be faced With the problem
of securing communication lines in their entirety
during the concluding period of the combat for
attaining the objectives of the initial stage of the
war, in particular for restoring the situation in
Important areas, for establishing new bridgeheads, and
supplying the appropriate groupings of armed forces
there.
In order to fulfil the task of disrupting the
enemy's sea and ocean communication lines, it will .
be necessary to'redeploy7our-submarines, ,which
raises the most.important problem of resupplying
submarines in the ocean, as one cannot count on doing
:this at shore bases which have been subjected to
destruction, not to mention the fact that there will '
be no time for this.-
...faNIMINart
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In previous wars, operations on communication
lines continued throughout the whole war. The ports
, where loading and unloading took place were not
subjected to significant destruction; the shipbuilding
industry succeeded not only in-restoring the losses
of tonnage, but in increasing it, while the use of
conventional weapons against ships at sea did not
give decisive results either in economic or military
respects.
I.3(a)(4)
Present-day conditions have created opportunities
for achieving decisive results in combat on communication
lines. Any ports where loading and unloading take
place and communication line centers on land,can now
be subjected to degtruction*by missile/nuclear weapons
which will often produce far greater results than those.
attained by the protracted combat on communication lines
in previous wars. For instance, the putting-out of
action of the Panama Canal would lengthen the sea route
from eastern United States ports to western ports from
five thousand to thirteen thousand miles, or, in other
words, would at once reduce transport possibilities
on this communication line threefold. The putting-out
of operation of the Suez Canal during the attempted armed
intervention in Egypt by the British and French, even
for a comparatively short period of time, when oil from
the Near East had to be transported partly around Africa,
forced the West European countries to ration fuel.
,Under conditions of missile/nuclear war,,the ship-
building industry will be the todus of intensive
Being based on extensive cooperation.
among many branches of industry, .it .is particularly
vulnerable to disorganization. Consequently, there
can be no question of restoring tonnage on. a large
.scale during a war. At the same time, the operational-
combat capabilities of the forces .of the Navy, and .
especially'of.submarines, in disrupting sea and ocean
communication lines have, as we have already .pointed
out, increased considerably. All this points to the
fact that effective results in the accomplishment of
this mission can now be attained more quickly than before.
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1.8(0(4)
Operations for the disruption of sea and ()dean
communication lines should, under modern conditions,
be built, not on the principle of protracted, so-called
"systematic operations" with a constant exertion of
forces, as was the case heretofore, but on the
principle of maximum concentration of forces on
decisive axes in a limited time. An interruption in
communication lines, even for a month, where the enemy
has large-scale personnel and materiel losses in the
main theaters of the war, will create favorable conditions
;
for the successful execution of combat by our armed
forces on the major axes.
The effective accomplishment by the Navy of the
basic tasks examined-above demands the carrying out of
appropriate measures both in the makeup of the Navy and
in the organization of its comprehensive support. What. '
are these measures?
1. .In the first place, the forces which will take part
In Accomplishing the main tasks in a war should be
developed in every possible way:
- atomic submarines, armed with missile/nuclear
weapOns.and'long-range torpedoes;
- naval strike missile aircraft, not wheeled air-
craft which:are-entirely dependent on airfields,
but .seaplanes;
- long-range antisubmarine strike forces -
submarines, seaplanes, helicopters, and anti-
submarine surface vessels. -
Increasing autonomy, units of fire of weapons,
and radius of operation,must be the main requirement
in the 'development of these forces.
2. Insofar as the operations of our forces, especially
of submarines far away from their bases, involve their
return to base after using up their units of fire, which
leads to a great reduction in their coefficient of-dbMbat
!Utilization, the main problem for ensuring that the forces
can operate effectively is in supplying them with..,
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0.11111111
missile/nuclear weapons and torpedoes and in resupplying
them at sea with material-technical resources.
1.3(a)(41
It would be most expedient to follow the course of
creating transport seaplanes capable of operating from
bases located on internal waterways in the depth of the
country and of delivering the necessary types of ammunition
and Supplies quickly to any areas of the ocean. The
accomplishment of this mission will be made much easier .
if efforts are made at the same time to reduce the
dimensions and weight of missile/nuclear weapons, which.
would considerably simplify resupply work at sea.
The first reloading of submarines at sea in the
initial period of a war could be carried but to some
extent by using modified transports and merchant ships
sent in advance to designated areas of the ocean which are
poorly watched.
We should also follow the course. of creating secret
depots, especially under water, in specially selected
areas 'situated close to the areas of combat operations
of our submarines.
The question of creating new, orreconstructing
existing, diesel-battery submarines for service as
supply bases also merits attention.
The creation of special floating supply bases,
especially for missile/nuclear weapons and torpedoes,
which have maneuverability and are less vulnerable
than depots located on land, is absolutely essential for
supplying our forces away from permanent naval bases
which could be subjected to destruction at the very
beginning of a war.
3. In view of the vulnerability of.. the main economic
installations and naval bases to missile/nuclear strikes
from the very beginning of a war, one cannot count on
being able to'carry out regular and.lengthy-repairs-to.
the forces of the Navy.: Only the,uait-method (agregatnyy
metod) of repair (replacement of entire mechanisms,
assemblies; subassemblies-mekhanizm, uzel; blok)can solve
this problem. Repairs by the unit niiiir6d can becarried
out by the crew itself in any conditions, including at
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sea, provided that the appropriate units are delivered
there.
It is the task of industry, and not of shipbuilding
yards and naval workshops, to support the unit method of
carrying out repairs, i.e.,to create a working stock
(oborotnyy fond) of mechanisms and assemblies in advance.
We have lagged behind in methods of repairing vessels,
and if these archaic methods are also followedin. wartime
'then it is doubtful if any of our vessels 'will_be.able-tO
put to sea again once their technical norms of maintenance
of mechanisms and weapon's have run out or they have been
damaged in combat.
It is mainly the working stock of unitd that calls
for repairs, and mit the vessels themselves. It is
necessary to provide the vessels only with the necessary
assemblies for replacement. In a future war, a vessel.
under repair at a base is a casualty vessel.
4. In view of the possibility of destroying basic
economic installations at the beginning-of-a war, one
cannot count on being able to produce means of combat
on large scales during the course of the war. This
applies particularly to the Navy, as the production of
its forces and weapons during hostilities is most compli-
cated. In comparison with other types of armed foicespin
the construction of submarines and surface vessels we.
observe the most extensive collaboration between the many
branches of industry, and parallel with this small-series
production. The production of each vessel takes very much
longer than the production of an airplane, missile, tank', ,
Or other types of weapons. -
Consequently, for the Navy, the problem'of creating.
and .maintaining at a high State of readiness both the
forces themselves and all types of supplies arises in an
especially acute form. Under present-day conditions it
would be rash and dangerous to rely on "ambling along"
("raskachka") on accumulating reserves in the course of
the war and making use of them during'pauses'of some sort..
The preparation of forces and accumulation of supplies
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giumpl.3(4.)(4)
in advance will permit a successful solution to the problem,
both in the case of a longias well as of a comparatively
short., war. The necessity of accomplishing the main tasks in
a war in the shortest possible time must be one of the most
important starting points in the reexamination of the
operational art of the Navy (and, incidentally, as is
obvious, of all the other types of armed forces).
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