
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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

## WEEKLY SUMMARY

Secret 54

17 February 1967 No. 0277/67 Approved for Release: 2018/04/17 C06571781

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## FAR EAST

Peking has abruptly moderated its tactics toward the Soviet Union, and apparently is also similarly shifting its approach to the Cultural Revolution. On 12 February, after nearly three weeks of escalating invective, the Chinese mobs that had been holding the Soviet Embassy in Peking in a virtual state of siege withdrew. Other steps also helped reduce the immediate tensions between Moscow and Peking, but the reasons for the shift are not yet clear. Although Moscow claims credit, the change seems related to Chinese domestic developments.

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The Peking authorities, led by Premier Chou En-lai, apparently have begun a concerted effort to curb Red Guard excesses. Militants have been advised to ease their approach to erring officials, and broadcasts have criticized young revolutionaries, especially ultraleftists. Unlike similar efforts last fall, these directives bear the endorsement of Mao and other top leaders. The regime still faces serious trouble on many fronts, however, with stiff resistance to Mao supporters evidently continuing in several provinces and further high military officers being purged.

The new year's cease-fire in Vietnam passed without significant military action, but the North Vietnamese mounted a well-organized, major logistics effort just north of the Demilitarized Zone, and sent an unusually large number of trucks through the Mu Gia Pass toward the routes through southern Laos.

The anti-Sukarno bandwagon rolls on in Indonesia. Parliament's unanimous request for Congress to oust the President and bring him to trial seems to leave Sukarno no escape from formal dismissal unless he resigns—a course that the government is still trying to arrange.

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Chinese to avoid any measures that would threaten the movement of Soviet supplies to North Vietnam.

Because of the unstable leadership situation in China, however, the decision to reduce Peking's anti-Soviet campaign can be reversed at any time. The Soviets also are aware of this possibility. In its commentary on the shift in Chinese tactics, Izvestia cautioned on 14 February that Peking's general anti-

Soviet offensive had not been at all weakened.

The Soviets may still be concerned with the possibilities of trouble along the border with China. On 15 February, the Soviet Army newspaper Red Star claimed that Komsomol members had been attached to frontier guard units along the Amur river on the Manchurian border.

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WAY PAVED FOR SUKARNO'S OUSTER IN INDONESIA

Forces in Indonesia seeking the ouster of President Sukarno have taken their campaign several steps further. They still hope to avoid possible internal disorder by securing his resignation, but are proceeding with the steps necessary to secure his dismissal by Congress next month. Either way, his early departure from the presidency seems increasingly certain.

Sukarno's loss of political influence was most dramatically shown when Parliament, which forms a major part of Congress, unanimously passed a resolution on 9 February asking Congress to take formal action to oust the President and to order an investigation that would lead to the placing of criminal charges against him. Even Sukarno's erstwhile supporters in the National Party voted for the resolution after their motion opposing General Suharto's "New Order" failed to attract any support.

The resolution was strengthened several days later by Gen. Suharto's report to congressional leaders documenting Sukarno's involvement in the coup and his financial manipulations involving several millions of dollars. This underlines the likelihood of Sukarno's formal dismissal when Congress meets on 6 March, if he does not resign.

Sukarno, for his part, continues to bluster his way through in an attempt to stall for time, confuse his enemies, encourage his friends, and salvage his dignity. He alternately agrees to resign, refuses to resign, agrees to leave the country, suggests compromise, and promises to resist to the bitter end. However, increasing official and popular pressures may cause him to capitulate at any time.

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