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The Peace Movement in Western Europe

Special National Intelligence Estimate

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THE PEACE MOVEMENT
IN WESTERN EUROPE

Information available as of 25 May 1982 was
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.

Also Participating:

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

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KEY JUDGMENTS

The peace movement, a longstanding and usually ineffectual force on the West European political scene, has burgeoned in the last three years. The roots of the peace movement are indigenous, but Moscow's efforts have been an important factor in explaining why antinuclear sentiment in Western Europe was mobilized so quickly and effectively after NATO's December 1979 decision to prepare to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles and at the same time pursue arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Underlying the movement's new strength are widespread fears of the consequences for Europe of rising Soviet-American tensions. Today many West Europeans believe that they are no longer in charge of their own destinies—and, especially, that they are threatened by a nuclear cataclysm brought on by the superpowers. Many believe that the arms race is out of control. Emerging from a period in which they had become acclimated to the benefits of detente, adherents of the peace movement are appalled by the uncertainties of growing East-West tension.

The sources of the movement's new strength are many and diffuse: the demise of SALT, NATO's INF decision, US rearmament efforts, instability and heightened superpower competition in Southwest Asia, and certain US rhetoric and actions that many West Europeans regarded as bellicose. These factors accelerated trends that for some time had been placing strains on Atlantic cohesion.¹

These trends include the emergence of postwar generations less receptive to a bipolar view of the world, perceptions of adverse changes

¹ The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and the Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps, although recognizing that there is significant support for the peace movement in Western Europe, do not believe it is as widespread as the overall Estimate suggests. In their view, support for the peace movement centers primarily in leftwing factions and organizations; these relatively small minorities, however, are strategically located and highly active so that their impact on the fragile West European coalition governments is magnified. Furthermore, they believe that the growing strength of the peace movement in the last few years reflects the increasing sophistication of Soviet involvement. In this regard, they believe it is Soviet coordination and direction that have given the peace movement much of its impetus and anti-US coloration. Working through local Communist parties and front groups, the Soviets have been largely responsible for the united effort of the various non-Communist peace groups. The overlapping memberships and directorates of the various groups involved have reinforced this integrative effort.

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in the global military balance and (paradoxically) of a low Soviet military threat to Western Europe, images of the United States as a "blundering giant," and increasing Atlantic disagreements about dealing with the Soviets.

The supporters of the peace movement have focused more sharply on the United States than on the Soviet Union because many of them believe that US initiatives have endangered detente and, in any event, they cannot affect the USSR. Many protesters are concerned that the United States—in seeking to redress a military imbalance—may be willing to sacrifice arms control opportunities, and may take actions that could exacerbate East-West tensions. By contrast, it appears to supporters of the peace movement that the Soviets—despite their deployment of SS-20 missiles—have not launched initiatives that change the rules of the game in Europe.

The peace movement constitutes a distinct minority, but it enjoys broader public sympathy than the disarmament campaigns of the late 1950s. Although the movement is particularly attractive to European youth, it includes sympathizers of all ages. And its ranks include dedicated Christians (notably Protestant, though increasingly Catholic as well), Communists, environmentalists and opponents of nuclear power, students, civil servants, and workers. Non-Communist groups have willingly accepted Communist participation in antinuclear events, but are increasingly suspicious of the motives and tactics behind Communist-directed activities.

Moscow has embraced and aided the peace movement, and has shaped its own peace campaign to persuade West Europeans that the United States is guilty of endangering Europe's security. As part of this effort, the USSR and local Communists have provided the movement with organizational and financial assistance and with advice. The Soviet campaign has been most effective in assisting and penetrating the peace movements in Holland and West Germany; it has had less of an effect on the peace movements in Italy, Great Britain, Scandinavia, and France. Soviet support of the peace movement will continue even though Moscow is concerned that Europeans—East and West—will increasingly focus on the Soviet arms buildup in addition to INF.

The peace movement has achieved sufficient momentum that it would remain a political force even in the absence of Soviet machinations. And although it cannot by itself bring down any government in Western Europe, the movement's influence severely constrains the political leadership in Holland, West Germany, and Belgium.

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Irrespective of Soviet and local Communist help, the cohesion of the movement might diminish if US-Soviet negotiations in Geneva show signs of progress. Other developments could also decrease support for and cohesion of the movement:

- Public revulsion with “street politics.”
- Violence associated with radical peace groups.
- Government and public concern over perceived US disenchantment with its NATO allies.
- Growing repression in Poland or overt Soviet interference in that country.
- Inept Soviet efforts to manipulate the peace movement.

Despite these potential vulnerabilities, the peace movement will increase its activity as the time nears for implementation of INF deployment or if the Geneva talks collapse. The movement in Western Europe will also benefit from the growth of antinuclear sentiment in the United States. The peace movement will mount major protest demonstrations, for example, when President Reagan visits Western Europe in June.

The primary short-term objective of the peace movement is to block INF deployment. Should this be achieved, NATO cohesion would be seriously weakened and the Soviets would attempt to direct the peace movement toward subsequent, long-term objectives, which would include the removal of US nuclear weapons from Europe.

The United States is not able to affect directly many of the underlying trends in Western Europe that nurture the peace movement; antinuclear sentiment will continue to be strong, especially among a younger generation in Europe that was not present as the strategy of nuclear deterrence was being forged, does not find it credible, and feels less committed to maintain its current form. Moreover, the political influence of the peace movement will continue to reflect US-West European differences about how to assure the security of Western Europe and will ebb and flow with public perceptions of the likelihood of nuclear war.

Nevertheless, the growth of the movement may slow if the United States is sensitive to European anxieties about nuclear conflict. And popular support for it may erode if more Europeans are convinced of the importance of nuclear deterrence in preventing war and of US readiness to engage in arms control negotiations.

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DISCUSSION

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Underlying the revival of the peace movement in Western Europe is diffuse but widespread unease over sharpening East-West conflict and fear of nuclear war. This unease has been fueled by differing US-West European views of the value of detente and growing doubts about the efficacy of nuclear deterrence, both of which have been exploited by the Soviets. The peace movement also reflects a desire for revived East-West cooperation, concern for the environment, strains of nationalism, moral outrage and pacifism, and outright neutralism—sometimes tinged by anti-Americanism. The movement in Western Europe has helped to stimulate peace sympathizers elsewhere (for example, Japan) and is in turn being reinforced by the burgeoning peace movement in the United States.

II. THE PEACE MOVEMENT: PAST AND PRESENT

2. Organized opposition to nuclear weapons is not new in Western Europe. From 1956 until roughly 1960, vigorous movements surfaced in West Germany and Great Britain to oppose nuclear armaments. Supporters were drawn from similar segments of society in both countries—pacifists, leftwing socialists, Communists, students, and trade unionists; however, the movements were independent of each other and remained largely isolated from the dominant political forces in their countries. Overall, the scope and appeal of the peace movements in Western Europe in the 1950s remained relatively limited.

3. The contemporary European peace movement, revived at a time of declining East-West detente and a pessimistic public mood, stands in contrast to its predecessor. In scope, it is a mass—albeit minority—movement of continental dimension mobilizing people across borders and attracting previously apolitical participants. Its members, supporters, and sympathizers are drawn from both the elite and general strata of European societies and from all points along the political spectrum (though predominantly leftist).

4. The current West European peace movement benefits from the organizational and financial assistance and the advice of the Soviets and local Communists. But the revival of the peace movement would not have been possible in the absence of a long-term evolution in US-European relations that produced differing perceptions of world conditions on each side of the Atlantic. New political, economic, and military realities—evident since the early 1970s—and resurgent national awareness among NATO allies provided necessary nourishment for dissatisfaction with NATO policies and US leadership. There are increasing signs that some European attitudes toward the Soviet threat, arms control, and the Third World are at odds with US policies within the Alliance. Other factors contributing to perceptions of diverging interests have been:

- Different historical experiences of West European and American postwar generations.
- The increasingly competitive international economic and monetary policies of the West—especially in periods of economic stringency.
- NATO's continuing conventional military disadvantage versus the Warsaw Pact, a disadvantage that has elevated the importance of nuclear weapons even while the development of US-Soviet strategic parity lessens the credibility of the US deterrent in Western Europe.

5. Beginning in late 1979 a confluence of events rapidly intensified the divergence of West European-US perceptions which had been slowly growing during previous years and provided numerous new recruits to the new peace movement:

- The demise of SALT brought an end to the framework of arms control that had postponed the necessity of coming to grips with knotty US-West European differences over how to defend Western Europe.
- The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan accentuated differing US-West European views about what actions to take against the USSR.

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- The collapse of the US position in Iran and the 1979 oil price increases intensified Western Europe's sense of vulnerability to events in the Middle East, reinforcing US-West European differences over the Arab-Israeli issue and other parts of the Third World.
- The subsequent US determination to rectify the global military imbalance and high-level US statements about the defense of Western Europe promoted West European fears that a nuclear war might break out and be waged in Europe.
- Some US actions and rhetoric (on El Salvador and Libya, for example) were believed by many West Europeans to be bellicose and irresponsible.

6. The demise of SALT was especially disconcerting. When West European leaders agreed to intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) modernization in December 1979, they assumed that SALT II would be approved and that additional arms control negotiations (the second track of the "dual" decision) aimed at eliminating Soviet SS-20s would be initiated. The INF decision came to seem less reassuring after the SALT treaty was withdrawn and US interest in results from either INF or SALT negotiations appeared uncertain to West Europeans.

7. The 1979 NATO decision to deploy Pershing II and ground-based cruise missiles was a major catalyst for the new European peace movement. Previous US deployments were made after bilateral consultation and without any formal commitment by the NATO Alliance. Giving European governments a greater and more visible responsibility for NATO nuclear strategy also committed them to a series of controversial political decisions that could become the focus for protests.

8. The current peace movement in Europe has had a far greater impact on political parties and governments than its antecedent. Indeed, it has touched all of NATO. In Holland, its activities almost certainly preclude INF deployment for the foreseeable future. In West Germany, it threatens to split the ruling SPD and has created considerable political difficulty for Chancellor Schmidt, who remains determined to carry

out the INF decision.² In Belgium, antinuclear sentiment in some regions has contributed to the government's refusal to make a clear decision regarding INF deployment. In Great Britain, the Labor Party has officially endorsed the exclusion of nuclear weapons from British soil. While the peace movement is not as well developed in Italy, this could rapidly change if the Italian Communist Party (PCI) continues its recent wholehearted support.

9. Since December 1979, when the NATO INF decision was reached, there has been significant public opposition to new deployments of nuclear weapons. The start of arms reduction talks in Geneva and the US zero option initiative have not overcome widespread negative attitudes to such deployments. According to a February 1982 USICA poll, 36 percent of the British public remained unconditionally opposed to the stationing of INF and 41 percent favored INF stationing only on condition that arms control talks are either in progress or have failed. Similarly, in West Germany, 39 percent were unconditionally opposed to stationing of INF and 41 percent supported stationing when linked to arms control talks. In both cases, unconditional opposition to INF deployment increased during the preceding six months. As of December 1981, a majority of the Dutch public (52 percent) unconditionally opposed the siting of cruise missiles in their country, while 40 percent would accept INF on the condition that arms talks were in progress or had failed. In Belgium, according to another February 1982 USICA survey, a sizable majority opposed INF (52 percent) even when informed of the SS-20 threat; without that qualification over 70 percent were opposed. And as of October 1981, a majority of the Italian public opposed INF basing regardless of the SS-20 threat.

10. In West Germany public opposition to INF deployment has complicated the government's effort to reconcile its view of Alliance obligations with recent American views of those obligations. West Germany's geographical position and the number of nuclear weapons already stationed there make it especially

² The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, believes that, although Chancellor Schmidt remains officially committed to carry out the INF decision, the need to retain the support of the SPD leftwing faction and the furtherance of key SPD policies such as "Ostpolitik" are likely to lead Schmidt to acquiesce in a postponement of INF deployment.

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sensitive to any perceived dangers of war or changes in NATO strategy. Because of their national division, West Germans are reluctant to endorse policies that could be obstacles to improved ties with their brethren in the East. On the one hand, West Germany retains close ties to the Western Alliance; on the other hand, many West Germans increasingly are restive at the impediments to independent behavior and ties to the East implied by Washington's efforts to rally Europe against the Soviets.

11. In contrast, France—which is not directly involved in NATO's INF decision—has not had to cope with a broad peace movement. It is not as exposed as West Germany, possesses an independent nuclear deterrent, has a clearer sense of national purpose, and reaps the benefits of NATO without surrendering any political autonomy. President Mitterrand strongly supports INF as well as increased defense efforts to meet the Soviet challenge, and has made known his concern about "neutralist" trends elsewhere in Europe (particularly West Germany). Nonetheless, some members of the governing Socialist Party remain skeptical about the need for increased defense spending and more sympathetic toward disarmament than the party or government leadership. And as of February 1982, 30 percent of the French public unconditionally opposed stationing INF in Western Europe. If the French economy slows significantly, Paris would face difficult choices about where to cut spending. French defense expenditures could come under increased pressures, particularly from the left, and the relatively weak French peace movement could grow.

III. COMPOSITION OF THE PEACE MOVEMENT

12. An important characteristic of the peace movement is its transnational scope and eclectic composition. This diversity is both a strength and a liability, as it projects an image of broad support for the movement but also impedes any single, unified program of action. Among the many elements in the peace movement, the following are prominent and influential.

A. Youth

13. The overwhelming majority of participants in public rallies against nuclear war and US nuclear weapons have been young people. In most West European countries, there is now a majority of the

population—which will reach two-thirds by 1990—that does not directly recall America's postwar role in Western Europe's reconstruction or the onset of the Cold War. In Western Europe, nearly 50 percent of the population was born after 1945. The members of the first postwar generation have now reached their thirties and are acquiring political leadership at the local and national levels. Members of this generation are accustomed to expressing their political views in the streets as well as at the ballot box. Many have been influenced by the strong critique of the establishment fashionable in the media.

14. The young people who went through the universities in the turbulent years of the 1960s have by now entered the educated middle class. In West Germany this group constitutes the leadership of the youth organizations of the major parties—the Jusos (SPD), Judos (FDP), and Junge Union (CDU).³ The Jusos, among the more vocal critics of West German security policies, advocated in June 1981 overturning the NATO double decision, a central European nuclear-free zone, and a European counterweight within NATO to reduce US dominance.

15. A second group, the product of the baby boom years of 1956-62, is now entering the universities or seeking places in the work force. In their early 20s, these youths presently appear less tied to traditional political parties and more concerned with "quality of life" issues. Their concerns have contributed to the growth of environmentalist and "alternative" parties, which are important elements in the new peace movement.

16. Several polls reveal an 18- to 30-year age group that is more pessimistic about the future than their elders. The perception that their elders are pursuing draconian policies of fiscal austerity as well as preserving dangerous and outmoded security arrangements—both of which they believe could threaten their future economic, social, and physical welfare—lends strength to their convictions that youth must try to change

³ *The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy, and the Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps, believe that significant numbers of West German youths are not politically active but, even among those who are, most probably do not support the extreme leftwing positions of the Jusos, the official youth organization within the SPD.*

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government policies. While such youth attitudes might change over time, the present mood of dissatisfaction currently shows few signs of disappearing. The peace movement will remain an important vehicle for articulating these frustrations over the next several years.

B. Churches

17. The active involvement of organized religion, particularly in northern Europe, has provided the peace movement with important moral backing as well as indispensable organizational resources and talents. The churches, especially Protestant, have been increasingly involved in secular affairs since the early 1970s, taking public stands on the importance of East-West detente, disarmament, and contact with the Third World. In Holland, the IKV (Inter-Church Peace Council, a political umbrella organization for various Protestant groups with over 400 local chapters) has led the opposition to INF deployment. Grass-roots declarations in favor of "municipal nuclear-free zones" has become a major IKV tactic to generate opposition. In West Germany, the June 1981 Kirchentag in Hamburg provided an opportunity for the Evangelical Church to protest against nuclear weapons, exemplifying the Protestant churches' critical attitude toward the State that has developed in the postwar period. In Great Britain, the president of the Methodist Church has called for churchgoers to fight nuclear weapons deployment, and local groups have responded with declarations for "atom-free zones" in Britain.

18. In spite of a more hierarchical tradition that officially abjures a Church role in secular affairs, Catholic elements have also embraced the peace movement. Pax Christi, a lay organization of the Church, has coordinated its antinuclear activities with the IKV and environmental groups throughout Western Europe. Catholic bishops recently expressed their dismay to Chancellor Schmidt over difficulties the Church was having in keeping its members and priests from joining the movement.

C. Labor

19. Western Europe's labor unions have also embraced the peace issue—cautiously in most cases, on occasion directly. Labor-backed parties in Holland and Britain have argued against new nuclear deploy-

ments and have been in the forefront of unilateralist movements. The German Trade Union Federation (DGB) specifically became involved in peace activities to counter the anti-US coloration of and Communist influence in the peace movement. However, the DGB's prohibition on official union representation in the Bonn demonstration on 10 October did not prevent many young trade unionists and their organizations from taking part. In France and especially in Italy, several labor groups have been vocal in criticizing Europeans for caving in to the "logic of blocs" and have protested the costs of the arms race.

D. Environmentalists

20. Environmental groups have added their organizational efforts to the new West European peace movement. Although amorphous, such groups have been increasing their strength; they have formed political parties in most West European states and have won modest representation at the state and local levels in West Germany, Belgium, France, Norway, and Austria. Strong opposition to further development of nuclear energy is clearly linked to anti-INF attitudes.

21. In West Germany two large environmentalist groups—the Federal Association of Citizens' Initiatives for Environmental Protection (BBU) and the Green List Party—have been instrumental in opposing INF. In October 1981, the BBU "peace manifesto" criticized both superpowers' military policies, advocated a bloc-free Europe, and proposed the abolition of the Bundeswehr. The Greens have recently shown impressive strength in state and local elections and threaten to erode SPD and FDP national electoral support. Last fall, West German environmentalist leaders met to plan a long-term program of anti-INF activities, including potentially disruptive forms of civil disobedience. By mobilizing supporters in "action committees," these groups will pose even more acute difficulties once INF deployments begin.

22. Until recently there has existed an alliance of convenience between the environmentalists and the Communists. However, in Germany at least, latent differences between the two groups concerning both leadership of the movement and the nature of its protests have surfaced. Nevertheless, it remains uncertain whether this rift will detract from the effectiveness of the peace movement.

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E. Non-Communist Political Parties

23. Political parties in varying degrees have been influenced by antinuclear opinion. Unlike earlier movements, opposition to nuclear weapons is not limited to socialists alone, although it is strongest among leftwing elements of West European political parties. In the Netherlands and Belgium the strongest political opposition to INF comes from labor and socialist parties, which are often participants in coalition governments. The Dutch PvdA (Labor) party is openly opposed to NATO's decision to proceed with INF deployment, as are the Flemish Socialist Party in Belgium and the Radical Party in Italy. Elements within Socialist parties in Scandinavia have also been active in demonstrating against nuclear war and demanding a Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone (NNWFZ).

24. In spite of the strong support of West German party leaders Schmidt and Genscher for INF deployment, support for a deployment moratorium or outright rejection of INF is also widespread among state-level organizations of the Social Democratic Party and, increasingly, the Free Democratic Party. The SPD confronts the delicate task of retaining the support of its electorally important left wing without alienating its more important conservative labor wing. The British Labor Party, led by its left wing, continues to be outspoken against Britain's continued reliance on nuclear weapons. While socialists in the UK and social democrats in the FRG are divided over nuclear policies, the Italian and French Socialist Parties remain officially supportive of INF.

F. Communist Parties⁴

25. Since the early 1950s, Communist parties in Western Europe have been at the forefront of organized public opposition to nuclear weapons. In 1977 public uproar over enhanced radiation weapons

⁴ *The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and the Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps, believe there is considerable evidence that the Communist parties are more active participants in the peace movement than indicated in this section. They initiate and provide purposeful guidance of peace movement activities. Further, the holders of this view believe the role of European Communist parties, especially in West Germany and the Netherlands, as instruments of Soviet policy is greater than implied here.*

(ERW), which received the full attention and strong support of Moscow, created a new opportunity to agitate against NATO's defense policies. The Dutch Communist Party (CPN) has been one of the more active, having worked closely with the IKV in organizing rallies against ERW and INF. Soviet guidance to CPN leaders, at times without the knowledge of other party members, has stressed the high priority Moscow assigns to CPN's involvement in the peace movement. Similarly, the German Communist Party (DKP) and the West Berlin Communist Party (SEW) have found in the peace movement an opportunity to broaden their cooperation with and influence over other political and environmental groups in West Germany. The DKP, through the German Peace Union (DFU) and other Communist front groups, joined with the Greens and other "Alternatives" in organizing the so-called Krefeld Appeal—a petition-signing campaign that claims to have collected over 1 million signatures against nuclear weapons—as well as other activities. The SEW has also taken a direct role in the West German peace movement, by participating in the Berlin demonstrations during Secretary Haig's visit, joining the October Bonn rally, and promoting the West German Evangelical Church's peace week in November 1981. It has shown a special concern that the peace movement—via renewed petition campaigns—reach larger numbers of workers and has responded to Soviet pressure that the antinuclear demonstrators not extend their criticism to Soviet SS-20 missiles.

26. Communist parties in other West European states have so far been less successful in marshaling broad public support against INF. The small Belgian Communist Party has remained hesitant to embrace the peace issue because Soviet actions in Afghanistan and Poland have created internal party rifts over whether it should follow the Soviet line on INF. The Italian Communist Party (PCI) has continued to promote reductions in nuclear weapons and has been increasingly aggressive in opposing INF. But the recent ideological battles with the CPSU over Poland promise to keep the PCI from wholeheartedly endorsing the Soviet position on nuclear weapons. In France, the Communist Party (PCF) remains the only political party that has organized public rallies against INF, and the poor turnouts have added to the reputation of a PCF that is increasingly isolated within French politics.

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27. With the exceptions of Italy and France, most Communist parties in Western Europe continue to enjoy only minuscule popular support. Nevertheless, the Soviets use them as vehicles for anti-INF propaganda, and they have played a far more significant role in the peace movement than their size or popularity might suggest. In particular, their organizational experience, dedication to single issues like INF (regardless of electoral consequences), and the support they receive from the Eastern Bloc has made them formidable participants in the West European peace movement.

IV. SOVIET AND COMMUNIST MANIPULATION OF PEACE SENTIMENTS IN WESTERN EUROPE

A. Soviet-Sponsored Anti-INF Activities

28. Moscow has had a longstanding interest in exploiting peace groups in Western Europe, and the Soviet role was significant to the revival of the peace movement in 1979 and 1980. The current antinuclear sentiment in Western Europe has been cultivated by the Soviet Union both openly and covertly in order to divide the Alliance and block INF deployment without any need for Soviet concessions at Geneva. Moscow has contributed propaganda themes, organizational expertise, coordination, and material and financial resources to the peace movement. Some elements within the Communist-front World Peace Council have even expressed opposition to Moscow's obsession with Western Europe to the detriment of activities elsewhere, notably in the Third World.

29. The current Soviet anti-INF campaign is patterned on the highly successful one in 1977-78 against enhanced radiation weapons, and assets employed by Moscow at that time were turned against INF relatively easily. As in the earlier campaign, Soviet efforts are directed from the upper echelons of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, especially the Central Committee's International Department (ID) and International Information Department (IID), and the Committee for State Security (KGB). The ruling Politburo approves major policies and themes, and Politburo members themselves participate in public diplomacy.

30. A wide variety of measures has been applied in a concerted effort to defeat NATO's program:

- Diplomatic means (for example, Brezhnev's offer of a unilateral moratorium on SS-20 deployment so long as INF modernization does not commence) and economic pressure.
- Propaganda emphasizing Soviet "peace" and disarmament proposals and alleged US disinterest in continuing the arms control process.
- Mobilization of local Communist parties, international front organizations (for example, the World Peace Council), local front organizations (for example, the German Peace Union).
- Penetration of local peace groups (such as the Dutch Interchurch Peace Council, the German BBU).
- Utilization of sympathizers and agents of influence (for example, in the press and in selected political parties), and forged US military documents and policy statements.

31. Soviet diplomatic initiatives and overt propaganda have been supplemented by a covert campaign using techniques and influence operations known in Soviet intelligence parlance as "active measures." Examples of this activity include:

- In Germany the Soviets have used journalists, party officials, and academicians to try to influence decisionmaking on INF in Bonn. In some countries the Soviet effort has bordered on blackmail and bribery.
- In Denmark the Soviets have provided funds to Danish peace activists in order to publicize anti-INF propaganda.
- Soviet front groups—the World Peace Council, the International Institute for Peace, the International Liaison Forum for Peace, the World Parliament of Peoples for Peace—at Soviet direction have sponsored or exploited a number of conferences, symposiums, and demonstrations organized to oppose the NATO INF decision. The Soviets are actively trying to broaden the bases of support of these fronts by attracting

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non-Communist participation in their activities. National Communist parties have set up their own front groups or are trying to exploit or infiltrate other organizations opposed to the NATO decision.

- In early 1982, two officials of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee met with senior officers of a West European communist party to emphasize that this is the critical year for mobilizing opposition to INF deployment. The Soviets offered additional support for propaganda efforts to play down Poland, play up Soviet and East European social and economic "achievements," and promote the theme of a "US threat" to Western Europe.

32. The Soviet anti-INF campaign has perhaps had its greatest effect in the Netherlands, where popular sentiments were already receptive to an early peace initiative. The mushrooming of the peace movement in Holland provided impetus to the West German movement, which the Soviets were quick to exploit. Moscow's endeavors have been less successful elsewhere in Europe. Where successful, Soviet efforts have been facilitated by the willingness of left-leaning activists and church groups to accept Communist assistance and to participate in "popular front" activities.

33. Soviet attempts to manipulate the peace movement have sometimes been counterproductive. Revelations about the connection of the KGB to Danish peace groups have alienated public opinion and cast a persistent shadow over peace groups throughout Scandinavia and, along with the grounding of a Soviet submarine in Swedish waters, have discredited recent Soviet overtures for a Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone.

34. Moscow's efforts have, nevertheless, constituted an important factor in explaining why antinuclear sentiment in Western Europe was mobilized so quickly and effectively after NATO's double decision in December 1979. The existing mood in Western Europe is more amenable than at any time since World War II to Soviet techniques that had been applied previously with only modest success. However, even in the absence of further Soviet assistance, the peace

movement would have sufficient momentum to maintain pressure on NATO governments.

B. Future Soviet Efforts

35. In the near future, Soviet-sponsored peace efforts will be targeted at President Reagan's visit to Europe, the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD) this summer, and the SPD special party congress in the autumn of 1983. The World Peace Council, which is receiving renewed Soviet attention and aid, is concentrating on preparing disarmament propaganda that especially criticizes NATO INF deployments. The Soviet-sponsored "World Peace Conference" in Moscow in mid-May 1982, to which major religious figures—including Americans—were invited, was also intended to add to these efforts.

36. Moscow, however, is showing signs of discomfort as West European peace advocates focus increasingly on the Soviet arms buildup as a fundamental element in the security debate by calling attention to Soviet SS-20 deployment. And the Soviets seem unable to put a stop to this development. Soviet publications on the nuclear balance with the United States—appearing in late 1981 and early 1982—indicate a new propaganda campaign by the CPSU aimed at refocusing the debate on US modernization. Elements of this campaign include the Soviet early moratorium proposal and the recent pledge that Soviet SS-20 deployments will be halted for the duration of the Geneva talks and so long as INF deployment does not proceed.

37. Soviet approval for participation by some East European regimes—specifically the GDR—in the West European peace movement seems to be having unwelcome effects. The effort served to stimulate peace sentiment among members of the Lutheran Church and draft-age youth in East Germany who hope (with little chance of success) to modify government resistance to alternative service programs. The recent high point for the East German movement was the 13 February peace demonstration in Dresden, which the authorities tolerated. Since then the regime has attempted to constrain the movement lest it develop into a Solidarity-type political opposition. Some activists have circulated an appeal calling for a European nuclear-weapons-free zone and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the two German states.

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V. THE WEST EUROPEAN POLITICAL CLIMATE AND THE NEW PEACE MOVEMENT

38. Many West Europeans are increasingly apprehensive because nuclear war—particularly one fought on European soil—now appears “thinkable” as never before to decisionmakers. The NATO decision to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles as a land-based force in Western Europe was in part taken to strengthen the credibility of the US nuclear umbrella; paradoxically, the proposed basing mode has intensified European fears because of its visibility and prominence. The abhorrence of nuclear war is especially reflected in West Germany, where a superpower confrontation could take place. Over the years, a stable majority of West Germans has been willing to defend the country against military attack (64 percent in 1980), but just as consistently only a small minority (15 percent in 1980) is prepared to counter that attack if the use of nuclear weapons is contemplated.⁵

39. To many West Europeans, current Soviet-American tensions seem to threaten arms control efforts, which they view as an important forum for US-Soviet political dialogue and the most visible symbol of the superpowers' interest in avoiding nuclear war. In the context of a nuclear and conventional military balance that appears to be increasingly disadvantageous to the West, West Europeans tend to view serious political dialogue through SALT and now START—quite apart from any results—as necessary for the avoidance of war. At the same time, they regard nuclear balance as the West's only reasonable goal.

A. The Changing Military Balance and Nuclear Weapons

40. Perceptions of changes in the global military balance have reinforced European fear of nuclear war through crisis escalation or political miscalculation. The belief held in the 1960s by most West Europeans that the United States was militarily superior to the USSR has given way to perceptions of approximate East-West parity. On the one hand, some Europeans (including political leaders like Helmut Schmidt) be-

lieve that relative balance at the strategic level, combined with Soviet advantages at the theater level, lessen the credibility of the US guarantee to defend Western Europe. On the other hand, many supporters of the peace movement believe that rough strategic parity provides greater deterrence stability than did US dominance and are concerned that the United States is attempting to regain a strategic advantage, which would destabilize the deterrence equation.

41. The idea that the United States might seek to limit a nuclear war to Europe, repeated over and over in a multitude of forums (not least by Soviet propagandists), has alarmed West European publics. Yet, the perceived conventional weakness of NATO tends to reinforce fears that any war on the continent would have to become nuclear. Although large majorities in Western Europe continue to favor adherence to NATO, few Europeans appear convinced that increased NATO defense efforts can prevent an attack on Western Europe or resist such an attack if it occurs. Constant allusion by allied leaders and spokesmen to the ominous growth of Soviet military power has not produced public support to rectify the imbalance between Western and Soviet military forces in Europe. The stark portrayal of Soviet power feeds European apprehensions about their security environment. In a 1981 poll taken in West Germany, for instance, 48 percent declared they would be prepared to live under Communism rather than risk nuclear war.

42. Believing that the threshold of nuclear conflict is dropping, some West Europeans are no longer persuaded that nuclear deterrence is a rational or workable strategy. West European concern about deterrence has grown over the years, initially after the 1950s doctrine of massive retaliation was discredited by a Soviet strategic nuclear capability and presently as the “flexible response” doctrine has been challenged by Soviet conventional and theater nuclear superiority; a return to “counterforce” doctrines and renewed emphasis on the nuclear options within the flexible response strategy have created their own anxieties. Some West Europeans appreciate that these latter doctrines allow for the possibility of war in Europe, the prospect that the West might resort to nuclear weapons before the USSR, and a war-fighting (as opposed to purely preventive) role for nuclear weapons in Western Europe.

⁵ Allensbach public opinion poll, May 1981.

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43. In addition, US rhetoric and actions in recent years have exacerbated existing West European doubts about the wisdom of NATO's military doctrine. In particular, West Europeans were alarmed by official American comments about a limited nuclear war in Europe, US announcements about the production of ERW, and ambiguous statements by high-level officials about the possible use of nuclear weapons for demonstration purposes. Such developments have been particularly disturbing to West Europeans who were not persuaded that the United States was seriously interested in the resumption of arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union, and many of these people have joined the peace movement. Protesters had seen an alarming pattern in President Carter's Presidential Directive 59, with its emphasis on targeting Soviet offensive forces, and in the US failure to ratify SALT II. Proposals to modernize the US chemical warfare arsenal in Western Europe will almost certainly reinforce these fears.

B. Perceptions of the Soviet Military Threat

44. Paradoxically, West European recognition of a less favorable East-West military balance does not translate into perceptions that the USSR intends to attack Western Europe. In 1981, 57 percent of Italians, 55 percent of West Germans, 48 percent of Britons, and 42 percent of the French who were polled professed to be either "not very" concerned or "not at all" concerned about the prospect of a Soviet attack against NATO. In all four countries, increasing tensions between the United States and Soviet Union were cited as more threatening than Soviet military expansion. Large percentages of the population were either "very" or "fairly" apprehensive about the threat posed by US-Soviet tensions: UK (72 percent), Italy (68 percent), West Germany (59 percent), and France (59 percent). Finally, approximately half of those who were queried were either "not very" or "not at all" concerned about the prospect of Soviet political intimidation of Western Europe. For the most part, concern about Soviet expansionism continues to take a back seat in much of Western Europe to more parochial issues like Flemish-Walloon rivalries in Belgium, terrorism in Northern Ireland, economic difficulties in Great Britain, and the prospect for socialist economic change in France.

45. Rather than perceiving the military takeover and repressive measures in Poland as a threat to themselves, West Europeans are more likely to interpret them as steps in the deterioration of the Soviet Bloc. Many West Europeans, in fact, are disturbed lest Western pressures on the Soviet Union provoke the Soviets to invade Poland. They see the Soviets as reluctant to take such an action but fearful of ideological and political contamination of the Bloc, and obsessed with historic security interests.

46. Another important difference in US-West European perceptions concerns the balance sheet of Soviet "successes" and "failures" in the world. Many West Europeans see signs of Soviet weakness—or at least constraints on Soviet behavior—in Poland's "revolution," China's hostility to the USSR, Romania's independent course in foreign affairs, Hungary's quiet economic reforms, and Soviet inability to control events in Afghanistan and Ethiopia. Accounts of Soviet economic difficulties and technological backwardness tend to reinforce these views and strengthen the belief that Moscow's military might does not threaten the West except as a "desperate" reaction to Western provocation.

C. Divergences in West European-US Interests

47. The peace movement has clearly benefited from emerging US-West European differences over their respective political and economic interests. Detente's role in Western security policies has become the focal point of this greater Atlantic discord. Surveys conducted in early 1981 reveal that far more West Germans (65 percent) and French (54 percent) than Americans (34 percent) believe that the West has benefited as much from detente as has the East.⁶ To many West Europeans, detente signaled the end of a period of recurrent crises in Europe that sometimes seemed to threaten war. In addition, for West Germany detente opened the possibility of improved relations and human contacts with the 17 million Germans under Soviet domination in East Germany, and revived hopes for eventual reunification.

⁶ USICA, March 1981.

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48. There is a belief in Western Europe that detente should be divisible, and many Europeans are apprehensive that American strategies aimed at confronting the Soviets worldwide will jeopardize the continuation of detente in Europe. They have repeatedly counseled the United States not to regard Third World conflicts as tests of East-West relations.

49. Many West Europeans regard arms control in Europe as the most important and perhaps the most likely victim of deteriorating Soviet-American detente. The 1979 NATO INF decision to deploy modern intermediate-range nuclear forces was made possible only because West Europeans insisted that it be joined with an effort to negotiate, which could obviate the need for such weapons and return the United States to a process of dialogue with the Soviet Union.

50. West European sensitivities to US policies toward the Soviet Union are further reinforced by Western Europe's greater stake in economic relations with the East. A willingness to continue major energy projects with the Soviet Union in the face of US pressure for economic sanctions against Poland and the Soviet Union has heightened West European appreciation for how their own economic interests diverge from those of the United States. The slowdown in domestic economic activity enhances the West European stake in East-West trade.

51. The Soviets have clearly recognized West European interest in trade. Thus, during his recent meeting in Bonn with Chancellor Schmidt, President Brezhnev adroitly linked together trade and security issues, declaring that the USSR urgently desired to undertake additional large-scale joint economic ventures with the Federal Republic but could not do so until conditions permitted the curtailment of military expenditures.

52. Western Europe's economic difficulties have played an important, albeit subtle, role in fostering the sociopolitical malaise that provides recruits for the European peace movement. The political consequences of West European economic pessimism go beyond changed voting patterns to increased social strife and public demonstration of frustration. Unemployed workers in Holland have joined peace marches. Some West German trade unionists are speaking openly of political alliances with leftists in order to alter the

Bonn government's "guns-versus-butter" priorities. Indeed, the relative political quiescence of German leftists that was partly purchased by the "economic miracle" and welfarism is ending.

53. Identification of the United States with pressures for increased defense spending reinforces the American role as the principal target of peace activists. Most West European governments find themselves with little maneuverability between their publics and the United States over NATO defense spending goals. Approximately 70 percent of the publics in West Germany, Holland, Italy, and Belgium favor either keeping defense expenditures at present levels or reducing them. When West Europeans are asked to weigh priorities between defense spending and social services, support for defense spending further diminishes. Given this choice, increased defense spending is supported by only 4 percent of the public in France, 5 percent in Italy, 9 percent in Norway, 11 percent in Holland, 15 percent in West Germany, and 17 percent in Great Britain.⁷

D. The West European Desire for Autonomy

54. Perceptions of US-West European political and economic differences do not directly yield anti-American sentiments. A recent poll, for example, reveals that a higher percentage of West Germans (though not the young) "like" the United States today than at any time since the mid-1960s. The signs of anti-Americanism found in the West European peace movement probably arise from—in addition to the effort of Communists to push the movement in that direction—a belief that the United States is a major obstacle to European autonomy. Leaders of the peace movement have expressed resentment over "American pressure" to deploy theater nuclear forces and have suggested that their countries take steps to regain a measure of autonomy in security issues. West Europeans, they argue, must hold the United States at arm's length in order to avoid being drawn into great power collisions. Moreover, many peace activists believe that they cannot affect Soviet decisions and so direct their energies against Western armaments in order "to do something."

⁷ USICA, March 1981.

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55. Fears of nuclear war and the belief that the superpowers control their fate have contributed to sentiments that Western Europe must somehow "escape" from the US-Soviet competition and regain control of its own destiny. The peace movement has been colored by such strivings for more autonomy, which has given a boost to various shades of nationalism more than to a supranationalism for Europe as a whole.

56. In Holland, nationalism takes the form of a belief that the country can protest "irrational" superpower behavior in order to set a moral example that does not endanger the vital interests of either. In Britain, it appears that public sentiments favor continued national control over nuclear weapons, including INF.⁹ An articulate minority in Britain, however, espouses the pacifist variant of contemporary nationalism in Europe. And in West Germany, there is some sentiment (particularly, though not exclusively, on the left) in favor of "nationalist neutralism" based on a vague belief that the current flux in both West and East may provide an opportunity for both Germanies to move closer together and so jointly to recover control over their political and economic destinies. In fact, some members of the left wing of the SPD aim consciously at achieving eventually a reunited and—in a return to a long-discarded party objective—a neutralist Germany, a goal that is in line with the objectives of many current peace movement activists.

E. Impact on Governments

57. The scope, diversity, and respectability of the peace movement present today's political leaders—in stark contrast to the 1950s—with political opinions that can be discounted only at their own peril. The mounting difficulties of governing during a period of economic crisis, heightened international tension, and declining public confidence have made all political parties more sensitive to public moods and expressions of discontent than before. Official concern about adverse public opinion has tended to make some political leaderships cautious, nondirective executors of public anxieties and fears.

⁹ According to a 1981 MORI poll, 52 percent favor an independent British deterrent, while 59 percent oppose US nuclear weapons in Britain.

58. The peace movement has not attained sufficient political influence of its own to bring down NATO governments that have supported the 1979 INF decision. However, for governments already suffering from internal party divisions over economic and social policies (for example, the FDP and the SPD in West Germany) or fragile multiparty coalitions (for example, Belgium and Holland), the peace movement has become an additional threat to their survival and constrains their maneuverability on security issues. Security policy disputes within and among the SPD and FDP in West Germany might cause a breakup of the coalition before the scheduled 1984 elections.⁹ As the 1983 deployment date approaches, coalition strains in West Germany, Belgium, and Holland will increasingly stem from government decisions related to deployment preparations (for example, site surveys, construction bids, and initial base construction). In the Netherlands, massive street demonstrations would be organized against any steps to implement the deployment decision, and these would probably trigger a major government crisis.

59. The media's coverage of the peace movement and security issues has heightened West European public sensitivity to the deployment of new weapons systems and complicated government efforts to explain the INF issue. Television and radio have been particularly significant in publicizing the European peace movement across state borders. Publicity for "peace happenings" in one country provides inspiration, information, and momentum to sympathizers in neighboring countries. Polls show that the long-established goals of NATO and the importance of US defense guarantees are understood and valued by the public. However, media coverage of current security issues has contributed to the psychological and political environment that underpins the peace movement by:

- Sensitizing publics to the uncertainties of and risks in nuclear deterrence.
- Articulating European uneasiness about developments in East-West relations and the US administration's policies.

⁹ The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, believes that the SPD will gradually accommodate to the vocal supporters of the peace movement within its ranks rather than risk their defection in the next national election.

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- Magnifying the impact of peace themes and events.
- Providing a continental dimension for local and national protests.
- Offering, in some cases, a conduit for pro-Soviet propaganda.

- Public concern, already evident among European elites, at the possible growth of anti-Americanism in Europe and American isolationism could weaken popular sympathy for the peace movement. There could be a backlash against government indulgence of "street" politics, especially if the movement is seen as threatening the basis of the NATO Alliance.

VI. OUTLOOK FOR THE PEACE MOVEMENT

60. President Reagan's proposal of the zero INF option combined with the beginning of US-Soviet negotiations in Geneva gave pause to the peace movement and brought greater balance to its themes. A combination of bad weather and public attention to events in Poland also contributed to reduced peace activities during the past winter. However, there is widespread pessimism about the success of the Geneva talks, and the steam has not gone out of the peace movement. Large Easter demonstrations have occurred, and planning continues for scores of additional demonstrations during the next few months.

61. Many peace movement leaders view the zero option as a cynical public relations effort to deflate the antinuclear campaign, and they believe that advocacy of unilateral disarmament and criticism of US policy must continue in order to sustain political pressure on West European governments. Moreover, peace activists probably believe they are partly responsible for US endorsement of a zero option, as well as for President Reagan's recent proposal for START negotiations, and that such demonstrations of their influence argue for renewed efforts.

A. Vulnerabilities of the Movement

62. The peace movement's diversity will serve to anchor antinuclear sentiment in broad sections of West European public opinion, but it could also provide important faultlines in the movement's solidarity if any of a number of conditions develop:

- Heightened violence, terrorism, or disruptive civil disobedience could diminish mainstream support from church groups and party organizations. The leadership of the Dutch IKV, for instance, is concerned that the Dutch political mainstream could be alienated if demonstrations during President Reagan's visit to Europe turn violent.

- The peace groups are already somewhat split over how to respond to Poland, and Soviet intervention would accentuate these divisions.
- New examples of Soviet or Communist manipulation could also increase divisions in the peace movement and lead to disillusionment of non-Communist supporters. Leaders of the West German Greens, for example, have denounced Communist attempts to stage-manage demonstrations planned against President Reagan in June and prevent criticism of the Soviet Union.

B. Violence and Civil Disobedience

63. Mainstream peace groups are ideologically opposed to violence and seek to disassociate themselves from terrorists, but are divided on the question of civil disobedience. Violence—if directly linked to the movement—would tarnish its claims to legitimacy. Some West German environmentalists, in fact, have plans for a three-year campaign of civil disobedience against the deployment of INF in Western Europe—including surveillance of and publicity about nuclear sites, demonstrations against military barracks, and interference with NATO maneuvers and military road traffic. In the Netherlands, one military ammunition train has already been stopped by protesters. Antinuclear environmentalists in Western Europe have also disseminated and published relatively accurate information regarding the location of nuclear weapons sites.

64. Some terrorist groups have discussed the possibility of seizing a nuclear weapon in transit to or at a weapons site, or attacking such a site under the guise of peace activities. Over the past year, both the Italian Red Brigades and the West German RAF have intensified their attacks against NATO in order to attempt to tap the antinuclear, anti-INF, and anti-NATO sentiment associated with the European peace movement.

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C. Prospects for the Movement

65. While the peace movement has succeeded in inducing governments to show caution in proceeding with INF, it has not yet been able to force any of them to reject the 1979 decision. And this failure is producing frustration among radicals, especially in the Netherlands. However, the movement will almost surely become more strident if it appears to West Europeans that the United States is responsible for stalling the INF or START negotiations. Leaders of the peace movement will, in any case, try to take advantage of upcoming political party congresses, state visits, and NATO summit meetings to mobilize followers and assure enough momentum for concerted action if and when INF deployment decisions are definitively taken or actual stationing begins. Soviet propaganda efforts during the Geneva talks—such as Brezhnev's SS-20 freeze proposal—will assure the peace movement of numerous opportunities to capitalize on popular concern about nuclear weapons.

66. Divisions will continue to trouble the movement over the next year or so. While many diverse groups will coordinate their planned demonstrations, not all will necessarily participate in each activity. Simmering ideological disagreements—for example, whether the peace movement should criticize Poland's martial law, how much emphasis should be placed on the East's arms buildup, and how closely non-Communists should work with Communist-sponsored organizations—will tend to keep the movement from developing a unified program. "Unity through diversity," however, has become a slogan for activists who wish to prevent any major schisms among church organizations, environmentalists, Communists, and party youth organizations. But when a peace issue or event arises, the movement will probably be able to pull itself together and mount demonstrations, some of them impressive.

67. Future demonstrations are likely to be spurred on not only by the impact of renewed Soviet propaganda and arms-control proposals but also by publicity surrounding US military policies—especially in Central America. Increasingly, demonstrations reflect criticism of US military aid to El Salvador and alleged American support for repressive government measures in that country and elsewhere. Closer to home, West

European media are covering US plans to augment its chemical warfare arsenal for use in Europe, and peace activists have added the theme of "no CW" to their anti-INF, anti-ERW slogans.

68. The Netherlands will remain the West European country most vulnerable to peace movement pressures, and the odds remain heavily against INF deployment there. In West Germany, on the other hand, the peace movement on its own now lacks the strength and unity necessary to cause a rejection of INF deployment, but developments within the SPD in 1983 might raise the danger of indefinite delay. In Belgium the peace movement is currently not strong enough to block deployment, but a West German rejection of INF deployment would also lead to rejection by Belgium. An independent Belgian rejection of the 1979 decision could occur only in the improbable case that both the Flemish and Walloon Socialist Parties assume a strong anti-INF stance and their participation is required to form a coalition government. The peace movements in Britain and Italy would have a significant impact on INF deployment decisions only if major changes occur in the political landscapes of these countries—for example, in Britain the accession of the Labor Party to power.

VII. SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE UNITED STATES

A. The Peace Movement and the Geneva Talks

69. The ongoing INF negotiations will affect importantly the fortunes of the peace movement, even though many peace activists believe that both superpowers use arms control talks simply to perpetuate the arms race. Many leaders are not impressed with Washington's interest in a US-Soviet zero option; they favor unconditional and unilateral West European rejection of INF deployments, although some are increasingly impatient with Soviet security policies as well. Indeed, many peace activists advocate unilateral nuclear disarmament as a more effective instrument than arms control talks. Nevertheless, the peace movement's ranks—and thus its political effectiveness—will be increased or decreased according to the progress of the negotiations. A stalemate in Geneva would exacerbate antinuclear protest as the time for missile deployment draws closer.

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70. As negotiations proceed and the 1983 deployment date approaches, domestic pressures on NATO governments will grow. The Geneva negotiations are likely to lead to one of the following situations:

- The talks break down with the Soviets refusing to reduce forces and the United States insisting on full INF deployment. In this event, the overall European peace movement would be revitalized—regardless of which superpower was seen to be at fault.
- The talks drag on inconclusively, with the Soviets promising to reduce their forces only if NATO abandons INF. In such an event, the peace movement would become increasingly restless, but West European leaders would have some room to exercise influence over their publics and to encourage the United States to modify its position.
- The talks continue but hold out the promise of agreement on something short of the zero option, requiring Soviet reductions and allowing partial INF deployment. With the exception of unilateralists, many of the supporters of the peace movement could reconcile themselves to such an outcome, especially since many of them value the appearance of progress in arms control and superpower dialogue almost as highly as they do actual weapons reductions.

B. The Peace Movement and US Policies

71. The US-European dialogue over the proper relationship between defense and detente is likely to remain contentious, however. West European political

elites are nevertheless anxious to find areas of agreement with the United States, if only to avoid exacerbating the American perception that Western Europe is no longer a reliable ally. Some leaders of the peace movement, however, would point to recent US congressional threats of troop withdrawals as confirming their beliefs that it is the United States—not the Soviet Union—that is trying to blackmail Western Europe.

72. The United States is not able to affect directly many of the underlying trends in Western Europe that nurture the peace movement; antinuclear sentiment will doubtless continue to be strong, especially within the younger generations, and protest based on anti-nuclear or other “peace” issues will have a disproportionate influence because of the fragility of several European governments. West European perceptions of the US-Soviet military balance will also be resistant to rapid change, and accelerated US defense programs may even serve to heighten fears of war rather than reduce them. Moreover, enough popular doubt and uncertainty will persist in Western Europe about the advantages and risks of Alliance defense strategies that the arguments of the peace movement will appear to some as simple and correct—correct, perhaps, because simple.

73. Even so, the effectiveness of the peace movement over the next few years will vary from state to state. More important, US policies touching on defense and nuclear weapons will remain targets of criticism so long as Western Europe remains dependent on American security guarantees. And the longer term US interests lie in convincing West European publics that these guarantees remain solid and that there is no effective substitute for Atlantic security cooperation.

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