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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

WEEKLY REVIEW

THE CUBAN CRISIS

The Soviet leaders, faced with the dangerous consequences of a major miscalculation of US intentions regarding strategic missiles in Cuba, have taken a variety of measures to minimize the damage to the USSR's prestige and interests and to deter direct US military intervention in Cuba. Moscow's cautious reaction to President Kennedy's 22 October speech was contrived to avoid commitments to specific countermeasures without giving an appearance of acquiescing to the measures announced by the President. Khrushchev's present intention, as reflected in the diversion of Soviet ships away from the US quarantine zone and in his call for a summit meeting, apparently is to avoid incidents which might make the crisis more difficult to control and to rely primarily on political pressures to forestall further US actions in Cuba. There are no indications that the USSR is planning retaliatory actions in other areas, such as Berlin or Southeast Asia.

Moscow's initial reaction to President Kennedy's speech was intended to underscore the USSR's military preparedness to meet any eventualities. The commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact forces, Marshal Grechko, ordered pact representatives in Moscow to increase the military readiness of member nations. Defense Minister Malinovsky reported to the Soviet Government on measures to raise the "battle readiness" of Soviet armed forces. Two days later, Malinovsky repeated earlier Soviet claims of a "mighty and invulnerable" global rocket and of the capability to destroy enemy rockets in flight. Moscow also announced that all military leaves had been canceled and that release from active duty for members of the strategic rocket forces, anti-

aircraft defense forces, and the submarine fleet had been postponed until further notice.

The Soviet Government statement of 23 October, warning that the US is "recklessly playing with fire," was aimed primarily at gaining time and placing the US on the defensive while Moscow attempts to generate growing pressures on the US which, the Soviets hope, will deter further US military action and oblige the US to ease the quarantine on shipping. The statement carefully refrained from specifying the USSR's reaction to the quarantine and to possible US military action to remove the strategic missiles in Cuba. It evaded the central issue of the missiles and reaffirmed the claim in Moscow's statements in September that the military equipment being sent to Cuba is "designed exclusively for defensive purposes." It sought to play down the USSR's role in the crisis by portraying the conflict as one between Cuba and the US.

Moscow's statement replied only indirectly to President Kennedy's warning of US nuclear retaliation against the USSR if any nuclear missiles should be launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere. It stated that Soviet nuclear weapons will never be used for aggressive purposes but added a vague and ambiguous warning that the "Soviet Union will strike a very powerful retaliatory blow" if the "aggressors touch off a war."

Although the statement denounced the US quarantine and denied Washington's right to halt and inspect foreign vessels on the open seas, it avoided any hints of Soviet reaction beyond stating that

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the USSR "resolutely rejects such claims." The statement also implied that the USSR will seek to circumvent the US demand for the prompt dismantling and withdrawal of all offensive weapons by contending that all military equipment in Cuba is defensive and owned by Cuba. Moscow termed the US demand as one which "naturally no state which values its independence can meet."

Although the Soviet statement did not unequivocally deny President Kennedy's statement about the presence of strategic missiles in Cuba, Soviet spokesmen and propaganda have attempted to cast doubt on the authenticity of US information. The statement dealt only indirectly with this question by noting that the US accuses Cuba of "allegedly creating a threat to US security" and termed this allegation "hypocrisy." Soviet UN delegate Zorin, however, charged that US "fabrications" were designed to persuade the UN Security Council to "approve retroactively" US aggressive acts against Cuba. He claimed that the US had failed to present proof of its charges. Moscow radio on 24 October asserted that the US Defense Department had produced "some kind of faked photographs taken from spy planes" to justify its "aggressive acts." It said the "big lie" spread by Washington is aimed at justifying "far-reaching aggressive actions." The Soviet ambassador to Mexico publicly denied that there is an "arsenal of Soviet arms" in Cuba, and a Soviet diplomat in Britain said Soviet weapons supplied to Cuba are not equipped with nuclear warheads.

The Soviet statement of 23 October again sought to justify Moscow's military presence in Cuba by pointing to the deployment of US forces and armaments throughout the world and to US rejection of Soviet proposals

for withdrawal of all foreign forces from alien territories.

Future Tactics

Khrushchev's call for a "meeting at the highest level" suggests that the Soviet leaders believe that time will work to their advantage and provide growing opportunities to press the US to agree to enter negotiations with Cuba and the USSR and possibly to suspend implementation of the quarantine and other measures. In his reply to a message from Bertrand Russell, Khrushchev sought to contrast Soviet and US positions by pledging that the USSR will do everything in its power to avert war. He said Moscow will avoid "reckless decisions" and will not allow itself to be "provoked" by US actions. He also tried to enhance the urgency of a summit meeting by warning that if the US carries out its announced "program of pirate action," the USSR would have no alternative but to "make use of the means of defense against the aggressor." He added that US "aggression" against Cuba would render a summit meeting "impossible and useless."

The Soviet leaders are seeking to convey an impression of composure and discipline in dealing with the Cuban crisis. Khrushchev and other top Soviet leaders went backstage to greet an American opera singer after a performance on 24 October. The performances of other US cultural groups in the USSR received an unusually cordial reception on 23 October. The demonstrations in front of the US Embassy in Moscow on 24 October were perfunctory by comparison with other demonstrations.

Gromyko made a demonstrative stop in East Berlin on his trip back to Moscow from New York. His public remarks there on 24 October, however, contained no

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
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hint of Soviet retaliatory action against the Western position in Berlin. He restated the Soviet position that an agreement with the West is possible but only on the condition that Western "occupation troops" are withdrawn and East German sovereignty is respected. He avoided any mention of a deadline but declared that the West should realize that the East German

There are nine Soviet offensive missile sites in Cuba. Five sites--all for 1,100-mile medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs)--appear to be fully operational. One additional MRBM site is expected to become fully operational on 28 October. One 2,200-mile intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) site may become operational by 1 December, the other two by 15 December.



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frontiers are "firmly and reliably secured." Soviet propaganda continued to play down the possibility of a "new Berlin crisis" in the near future and professed to see a "more realistic approach" to the German problem at the UN General Assembly.

Missiles in Cuba

It now is apparent that the deployment to Cuba of Soviet offensive missiles and associated construction equipment and prefabricated materials began last spring. Necessary surveying, road construction, and initial building construction were mostly concentrated in August, September, and October.

Four MRBM sites are grouped in the San Cristobal area of western Cuba, and two are near Sagua la Grande. Each has or will have four launchers with at least two missiles for each launcher.


Two fixed sites for IRBM missiles are in the Guanajay area near Havana. One IRBM site is near Remedios, and there probably is a second, companion site there. Each of the IRBM sites has four launch pads.

There is no positive evidence that nuclear warheads for these missiles are present in Cuba. However, certain buildings under construction at the sites appear to be for storage of nuclear weapons.

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The 24 Soviet surface-to-air (SAM) sites in Cuba now are in operational status and give air defense cover to most of Cuba.

Other Weapons

In addition to the MRBM and IRBM deployment and the SAM defensive system, there are three known short-range cruise-missile sites in Cuba and 12 short-range missile-equipped KOMAR motor torpedo boats.

Aircraft counts at the various fields show a total of 22 IL-28 (Beagle) medium jet bombers at San Julian in extreme western Cuba. None have been observed elsewhere.

Jet fighters are concentrated in areas near surface-to-surface missile installations. All 39 known MIG-21s (Fishbeds) are at Santa Clara airfield in central Cuba, about midway be-

tween the Sagua Grande MRBM site and the IRBM site near Guanajay.

As many as 26 MIG-15s (Fagots) and 9 MIG-19s (Farmers) recently have been located at the Cuban Air Force Headquarters base at San Antonio de los Banos, south of Havana and near both the IRBM installation at Guanajay and the MRBM sites at San Cristobal.

Thirteen IL-14 (Crate) transport aircraft have been noted at nearby Playa Baracoa. Two other unidentified transports are located here also, and there is one apiece at San Antonio de los Banos and at Camaguey. As many as 40 helicopters have been reported at Playa Baracoa airfield, Cuba's major heliport.

Cuban Reaction to President's Speech

Cuba's reaction to the US moves of 22 October has been

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cautious. The high level of military alert continues, but Castro's public response to the crisis has been relatively restrained. His speech on 23 October--unusual in that it was not the occasion for a mass public demonstration--was comparatively mild, full of stereotyped references to "the inevitable triumph" of the Cuban revolution over "Yankee imperialism." The speech explicitly rejected any inspection of Cuban territory by foreign nationals. The subdued tone of the Castro speech and the lack of significant comment by other Cuban leaders since may be a result of close consultation with Soviet authorities.

Non-Cuban press representatives in Cuba report the city to be calm and relatively normal, with none of the confusion and disorganization that accompanied the mobilization prior to the invasion of 1961.

Nonbloc Reaction

Official and unofficial expressions of support, sympathy, or understanding for the US position on Cuba--either overtly or privately expressed by government leaders--have reached an impressive volume from all parts of the world. Nations from which such expressions have recently been received are Italy, Portugal, Luxembourg, Belgium, Switzerland, Iran, India, Thailand, Congo (Brazzaville), Sudan, Jamaica, and Panama. Among the very few nations or groups expressing open opposition to the US stand was the Algerian National Liberation Front, which terms the quarantine of Cuba an intolerable interference in the internal affairs of that country." An official Iraqi statement also says the US quarantine is a "flagrant violation of the principle of freedom of the international seas" and a "regression for the organization of international society."

An Air Cubana plane coming from Prague made a technical stop at Goose Bay, Labrador, on 23 October and was searched by Canadian authorities before being allowed to continue to Havana. Two East German missile technicians and five Czech technicians were on board.

In Latin America, military support for the quarantine action has been offered by Argentina, Guatemala, Peru, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Honduras. Enthusiastic backing for the US position is reported among the Chilean armed forces, particularly on the part of air force officers. The Argentine Government has offered two destroyers on three days' notice, with a submarine, a marine battalion with transport, and other units if required later. The Argentine Air Force commander has sent messages to General LeMay and other hemisphere air force commanders pledging readiness to participate in any joint measures required by the Cuban crisis.

The Peruvian offer is qualified by a requirement of unanimous approval of the OAS resolution. The Uruguayan Government, according to press reports, has now decided to support the OAS resolution, but with certain reservations on the use of armed force.

President Duvalier of Haiti and President Rivera of El Salvador have announced support for the quarantine policy. President Goulart of Brazil, however, apparently seeks a mediatory role.

Demonstrations of opposition in Latin America remain scattered and ineffective. The Communists appear reluctant to commit themselves to a major effort in the face of widespread official and public acceptance of the US position.

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