

FROM AMB. WHELEN IN NIC.

Source 17

SECRET

23 September 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Telephonic Call to Ambassador Thomas E. Whelan

1. Pursuant to instructions received from Jacob D. Esterline on 22 September 1960, L. P. Napoli spoke telephonically to Ambassador Thomas E. Whelan on 23 September 1960. LFN explained that in accordance with instructions received from his superiors he had travelled to Nicaragua where, on two occasions, he had spoken with President SUMER. The Ambassador was asked if he recalled several talks held with the president during the past several months relative to a matter of mutual concern to the United States and Nicaragua. The Ambassador was reminded that the talks centered around three points. No further details were given. Ambassador Whelan quickly responded that he fully remembered the talks and the position taken by President SUMER at that time. (REF: The points covered in the talks were air strips, training areas, and radio facilities in Nicaragua for use in JMWAVE activities.) The writer then explained that these points were the subject of the visits to President SUMER.

2. At the outset of the phone conversation it was explained to Ambassador Whelan that it was unfortunate he was not in Nicaragua at the time of the visit; there was an urgency to hold the talks quickly, however, and the writer was advised that the Ambassador was not at his office. It was explained that this was probably due to lack of complete coordination at the Liaison level. The Ambassador said that he understood, not to worry about it, and that he was glad Napoli had made the trip. The writer went on to explain that in the Ambassador's absence, he (writer) had checked in with the DCN, [Name], who was given a brief outline of Napoli's mission. (REF: It should be explained that the trip was cleared with the Director of State officials and the Embassy, [Name], was not informed of the trip. The DCN had received strict orders from the Ambassador, prior to the latter's departure for vacation, that no one was to see the president or the general without the DCN's prior knowledge and consent. For this reason it was deemed necessary to clear the matter through the DCN. The DCN was quite upset that State had not advised him of the visitor's visit, and he was more upset as to whether or not the visit had been cleared by the Department. He explained that it was most unusual that CAS would take such a drastic step without cutting the Embassy in on the matter beforehand. It was explained to the DCN that the writer was not in a position to explain top-level policy, but was acting strictly on his agency's orders. The DCN then said that he would not advise his superiors of Napoli's visit through

U.S. Council throughout JMWAVE

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JOB NO. 63-42, FOLDER 15

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-2-

official channels, but instead would write Assistant Secretary ^{Mann} a private and restricted letter via State post facilities. All of this was explained to Ambassador Whelan to enable him to get our side of the story as it actually happened. The Ambassador told the writer that Blanchard had acted properly, but that he understood the problems involved and neither the agency nor the writer need fear that he (Whelan) was put out or upset by the writer's actions in Nicaragua. He only expressed the hope that some real values was realized by the trip.)

3. The Ambassador then queried whether or not SORNA raised the question of "being left holding the bag". Napoli told him it had come up and had been kicked around for a while, and that the answer given to SORNA seemed to give him enough satisfaction to cause him to give the writer a favorable reply to his question. (NOTE: This is a matter of real concern to the Ambassador and one which the agency cannot take lightly. A policy decision must be reached on the question "What will the role of the U.S. be in the event Nicaragua is threatened with sanctions by the OAS for allowing its (Nicaragua's) soil to be used for revolutionary purposes against Cuba?" SORNA told the writer that he would expect the U. S. to take whatever steps necessary, behind the scenes, to kill any sanctions being taken against the Nicaraguan Government by CASREO through the OAS. SORNA was told that this question could not be answered by the writer as it was a matter for top-level U.S. Government officials to answer. Napoli, however, did add that in his personal opinion the U. S. has to back up its friends in times of need, and as SORNA is a friend--not only in words but in deeds--then we should help Nicaragua as Nicaragua is helping us. SORNA understood this was Napoli's personal feeling, not U. S. policy.)

4. The Ambassador concluded the conversation by saying he was pleased that something was "finally going to be done" and he was pleased to learn that Nicaragua was considered as support. (NOTE: Probably Ambassador Whelan feels that the U.S. has finally come around to his way of thinking--the SORNA's are good people who deserve U. S. backing.)

5. It is recommended that Ambassador Whelan be contacted periodically by an agency officer if and when the former comes to Washington for consultations. The Ambassador is on vacation in North Dakota and may come to D. C. in connection with Nicaragua. He is a real friend of the agency, and a person who has been extremely useful and friendly to the writer during the latter's tour in Nicaragua.

L. P. Napoli

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2 - WH/A Files

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JOB NO. 63-42, FOLDER 15

Source 11

Source 18

~~So~~

Not filed at this point -
Have additional use.

MR for DDP from

CT say Brown, 18 Nov 60

Sub: Points re Cuba for Discussion
at ~~with~~ Special Group Meeting, Saturday,
19 Nov 60.

Source 19

Barney - some
opposition to use
of Wei - - had
for US image.
18 Nov 60

P. 2. Barney goesy about implications of use of
McCona site by US since Somozas such a
~~and~~ bad guy. "In the long run we would
lose an unacceptable amount of face ~~with~~ these
[more democratic?] countries." "They have to do it
anyhow for a stake loss."

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SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

EX-107

**BASES & EVACUATION
TO CONUS/SAIPAN
21 NOV 60**

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: R. D. Drain
C/WH/4/P&P *RD*

NO. _____
DATE 21 Nov 60

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE
RECEIVED FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.	C/WH/4	22 NOV 1960	<i>RD</i>
2.	<i>Chief, WHD</i>		<i>gck</i>
3.	<i>Chief/WH 4/P&P</i>		
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*[also some 20 [Chief
New for Rel]
GUANT?]*

EYES ONLY

SECRET

21 November 1960

(Monday)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : JMARC Meeting with DDP

PARTICIPANTS: Messrs. Bissell, Barnes, Flannery, Esterline, Reynolds, Eisemann, Drain.

11 Nov 60
1. The meeting was held to bring JMARC personnel up-to-date on Saturday's special meeting of the Special Group and on the DDP's thinking resulting from that meeting.

2. Mr. Bissell felt that meeting had sufficiently reviewed the outstanding problems to permit the following conclusions:

a. We have to be ready to evacuate TRAV of ground trainees, at least temporarily in the case of an as yet unfixed OAS inspection.

b. We can plan to use Fort Randolph for up to 200 trainees either for temporary holding or for longer term training.

c. We can anticipate the use of a U.S. installation for holding evacuees and possibly also for longer term training.

d. There is no objection to continuing air training at MADD nor to the use of Guatemala or Nicaragua for basing air strikes.

e. Even if TRAV is evacuated, it could well be continued in use for the training of Guatemalans.

3. There was some discussion as to the cover arrangements which might be arranged for any Z. I. installation chosen for a training area. After reviewing the probable expense of activating a secure area and the likely difficulty of creating a "refugee" cover, the balance of the discussion was concerned with Saipan, about which it was agreed:

a. JMARC would promptly ascertain from DDS and OTR what facilities were available and what problems existed in regard to its possible use to train up to 600 men.

b. DDP would explore the various facets of air evacuation from TRAV to Saipan, including cost, time, and security. In regard to the latter, it was suggested that JMCLEAR aircraft and crews might evacuate to Del Rio with AF 130's transshipping therefrom.

Cuba from 8 Oct 60

EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY
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4. Concurrently, JMARC would continue to explore the most promising Z.I. sites previously ascertained, and an additional unused Army post on Florida's west coast.

5. The DDP suggested an evacuation date of about 1 December.



Richard D. Drain
C/WH/4/P&P

WH/4/P&P:RDDRAIN:jss (21 Nov 60)

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1 - Mallard, Barkley, File

(b)(3)

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

BASES, MOVES, EVAC

SUBJECT: (Optional)

1577

FROM: R/D/Drain

NO.

22 Nov 60

DATE

22 Nov 60

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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23 NOV 1960

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Some 20 [Chap WHD For Rel]

USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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EYES ONLY
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22 November 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : JMARC Meeting with DPD (b)(3)

PARTICIPANTS: Messrs. Esterline, Hawkins, Drain, Eisemann, Brown,
[redacted] Bierli, Gaines, [redacted] (b)(3)

1. Col. Gaines is checking today with USAF to explore the possible move. In connection with this problem it was agreed:

a. Decision regarding Saipan is dependent upon the survey of some seven alternative ZI installations, that survey to be sufficiently completed by 23 November to permit final consideration of Saipan.

b. Any move from TRAV should be initiated not later than 1 December.

c. If Saipan is chosen, DPD would handle the move from TRAV in C-54's with 50-passenger capacity to a sterile (i.e. non-AF) ZI base, from which AF would transship in C-124's or 118's. So doing would free DPD to have available thereafter seven C-54's by 1 January, five in assured use.

2. Nicaragua

While still retaining MADD, Nicaragua will be promptly developed for use as a strike base, with a secondary capability for resupply. In regard to this development, it was agreed:

a. The cost will be kept to the absolute minimum required, hopefully under \$100,000.


b. With a strike capability as the primary construction objective, repair of the asphalt/macadam airstrip has priority.

c. In Nicaragua, the JMARC representative will be a senior PM KUBARKer with seven years experience. He will handle governmental relationships. DPD will handle the actual development of the site and will dispatch a team for that purpose by 28 November.

d. People and planes (with the exception of one C-46 for evacuation) will not be kept at the site for protracted periods. No B-26's or C-54's except transiting for ops.

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e. To cover the possibility of denial of ZI bases for resupply of the strike force and its subsequent adherents, a supply capability should be realized in Nicaragua as a second priority. Resupply of our 600 is estimated to take 12 tons per day, or one-half the U.S. Army figure. Food and ammunition for both the initial force and its adherents and arms for the latter could be shipped by sea to Nicaragua for air resupply thence.


Richard D. Drain
C/WH/4/P&P

WH/4/P&P:RDDRAIN:jss (22 Nov 60)

Distribution:

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1-Mallard, Barkley, File

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INTERNAL

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

**REQ FOR
TING SITES IN
US**

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

V/44
C/WH/4/Support

NO.

DATE

18 November 1960

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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1. C/WH/D
1317 Barton Hall

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Source 20

18 November 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : CONUS Military Installations for JMARC Training Sites

1. This memorandum contains a recommendation for approval by the Deputy Director (Plans) as set forth in paragraph 3 below.

2. Listed below, in order of preference, are CONUS military installations considered suitable for use by JMARC as training sites for approximately 1,000 men. The installations have been selected from information available at Headquarters without benefit of personal inspection. The installations are:

- a. Fort Benning, Georgia
- b. Fort Bragg, North Carolina
- c. Belle Chasse Naval Ammunition Depot, Louisiana
- d. Moore Field, Texas
- e. Camp Leroy Johnson, Louisiana
- f. Gulf Ordnance Plant, Prairie, Mississippi
- g. Camp Bullis, Texas

Information concerning each of the above bases is attached hereto.

3. It is recommended that representatives from JMARC make a field survey of the above installations in order to obtain sufficient facts on which to base a firm recommendation.

SIGNED

J. C. King
Chief

Western Hemisphere Division

Attachment

APPROVED:

Deputy Director (Plans)

Cuba from 8 Oct 60

SECRET

ATTACHMENT

CONUS INSTALLATIONS

A. Fort Benning, Georgia

This is one of the Army's largest facilities. It is divided into four main camps, all of which are at least ten miles apart. It has a mobilization capacity of 90,000 troops. Currently there are 27,000 troops stationed there.

B. Fort Bragg, North Carolina

The area considered suitable for training is an adjunct of Fort Bragg known as Camp McCall, which is an isolated bivouac area with an air field in the immediate vicinity.

C. Belle Chasse Naval Ammunitions Depot

This installation contains 3,440 acres. Improvements include an Administration Building, barracks, warehouses, utility systems and magazine storage facilities.

D. Moore Field, Texas

This is a four year old installation to be declared excess by the Air Force to GSA. It was built by Eastman Kodak as a school for the Air Force. It is reported to be in excellent condition.

E. Camp Leroy Johnson

A suitable sub-area of Camp Johnson is called Villere. It contains 1700 acres and belongs to the Transportation Corps of the Army. It is used for small arms training. It is located in New Orleans Parish, La.

F. Gulf Ordnance Plant, Prairie, Mississippi

This installation covers approximately 3000 acres. It contains 197 miscellaneous buildings and is surrounded by security fencing. It is now excess property in the hands of GSA.

G. Camp Bullis, Texas

This is a vast area which is currently being used for medical field training. It is possible to isolate a large number of people in several places on the reservation.

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