talystidion'S Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05140033 ROUTINE Intelligence Information Cable IN 250059 PAGE 1 OF 13 PAGES STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) KIA NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE CRS DIRECTORATE FOR EXO DDI PLANS of the Espionage Laws, Tipe 18, U.S.C. Secs 793 and 794, the This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. GROUP I NO FOREIGN DISSEM THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE (b)(3)222219Z SEC/RET DIST-22 JANUARY JORDAN/LEBANON/ARAB STATES COUNTRY: DOI: (b)(1)(b)(3)SELF-CRITICISM MEETING IN BEIRUT ATTENDED BY YASIR SUBJECT: ARAFAT. OTHER FATAH OFFICIALS. AND INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN INTELLECTUALS Palestinaux interlectuals meet trafet were bragged problem as discinity with trapat to review -- Untically (b)(1) ACG: (b)(3)SOURCE: VISIT TO LEBANON OF (SUMMARY. DURING THE (b)(1)(b)(3)PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) CHAIRMAN AND FATAH LEADER YASIR A R A F A T, CERTAIN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN LEADERS, AT THEIR REQUEST, MET WITH ARAFAT AND OTHER FATAH OFFICIALS TO REVIEW THE CURRENT STATE OF THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT. AT THESE MEETINGS, THE INDEPENDENTS VOICED CRITICISM OF MANY ASPECTS OF THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT. ARAFAT AND THE OTHER FATAH OFFICIALS AGREED

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WITH MANY OF THE POINTS RAISED, BUT ALSO ATTEMPTED TO JUSTIFY THEIR

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POLICIES. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE DISCUSSIONS. IT WAS AGREED TO KEEP THE MEETINGS SECRET AND TO HOLD MEETINGS IN THE FUTURE, TO INCLUDE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP). IT WAS RECOMMENDED BY THE INDEPENDENTS THAT SINCE UNIFICATION OF THE COMMANDO ORGANIZATIONS WAS UNREALISTIC AT THIS TIME. THE THREE MAIN ORGANIZATIONS, NAMELY, FATAH, SA'IQA, AND THE PFLP, SHOULD ATTEMPT TO ERADICATE THE SMALLER ONES, NOT BY FORCE. BUT BY EXPELLING THEIR LEADERS FROM IMPORTANT POSTS WITHIN THE RESISTANCE, SO AS EFFECTIVELY TO ISOLATE THEM FROM THE MAINSTREAM. AND BY APPEALING TO THEIR MEMBERS TO JOIN ONE OF THE THREE MAIN GROUPS. THE INDEPENDENTS REALIZE THAT IN SPITE OF THEIR CRITICISM AND RECOMMENDATIONS, ARAFAT'S OWN VIEWS WILL PREVAIL. NEVERTHELESS, THE GROUP CONSIDERS ITSELF TO BE THE CONSCIENCE OF THE PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT. HAVING A MORAL RESPONSIBILITY TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN THE MOVEMENT, AND THAT BY KEEPING CLOSE WATCH ON THE ACTIONS AND POLICIES OF THE MOVEMENT'S LEADER-SHIP, IT WILL INDUCE THE LATTER TO ACT MORE PRUDENTLY.

END OF SUMMARY.)

1. DURING THE YISIT TO BEIRUT OF PLO
CHAIRMAN AND FATAH LEADER YASIR ARAFAT, DOCTOR YUSUF S A Y I G H,

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DIRECTOR OF THE PLO PLANNING INSTITUTE IN BEIRUT, REQUESTED THAT ARAFAT AND OTHER FATAH OFFICIALS MEET WITH SAYIGH AND OTHER INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN THINKERS AND INTELLECTUALS AT SAYIGH'S VILLA IN THE MOUNTAIN VILLAGE OF AYN UNUB NEAR SHAMLAN TO REVIEW

THE CURRENT STATE OF THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT, ESPECIALLY FOLLOWING THE SEPTEMBER 1970 FIGHTING IN JORDAN, AND TO MAKE APPROPRIATE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE.

2. ARAFAT ACCEPTED THE INVITATION AND VISITED SAYIGH'S MOUNTAIN VILLA, WHERE MANY HOURS OF MEETINGS WERE HELD IN TWO SESSIONS

ATTENDING WITH ARAFAT WERE FATAH.
OFFICIALS SALAH K H A L A F, KHALID H A S A N, ZUHAYR
A L A M I, AND KAMAL A D W A N. PRESENT ON BEHALF OF THE
INDEPENDENTS WERE SAYIGH; HISHAM S H A R A B I, A WELL-KNOWN
PALESTINIAN AUTHOR/INTELLECTUAL CURRENTLY VISITING PROFESSOR AT
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT (AUB); IBRAHIM A B I D, THE DEPUTY
DIRECTOR OF THE PLO PLANNING INSTITUTE; AHMAD K H A L I F A H,
AN OFFICIAL OF THE BEIRUT PLO RESEARCH CENTER AND A SYMPATHIZER
OF THE POPULAR DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE
(PDFLP), WHO SPENT 1968 IN AN ISRAELI PRISON AND WHO
HAS BEEN LIVING IN BEIRUT SINCE THE SUMMER OF 1969; AND NABIL NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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S H A T H, A PROFESSOR AT AUB WHO, DESPITE HIS OFFICIAL FATAH ASSOCIATION, LIKES TO PORTRAY HIMSELF AS AN INDEPENDENT THINKER AND THEORETICIAN FOR THE PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT AS A WHOLE.

- DURING THESE MEETINGS, THE INDEPENDENT PALESTINIANS

 POSED A SERIES OF CRITICAL QUESTIONS TO ARAFAT AND THE OTHER FATAH

 OFFICIALS CONCERNING THE ACTIVITIES AND POLICIES PURSUED BY THE

 LEADERSHIP OF THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT DURING THE PAST

 YEAR, PARTICULARLY IN JORDAN. ARAFAT AND THE OTHER FATAH LEADERS

 AGREED WITH MANY OF THE POINTS RAISED BY THE INDEPENDENTS AND

 REPEATEDLY TRIED TO JUSTIFY THEIR ACTIONS AND POLICIES DURING THE

 PAST TWELVE MONTHS. THEY DID NOT TAKE THE OFFENSIVE AGAINST THESE

 INDEPENDENTS, BUT MERELY TRIED TO CONVINCE THEM THAT WHAT THEY

 HAD DONE WAS JUSTIFIED AND IN MANY CASES UNAVOIDABLE. SHA'TH,

 ALTHOUGH A FATAH OFFICIAL HIMSELF, PROVED TO BE THE MOST CRITICAL,

 DIRECT, AND PROBING IN HIS QUESTIONS, WHICH CONCERNED MOSTLY THE

 POLICIES AND ACTIVITIES OF THE PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP IN THE FIELDS

 OF PROPAGANDA AND INFORMATION.
- 4. ALTHOUGH ALL PARTICIPATED IN THE DEBATES, WHICH WERE FAR RANGING, THE FOLLOWING EXAMPLES ARE ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE TYPE OF CRITICISMS VOICED DURING THESE SESSIONS, AND THE

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JUSTIFICATIONS PUT FORWARD BY THE FATAH OFFICIALS PRESENT:

SHARABI MAINTAINED THAT THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT HAD EVOLVED INTO AN ORGANIZATION OF ARMED MOBS WHOSE MEMBERS FELT FREE TO COMMIT MURDER, RAPE, AND THEFT, BECAUSE THEY WERE CONVINCED THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE PUNISHED FOR THEIR CRIMES. HE SAID ARAFAT HAD NADE DECISIONS DURING THE PAST YEAR IN A UNILATERAL AND DICTATORIAL FASHION. WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE VIEWS OR FEELINGS OF THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE PLO CENTRAL COMMITTEE. IN ADDITION, SHARABI ACCUSED THE COMMANDO LEADERSHIP, AND PARTICULARLY ARAFAT AS ITS MOST POWERFUL COMMANDO LEADER, OF DOING NOTHING CONCRETE TO ACHIEVE THE UNIFICATION OF THE COMMANDO ORGANIZATIONS. SHARABI ADMITTED THAT IF ARAFAT'S UNILATERAL DECISIONS HAD TURNED OUT TO BE CORRECT. THOSE CRITICS PRESENT, INCLUDING HIMSELF, WOULD HAVE PROBABLY REMAINED , SILENT AND ON THE SIDELINES, BUT SINCE THESE ARBITRARY DECISIONS PROVED WRONG AND HAD COST THE PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT MANY LIVES AND MUCH PRESTIGE, IT WAS PROPER TO SURFACE THESE MISTAKES. SHARABI MAINTAINED THERE WAS NO LONGER A PALES-TINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT IN JORDAN, AND IT WAS NOW SHAMEFUL AND EVEN DANGEROUS TO ADMIT TO BEING A PALESTINIAN IN THAT COUNTRY.

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REGARDING THE EVENTS IN JORDAN. ARAFAT DEFENDED B. HIMSELF BY SAYING THAT HE AND THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE LEADERSHIP DID NOT AND DO NOT WANT TO DO BATTLE WITH THE HASHIMITE REGIME, BECAUSE IT WAS NOT IN THE INTEREST OF THE PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT TO DO SO. UNFORTUNATELY, HOWEVER, ARAFAT SAID, THERE ARE OTHER COMMANDO ORGANIZATIONS WHO BELIEVE THAT THE CONTRARY SHOULD BE THE CASE. "HOW CAN WE ARRIVE AT A GENUINE FORMULA FOR UNIFICATION." ARAFAT ASKED. "IF WE CANNOT EVEN AGREE ON SUCH AN ESSENTIAL POINT AS WHETHER THE MOVEMENT SHOULD FIGHT KING H U S A Y N OR NOT?" ARAFAT REVEALED THAT FATAH HAD MADE MANY ATTEMPTS TO ENTER INTO A DIALOGUE WITH THESE DISSENTING COMMANDO ORGANIZATIONS, PARTICULARLY WITH THE POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP), BUT THERE HAD ALWAYS BEEN MAJOR OBSTACLES TO ANY REAL PROGRESS IN THESE DISCUSSIONS. ARAFAT SAID THE PELP HAS CONCENTRATED ITS EFFORTS IN JORDAN ON THE JORDANIAN TRADE UNION MOVEMENT BECAUSE THE PFLP WISHES TO CREATE A SOCIAL REVOLUTION THERE, BEFORE CONSIDERING ITS PRIMARY DUTY AGAINST ISRAEL. ARAFAT ADMITTED THAT THE BASIC PROBLEM AMONG THE COMMANDO ORGANIZATIONS IS ONE OF A CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE. EACH ORGANIZATION, FOR ITS OWN REASONS AND SELF-

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INTEREST. DISTRUSTS THE POLICIES AND MOTIVES OF THE OTHER COMMANDO

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ORGANIZATIONS, THUS ENSURING THE FAILURE OF ALL EFFORTS AT.

UNIFICATION. FURTHER, ALTHOUGH AGREEMENTS ARE CONCLUDED AMONG
THE VARIOUS ORGANIZATIONS, THESE ARE ENTERED INTO BY THE SMALLER
ORGANIZATIONS AS A TEMPORARY TACTIC ARISING FROM THEIR OWN INTERNAL
WEAKNESSES. THEREFORE, THESE AGREEMENTS CANNOT BE CONSIDERED
PERMANENT OR BINDING. AS FOR HIMSELF, ARAFAT ADMITTED HONESTLY
THAT HE HAD MADE MISTAKES IN THE PAST. BUT HE DENIED THE CHARGE
THAT HE HAD MADE PERSONAL, DICTATORIAL DECISIONS WITHOUT CONSIDERING
THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE PLO LEADERSHIP. HE SAID SUCH DECISIONS
HAD ONLY BEEN MADE UNAVOIDABLY WHEN HE COULD NOT FIND ANY OF THE OTHER
MEMBERS OF THE PLO CENTRAL COMMITTEE, ESPECIALLY DURING TIMES OF
CRISIS AND FIGHTING, AS MOST OF THESE MEMBERS WERE IN BEIRUT,
DAMASCUS, OR HIDING OUT IN THEIR HOMES IN AMMAN ORELSEWHERE.

C. FOR HIS PART, SHA'TH CONCENTRATED HIS CRITICISM ON
THE INFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA POLICIES OF THE LEADERSHIP AND
REPEATED HIS PAST CHARGES THAT PRACTICALLY ALL MILITARY COMMUNIQUES
ON COMMANDO OPERATIONS AGAINST THE ISRAELIS, WHETHER FROM THE
ARQUB AREA OF SOUTH LEBANON, FROM JORDAN, OR GAZA, WERE TOTALLY
FALSE. SHA'TH MAINTAINED THAT THESE EXAGGERATED, BOASTFUL
COMMUNIQUES HAD FILLED THE OLDER PALESTINIANS WITH A SENSE OF FALSE

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VANITY AND SUCCESS. THESE FEELINGS WERE THEN TRANSMITTED TO THE YOUNGER PALESTINIAN ELEMENTS, WHO BEGAN TO CONSIDER THEMSELVES "LITTLE GODS." AS A RESULT, THE COMMANDOS IN JORDAN AND LEBANON BEGAN LOOKING UPON THE LOCAL POPULACE AS BEING INFERIOR TO THEMSELVES AND TREATED THEM I AN INSULTING MANNER. SUCH BEHAVIOR. CAUSED THE COMMANDOS TO LOSE WHATEVER POPULARITY THEY MAY HAVE HAD WITH THE ARAB MASSES, AND THIS CONSTITUTES A SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT AT THIS TIME. SHA'TH SAID THAT SOME EXAGGERATION IN THE COMMANDO CLAIMS AGAINST THE ISRAELIS WAS UNDERSTANDABLE, BUT CONSTANT OUTRIGHT LIES WERE A SELF-DEFEATING EXERCISE, PARTICULARLY WHEN MANY OF THE PALESTINIANS AND OTHER ARABS WERE BEGINNING TO LEARN COMMENT: DURING THE DISCUSSION. WHEN THE TRUTH. (b)(3)ARAFAT WAS CITICIZED SHARPLY AND ESPECIALLY WHEN SHA'TH HAD THE FLOOR. ARAFAT EMPLOYED THE TACTIC OF FEIGNING SLEEP BECAUSE OF EXTREME FATIGUE. THUS, WHEN CRITICAL QUESTIONS DIRECTED AT HIM WERE EMBARRASSING OR DIFFICULT TO ANSWER. ARAFAT WOULD SNAP AWAKE. EXCUSE HIMSELF, SAY HE HAD NOT BEEN PAYING CLOSE ATTENTION. AND PASS THE QUESTION TO ONE OF THE OTHER FATAH LEADERS FOR A REPLY. THUS, IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE, SHA'TH'S CRITICISM WAS PASSED ONTO SALAH KHALAF FOR COMMENT.) KHALAF ADMITTED THAT SHA'TH'S ACCUSATIONS

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TRUE, BUT HE WANTED IT UNDERSTOOD THAT THE PRINCIPAL AIM OF WERE EACH COMMANDO ORGANIZATION, UNFORTUNATELY, WAS TO COVER ITSELF WITH GLORY AT ANY COST AND AT THE EXPENSE OF THE OTHER ORGANIZATIONS. THERE HAD BEEN NO OBJECTIVITY IN PAST BATTLE COMMUNIQUES BECAUSE THEIR MAIN PURPOSE HAD BEEN TO PORTRAY THE COURAGE AND FORTITUDE OF THE COMMANDOS OF A PARTICULAR ORGANIZATION. BECAUSE OF FATAH'S LARGE SIZE AND IMPORTANCE AS AN ORGANIZATION, THE SMALLER COMMANDO GROUPS, IN ORDER NOT TO BE LEFT BEHIND IN THE MATTER OF PALESTINIAN AND ARAB PUBLIC OPINION, FELT THEMSELVES FORCED TO ISSUE THESE GROSSLY INFLATED OR WHOLLY FALSE CLAIMS ABOUT THEIR OPERATIONS AGAINST THE ISRAELIS. FATAH REALIZED THAT SUCH A POLICY WAS HARMFUL AND SOME MONTHS AGO ATTEMPTED TO RECTIFY THE SITUATION BY CONCLUDING AN AGREEMENT WITH THE OTHER COMMANDO ORGANIZATIONS TO HAVE BATTLE COMMUNIQUES ISSUED IN THE NAME OF THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT, AND NOT BY ANY PARTICULAR COMMANDO ORGANIZATION. KHALAF REVEALED THAT THIS AGREEMENT FELL APART TWO WEEKS LATER, WHEN THE PFLP ISSUED FOUR BATTLE COMMUNIQUES IN ITS OWN NAME WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION.

5. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THESE DICUSSIONS, IT WAS AGREED BY THOSE PRESENT THAT THESE MEETINGS SHOULD REMAIN SECRET AND THAT

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DO SO.)

THEY SHOULD BE CONTINUED IN THE FUTURE. BECAUSE OF THE SPECIAL

PROBLEM ARISING FROM THE INTRANSIGENT ATTITUDE OF THE PFLP, IT WAS

DECIDED THAT THE NEXT MEETING OF THIS GROUP SHOULD BE HELD IN

JORDAN IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND SHOULD INCLUDE PFLP LEADER DOCTOR

GEORGE H A B B A S H AND OTHER PFLP LEADERS.

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COMMENT: WHILE THIS GROUP WAS PREPARING TO TRAVEL TO JORDAN FOR

THIS MEETING, THE LATEST FIGHTING BETWEEN THE COMMANDOS AND THE

JORDANIANS ERUPTED AND FORCED THE CANCELLATION OF THESE PLANS.

IT IS STILL THE INTENT OF THIS GROUP TO HOLD THIS MEETING IN JORDAN,

AS SOON AS THE TENSE SITUATION THERE DIES DOWN AND IT IS FEASIBLE TO

PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT SHOULD DO EVERYTHING IN ITS POWER

TO AVOID PROVOKING THE JORDANIANS AND AT ALL COSTS, SHOULD AVOID

AN ARMED CONFRONTATION WITH THE JORDANIAN ARMY.

COMMENT: (b)(1 (b)(3)

WHILE THIS DECISION WAS TAKEN PRIOR TO THE MOST RECENT FIGHTING IN

JORDAN, IT IS EVEN MORE APPLICABLE TODAY FOLLOWING THE ADDED DEFEAT

OF THE PALESTINIAN COMMANDOS AT THE HANDS OF THE JORDANIAN ARMY.)

7. CONCERNING THE UNIFICIATION OF THE COMMANDO ORGANIZATIONS,
IT WAS AGREED REALISTICALLY THAT THERE IS NO SERIOUS HOPE THAT SUCH

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UNIFICATION CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED AT THIS TIME; THEREFORE, IT WAS RECOMMENDED THAT THE THREE MAIN ORGANIZATIONS -- FATAH, SA'IQA, AND THE PFLP (THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ARMY, A MILITARY ORGANIZA-TION, WAS NOT CONSIDERED AS A COMMANDO ORGANIZATION IN THIS CONTEXT) -- SHOULD TAKE STEPS TO ERADICATE THE SMALLER COMMANDO ORGANIZATIONS, NOT BY FORCE, BUT BY EXPELLING THE LEADERS AND OFFICIALS OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS FROM ANY AND ALL IMPORTANT POSTS WITHIN THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT. SUCH REMOVALS WOULD INCLUDE BAHJAT A B U G H A R B I Y A H, CHIEF OF THE POPULAR STRUGGLE FRONT AND A MEMBER OF THE PLO CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND ITS RECENTLY-FORMED SECRETARIAT: AHMAD Z A R U R. LEADER OF THE ARAB PALESTINE ORGANIZATION AND A MEMBER OF THE RECENTLY-ESTABLISHED PALESTINIAN SUPREME MILITARY COUNCIL; NAYIF H A W A T M A H, PDFLP LEADER AND A MEMBER OF THE PLO CENTRAL COMMITTEE; AHMAD J A B R I L, THE POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE/ GENERAL COMMAND CHIEF. WHO IS ALSO A MEMBER OF THE SUPREME MILITARY COUNCIL; AND OTHERS IN LESSER POSTS IN THE MOVEMENT MEANWHILE, AN URGENT APPEAL WOULD BE MADE TO THE OFFICIALS AND MEMBERS OF THESE SMALLER COMMANDO ORGANIZATIONS TO JOIN EITHER FATAH, SA'IQA OR THE PFLP. PRIOR TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ABOVE PLAN. IT

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WAS RECOGNIZED THAT THIS SEMI-UNIFICATION WAS NOT THE OPTIMUM
SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM, BUT IT WAS THE MOST PRACTICAL STEP
DURING THIS PERIOD. IF THE LEADERS OF THE SMALLER ORGANIZATIONS
WERE FINALLY EXPELLED, BUT STILL MANAGED TO RECEIVE FINANCIAL
ASSISTANCE FROM A FOREIGN COUNTRY OR ELSEWHERE, IT WAS BELIEVED
THAT THESE ORGANIZATIONS WOULD STILL BE EFFECTIVELY ISOLATED FROM
THE MAINSTREAM OF THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT. IT WAS ALSO FELT THAT
MOST OF THE MEMBERS OF THESE ISOLATED ORGANIZATIONS, PARTICULARLY
IF AN INTENSIVE ENLIGHTENMENT CAMPAIGN WERE TO BE LAUNCHED, WOULD
QUICKLY ABANDON THEIR PARENT ORGANIZATIONS FOR ONE OF THE LARGER
COMMANDO GROUPS. COMMENT: THE PALESTINIAN INDEPENDENTS (b)(1) (b)(3)
WHO ATTENDED THESE MEETINGS REALIZE THAT ARAFAT HAS HIS OWN VIEWS
AND THAT THESE WILL PREVAIL ULTIMATELY DESPITE THE OBJECTIONS OF
THE INDEPENDENTS. NEVERTHELESS, THIS GROUP CONSIDERS ITSELF THE
CONSCIENCE OF THE PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT, HAVING A MORAL RESPONSI-
BILITY TO PLAY AN ACTIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN THE MOVEMENT.
WHILE POSSESSING NO PRACTICAL OR COMMANDO FUNCTION, THE GROUP
CONSIDERS THAT BY ACTING AS A CENSORSHIP-TYPE BOARD AND BY
MAINTAINING A CLOSE WATCH ON THE POLICIES AND ACTIONS OF THE
LEADERSHIP. IT WILL HELP IN MAKING THE LEADERSHIP TOE THE LINE

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AND CONDUCT ITSELF IN AN EFFICIENT, CONSTRUCTIVE MANNER. ONE OF THE PARTICIPANTS, IN FACT, IBRAHIM A B I D, IS KEEPING THE MINUTES OF THESE MEETINGS AS A FUTURE REMINDER FOR ARAFAT, IN THE EYENT ARAFAT FAILS TO IMPLEMENT OR LIVE UP TO SOME OF THE DECISIONS AND PROMISES MADE DURING THESE SESSIONS.)

7. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCMEAFSA

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