


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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

REPORT CLASS S E C ~~R~~ E T--NOFORN

DIST: 4 JULY 2001

COUNTRY: ARGENTINA

SUBJ: SECURITY ASSESSMENT FOR THE 10 JULY 2001 VISIT OF FORMER
PRESIDENT CLINTON TO BUENOS AIRES

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SOURCE:

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SUMMARY: THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS THAT ANY GROUP OR
INDIVIDUAL IS PLANNING TO CARRY OUT OR PROMOTE DISTURBANCES OR ACTS
OF VIOLENCE AGAINST THE VISIT TO ARGENTINA OF FORMER PRESIDENT BILL
CLINTON. GIVEN THE HEIGHTENED ALERT WORLD-WIDE OF POTENTIAL

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TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST U.S. INTERESTS, TWO CASES OF UNSOLVED TERRORIST ACTIVITY HERE ASCRIBED TO HIZBALLAH WITH SUSPECTED IRANIAN SUPPORT SHOULD BE NOTED. ARGENTINA IS ALERT TO THE POSSIBILITY OF EXTREMIST ACTIVITY IN COUNTRY, ESPECIALLY BECAUSE THERE IS: IN THE TRI-BORDER AREA A NUMBER OF EXTREMIST ISLAMIC GROUPS; IN-COUNTRY REPRESENTATION OF LATIN AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS; AND TERRORIST GROUPS IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES ARE CONFIDENT THERE IS NO PLANNED THREAT AGAINST THE FORMER PRESIDENT, NOR IS THERE INDICATION OF PLANNED VIOLENT ACTS THAT MAY IMPACT ON HIS VISIT. UNPREDICTABLE LABOR AND SOCIAL DISTURBANCES MAY BE ORGANIZED, BUT THE MOVEMENT OF VISITORS WILL BE PLANNED TO AVOID UNDESIRABLE CONFRONTATIONS. THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS DIVISION OF THE ARGENTINE FEDERAL POLICE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR OFFICIAL VISITS, AND WILL SHARE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SECURITY OF THE VISIT WITH THE AERONAUTICAL POLICE AT EZEIZA AIRPORT, THE NATIONAL GENDARMERIE, AND POSSIBLY THE PROVINCIAL POLICE. SIDE, ARGENTINA'S PRIMARY INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION. WILL PROVIDE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] VIOLENT STREET CRIME, HOTEL ROBBERIES, AND CRIMINAL/POLICE SHOOT-OUTS ARE A PROBLEM IN BUENOS AIRES, BUT ARE MORE LIKELY TO AFFECT ADVANCE AND SUPPORT ELEMENTS THAN THE FORMER PRESIDENT'S PARTY.

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TEXT: 1. [REDACTED] THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS THAT ANY GROUP OR INDIVIDUAL IS PLANNING TO CARRY OUT OR PROMOTE DISTURBANCES OR ACTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST THE 10 JULY 2001 VISIT TO BUENOS AIRES OF FORMER PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON. THE VISIT HAS BEEN HIGHLY PUBLICIZED IN PRINT AND ELECTRONIC MEDIA, AS WELL AS THE NAME OF THE HOTEL, WHERE THE PRESIDENT WILL BE STAYING AND HOLDING HIS CONFERENCE, ALTHOUGH WITH NO PARTICULAR EMPHASIS. BUENOS AIRES HAS BEEN THE SCENE OF TWO BLOODY TERRORIST ATTACKS, ONE ON 18 JULY 1994 AGAINST THE ARGENTINE-ISRAELI MUTUAL ASSOCIATION (AMIA), IN WHICH 86 PEOPLE WERE KILLED, AND THE OTHER ON 17 MARCH 1992 AGAINST THE ISRAELI EMBASSY IN WHICH 25 PEOPLE WERE KILLED; VEHICULAR BOMBS WERE EMPLOYED IN BOTH INCIDENTS. OFFICIALS ASSIGNED TO THE IRANIAN EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES ARE KNOWN TO HAVE PROVIDED AT LEAST SOME SUPPORT FOR THE AMIA ATTACK. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] ALTHOUGH HIZBALLAH CLAIMED CREDIT FOR THE ISRAELI EMBASSY BOMBING, THERE IS NO CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE TO BACK-UP HIZBALLAH'S LINK TO THE EMBASSY BOMBING. BOTH CASES REMAIN UNSOLVED AND ARE A POLITICALLY EMBARRASSING ISSUE FOR THE GOVERNMENT. GIVEN THE HISTORY OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN ARGENTINA, THERE IS ALWAYS CONCERN THAT BUENOS AIRES COULD BE THE SITE OF A THIRD ATTEMPT, ALTHOUGH THERE IS AS OF THIS DATE NO SPECIFIC REPORTING OF ANY SUCH PLANNING. GIVEN THE CURRENT HEIGHTENED STATE OF ALERT FOR U.S. PERSONS AND INSTALLATIONS WORLD-WIDE, HOWEVER, OFFICIAL U.S. INSTALLATIONS AND PERSONS MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE HISTORY OF PRIOR TERRORISM IN ARGENTINA IN THEIR SECURITY PLANNING WHILE IN COUNTRY.

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2. THE 1992 BOMBING WAS A REPRISAL FOR AN ISRAELI ATTACK IN LEBANON. THUS, ARGENTINEAN CONCERN WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF A THIRD ATTACK IS USUALLY HEIGHTENED FOLLOWING VIOLENCE AGAINST HIZBALLAH OR PALESTINIANS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE "SECOND INTIFADA" DRIVING THE PRESENT STATE OF ISRAELI/PALESTINIAN CONFLICT ADDS CONCERN TO SECURITY PLANNING FOR A VISIT TO BUENOS AIRES. [REDACTED]

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3. THERE IS IN THE TBA A LARGE MUSLIM COMMUNITY, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THERE ARE ALSO GROUPINGS OF SUNNI ISLAMIC EXTREMISTS, PRIMARILY THE GAMA'AT AL-ISLAMIYAH (IG) AND THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT (HAMAS). ALTHOUGH THE LATTER TWO HAVE YET TO CONDUCT ANY ACT OF VIOLENCE IN THE REGION. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] THE DISRUPTION OF HIZBALLAH GROUPS IN CIUDAD DEL ESTE, PARAGUAY AND THE ARREST IN 1999 AND IMPRISONMENT IN URUGUAY OF AN IG MEMBER WHO SINCE THEN HAS BEEN AWAITING EXTRADITION TO EGYPT ALLEGEDLY IN CONNECTION WITH THE 1997 ATTACK IN LUXOR, IN WHICH 58 TOURISTS WERE KILLED. MEMBERS OF THESE GROUPS IN THE TBA, WHO TRAVEL FREQUENTLY TO THE MIDDLE EAST, POTENTIALLY COULD BLAME THE U.S. FOR THIS [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] OVERALL, THE ACTIVE U.S. ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS HAS ALWAYS MADE U.S. OFFICIALS AND INSTITUTIONS ATTRACTIVE TARGETS. THE WELL-PUBLICIZED U.S. PEACE EFFORTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST MAY HEIGHTEN THE POSSIBILITY OF ATTENTION FROM THESE GROUPS. SEVERAL U.S. EMBASSIES IN SOUTH AMERICA HAVE REPEATEDLY BEEN THE TARGET OF ALLEGED THREATS BY ISLAMIC EXTREMISTS OVER THE COURSE OF CALENDAR YEARS 2000 AND 2001. NONE OF THESE THREATS, HOWEVER, HAVE MATERIALIZED INTO AN ACTUAL ATTACK NOR HAVE THEY BEEN PROVEN TO HAVE BEEN LEGITIMATE.

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4. THERE ARE NO EXTANT DOMESTIC POLITICAL TERRORIST GROUPS IN ARGENTINA WHICH WOULD POSE A THREAT TO THE FORMER PRESIDENT. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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5. IN EARLY JULY 2000, A SANDINISTA NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (FSLN) SPONSORED "MILITARY BRIGADE" REPORTEDLY FINISHED TRAINING IN NICARAGUA AND MEMBERS WERE EXPECTED TO TRAVEL TO SOUTH AMERICA TO CARRY OUT SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES. THE BRIGADE ALLEGEDLY WAS TRAINED WITH FINANCING FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA (FARC). THE EFFORT PURPORTEDLY WAS PART OF A NEW FARC STRATEGY TO "VIETNAMIZE" ITS ACTIVITY IN RESPONSE TO U.S. ECONOMIC AND MILITARY SUPPORT TO COLOMBIA. MEMBERS OF THE BRIGADE AND INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED IN THIS ALLEGED EFFORT INCLUDED CUBANS, PERUVIAN TUPAC AMARU REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT (MRTA) MEMBERS, AND MEMBERS OF OTHER GROUPS WHICH CONSIDER THE U.S. AN ADVERSARY. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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6. [REDACTED]

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7. [REDACTED]

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8. ARGENTINES ARE FREE TO EXPRESS OPENLY THEIR POLITICAL VIEWS. THIS IS OFTEN DONE THROUGH DEMONSTRATIONS AND BLOCKADES OF STREETS AND ROADS. 2001 HAS THUS FAR BEEN A BANNER YEAR FOR EXPRESSING POLITICAL DISSENT AGAINST "GLOBALIZATION" AND GOVERNMENT POLICIES AIMING TO CORRECT THE FISCAL SITUATION. THESE AUSTERITY MEASURES ARE INTENDED TO COMPLY WITH COMMITMENTS TO THE IMF AND INTERNATIONAL LENDING INSTITUTIONS WHICH HAVE ASSISTED ARGENTINA TO AVOID FINANCIAL DISASTER WHILE IT ATTEMPTS TO PUT ITS FISCAL HOUSE IN ORDER. MANY POLITICAL, LABOR, AND SOCIAL LEADERS SEE THESE GOVERNMENT EFFORTS AS PREJUDICIAL TO ARGENTINE SOCIETY AND AS AN INDICATION THE GOVERNMENT IS BOWING DOWN TO "GLOBALIZATION" FORCES. IN EARLY APRIL 2001 THERE WERE MASSIVE, MOSTLY PEACEFUL PROTESTS AGAINST THE SIXTH FTAA MINISTERIAL HELD IN BUENOS AIRES. LABOR, STUDENT, AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS PARTICIPATED. THERE WAS SOME VIOLENCE DURING THE LAST DAY OF THE MEETING, AGAIN SPURRED BY A SMALL GROUP OF YOUTH WHO INFILTRATED THE PEACEFUL PROTEST. WHILE THERE HAVE BEEN FEWER DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE U.S. EMBASSY IN 2001 THAN IN THE PREVIOUS YEAR, THE CURRENT POLITICAL CLIMATE HAS LED TO SOME EXTREME BEHAVIOR AMONG ARGENTINE PROTESTERS. THE POTENTIAL LOSS OF SEVEN THOUSAND JOBS IF THE NATIONAL FLAG AIRLINE, "AEROLINEAS ARGENTINAS," OWNED BY THE SPANISH, LED TO PEACEFUL PROTEST IN JUNE WHICH DEGENERATED INTO VIOLENCE AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE. DURING THE WEEK OF 11 JUNE, SECURITY FORCES RESTRICTED ACCESS TO EZEIZA, THE MAJOR INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, IN AN ATTEMPT TO CONTROL THE PROTESTERS. IN ONE SPECIFIC AND DANGEROUS EVENT REPORTED BY "LA NACION" 13 JUNE, PROTESTERS BLOCKED THE PRIMARY RUNWAY TRYING TO PREVENT AEROLINEAS AND OTHER AIRLINES FROM COMING IN AND DEPARTING. ON 20 APRIL, A FEDERAL JUDGE ORDERED AEROLINEAS TO RESUME FLYING ITS ORIGINAL SCHEDULE AND ENJOINED IT FROM FIRING ITS EMPLOYEES, BUT A SMALL CONTINGENT OF AEROLINEAS EMPLOYEES MAINTAIN A SMALL PROTEST BEACHHEAD IN EZEIZA AIRPORT'S ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURES BUILDING IN FRONT OF THE AEROLINEAS/IBERIA COUNTERS. IT IS NOT LIKELY THESE FEW PROTESTERS, HEAVILY GUARDED BY AUTHORITIES, WOULD IMPEDE THE FORMER PRESIDENT'S PASSAGE THROUGH THE AIRPORT, BUT BECAUSE THE SPANISH HOLDER OF THE AIRLINE HAS TACITLY DECIDED TO SELL IT, THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT THE FORMER PRESIDENT'S PARTY MAY ENCOUNTER ROADBLOCKS COMING FROM OR GOING TO THE AIRPORT. HOWEVER, THE SECURITY FORCES CLOSELY MONITOR PROTESTS AND STRIKES, PARTICULARLY THOSE INVOLVING THE U.S. EMBASSY OR VISITORS, AND WILL REROUTE MOTORCADES OF VISITING OFFICIALS WHEN NECESSARY TO AVOID CONTACT WITH DEMONSTRATIONS. WITH THE ABOVE POSSIBLE EXCEPTIONS, THERE ARE NO OTHER INDICATIONS ANY GROUP PLANS TO HOLD DEMONSTRATIONS THAT MIGHT PURPOSELY THREATEN, EMBARRASS, OR

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IMPEDE FORMER PRESIDENT CLINTON'S VISIT.

9. PRESIDENT FERNANDO ((DE LA RUA)) VISITED WITH THEN PRESIDENT CLINTON IN THE U.S. IN JUNE 2000. PRESIDENT CLINTON'S VISIT IS RELATED TO ACTIVITIES OF DE LA RUA'S SON, FERNANDO, WHOSE EDUCATIONAL ENDEAVOR IS AN OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT PROJECT. IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA THAT THE VISIT GO OFF SMOOTHLY. DE LA RUA ALSO MET 19 APRIL 2001 WITH PRESIDENT BUSH. THE VISIT HELPED PROTECT AND ENHANCE THE COOPERATION THE MISSION RECEIVES FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA ON KEY ISSUES OF INTEREST. BILATERAL RELATIONS AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL ARE ON TRACK.

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10. THERE IS CONFLICT BETWEEN THE RULING ALLIANCE GOVERNMENT AND THE PERONIST JUSTICIALIST PARTY (PJ), THE MAJOR OPPOSITION PARTY TO DE LA RUA, WHO WAS ELECTED BY AN ALLIANCE OF THE UCR AND THE 'FRONT FOR A COUNTRY IN SOLIDARITY' (FREPASO). THERE IS DISSATISFACTION IN THE PJ FOR WHAT SOME SEE AS THE POLITICAL IMPRISONMENT OF FORMER PRESIDENT CARLOS SAUL ((MENEM)) ON CHARGES HE FALSIFIED DOCUMENTS AND WAS THE LEADER OF AN ILLICIT ASSOCIATION WHICH SENT ARMS ILLEGALLY TO CROATIA AND ECUADOR, WHILE UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS WERE IN PLACE, DURING THE EARLY TO MID-1990S. MOREOVER, DISSIDENT ELEMENTS OF THE MINORITY FREPASO ELEMENT OF THE ALLIANCE CAN BE VOCAL IN THEIR CRITICISM OF U.S. POLICIES. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE IT UNLIKELY FOR ANY VIOLENT ACT TO EMANATE FROM THE FORMAL POLITICAL PARTIES IN ARGENTINA. THE VISIT MAY, HOWEVER, PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY FOR DISSATISFIED GROUPS AND SOCIALLY CONSCIOUS POLITICAL PARTIES ALLIED WITH DISSIDENT LABOR UNIONS TO PROTEST BILATERAL TRADE ISSUES, THE IMF, EXTERNAL DEBT ISSUES, AND, POSSIBLY, ARGENTINA'S HUMAN RIGHTS VOTE AGAINST CUBA AT THE UNCHR IN GENEVA.

11. THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS DIVISION OF THE ARGENTINE FEDERAL POLICE (AFP) IS RESPONSIBLE FOR OFFICIAL VISITS AND BEARS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SECURITY OF HIGH LEVEL FOREIGN OFFICIALS (INCLUDING FORMER HEADS-OF-STATE). THE AFP WILL BE IN CHARGE OF THE PERSONAL SECURITY OF THE FORMER PRESIDENT IN THE FEDERAL CAPITAL OF BUENOS AIRES. IN BUENOS AIRES, THE AFP WILL BE IN CHARGE OF SECURITY FOR VIP MOVEMENTS, LODGINGS, AND ALL SITES WHERE ACTIVITIES WILL TAKE PLACE FOR PRESIDENT CLINTON'S VISIT. THE AFP WILL HAVE AT ITS

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DISPOSAL ALL ITS RESOURCES, TO INCLUDE AN EXPLOSIVES BRIGADE, U.S.-TRAINED CANINE TEAMS, A SPECIAL SUPPORT SWAT GROUP (THE GEOF UNIT -- "GRUPOS ESPECIALES OPERACIONES FEDERALES"). AND AN AIR SQUADRON.

THE AERONAUTICAL POLICE WILL BE IN CHARGE OF AIRPLANE SECURITY AT EZEIZA AIRPORT AND ALL OTHER AIRPORT FACILITIES UTILIZED, LUGGAGE SECURITY, AND ANTI-EXPLOSIVE CONTROLS. THE BUENOS AIRES PROVINCIAL POLICE WILL AUGMENT MOTORCADE MOVEMENTS FROM EZEIZA TO THE CAPITAL AS NEEDED.

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12. A MAJOR ISSUE IN TODAY'S ARGENTINA IS INSECURITY DUE TO INCREASED CRIME. DAILY THERE ARE INCIDENCES OF "EXPRESS" BANK AND PERSONAL ROBBERIES, FEDERAL POLICEMEN KILLED-- 32 SINCE JANUARY 2001--AND A SMALL BUT WORRISOME INCREASE IN VIOLENCE ACROSS THE BOARD. CITIZENS ARE SO UPSET WITH THE LACK OF SECURITY THEY FAVOR GIVING POLICE ADDITIONAL POWERS EVEN IF THAT MEANS RESTRICTING PERSONAL LIBERTIES. ON 21 JUNE, FOR EXAMPLE, A LOCAL NEWSPAPER PUBLISHED A CHRONOGRAM OF 12 HOURS OF VIOLENCE WHICH LEFT NINE DEAD AS A RESULT OF FIREFIGHTS IN THE CAPITAL CITY. ON 17 JUNE THERE WAS A SOCIAL UPRISING IN SALTA PROVINCE, IN NORTHWESTERN ARGENTINA. THE ROOT OF THE PROBLEM WAS AN ATTEMPT BY SECURITY AUTHORITIES TO OPEN UP A ROADBLOCK ON A NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION ROUTE WHICH CONNECTS BUENOS AIRES WITH BOLIVIA AND PROTECT AN OIL REFINERY STORAGE FACILITY WHICH HOUSES FIVE MILLION LITERS OF PETROLEUM IN THE TOWN OF GENERAL MOSCONI IN SALTA.

THE STANDOFF BEGAN WITH A FIREFIGHT BETWEEN GN AND PROTESTERS IN THE TOWN OF GENERAL MOSCONI, RESULTING IN 24 GN ENLISTED PERSONNEL INJURED, TWO CRITICALLY, AND TWO BYSTANDERS KILLED. WHILE THE SITUATION HAS CALMED DOWN, THE STANDOFF CONTINUES. VISITORS MAY FIND THEMSELVES IN THE MIDDLE OR BECOME VICTIMS OF ARMED ASSAULTS, AGGRAVATED ROBBERIES, AND CRIMINAL SHOOT-OUTS WITH THE POLICE; INCIDENTS OF ARMED INVASIONS OF BANKS, RESTAURANTS, SHOPS, AND RESIDENCES BY CRIMINAL GROUPS OCCUR WITH FREQUENCY. SEVERAL EMBASSY OFFICERS AND DEPENDENTS RECENTLY HAVE BEEN VICTIMS OF MOSTLY NON-VIOLENT PERSONAL CRIME. ADVANCE AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL FOR THE VISIT SHOULD BE AWARE OF THIS FACT, AS A VISITING U.S. SECURITY ASSESSMENT TEAM WAS MUGGED BY A GROUP OF THIEVES ON THE "FLORIDA" PEDESTRIAN SHOPPING STREET SOME YEARS AGO, AND THE ROOMS OF A U.S. DELEGATION IN BUENOS AIRES FOR A UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE WERE ROBBED OF CASH, JEWELRY, AND LAPTOP COMPUTERS. THE OFFICIAL PARTY ITSELF SHOULD NOT BE AFFECTED BY CRIMINAL ELEMENTS GIVEN THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS BY ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES. WHILE IN BUENOS AIRES, THE EMBASSY RECOMMENDS NORMAL VIGILANCE AND COMMON SENSE REQUIRED WHEN TRAVELING TO ANY LARGE CITY.


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