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REFS: A. [] (b)(1)
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A. SALVADORAN MILITARY ARE UNITED IN RECOGNIZING THAT STRONG U.S. HELP AND GUIDANCE ARE INDISPENSABLE TO THEIR SURVIVAL AS AN INSTITUTION AND TO THEIR COUNTRY'S DEVELOPMENT AS NON-COMMUNIST STATE. HOWEVER, THEY DISAGREE IN THEIR INTERNAL POLITICAL SYMPATHIES. APOLITICAL ONLY IN THEORY, THE ARMED FORCES HARBOR PREFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO LEADING CANDIDATES, AND HAVE THE PERCEPTION THAT THE U.S. FAVORS NAPOLEON ((DUARTE)). THIS PERCEPTION HAS SWAYED "SOPHISTICATED" OFFICERS TO FAVOR DUARTE, WHILE THE LOWER RANKS FAVOR ROBERTO ((D'AUBUISSON)). [] MIN DEF GEN CARLOS ((VIDES)) CASANOVA IS ALMOST SURE TO STAY IN OFFICE UNDER DUARTE. VIDES WOULD NOT HOWEVER, SERVE UNDER D'AUBUISSON DUE TO PERSONAL DISLIKE, EVEN IN "THE UNLIKELY CASE HE WERE ASKED." [] GEN RAFAEL ((BLANDON)) HAS A BETTER CHANCE THAN VIDES TO STAY IN HIGH POSITION UNDER D'AUBUISSON ALTHOUGH LATTER MORE LIKELY WILL PLACE IN KEY POSITIONS KNOWN HARD LINERS SUCH AS COLS ((CARRANZA)) AND ((BUSTILLO)). RE LATTER TWO, [] THEIR PROMOTION TO GENERAL WAS WIDELY EXPECTED LAST DEC 82 THEY SHOULD NOW BE QUITE DISAPPOINTED (A FACT D'AUBUISSON UNDOUBT

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B. [] CONTINUING MEDIA MUCKRAKING AGAINST THE MILITARY PROMOTES SYMPATHIES FOR D'AUBUISSON. THE ((AVILA)) AFFAIR IS A CASE IN POINT. SALVADORAN OFFICERS AT THE WDC EMBASSY WERE COMMENTING RECENTLY THAT RADIO HAVANA IS ALSO PLAYING UP AN ALLEGED ACCUSATION BY THE FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR THAT NATIONAL POLICE CHIEF COL REINALDO ((LOPEZ)) NUIILA HEADS THE SECRET ANTI-COMMUNIST ARMY (IESA) AND THAT TREASURY POLICE COL NICOLAS ((CARRANZA)) IS INVOLVED IN RIGHT-WING VIGILANTE ACTIVITIES. [] SALVADORAN OFFICERS IN WDC HAVE COMMENTED THAT TO BECOME INTEL CHIEF FOR ANY SERVICE IS TO INVITE PROFESSIONAL "DISCREDIT AND RUIN." [] IT CERTAINLY WAS THE CASE IN THE TRANSFER

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OF LTC ARISTIDES ALFONSO ((MARQUEZ)) FROM NATIONAL POLICE G-2. MARQUEZ HAD BEEN A SUCCESSFUL INTEL OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR DISCOVERING AND NEUTRALIZING SEVERAL SIGNIFICANT SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES.

C. ALTHOUGH D'AUBUISSON IS PERSONALLY "ANTIPATHETIC" (b)(1) A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF SENIOR OFFICERS, TRADITIONAL SYMPATHIL (b)(3) AT LOWER LEVELS FAVOR D'AUBUISSON. [REDACTED] VIDES HAS NO RPT NO SYMPATHY FOR D'AUBUISSON, BUT CANNOT EFFECTIVELY KEEP LOCAL MILITARY LEADERS IN THE MANY COUNTRYSIDE VILLAGES WHICH ABOUND IN EL SALVADOR FROM TELLING PEASANTS TO FOLLOW THEIR NATURAL INSTINCT AND VOTE FOR STRONGMAN D'AUBUISSON. D'AUBUISSON IS EFFECTIVELY PLAYING UP NATIONALISM AND THE TRADITIONAL STRONG RULE APPEAL, CHANGING THE POLITICAL CLIMATE TO THE POINT THAT [REDACTED] D'AUBUISSON MIGHT WIN A RUN OFF ELECTION AGAINST DUARTE.

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D. [REDACTED] WILL NEED TO TAKE MORE SOUNDINGS AMONG [REDACTED] OFFICERS IN EL SALVADOR TO DEVELOP A BETTER PICTUR (b)(1) OF THEIR POSSIBLE REACTION TO A VICTORY BY EITHER DUARTE OR (b)(3) D'AUBUISSON. AS OF NOW, [REDACTED] INDISPENSABLE U.S. AID AND GUIDANCE AGAINST THE COMMON ENEMY (COMMUNIST SUBVERSION) ARE PARAMOUNT AMONG MILITARY: THEY WILL SUPPORT EITHER DUARTE OR D'AUBUISSON AGAINST SUBVERSION. IT IS TAKEN FOR GRANTED THAT "DEFINED ULTRA RIGHTISTS, SUCH AS LTC SIGIFREDO ((OCHOA)), " WILL PLAY KEY ROLES UNDER D'AUBUISSON, WHEREAS UNDER DUARTE CURRENT MILITARY KEY "MODERATE" OFFICERS WILL REMAIN IN POWER, [REDACTED] RE REF A PARA 2, [REDACTED] LTC ((CACERES)) CABREDA IS KNOWN FOR A QUICK TEMPER AND TENDENCY TOWARD MORE AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS. THE NEW CHIEF OF NAVAL OPS. COL HUMBERTO P. ((VILLALTA)), IS ANOTHER MEMBER OF THE "TANDA SINFONICA" OF 44 WHO IS CAPAF (b)(1) AND HAS BEEN MANEUVERED UPSTAIRS BY HIS "TANDA." HE IS A "MC (b)(3) ERATE RIGHTIST," [REDACTED]

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2. [REDACTED] THE MILITARY HAVE BEEN INCREASINGLY "POLITICIZED" AND PLACED IN A TOUGH POSITION BY THE NEED TO FIGHT THE WAR ON ONE HAND AND "DEATH SQUAD" ALLEGATIONS (b)(1) THE OTHER (THE LATTER HAS BECOME FOR THE MILITARY A VERITA (b)(3) "BETE NOIRE," [REDACTED]). THE ELECTIONS AGGRAVATE THIS DILEMMA BY FEARS FOR PROFESSIONAL PROSPECTS: LTC OCHOA, FOR EXAMPLE, SEES HIS "FUTURE MADE" IF D'AUBUISSON WINS, WHILE OFFICERS (b)(1) KNOWN AS "MODERATES" WOULD BENEFIT UNDER DUARTE. [REDACTED] (b)(3) [REDACTED] CAN STILL PLAY "BOTH ENDS" [REDACTED] [REDACTED] WILL SEEK OUT MILITARY FRIENDS FROM BOTH SIDES [REDACTED] [REDACTED] AND TRY TO PAVE THE WAY TOWARD [REDACTED] NEXT "IDEAL POSITION:" [REDACTED] (b)(1) [REDACTED] (b)(3) [REDACTED] IN U.S. AS QUALIFICATIONS EITHER SIDE NEEDS, TO FOMENT THE "INDISPENSABLE GRINGO ALLIANCE." [REDACTED] BOTH DUARTE AND D'AUBUISSON SYMPATHIZERS [REDACTED] IN THE PROCESS (AND THROUGH OTHER CONTACTS), [REDACTED] (b)(1) [REDACTED] (PER REFS). [REDACTED] (b)(3)

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3. FILE: [REDACTED] ALL SECRET. MCS COMMENT: CORRECTED COPY FOR LINE DROPPED PARA 2

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