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Executive Registry

1 2 JUN 1973

MEMORAND JM FOR: Executive Secretary, CIA Management Committee

SUBJECT

: Response to 23 May 1973 Memorandum to All Employees

1. The response to the 23 May memorandum does not seem uniform, and we are of the opinion that it has been interpreted differently by different persons. Some seem to have interpreted the memorandum in the specific context of the Watergate affair and the various activities that have become associated with it, not reporting unrelated contacts that they may have had with McCord or Hunt during the period that they were employed with the Agency. Others have interpreted the following phrase literally, "anyone who has had any connection or contact with individuals on the attached list, " and have reported the most insignificant contact. Our opinion is based on the belief that a larger number of employees still in the Agency must have known Hunt or McCord during their employment, than the relatively limited number who have reported such associations.

2. We have the names of 137 employees, both presently active and retired, who had contacts with one or more of the individuals listed in the 23 May memorandum. Between them, these 137 employees are reported to have had a total of 175 contacts with one or more of the individuals listed in the 23 May memorandum. Forty-eight contacts were by DDO personnel, twenty-nine in the DDI, fifty-four in the DDM&S, seventeen in the DDS&T (including OTS personnel), and twenty-four were in the Office of the DCI, including OGC, OLC, and OIG. It was not unexpected that the two former Agency employees -- Hunt and McCord--had the largest number of contacts and associations, forty-eight for McCord and forty-six for Hunt, each with the preponderance being reported from their former directorates. We are nevertheless surprised at the small number of reported associations for these two men, who retired less than three years ago. David Young, with a total of thirty reported contacts, and Egil Krogh, with eighteen, far outnumbered the remaining names on the list, with Colson and Caulfield having no reported associations (we are dubious about Colson, in this respect). The tally is as follows:

NIZ W-5

(b)(3)

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	DDO	DDI	DDM&S	DDS&T	<u>O/DCI</u>	Total	
Haldeman	0	0	0	0	2	2	
Ehrlichman	2	1	0	0	5	8	
Dean	2	0	0	0	1	3	
Krogh	3	7	5	2	1	18	•
Young	2	11	4	0	13	30	
Hunt	24	5	7	7	3	46	
Liddy	2	5	1	2	0	10	
McCord	3	0	37	8	0	48	
Colson	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Caulfield	0	0	· 0	0	0	0	
Martinez	3	0	0	0	0	3	
11202 01110-	1	0	• 0	0	0	1	
Barker	4	0	0	0	0	4	
Gonzalez	1	0	0	0	. 0	1	
Sturgis	<u> </u>	0	0		0		
	48	29	54	19	25	175	Totals

3. As nearly as we can determine, twelve Agency employees had professional contact with Hunt, Liddy or Young (or combination of them) during the period that the Agency was giving support to Hunt or preparing the personality profile on Ellsberg. They are listed below:

a. General Cushman. He first met Hunt on 22 July 1971, following a telephone call from Ehrlichman on 7 July. He also phoned Ehrlichman on 27 August calling a halt to Hunt's request for added support. We have been unable to verify a reported luncheon appointment with Hunt in October 1971.

b. Karl Wagner. Briefly--before being dismissed at Hunt's request--he was present at the 22 July meeting between Cushman and Hunt. He also handled a later request for a secretary.

c. Steve Greenwood. He was TSD's (now OTS) case officer for dealing with Hunt, meeting him a number of times. He also met Liddy.

d. He met Hunt three times, providing him a recorder and two microphones. Liddy was present on one of these occasions. (b)(3)

(b)(3)



(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

e. He provided the camera, and trained Liddy in its use. Hunt was present at the meeting.

f. Howard Osborn. As Director of Security he served as intermediary between Young and CMS on the personality profile.

g. OMS man assigned to prepare the personality profile on Ellsberg. He met with Young, Liddy and Hunt.

h. in October 1971 honored Hunt's request for material on a French security leak, instructing the Division's Executive Officer to provide it.

i. John Caswell. who, under (b)(3) nstructions provided Hunt with unclassified material on 1954 French security leak.

j. In December 1971 she received an out-of-channel request from Hunt for a name trace, which was put back in channels and reported to the Agency representative with the NSC Staff.

k. Detailed to the NSC Staff, he reports an undetermined number of name traces (he believes more than the one noted above) which he levied on the Agency for Hunt around the end of 1971. There is no record supporting his recollection.

1. He received a request from Hunt for		(b)(3)
telephone extensions of persons in TSD, which he obtained	·	
for him. Our source recalled that		(b)(3)
and that the incident had to be before that. A check		(b)(3)
of records showed		(b)(3)
and suggests the possibility that Hunt's request was during		
the period that he was being supported by TSD. Hunt may	•	
have misplaced the telephone numbers he had, and got	•	
to replace them for him.		(b)(3)
4. In addition to the foregoing, Hunt wrote to		(b)(3)
advising her that he had requested her by name for		(b)(3)

secretarial work. He requested Karl Wagner for her, but was turned down.

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5. There were a handful of Agency employees who knew Hunt or McCord from former times, and who have continued desultory social contacts. _____had maintained a continuing association with Hunt, playing tennis, etc. Others continue to have a sense of responsibility for Hunt's family, which we have not discouraged, counselling cnly that they be discreet. One or two past and present employees initially considered helping raise the bail for either Hunt or McCord, depending on the ones they knew, but nothing seems to have come of this.

6. As a matter of interest, we have compiled a list of some twenty employees, mostly retired, but including one or two still on the active rolls, whose names were referred to McCord or Hunt by Outplacement, or who were considered for employment with one or the other of them, McCord being the one primarily interested in applicants. Some of these did take employment with McCord.

7. We are still receiving a few reports, and expect this to continue for a while, but we believe that unless more personnel are stimulated to report what is probably more of the innocent contacts out of the past we are unlikely to receive much more of interest or significance. It is our opinion that we have found all the significant contacts that will be volunteered. We doubt that there are any more, but given the uncertainties of this unique situation it cannot be said with absolute certainty that all contacts of significance have been recorded.

((Signed) William V. Broe

William V. Broe Inspector General



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