

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DOCUMENT NO. 30
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S (C)
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 1990

29 April 1954

[Redacted]

STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 30-54

SUBJECT: Report on O/NE Consultant's Meeting at Princeton, N. J.,
on 21 and 22 April 1954

(b)(3)

INTRODUCTION

1. Participating under the Chairmanship of Abbott E. Smith were:
William Langer, [Redacted] Max Millikan, Raymond Sontag,
[Redacted] Joseph Strayer,
Philip Mosely,* [Redacted] and Calvin Hoover.** Mr. Amory was present on 21 April. William O. Webb,
R. Jack Smith, Robert Komer, and Ray S. Cline* represented the O/NE Staff.

(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)

2. Discussion on 21 April centered on prospects for the Geneva talks and Soviet Capabilities and Intentions through 1959. Discussion on 22 April centered on the Middle Eastern Situation, NIE 100-54 (the Nuclear paper), and on economic conditions in the Soviet Union.

DISCUSSION

SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND STRATEGIC POLICY THROUGH MID-1959 (NIE 11-5-54)

3. The consultants, particularly [Redacted] felt that the O/NE staff draft was an admirable job and went about as far as it was possible to go and still satisfy the various conflicting views on the nature of developments in the USSR. The discussion of this paper by the consultants has been arbitrarily divided into the four main headings below:

(b)(3)

STABILITY OF THE REGIME

4. There was sharp difference of opinion between [Redacted] and MOSELY on the stability of the Soviet regime, with SONTAG offering slightly different views.

(b)(3)

* Present for Wednesday only.
** Present for Thursday only.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~SECRET~~

a. [] believes that Malenkov is a figurehead, that Krushchev through his control over the Party Secretariat and the power of appointment holds far more power than Malenkov, and that the real power lies with a group working behind the scenes. [] believes that Malenkov did not purge Beria and points out that no important officials previously associated with Malenkov now hold positions of power. [] also pointed to the increasing attention being paid by the Soviet regime to the economic managerial class and the intelligentsia. This is leading to the rise to power of young people from the vested and privileged classes; these people are not devoted, revolutionary Communists and they will eventually change the fundamental nature of the regime. [] concluded from the above that:

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(1) There will be continuing jockeying for power and position, and changes in the top leadership will probably occur between two and five years;

(2) The problem of succession will become more difficult; and

(3) Though not foreseeable or probable now, the danger will continue to exist that the army and the police will line up on different sides and engage in open conflict.

b. MOSELY, on the other hand, believes that Malenkov is top dog and has effective control over the regime. He believes that Malenkov and Krushchev are working together. He is not convinced that Malenkov has relinquished the power of appointment in the Party. He also points to the danger of drawing sweeping conclusions solely from an analysis of personalities and changes in the jobs they hold. MOSELY describes the present phase as one of "relaxation with brakes on" during which the ratio of the carrot to the stick is increasing. The absence of rule by terror increases the regime's flexibility and its ability to foresee and cope with problems before they become serious. There is more discussion in high places in the government and the middle class is being effectively melded into the government apparatus. Nevertheless, Malenkov remains the final arbiter. MOSELY foresees no upheaval in high places and believes that Soviet system has become sufficiently institutionalized to minimize the problem of succession.

c. SONTAG postulated that the basis of the regime's success appeared to lie in the avoidance or absence of major failures or imbalances. He could not believe that the Soviet regime had solved the problem of avoiding crises requiring changes in policy.

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

He doubted that a regime which did not rely on a tradition of leadership (Tsar, King, etc.), the absolute use of terror (Hitler), or well established and accepted political institutions (US and UK) could survive major crises or imbalances.

SOVIET-SATELLITE RELATIONS

5. [] noted the absence in the paper of a discussion of the effects of Stalin's death on Soviet-Satellite and particularly on Sino-Soviet relations. Removal of a principal element of leadership, unity, and terror as personified in Stalin creates problems for the Satellite leaders. Mao, for example, probably regards himself as above the present relatively young leaders in the Kremlin and not as bound blindly to follow their leadership. [] pointed out that as long as a Satellite was not occupied by Soviet troops, its leaders had little to stop them from becoming Titoists -- it was a purely subjective decision on their part.

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

BASIC SOVIET OBJECTIVES

6. There was much discussion but no clear consensus of opinion regarding the proposition as stated in the O/NE draft that the ultimate objective of the USSR was world domination. The lack of consensus or clearly defined differences of opinion among the consultants arose in part from the difficulty of distinguishing clearly between long and short range objectives, between the relative priority attached to different objectives, and between objectives as contrasted to policies or tactics designed to achieve variously stated objectives.

7. LANGER began the discussion by suggesting that the USSR desired to "eliminate capitalist regimes" rather than to "dominate the world". MOSELY and [] suggested "eliminate competing power centers". SONTAG by and large stuck to the "world domination" theme. The lengthy discussion indicated the extreme difficulty of describing basic Soviet objectives in a few words which seemed to have differing connotations for different people. There follow some of the lines of thought advanced by the consultants:

(b)(3)

a. [] stated that the primary aim of the USSR was to get the US out of Europe and Asia, thereby making it easier for the USSR to keep that area weak. He believes that the Kremlin regards Germany as its greatest threat and would sacrifice China (if attacked by the US) if it thought that by doing so the Western Alliance (and hence German rearmament) could be prevented.

(b)(3)

[] emphasized that Washington tended to underestimate the problems confronting the USSR in ruling its vast empire; that the

(b)(3)

- 3 -

~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~SECRET~~

Kremlin was well aware of its limitations in this respect; that it therefore had no desire to have local Communist Parties come to power in areas it could not itself police; and that its objectives were just as well served by maintaining conditions of instability and weakness outside the Bloc. [] believes that the USSR moved in Korea out of fear rather than as part of calculated offensive design. The Kremlin fears US military aggression but at the moment believes the US will not launch an attack because of the strain it would cause on the Western Alliance system.

(b)(3)

b. MOSELY concurred in much of what [] had to say, but tended to place slightly different emphases. He felt that the Soviet leaders were convinced that the US planned eventually to attack the USSR. He attached slightly less importance to Soviet reluctance to see local Communist Parties come to power in areas that the USSR could not police. He agreed with [] that the USSR would be most cautious in initiating war against the US or in participating itself in acts of local aggression; this did not mean that the USSR would be reluctant to support civil wars one at a time. Whereas [] felt the chief brake on Soviet aggression was post-war policing problem, MOSELY felt the chief brake was fear of the Soviet's regime's being overthrown or of losing the war.

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

c. SONTAG laid more stress than [] and MOSELY on the dynamics of totalitarianism. He decried a tendency he noted in recent O/NE drafts to regard the Soviet boys as "just another bunch of boys making a living". He tended to believe that internal troubles might at any time lead the USSR to a more aggressive policy, particularly since the Soviet leaders remain not only convinced that coexistence with the West is impossible but in constant fear of being attacked or of their position being undermined by Western action.

(b)(3)

d. [] on the [] thesis of reluctance to see Communists in power in non-policeable areas, suggested that nuclear weapons might soon change the picture. With nuclear monopoly and once other power centers are eliminated, the USSR could rule the world without occupying it.

(b)(3)

SOVIET AGRICULTURE

8. This subject was discussed on Wednesday by MOSELY and Thursday by HOOVER, with no chance for rebuttal by either one.

a. MOSELY believed that the new Soviet agricultural and consumer program was not forced on the regime by a seriously deteriorating situation but was adopted primarily as a means of increasing incentives and in an effort to strengthen and balance

- 4 -

~~SECRET~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~SECRET~~

the entire economy. He considers it well within the capability of the USSR to increase agricultural production by at least 20% over the next few years by greater incentives, new techniques, fertilizers, etc.

b. HOOVER, on the other hand, felt that the new program was forced on the regime by a difficult situation and that the action was required to prevent the development of serious political unrest. HOOVER believes the food situation may actually deteriorate rather than improve. Fertilizers and capital investment will help, but not much. Basic problem is that increasing livestock means increasing fodder production which means less wheat production for human consumption. Restoring the balance will require time, as will improving farming techniques and manpower problem. Meanwhile, population and food consumption requirements continuously rising.

c. MILLIKAN warned against drawing comparisons between Soviet and Chinese agricultural problems which are basically different. He also urged that O/RR do some imaginative studies on the results of alternative lines of capital investment in Soviet agriculture. He also urged a careful watch on Soviet efforts in the housing field. Soviet housing is deficient and any major effort to ameliorate housing would constitute a heavy drain on capital resources.

NUCLEAR PAPER (NIE 100-54)

9. LANGER opened the discussion by criticising the paper for placing too much emphasis on probable differences between US policy and that of its allies. Neither the US nor its allies are as free agents as the paper implies. Increasing nuclear capabilities will lead both the US and its allies to lay more stress on maintaining the alliance. Specifically, LANGER felt that paragraph 12a should read "the allies will...seek to obtain greater influence over Allied policy" rather than "over US policy". LANGER also felt that paragraph 4* should be strengthened. As it stood it was not clear and implied that US allies would back out at the last minute. LANGER believed the allies would have no choice but to stick together until the end.

10. The consultants were in general agreement with LANGER's views, but there was considerable divergence regarding other implications of nuclear plenty. SONTAG felt that increasing nuclear capabilities would result in a spread of appeasement sentiment -- the allies

* "In the event of international crisis involving grave danger of general war, we believe that the allies would almost certainly support the US as long as they believed that firm maintenance of the alliance would probably avert war".

~~SECRET~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~SECRET~~

would always wait for a more important issue before standing fast. He felt that the USSR would recognize this and would calculate that it could apply increasing pressure step by step, place by place, confident that the Western Alliance would crack before "hot" war had been reached. Others, particularly LANGER and [] felt that there might be pressure for appeasement at the early stages, but that nuclear plenty would increase pressure on the allies to stick together when the chips were down and that the USSR could never be sure when Western appeasement would cease and that therefore the USSR would run as great a risk as before that a local aggression would lead to general war. [] believed that nuclear plenty, by increasing reluctance of both sides to risk general war, might lead the allies to conclude that it was safer to stop a "small creep than wait for a big one" on the grounds that the USSR would not initiate war over an unimportant issue. [] warned against thinking that increased caution would lessen the chances of general war -- the danger remained that each side would think the other would be more cautious and that each therefore could be bolder.

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

STAFF MEMORANDUM ON GENEVA CONFERENCE

11. The consultants generally felt little enthusiasm for the belief that the USSR or Communist China felt under any compulsion to settle the Indochina War. They could see no way in which the Communists would not profit from negotiation at Geneva. [] felt that Moscow was not alarmed by the threat of US intervention in Indochina or expansion of the war to China; that in fact Moscow might welcome such a development in the hope that it would wreck the Western Alliance.

(b)(3)

[] doubted that Moscow and Peiping would at Geneva accept any responsibility for Viet Minh actions and had no idea that practical results in Indochina would result from the Geneva talks. MOSELY felt that one of the Kremlin's objectives in going to Geneva was to be sure to be in a position to join in the decision as to how far the Chinese should go in supporting the Viet Minh. Moscow was scared the Chinese might force US intervention or retaliation and at Geneva wanted to sound out both the West and the Chinese so as to be able to make its decision. SONTAG felt that both Moscow and Peiping could not disregard that US prestige was at stake in Indochina. This realization might force them to decide between backing down or risking US retaliation which would divert Communist China from its primary goal of internal economic development and political consolidation. LANGER pointed out that the US was committed not to win but only to prevent a Communist victory and in those circumstances the Communists could drag on the war indefinitely.

(b)(3)

STAFF MEMORANDUM ON MIDDLE EAST DEFENSE

12. The consultants were virtually unanimous in thinking that the O/NE staff memorandum was too optimistic in its estimate both of the

- 6 -

~~SECRET~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~SECRET~~

probability of strengthening the defense of the Middle East and of the usefulness of using defense as a means and foundation for strengthening the area politically and economically. However, there was considerable variance of opinion about the basic causes of instability in the area.

13. LANGER strongly questioned whether any progress could be made toward Middle East defense until the Arab-Israeli conflict had been resolved. He believed this conflict was a basic cause of instability in the area. [redacted] agreed that Middle East defense was difficult as long as the Arab-Israeli dispute continued, but did not believe the conflict was a basic cause of instability. He believed that the Arab world was undergoing a profound revolution as a result of the impact of Western civilization. Even if the Israeli, Suez, and Iranian oil disputes were settled, others would be manufactured to take their place.

(b)(3)

14. This led [redacted] to develop his thesis that the US laid too much stress on attempts to reach an Arab-Israeli settlement. With respect to defense, Israel is not important to Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and perhaps not too important to Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Egypt. [redacted] felt it was important to Saudi Arabia and Iraq. [redacted] went on to say that the real issue was to get the Arabs to adopt a constructive attitude toward their own problems. By emphasizing the Arab-Israeli conflict the West merely gave the Arabs another excuse for diverting their energies outward instead of inward.

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

15. MILLIKAN, seconded in varying degrees by [redacted] argued that emphasis on building defense would boomerang against the West. The area is not worried about Soviet aggression. Pushing the area to build defenses gives the impression that we are not very different from the USSR and the former Colonial powers -- that we want to dominate the area. Emphasis on military defense and the cold war conceals the fact that the US wants the people of the area to work out their own problems in their own way provided they cooperate with the West rather than with the USSR. The focus of US effort should be on building economic and political strength. In this connection, [redacted] believed that we should play down the theme of Westernization, capitalizing instead on the desire of the area for modernization, not necessarily in imitation of the West. MILLIKAN posed the danger that in the process of modernization the area could easily turn to the USSR, but the others felt it would be some time before local Communist strength would be sufficient to permit a Soviet take-over in the absence of military aggression.

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

- 7 -

~~SECRET~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~