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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



Office of Inspector General

REPORT OF AUDIT

(b)(3)Corporate Information Retrieval and Storage (CIRAS) System Report No. 2005-0018-AS

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5 September 2006 **ISSUE DATE**

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Corporate Info	rt of Audit ormation Retrieval and CIRAS) System	(b)(3
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY		(b)(3
The objectives of this a	audit were to determine whether:	(b)(3
 The CIA can rely on CIR intelligence records effici 	AS to store, process, and retrieve iently and accurately.	
 CIRAS has adequate inter unauthorized access, discl 	rnal controls to protect information from losure, alteration, or destruction.	
• The Trident conversion act this audit.	ddresses issues identified with CIRAS in	
store, process, and retrieve intelligence re application testing found that features and requirements for speed, reliability, and co CIRAS survey respondents were satisfied		(b)(3 (b)(3
work.		(b)(1 (b)(3

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d not evaluate how the Trident conversion addresses issues because the Trident system is in the early stages of deployment. Enduction environment in March 2006 and currently supports Trident Program Office management expects the application IRAS by the end of 2008.	identified with CIRAS because the Tr Trident moved into a production envi
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Assistant Inspector General for Audit	

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BACKGROUND	(b)(3)
CIRAS is a mission-critical system that serves as the primary intelligence information repository and search, retrieval, and data organization and management	(b)(3)
system for the Directorate of Intelligence (DI) and other components in the CIA. As of May 2006, officers in the Washington Metropolitan Area and in the field use CIRAS to prepare intelligence reports, research requests for information. monitor real-time world events, and manage collection requirements.	(b)(1) (b)(3)
monitor rear-time world events, and manage confection requirements.	(b)(1) (b)(3)
The CIRAS system was deployed in 1997, replacing the Support for	(b)(3)
the Analysts' File Environment (SAFE) system, which had been in operation since 1986. Over the next several years, the Trident user interface will gradually replace CIRAS. Trident is	(b)(3)
being developed to meet the DI's priority of deploying advanced analytic tools and the CIA's transition to web-based applications. Trident's web-based architecture will allow Headquarters and field users to access the application using web-browser software. Trident will include tools for advanced searches, highlighting text and comment insertion, link analysis, mapping, data visualization, and foreign language translation. There are currently dual Trident-CIRAS users. The Trident Program Office predicts that Trident will service users by yearend, and that the remaining CIRAS users will be transitioned to Trident by the end of 2008. New Trident users will receive training on the system, and their CIRAS profiles will be adjusted to be compatible with Trident. Trident Program Office management told us they are preparing for full deployment by completing capacity testing to understand how a higher volume of users will affect performance, assessing non-DI users' requirements, and conducting field-connectivity testing.	(b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3)
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5 Link analysis tools allow analysts to graphically depict interrelationships between objects, such as people, organizations, places, or products.	(b)(3)
Data visualization refers to a visually oriented analytic tool-set that helps analysts understand large volumes of textual information.	(b)(3)
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AUDIT RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS		(b)(3)
CIRAS is an Efficient Application		(b)(3)
The CIA can rely on CIRAS to efficiently and accurately process, and retrieve intelligence records. Our application testing found th and functions in CIRAS generally meet requirements for speed, reliability, consistency.	at features	(b)(3)
consistency.		(b)(3)
In November 2005, we surveyed CIRAS users and re nearly a 29 percent response rate. CIRAS users surveyed included a judgm sample of DI analysts, Trident pilot participants, and the most active CIRAS	iental	(b)(3)
Eighty-five percent of the CIRAS users who responded to our survey s were satisfied with the CIRAS system as a tool to facilitate their work.		(b)(3)
Vulnerabilities Associated With Disaster Recovery and System Security Need To Be Addressed		(b)(3)
Internal controls over CIRAS are generally adequate. While our the System Security Plan, incident response procedures, data integrity, and controls found that the CIRAS system has sufficient integral controls in all	user access	(b)(3)
controls found that the CIRAS system has sufficient internal controls in pla	ace.	(b)(1)
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Exhibit A

	Objectives, Scope, and Methodology	(b)(3
	The objectives of this audit were to determine whether:	(b)(c
•	The CIA can rely on the Corporate Information Retrieval and Storage (CIRAS) system to store, process, and retrieve intelligence records efficiently and accurately.	
•	CIRAS has adequate internal controls to protect information from unauthorized access, disclosure, alteration, or destruction.	
•	The Trident conversion addresses issues identified with CIRAS in this audit.	
entified with	We did not evaluate how the Trident conversion addresses issues CIRAS because the Trident system is in the early stages of deployment.	(b)(3
	In conducting the audit, we:	(b)(3
•	Reviewed applicable regulations and policy guidelines pertaining to information security of Federal information systems.	
•	Reviewed CIRAS and Trident systems' documentation and received system briefings and demonstrations.	
•	Interviewed cognizant officials involved in CIRAS system development, operation, maintenance, and security.	
•	Interviewed and surveyed a judgmental sample of CIRAS and Trident users to gain user-perspective of the applications.	
. •	Tested CIRAS application controls.	
•	Conducted internal controls testing of CIRAS (according to DCID 6/3 requirements).	
•	Conducted interviews, reviewed documentation, and observed the relevant processes, procedures, and facilities to ensure compliance with DCID 6/3 management, operational, and technical controls.	
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Significant recommendations will General's semiannual report to the Dir	l be reported in the next Inspece ector, Central Intelligence Age	ctor (k ency.
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