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	PAGE 001 TOT: 121930Z MAY 82	(b)(3 bushes (D)(3
121930Z TO: DIRNS ZEN/WHITE STAFF, ZE CINCPAC F SHAFTER F	SA, DEPT OF STATE, DIA, TREASURY DEPT, NPIC, HOUSE SITUATION ROOM, ZEN/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL N/CIA OFFICE OF CURRENT OPERATIONS, HONOLULU HI, CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI, CDRWESTCOM FT HI, COMIPAC HONOLULU HI, CINCPACAF HICKAM AFB HI, HFLT, 13AF CLARK AB PI.	(b)(1) (b)(b)(3
SERIAL: [DIST: PASS:	12 MAY 82	(b)(3)
REPORT CL COUNTRY:	CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. ASS C D N F I D E N T I A LWNINTELNOFORN KAMPUCHEA/VIETNAM REDEPLOYMENT OF PAVN 7TH DIVISION TO ATTACK SOKH SAN CAMP; STRATEGY AND RESULTS OF PAVN ATTACK ON SOKH SAN;	
SOURCE :	PLANNED WITHDRAWAL OF 7TH DIVISION FROM THE KAMPUCHEAN/THAI BORDER	(b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(3)
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SUMMARY: IN EARLY MARCH 1982, ELEMENTS OF THE PAVN 7TH DIVISION REDEPLOYED FROM KOMPONG CHHNANG (VU6454) TO THE KAMPUCHEAN/ THAI BORDER AREA TO MOUNT AN ATTACK AGAINST THE KHMER PEOPLE'S NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (KPNLF) BASE LOCATED AT SOKH SAN (TU 5978) THE OBJECTIVE OF THE ATTACK WAS TO CAPTURE OR ANNIHILATE ALL KPNLF PERSONNEL THERE AND TO DESTROY THE BASE TO PREVENT ITS USE. PAVN WAS SUCCESSFUL IN DESTROYING THE BASE BUT INFLICTED VERY VEW CASUALTIES ON THE KPNLF BECAUSE THEY WERE UNABLE TO BLOCK THE KPNLF'S WITHDRAWAL INTO THAI TERRITORY. THE PAVN DOES NOT INTEND TO OCCUPY SOKH SAN, AND IMMEDIATELY WITHDREW ITS FORCES FROM SOKH SAN IN HOPES OF LURING THE KPNLF BACK TO THE AREA SO THEY MIGHT AGAIN TRY TO ATTACK THEM USING A PINCER ACTION. FAILS, PAVN PLANS TO CONTAMINATE THE AREA USING POISONOUS ARTILLERY SHELLS AND TO WITHDRAW BACK TO KOMPONG CHHNANG TO PREPARE TO RETURN TO THE SRV. THE 7TH DIVISION WILL BE REPLACED ON THE BORDER AREA BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA 196TH DIVISION. END SUMMARY.

IN EARLY FEBRUARY 1982, THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE PEOPLE'S ARMY OF VIETNAM (PAVN) 7TH DIVISION, 4TH CORPS, MOVED FROM VU 7506, ABOUT THREE KILOMETERS EAST OF O DONG DISTRICT TOWN, TO THE AIRFIELD IN KOMPONG CHHNANG CITY (VU 6454). IN EARLY MARCH 1982. IN PREPARATION FOR A PLANNED ATTACK AGAINST THE KHMER PEOPLE'S NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (KPNLF) BASE LOCATED AT SOKH SAN (TU 5978); THE 7TH DIVISION ESTABLISHED AS FORWARD HEAD-QUARTERS IN THE VICINITY OF TU 6685, ABOUT EIGHT KILOMETERS FROM THE THAI BORDER AND REDEPLOYED ITS SUBORDINATE UNITS TO THIS AREA. THE 7TH DIVISION COMMANDER, COLONEL NGOC ((ANH)), A 54-YEAR-OLD SOUTHERNER, ASSUMED PERSONAL COMMAND OF THE ATTACKING FORCES WHICH INCLUDED THREE 7TH DIVISION INFANTRY REGIMENTS (THE 34TH AKA 165TH, THE 38TH AKA 141ST, AND THE 42ND AKA 209TH) AND THE 210TH ARTILLERY REGIMENT PLUS AN ELEMENT OF THE 24TH ARTILLERY BRIGADE, 4TH CORPS, WITH TWO 130MM ARTILLERY PIECES ONE UNKNOWN BATTALION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA (PRK'S) 1ST BRIGADE WAS ALSO ATTACHED TO THE 38TH REGIMENT. COMMENT: THE PRK FIRST BRIGADE IS NOW REFERRED TO AS THE 196TH DIVISION.) OTHER 7TH DIVISION ELEMENTS INCLUDED THE 25TH ENGINEER, THE 26TH SIGNAL, THE 27TH RECONNAISSANCE, THE 29TH TRANSPORTATION

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AND THE 33RD MEDICAL BATTALIONS.

2. THE PAVN OBJECTIVE IN ATTACKING SOKH SAN WAS TO CAPTURE OR ANNIHILATE ALL PERSONNEL THERE AND TO DESTROY THE BASE COMPLETELY TO PREVENT ITS FUTURE USE. SECOND LIEUTENANT VU DUC ((VINH)), A 27-YEAR-OLD NORTH VIETNAMESE POLITICAL OFFICER OF THE 16TH 120MM MORTAR COMPANY OF THE 38TH REGIMENT, TOLD HIS SUBORDINATES TO CARRY OUT THE THREE CLEARING GUIDELINES WHEN ATTACKING SOKH SAN, I.E., BURN EVERYTHING WHICH CANNOT BE CONFISCATED; DESTROY EVERYTHING INCLUDING FOOD SUPPLIES, PLANTS, EQUIPMENT, ETC; AND KILL EVERYTHING INCLUDING DOMESTIC ANIMALS. HE TOLD HIS MEN TO CALL UPON THE ENEMY TO SURRENDER AND TO ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE PRISONERS. ANYONE WHO CAPTURED AN ENEMY SOLDIER WITH A WEAPON WOULD RECEIVE A NEW GOOD QUALITY UNIFORM COMMENT: SOKH SAN WAS THE AND LEAVE AUTHORIZATION. KPNLF'S MAIN BASE OF OPERATION FOR THE SOUTHERN ZONE AND WAS THE MOST EFFECTIVE AND PROMISING OF THE THREE ZONES.)

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THE PAVN STRATEGY AGAINST SOKH SAN WAS TO HAVE THE 38TH REGIMENT APPROACH IT FROM THE WEST BY MOVING IN FROM THE NORTH AND PENETRATING THAI TERRITORY TO GET BEHIND THE KPNLF TROOPS. ON 17 MARCH THE 42ND REGIMENT WAS TO ATTACK THE CAMP FROM THE EAST; THE 34TH REGIMENT WAS TO ATTACK FROM THE SOUTH, UTILIZING ARTILLERY SUPPORT FROM THE 210TH REGIMENT AND THE 24TH BRIGADE, INCLUDING COMMENT: THE SPECIFIC MISSION DEBILITATING CHEMICAL ROUNDS. OF THE 34TH REGIMENT WAS UNKNOWN.) THE STRATEGY, HOWEVER, WAS UNSUCCESSFUL BECAUSE KPNLF RECONNAISSANCE FORCES MADE CONTACT WITH PAVN ON THE 15TH AND THE MAJORITY OF THE KPNLF FORCES WERE ABLE TO WITHDRAW INTO THAILAND BEFORE THE 38TH REGIMENT COULD GET BEHIND THEM. THEREFORE, WHILE THE KPNLF LOST THEIR BASE OF OPERATION AND A GREAT

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DEAL OF MEDICAL AND FOOD SUPPLIES, THE PAVN KILLED ONLY ABOUT 10 KPNLF TROOPS, CAPTURED ANOTHER 10 CIVILIANS, AND APPROXIMATELY 20 WEAPONS. PAVN CASUALTIES WERE UNKNOWN, BUT TWO TRUCKS OF THE 210TH REGIMENT WERE DESTROYED. NUMEROUS PAVN TROOPS WERE KILLED AND WOUNDED - BY DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEAN (DK) MINES. INCLUDING THE POLITICAL OFFICER	
OF THE 34TH REGIMENT	(b)(1) , (b)(3)
4. FOLLOWING THE OCCUPATION AND DESTRUCTION OF SOKH SAN BY PAVN ON 20 MARCH 1982, AND THE SUBSEQUENT CONFISCATION OF MEDICAL AND FOOD SUPPLIES, PAVN FORCES WITHDREW FROM THE AREA IN HOPES OF LURING THE KPNLF FORCES BACK SO THAT PAVN CDULD AGAIN ATTEMPT TO. ATTACK THEM USING A PINCER ACTION. THE 38TH REGIMENT WITHDREW TO THE VICINITY OF TU 6185, THE 210TH REGIMENT REMAINED IN THE VICINITY OF TU 6586 WITH TWO 105MM ARTILLERY PIECES DEPLOYED AT TU 6387 AND TWO 85MM ARTILLERY PIECES DEPLOYED AT TU 6683. THE 60-MAN ELEMENT OF THE 24TH ARTILLERY BRIGADE WITH TWO 130MM ARTILLERY PIECES WAS DEPLOYED AT TU 6788. 1ST LIEUTENANT DAO VAN ((MAO)), A 33-YEAR-OLD NORTH VIETNAMESE MEDICAL OFFICER ASSIGNED TO THE 210TH ARTILLERY REGIMENT, SAID THAT IF THE KPNLF FORCES DID NOT RETURN TO THE AREA BEFORE THE 7TH DIVISION WITHDREW, THE PAVN WOULD FIRE POISONOUS ROUNDS OF ANOTHER TYPE INTO THE AREA WHICH WOULD RENDER THE AREA UNINHABITABLE FOR UP TO THREE YEARS. HE SAID THAT NEITHER THE PAVN NOR THE PAVN ATIACK. HAD BEEN COVERED WITH A YELLOWISH/WHITISH POWDER WHICH FELL ON THE CAMP AT NIGHT. THE POWDER WAS DELIVERED FROM 130MM ARTILLERY SHELLS WHICH EXPLODED OVERHEAD RELEASING A SMOKE-LIKE SUBSTANCE. NO ONE IN THE CAMP HAS DIED FROM THE POWDER. ADDITIONALLY, IN EARLY MAY, A KPNLE PATROL ENTERED SOKH SAN I AND II BUT HAD NO CONTACT WITH TOXIC MATTER. IN FACT, THE PATROL ENCOUNTERED A HANDFUL OF PAVN AT SOKH SAN II. IT APPEARS UNLIKELY, THEREFORE,	(b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3)
THAT PAVN ACTUALLY SPRAYED THE AREA WITH TOXIC CHEMICALS BEFORE WITHDRAWING THE ELEMENTS OF THE PAVN DIVISION SEVERAL WEEKS AGO.) 5. IN LATE MARCH 1982, 1ST LIEUTENANT ((TIN)), THE DEPUTY OF THE REAR SERVICES SECTION OF THE 210TH REGIMENT, AND LIEUTENANT DAO VAN MAD SAID THAT THE 7TH DIVISION WOULD GRADUALLY PULL OUT OF THE THAI BORDER AREA AND BE REPLACED BY THE PRK 1ST BRIGADE FROM THE AREA OF TV 7318. THEY SAID THE ARTILLERY REGIMENTS WOULD MOVE OUT FIRST BEFORE THE RAINY SEASON, FOLLOWED BY THE INFANTRY REGIMENTS. COMMENT: IN LATE MARCH 1982, COLONEL NGUYEN NGOC ((DOANH)) AKA BA ((DOANH)), THE PAVN ADVISOR TO THE PRK 1ST BRIGADE AND ANOTHER HIGH RANKING 4TH CORPS OFFICER MADE AN INSPECTION VISIT TO SOKH SAN REPORTEDLY IN PREPARATION FOR THE ARRIVAL OF THE BRIGADE. AN OFFICER OF THE 210TH REGIMENT SAID THAT THE REGIMENT WOULD MOVE BACK TO KOMPONG CHHNANG AROUND THE 15TH OR 16TH OF APRIL 1982. OTHER WOULD NOT OCCUR FOR MORE THAN TWO MONTHS BECAUSE THE DIVISION HAD TO RETURN TO KOMPONG CHHNANG TO PREPARE TO WITHDRAW TO THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM WHERE IT WOULD BE REORGANIZED INTO A MECHANIZED	(b)(1) (b)(3)
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SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVEDNOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS. ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.	(b)(3)
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