


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Background Use Only

October 1974



Prospects for a Greek Cypriot Insurgency

Summary

The occupation of 40 percent of Cyprus by Turkish troops has created a situation in which Greek Cypriots might vent their frustration by waging a terrorist campaign against the Turkish troops or Turkish Cypriot population. The likelihood of insurgency depends to a large extent on the outcome of negotiations over both the final demarcation between the Greek and Turkish held portions of the island and the provisions for exchange of prisoners and refugees. A small insurgency could be led by any one of three factions—the rightist EOKA-B organization, a leftist group (either EDEK or AKEL), or a movement unofficially under control of the Greek Cypriot government.

Many physical and political obstacles make it unlikely that a large-scale insurgency movement would be mounted or could be successfully carried out:

- Turkey has taken seriously the possibility of guerrilla warfare on Cyprus and has augmented its occupation forces with three special battalions (one commando and two trained in population control) to cope with this eventuality.
- The Turkish lines run through a broad area of cultivated land, facilitating the observation of infiltrators. Furthermore, the small size of Cyprus would permit Turkish military reaction in any part of the island.
- Throughout their area, the occupation forces have instituted tight control over population movement.
- Turkish occupation forces probably are prepared to use massive reprisals against the Greek Cypriot population to counter any Greek insurgency operations.
- The long distance from Greece to Cyprus would permit Turkish naval and air forces to interdict incoming supplies.
- A Greek Cypriot insurgency would involve territorial risks for the Cypriots and for Greece should Athens support the movement. The Turks might overrun the entire island or invade Greek islands near the Turkish coast.
- Little outside support could be expected by a Greek Cypriot insurgent movement. Thus far, neither the major powers nor any other states have actively supported the Greek Cypriot populace against the Turks, and other than humanitarian relief cannot be expected.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 Directorate of Intelligence
 October 1974

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Prospects for a Greek Cypriot Insurgency

The unsettled postwar situation on Cyprus could foster a Greek Cypriot insurgency against the Turkish community and occupation forces. Officials of both the Clerides government in Nicosia and the Karamanlis government in Athens, as well as such self-proclaimed Cypriot leaders as Nicos Sampson, have referred to the possibility of guerrilla warfare on Cyprus. Insurgency could grow out of a continued frustration of the efforts of Greek Cypriot military and political leaders to effect what they view as a reasonable settlement with the Turks. Thus the likelihood of insurgency depends to a large extent on the outcome of negotiations over both the final demarcation between the Greek and Turkish held portions of the island and the provisions for exchange of prisoners and refugees.

Potential Leadership

Any of three political parties on Cyprus or the Greek Cypriot government could sponsor insurgency operations against the Turks:

- The EOKA-B, a right-wing organization dedicated to union of Cyprus with Greece, might attempt to assume leadership of an insur-

Note: This memorandum was prepared in the [redacted] [redacted] the Office of Strategic Research in consultation with analysts of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Comments and queries may be directed to [redacted] [redacted]

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
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gency movement. This group could count on the support of rightist Greek Cypriots, but could not depend on the Cypriot government or leftist elements for help.

- The left-wing forces, through the EDEK (non-Communist leftist party) or the AKEL (Communist party), might be inclined to mount insurgency operations, primarily for their own political gain. However, the AKEL probably would be dissuaded from violent action against the Turks by the Soviet Union. Neither of these elements would be likely to gain the support of the EOKA-B or mainland Greek officials.
- The relatively well-disciplined Greek Cypriot national guard could "unofficially" be employed by the Greek Cypriot government as the core force for guerrilla-type operations. Further, the national guard is presently integrating EOKA-B militiamen into its ranks.

Geography

Both the relatively small size of Cyprus and its long distance from Greece would hamper insurgency involving large units. The oversea supply route from Greece is at least 350 miles long and susceptible to Turkish interdiction. The relatively small size of the island would facilitate any attempt by Turkey to blockade the Greek side and to employ air strikes and commando troops in attacks on Greek insurgent bases which might be located in the Troodos Mountains.


The division of Cyprus by the Turks along their present lines would hamper Greek abilities to stage infiltration raids into Turkish territory. Turkish positions, except those in a wooded area on the northwest coast, would extend through a wide belt of

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Cyprus: Land Use



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cultivated fields, facilitating Turkish observation of personnel movements. Infiltration over such terrain by Greek units larger than squads of a few men would be almost impossible.

Resources

Stocks of arms, ammunition, and demolition equipment would be sufficient to support sporadic Greek raids and terror campaigns. The years of tension and recent fighting on the island have given cause for almost every Greek Cypriot group to acquire weapons. The Cypriot national guard lost most of its tanks and some artillery in the July and August fighting, but at least some antitank and antiaircraft weapons are being reintroduced by importing Greek

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materiel. The shortage of heavier weapons probably would not hinder a limited terror campaign.

Turkish Resistance

Turkey has taken seriously the possibility of guerrilla warfare on Cyprus, and has deployed troops specially trained for antiguerrilla operations. Two battalions of Jandarma troops--specially trained for population control--have been incorporated into the occupation force. One commando battalion also was put ashore, charged with responsibility for combating guerrilla activity.

Turkish authorities have been careful to establish tight controls over population and movement throughout their areas. Greek refugees have been carefully screened when allowed to return to Turkish-held areas--males of military age generally have not been permitted to return to villages. The Turks seem intent upon maintaining a Turkish majority throughout the occupation zone.

The disposition of Turkish forces is intended to provide the maximum counterinsurgency capability. The Turks have sufficient armor and armored vehicles to maintain security on all roadways in their zone, and the troops are primarily mobile infantry, capable of constantly patrolling to guard against infiltration by raiding forces. Moreover, the Turks have kept their armor and other major equipment dispersed so as not to provide large targets for sabotage.

Turkish occupation forces probably are prepared to use massive reprisals against the Greek Cypriot population to counter any Greek insurgency operations.

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~~SECRET~~Political Risks

Greek Cypriot factions are seriously divided and have not been able to coordinate effectively their efforts against the Turks. If either a right-wing or left-wing organization were to call for guerrilla warfare little unified direct support from Cypriots of the opposing persuasion could be expected. Although the Athens government, working through the Greek Cypriot government, probably could obtain broad political cooperation on the island, it probably would recognize that an attempt at insurgency operations would be fraught with problems and risks:

- A Greek-supported insurgency effort might precipitate an offensive by the Turks to establish control of the entire island. Militarily, the Greeks cannot expect to expel the Turkish forces, and the potential for personnel losses would be great.
- The Greek islands in the Aegean would be placed in danger of attacks by Turkey. This is particularly relevant to the islands of Limnos and Lesbos, both of which are in the area of disputed oil concessions.
- The Turkish population in Greek Thrace could start its own sabotage campaign.

The Greek Cypriots could expect little outside support for any insurgency struggle on Cyprus. The major powers in Western Europe, the US, and the USSR probably would remain aloof. The Arab states and the Palestinian organizations also would be unlikely to support the Greeks. Although there has been some contact between the EDEK and various Arab governments on the basis of socialist fraternalism, political sympathy probably would not override religion-based support for the Turks on Cyprus.

Limited Prospects

Should insurgency operations be attempted, the prospects for success on any significant scale are

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dim. It is unlikely that any of the groups which could initiate such operations would receive adequate support from the others. Other important factors in the Cyprus situation--the geography of Cyprus, limited military capabilities, and the current political situation--militate against successful widespread guerrilla warfare and make attempts at other than small-scale harassment of the Turkish forces unlikely.

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