

FORM 30068



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MICRO

Intelligence Information Cable

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REPORT CLASS ~~S E C R E T~~--WNINTEL--NOFURN--NOCONTRACT--ORCON

CITE [REDACTED]
DIST 04 APR 80

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COUNTRY KAMPUCHEA/VIETNAM/THAILAND
SUBJECT PAVN ATTACKS INCLUDING INCAPACITATING GAS
AGAINST KPRLF POSITIONS NEAR THE KPRLF CENTRAL
REGION HEADQUARTERS AT SROCH SRANG VILLAGE [REDACTED]

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SOURCE [REDACTED]

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1. ON 13 MARCH 1980, KHMER PEOPLE'S NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (KPRLF) DEFENSIVE POSITIONS NEAR THE KPRLF'S CENTRAL REGION'S HEAD-QUARTERS AT SROCH SRANG VILLAGE (TA7553), KAMPUCHEA CAME UNDER HEAVY ATTACK BY ELEMENTS OF THE PEOPLE'S ARMY OF VIETNAM (PAVN) 752ND (AKA 174TH) REGIMENT SUPPORTED BY FOUR 105MM HOWITZERS. THE ATTACKS WERE CONCENTRATED IN THE VICINITY OF BANTEAY AMPIL WHICH IS ALONG THE KPRLF'S FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE AND IS APPROXIMATELY FIVE KILOMETERS EAST OF THE THAI/KAMPUCHEA BORDER.

2. AT THE TIME OF THE ATTACK, THERE WERE APPROXIMATELY 4,000 KHMER

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CIVILIAN PERSONNEL LIVING IN THE VILLAGE AND THE VILLAGE WAS DEFENDED BY ROUGHLY 1,500 KPNLF SOLDIERS ORGANIZED INTO FOUR INFANTRY BATTALIONS. MANY OF THE CIVILIANS HAD RECENTLY MOVED TO THE VILLAGE FROM THE KHAO I DANG REFUGEE HOLDING AREA. PRIOR TO THE ATTACKS, THE KPNLF LEADERSHIP WAS PLANNING TO CREATE FOUR ADDITIONAL VILLAGES NEAR SROCH SRANG EACH OF WHICH WOULD CONSIST OF APPROXIMATELY 3,500 CIVILIANS TO BE RESETTLED FROM THE REFUGEE CAMPS IN THAILAND. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF THE TACTICAL SITUATION IN THE AREA THESE PLANS HAVE BEEN POSTPONED.

3. DURING THE FIGHTING THE KPNLF FORCES WERE ABLE TO HOLD THEIR POSITIONS AROUND BANTEAY AMPIL UNTIL 17 MARCH, BUT WERE FORCED TO WITHDRAW DUE TO A SHORTAGE OF AMMUNITION. DURING THE FIGHTING THE KPNLF CLAIMED THAT PAVN HAD USED AN INCAPACITATING GAS WHICH CAUSED THE KPNLF SOLDIERS TO BECOME WEAK AND DIZZY. THE GAS REPORTEDLY WAS DELIVERED BY 105MM ARTILLERY SHELLS AND WAS RELEASED IN THE FORM OF A DARK CLOUD WHEN THE ROUNDS EXPLODED. AS OF 22 MARCH THE SITUATION AROUND SROCH SRANG HAD STABILIZED BUT THE KPNLF DEFENSIVE POSITIONS WERE ONLY ONE AND A HALF KILOMETERS EAST OF THE BORDER. AS OF 24 MARCH, KPNLF CASUALTIES WERE ESTIMATED AT OVER 100 KILLED, WOUNDED OR MISSING; HOWEVER THESE FIGURES WERE NOT COMPLETE. PAVN CASUALTIES WERE ESTIMATED AT MORE THAN 200 KILLED.

4.

[REDACTED] THE 752ND REGIMENT,

REINFORCED BY A 200-MAN BORDER SECURITY (CONG AN) COMPANY, HAD MOVED

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FROM ITS BASE AT SVAY CHEK (TAB127) INTO THE AREA JUST PRIOR TO THE
ATTACK. THE REGIMENT'S 4TH AND 6TH BATTALIONS WERE THE PRINCIPAL
UNITS INVOLVED IN THE FIGHTING WHILE THE REGIMENT'S 5TH BATTALION
ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DEFENSE OF BANTEAY AMPIL AFTER IT WAS
CAPTURED. PRIOR TO THE ATTACK, THE 4TH BATTALION HAD A TOTAL
STRENGTH OF 450 MEN AND THE REGIMENT'S 5TH AND 6TH BATTALIONS WERE
ASSUMED TO BE OF EQUAL STRENGTH. FOUR 105MM HOWITZERS SUPPORTING
THE ATTACK WERE DEPLOYED IN THE VICINITY OF KANDOL VILLAGE (UA1300).

COMMENT: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] NO MENTION OF ANY TOXIC AGENT BEING USED IN THE
ATTACK.) FOLLOWING THE CAPTURE OF BANTEAY AMPIL, BOTH THE 4TH AND
6TH BATTALIONS WERE WITHDRAWN FROM THE AREA FOR REST. AS OF 17 MARCH,
THE REGIMENT'S 4TH BATTALION HAD SUFFERED 40 KILLED IN THE FIGHTING.

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5. THE KPNLF PLANNED TO HOLD A CONFERENCE AT SRUCH SRANG
VILLAGE ON 20 MARCH 1980 WHICH WAS TO BE ATTENDED BY KPNLF REPRESENT-
TIVES FROM BOTH INSIDE KAMPUCHEA AND FROM THAILAND. MANY OF THE
REPRESENTATIVES FROM INSIDE KAMPUCHEA HAD ALREADY ARRIVED AT THE
VILLAGE WHEN THE ATTACKS ON THE 13TH BEGAN AND AS A RESULT WERE AMONG
THE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL WHO FLED INTO THAILAND. BECAUSE OF THE
TACTICAL SITUATION IN THE AREA AND OTHER POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS,
THE CONFERENCE WAS POSTPONED INDEFINITELY. KPNLF CHAIRMAN S O N
SANN HAD PLANNED TO ATTEND THE CONFERENCE BUT WAS UNABLE TO OBTAIN
PERMISSION FROM ROYAL THAI AUTHORITIES TO TRAVEL TO THE BORDER.
HOWEVER, AS OF 30 MARCH, SON SANN HAD RECEIVED PERMISSION TO VISIT ALL

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KPNLF CAMPS ALONG THE BORDER AND WAS PLANNING TO VISIT THE SROCH
SRANG AREA ON APPROXIMATELY 3 APRIL.

6.

7.

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