

17 September 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Operational Planning for Project FUBELT

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1. A meeting was held at 10:30 a.m. on this date to discuss further planning for Project FUBELT. Present were Messrs. Karamessines, Broe, [redacted] Warren, [redacted] and [redacted]. The following matters were discussed:

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a. Santiago 2911 described how the Communist Party is systematically trying to get mass communication media under its control and in particular, throttle "El Mercurio." It was agreed that this was a very important issue that needed to be exploited fully. Mr. Karamessines agreed with Mr. [redacted] suggestion that we submit to him a game plan on which we were working later on in the day. The emphasis is on as wide an exploitation of this issue as possible both in the U.S. and abroad.

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b. Mr. Karamessines requested that a copy of this cable information be prepared for the Director on sterile bond for use with his press contacts.

c. Mr. Karamessines requested that we use an Immediate precedence on our messages relating to this Project unless, where no night action is required, we were certain that a Priority precedence cable would be at the Station the first thing next morning.

d. Mr. Karamessines indicated that he would like to know from us when developments were such that he could usefully ask the Director to see [redacted] aspects of this problem.

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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e. Mr. Karamessines reminded the group that we had to prepare for the Director a list of things the Director could do bearing on the economic aspects of the problem. It was noted that [redacted] our Task Force economic specialist, would be in contact with the OER specialist on Chile today to pick her brains on the subject and, within several days, we should be getting some ideas on what can and should be done.

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f. Mr. Karamessines asked where the matter of contacting the [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] said he had a meeting scheduled with him at 11:30 this morning.

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response

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g. In connection with the message from the Ambassador to the Department of State (Santiago 2931) it was agreed that Mr. Broe would call the Department to see what, if anything, they were doing about it and to try to induce some action if it is possible.

Broe
has
done,
but -

h. Station Santiago should be queried immediately on when Ambassador intends to give us his suggestions on how to use the Santiago 2911 information as promised. In the meantime, we would be moving with Mr. [redacted] on having him contact [redacted] executives.

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i. Close contact is to be maintained with Mr. [redacted] on a continuing basis to keep him from becoming an "unguided" missile. This is quite aside from the positive contribution he can make, such as in the [redacted] endeavor. We should be careful on what we use Mr. [redacted] for since his vested interest can render his motives and assessments suspect to some circles.

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j. Situation Report #1 (17 September 1970) was reviewed on the key personnel assignments, all of which should become effective sometime during 18 September.

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
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k. The Department of State questioned the TDY of [redacted] to Station Santiago early 17 September. It was explained as a temporary replacement but this careful scrutiny of official travel to Santiago by State may generate some problems in the future.

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1. We should use OER under a logical pretext to look into any economic angles of interest to us and involving DOD, AIR or other such outside agencies.



William V. Broe

Chief

Western Hemisphere Division

(b)(3)

DDP/WH [redacted]

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