



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

15 April 1959

STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 13-59

SUBJECT: O/NE Consultants' Conference, Princeton, 12-13 March 1959

Participants:

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Consultants

Cyril Black Robert Bowie Lt. Gen. Harold Roe Bull Calvin Hoover Klaus Knorr Col. George A. Lincoln William Langer Harold Linder Philip Mosely Joseph Strayer T. Guyler Young CIA

Gen. Charles P. Cabell Robert Amory, Jr. Abbott Smith Wayne Jackson Ludwell Montague William Bundy Robert Hewitt Richard Burks Drexel Godfrey

The Consultants Conference reviewed NIE 70-59, "The Outlook in West Africa", and NIE 22-59, "The Political Outlook in France."

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The Berlin situation was discussed in conjunction with the draft-

ing of a new Berlin estimate.

The attached review of the group's discussion covers only the first morning session which dealt with the African paper.

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
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AFRICA

1. Mr. SMITH opened the morning's discussion with a brief review of O/NE's activities during the past year in dealing with the rapid changes taking place in Black Africa. He hoped that the Panel's discussion of the West Africa estimate would provide us with some advice on how best to handle the over-all approach to African estimative problems.

2. Mr. MONTAGUE, Chairman of the West Africa estimate, briefly outlined some of the difficulties encountered in drafting the paper. He called particular attention to the problem of introducing background information in sufficient depth to make the text intelligible to the many readers who have little or no familiarity with the situation in Africa. By including the large amount of background material, which is required under these circumstances, there is danger that the estimate will assume the characteristics of a handbook. A second difficulty grows out of our limitations in interpreting the small amount of information which is available. Most of West Africa's emerging leaders are relative strangers to us. We have little appreciation of the circumstances of their origin or of the forces shaping their general outlook. Over time, some of these shortcomings will be overcome

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as we become more familiar with Africa. In the meantime, however, we are obliged to function under serious handicaps.

3. Mr. BOWIE inquired as to whether or not an inventory of our total resources in African information and exploitable sources had been taken. Such an inventory should be taken, and it should include the considerable amount of work being done by private research groups. In African estimates as much background information should be included as needed in order to make the paper meaningful. If the policymaker is in need of a primer, then that's what he should be given. Mr. LANGER agreed that considerable background material would be needed in the initial African estimate; however, he felt we need not go so far that the estimate becomes a primer. He wondered if it would not be possible to expand somewhat the background section of the present paper, and include additional supporting material through preparation of a cartographic annex, which would cover such factors as the location of the principal tribal groups, climatic zones, agricultural distribution, etc. Mr. STRAYER agreed with Mr. LANGER and in addition suggested that the services of a good anthropologist might help to improve the paper's first section.

4. Mr. LINDER suggested that some of the problem results from our handling too large an area. We limit estimates to a

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
single European country although there is a general understanding of the background, but for Africa, where such general understanding does not exist, we handle a dozen or more countries at a time. LINDER wanted to know to what extent information was being received from the British. ______ replied that from time to time we get reports from theBritish, but little or nothing from the French and Belgians. Much of the British reporting contains a very pronounced bias in favor of British interests in Africa.

5. A remark by KNORR on the need for a training program in African studies touched off a lively discussion on the ways and means of best implementing such a program. BOWIE called attention to the disastrous consequences of US failure to appreciate developments in the Middle East. He believes we are headed for the same fate in Africa, unless there is an early effort to train personnel capable of understanding the African situation. LANGER and STRAYER both suggested that O/NE assign one or two people to African affairs, and that they be trained perhaps by an extended residence, six months to a year, in the colonial capitals of Europe, where they might become familiar with the large amounts of source material the colonial administrations have accumulated during past years. After they have obtained the necessary background they should be allowed to go to Africa and spend another six months or so in order to test various hypotheses arrived at

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in Europe. MOSELY pointed out that the British and French are probably better informed on African affairs than they are on the Middle East and that we could hope to gain a great deal from them. He mentioned that the International of Free Trade Unions in Brussels should prove to be a useful source of information. KNORR noted that the need is not for just a few Africanists, but that until there are large numbers of people working in African affairs, cross communications and all its attendent benefits, is not likely to materialize.


6. LINCOLN suggested that in view of the problems involved in drafting NIE's on Africa, the logical first step would be to reduce the size of the task by preparing a list of the decisions policymakers are likely to be faced with in dealing with Africa. Such a list might be along the following lines:

- (a) Boundaries, including the question of federation and balkanization:
- (b) Leadership;
- (c) Bloc relations;
- (d) US relations with Western colonial powers;
- (e) Economic; and
- (f) Political stability.

STRAYER thought that to LINCOLN's list should be added some consideration of what appeal will strike the strongest chord among

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
the African people -- should we pitch our efforts to influence African developments in terms of economic, political, or social programs. BLACK added that the determination of African sociological loyalties and motivations is of crucial importance if we hope to win the confidence and support of an independent Africa.

7. STRAYER pointed out that despite the artificiality of the boundaries in Africa, they have been in existence for 60 years or more, and that boundaries have a tendency to become fixed. Hence, we cannot be certain that ethnic considerations will result in .any significant shift in boundaries. Commenting on LINCOLN's second point BOWIE pointed out that under existing conditions there will probably be an increasing tendency for the leaders to become autocratic. KNORR suggested that careful study be given to those who have power, and to those who would prefer to have power.

8. SMITH then asked for the Panel's views regarding the extent of the Soviet effort in Africa. YOUNG, speaking from the experience of individuals recently returned from Cairo, indicated that the Soviets are unspareing of time, money, and energy in contacting Black Africans. Indeed the Soviets seem to be giving more attention to the Africans in Cairo than they are to the Arab students. MOSELY remarked that the Soviets are making much the same effort in Paris and London. _______asked for views as to the

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probable direction and effect of Soviet economic efforts in Africa. LINDER remarked that in an area such as Africa, largely a producer of surplus crops, it is the marginal buyer, the one who takes the last 10 percent of the crop, who holds the upper hand. In these circumstances it was concluded that the Soviets should be able to make considerable gains without a great expenditure of money.

