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Security Information

## Official Diary

Thursday, 11 September 1952

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1. Spoke to Dr. Kent, at Mr. Wisner's suggestion, about the employment of [redacted] as a Princeton consultant and was later informed that Mr. [redacted] would be invited to the next meeting at Princeton. So advised Wisner's office.

2. Requested Mr. Hulick to have the briefing on [redacted] scheduled for Monday, September 15, deferred to Tuesday, September 16. I had spoken to Mr. Wisner about this and the delay was requested, since both of us planned to be out of town on Monday. (b)(1)

(b)(1)

3. Informed Mr. Friedman that the two volumes relating to certain [redacted] activities which he had requested could not be located in CIA files, but those in charge of the files felt certain that these volumes had been included in material sent to ASA.

4. Arranged with Mr. Corson for distribution of Volume II of the GENIS studies to Mr. Bohlen and General Cabell.

5. Phoned Mr. Sheldon and noted that, for the second time, my copy of the Digest contained duplicate pages. In view of the consumers of this publication, I felt that someone should be charged with making a final check and he assured me that he would look into this.

6. At the Deputies' meeting, Mr. Dulles reported that in a conversation with the Netherlands Ambassador, the latter had noted a definite increase in social approaches by Soviet personnel to Netherlands' military and diplomatic personnel.

7. [redacted] phoned to inquire about a [redacted] who had visited [redacted] being introduced by a representative of the FBI. Upon checking with George Carey, we ascertained that [redacted] was a representative of the Cover Division who had appropriately cleared with O/O. Accordingly, I informed [redacted] that [redacted] represented CIA, that we regarded him as responsible, and would appreciate any assistance that might be given him. I asked that he phone me, in the event he had any further questions. (b)(6)

(b)(3)

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8. Mr. Matthias consulted me respecting a redraft of the Civil Defense contribution to NSC 135/1, and I indicated that he should redraft this section as he sees fit and insist upon CD accepting the intelligence version, since this was an intelligence estimate beyond the competence of Civil Defense.

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9. Met with General Samford, Admiral Bieri, and Mr. Hoover, on the summary evaluation paper. Complete agreement was reached on a revision of General Samford's amendments and we agreed that after the revised basic paper had been circulated among the group, it would be checked by General Samford with the NSC Senior Staff Steering Group. Following the foregoing meeting, had an extended discussion on the necessities of a Commander's estimate for the President.
10. Passed on to Mr. Dulles certain information respecting the flow of cables from State furnished by AD/CD and requested Mr. Dulles to speak to Mr. Bruce about this, particularly to ask Bruce to direct his injunction to the Secretary's Secretariat. I felt that we had done all we could through intelligence channels.
11. Mr. Forwood of Brigadier Tiltman's office phoned and indicated that the flow of [ ] reports from CIA had dried up as of May of this year. I undertook to look into this question and was later advised by Mr. Sheldon that the flow prior to May had primarily consisted of a back-log. After that time there had been very few reports and some delay was encountered in sanitizing these reports for OOB's, etc. (b)(3)
12. Attended PSB meeting and opposed adoption of the recommendations of the Loomis Report. The PSB decided against adopting such recommendations and we welcomed the association of the PSB staff with our coordinating effort.
13. Mr. Amory informed me that some of the material received from Mr. Angleton was unique and was thought to be of great value by his people. I so informed Mr. Angleton, requesting Mr. Amory to emphasize in his Office the desirability of additional questions.
14. On seeing [ ], I phoned Lloyd George and requested that he expedite a PD thereon to O/CI, which would undertake to furnish a reply. Requested [ ] to alert O/CI on this. (b)(3)  
(b)(3)
15. Following the PSB meeting, Mr. Price, Deputy Director of R&DB, requested that I ascertain the CIA view on one [ ] said to have been employed at one time by CIA. I undertook to call him on this. Mr. Drain is checking. (b)(3)
16. Spoke with Generals Partridge and Porter and indicated that CIA would not participate in the exercise of preparing an estimate for NATO

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Standing Group use on or before October 2nd. My primary reason was that the demand was unreasonable and made without any true appreciation of intelligence capabilities. I offered to assist informally, but emphasized that this did not involve acceptance of broad requirements; at most, we would ask a man or two to sit in with their people. I particularly emphasized that it should be made plain [redacted] that they were receiving a US Military, not a US, view. Drafted a cable expressing these views to Cline, and also discussed these decisions with Sherman Kent, who concurred.

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

17. Dr. Kent informed me that he would be glad to have [redacted] for a period of six months as a consultant to the Board of National Estimates and I shall have to speak to Messrs. Dulles and Wisner about this.

(b)(3)

18. At the request of Mr. Sheldon, asked Col. White to check on the availability of [redacted] White later informed me that [redacted] would give him a final decision on Monday.

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