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
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North Korea: Pyongyang's light propaganda coverage thus far of the EC-121 shootdown probably reflects the realization that it is not receiving international support for its claims.

The sparse coverage on the incident in the North Korean press and radio seems geared primarily to further the regime's domestic goals. A statement by Defense Minister Choe Hyon and an editorial in the party newspaper both interpret the 15 April incident as further proof that the Korean people must prepare themselves "more thoroughly" politically and ideologically to carry out the party's program. The North Koreans have not yet made any specific reference to the US announcement that it will resume reconnaissance flights and send a task force to Korean waters.

Only three Communist states--East Germany, North Vietnam, and Cuba--have given full support to Pyongyang's claims that the EC-121 violated North Korean airspace. Articles from Belgrade, Warsaw, and Bucharest describe US flights as "near" or "in the region of" North Korean borders. Peking has made no comment on the incident, and Albania, Peking's close ally, did not even mention North Korea when commenting on Nixon's press conference. Moscow still has made no authoritative commentary on the attack, and this, combined with Soviet cooperation in searching for survivors, is almost certainly interpreted by Pyongyang as disapproval of its conduct.

The Japanese Government has strongly supported the US position and publicly censured Pyongyang. Cabinet Secretary Hori stated that Japanese security requires these reconnaissance flights, and he dismissed opposition charges that President Nixon's order to protect the flights would heighten tension, saying that protection would prevent further incidents.

North Korea has taken defensive measures against the possibility of US retaliation.

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