


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
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
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


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Korea: The North Korean regime is exploiting the shutdown of the US aircraft on 15 April to rally the population around the leadership of Kim Il-song and the Communist Party.

In a congratulatory statement to the unit which was involved in the attack, Defense Minister Choe Hyon called the US flight a link in a premeditated scheme to provoke a new war. He depicted the incident as showing that "war may break out at any moment."

The Pyongyang leadership long has used the threat of a US invasion to justify the party's harsh demands on the population. Periodic "proof" that the threat is real is essential if the war psychosis is to be sustained for exploitation by the regime.

\* \* \* \*

The South Korean Government appears anxious not to get too far ahead of the US position on the shutdown. In a relatively moderate statement, the government yesterday condemned the "outrageous, illegal, barbaric" North Korean action and called on the "US and the free world...to take prompt and effective countermeasures to prevent once and for all the Northern puppets from playing with fire and provoking war." The statement avoided any demand for immediate military retaliation and asserted only that North Korea's leaders "should receive due punishment for the crime they committed." The Seoul press, however, is continuing to call for immediate retaliation.

\* \* \* \*

Japanese Prime Minister Sato publicly censured Pyongyang in the Diet yesterday, stating that the North Korean action should be "internationally condemned." He noted that "all countries" engage in reconnaissance flights for the purpose of security, and he stipulated that such operations from Japanese

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bases did not require prior consultations under the security treaty. Sato, however, has expressed what is clearly the Japanese public's hope that the US will take a cautious attitude and that the incident will not develop into any further conflict. This hope has also been reflected in commentary by Foreign Minister Aichi, Japanese defense officials, and the news media. Sato also implied a concern that US retaliation might affect the progress of negotiations on the return of Okinawa to Japanese administration.

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