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DIRECTORATE OF
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
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NR Record

Korea: Pyongyang is showing frustration over its inability to win foreign support for its position on the shutdown. (Page 2)



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Korea: Pyongyang is showing increased frustration over its failure to obtain foreign support for its version of the incident of 15 April.



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Moscow's first editorial comment on the affair, contained in Pravda on 27 April, may have been a result of similar prodding. According to the US Embassy in Moscow, the article claimed that the "Soviet people" condemned the "dangerous actions" of the US in the area. This is the closest the Soviets have come to a clear endorsement of North Korean actions.

The article probably reflects Moscow's estimate that the most dangerous part of the US - North Korean confrontation is past, and that the likelihood of Soviet involvement has lessened accordingly. By stating that the US "must" stop its activities--

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particularly the concentration of forces in the Sea of Japan--the article also served to convey Moscow's uneasiness over a US task force operating relatively near the Soviet Union.

North Korea has made no public comment as yet on the dispersal of US naval units from the Sea of Japan.

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