



~~Top Secret~~

(b)(3)



DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Central Intelligence Bulletin



~~Top Secret~~

(b)(3)

T 39

17 April 1969


~~Top Secret~~

Background Use Only/Controlled Dissem

The *CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN* is produced by the Director of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providing current intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the President, the National Security Council, and other senior government officials. It is produced in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense. When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the department of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are produced by CIA and enclosed with brackets.

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete analysis.

Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.



(b)(3)

WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws U. S. Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794 and 798. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States. It is to be seen only by personnel especially indoctrinated and authorized to receive information in the designated control channels.

(b)(3)



GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

03

~~Top Secret~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

TCS No. 516/69
17 April 1969

Central Intelligence Bulletin

CONTENTS

[redacted]

NR Record

Korea: South Korean spokesmen have called for strong US retaliation for the shootdown; North Korean military activity is cautious and defensive. (Page 2)

[redacted]

NR Record

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

(b)(3)

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

Korea: The South Korean Government has thus far not taken an official position on the shutdown of a US reconnaissance aircraft by North Korea. Spokesmen for the government and opposition parties in South Korea, however, have called for the US to take strong retaliatory action to prevent more such incidents.

The incident is cited by some South Korean commentators as further evidence of South Korea's need for additional US military assistance. Underlying the South Korean reaction is concern over the US resolve to deal firmly with North Korean attacks.

Japanese Government spokesmen, citing lack of detailed information, have refrained from denouncing North Korea. Yesterday, Foreign Minister Aichi was put on the defensive in the Diet by the opposition with a heavy barrage of questions regarding the implications of the incident for Japan. The Socialists and Communists, stressing that the plane was from a US base in Japan, are exploiting popular fears that Japan might become embroiled in a Korean conflict. This line promotes the leftist campaign to scrap the US-Japan security treaty.

The Japanese press has developed the theme that an increase in tension in the area might dim prospects for an early return of Okinawa to Japanese administration.

* * * *

The Soviet Union, whose ships and aircraft have joined in the search for survivors, has used both US and North Korean press agency reports of the incident, but Soviet press commentary has supported the North Koreans.

Because Soviet ships were closest to the crash site, Moscow probably believed it had to help as long as there was the possibility of survivors. The Soviets may also believe their cooperation may help deter US retaliation, and relations with the US

17 Apr 69

Central Intelligence Bulletin

2

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

will thus not be endangered. Moscow may not mind if Pyongyang sees the cooperative search operations, in which the Soviets have recovered debris, as a tacit rebuke for its action against the US aircraft.

* * * *

[redacted]

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

North Korean military activity since the shoot-down has been cautious and defensive. [redacted]

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

[redacted]

UN Command forces along the Demilitarized Zone have been placed on full alert. A North Korean claim that US forces fired into the Demilitarized Zone on 15 April is unsubstantiated. [redacted]

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

[redacted]

17 Apr 69

Central Intelligence Bulletin

3

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

(b)(3)