



**Director of  
Central  
Intelligence**

**Top Secret**

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# National Intelligence Daily

**Wednesday  
3 October 1984**

**Top Secret**

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


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
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
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EL SALVADOR:

Military Situation

**Army operations in the north suggest that tactical coordination between ground and air units is improving, while the guerrillas reportedly continue to have problems.**



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Military attache reporting indicates that 2,000 to 2,500 troops currently are sweeping eastern Chalatenango.

air and artillery strikes against guerrilla concentrations are providing support to infantry units

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Insurgents in the west reportedly are concerned about the possible delay of a crucial arms shipment expected to cross Guatemala later this month. the guerrillas believe the shipment will include munitions, medicine, and money

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Meanwhile, lack of funds in the Guazapa area, in central El Salvador, reportedly forced one insurgent faction to suspend operations during August and September



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**Comment:** Much of the Army's success in recent months reflects closer coordination between infantry, artillery, and air units and better and more timely use of tactical intelligence. Recent command changes and a realignment of brigade boundaries also have resulted in more capable and aggressive field commanders taking charge of the key 4th and 5th Brigades.

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The Chalatenango campaign is the Army's first major operation in the area for many months. Previous reporting indicated that large numbers of insurgents were evacuating their strongholds in the region, probably to escape Army ground and air attacks, but also to begin operations farther to the west. Current government operations in the north, however, will complicate rebel efforts to train, resupply, and concentrate for large-scale attacks.

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Nevertheless, insurgent resupply continues. The guerrillas, despite their many problems, remain fully capable of striking hard at lucrative military and economic targets.



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**CENTRAL  
AMERICA:****Contadora Negotiations**

***The Core Four countries—Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador—have agreed that the proposed peace treaty needs further negotiation, but Contadora mediators are seeking support for it at the UN.*** [redacted]

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The Core Four Foreign Ministers have agreed that a new phase of negotiations should begin after 15 October, the deadline for their replies to the Contadora group. According to a US Embassy report, each government will send its comments separately. Costa Rica and Guatemala will address political issues, while Honduras and El Salvador will concentrate on security concerns. [redacted]

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The Costa Ricans believe that focusing on the unique concerns of each state will reinforce the political impact of the presentations. The Honduran and Salvadoran ministers have told US officials, however, that they are unhappy because they all want to share equally the burden of objecting to the draft. [redacted]

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The US Mission to the UN reports that Mexico and Nicaragua are urging the Security Council to meet this week to endorse the latest Contadora draft. The Panamanian Foreign Minister in his speech to the General Assembly urged other countries to promote the draft, while the Colombian Foreign Minister called on the Security Council to back the Contadora process. [redacted]

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Colombian President Betancur told the US Embassy that he disagrees with US objections to the draft but would consult his Contadora colleagues. He fears that Nicaragua will withdraw from the talks if more changes are made. [redacted]

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**Comment:** Managua's early acceptance of the draft treaty has given Nicaragua a propaganda victory and has put the onus on the Core Four. Although the Core Four will not be stampeded into signing the draft, continuing pressure by the mediators for a quick settlement will make it more difficult to revise the proposal. Moreover, their decision to submit their observations independently probably indicates some dissension. [redacted]

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An endorsement of the draft by a majority of the Security Council would be a substantial diplomatic victory for Managua. The Contadora mediators, however, probably will pursue a noncontroversial resolution that merely backs the Contadora process in order to avoid a possible US veto. [redacted]

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**EGYPT-  
NORTH YEMEN:**

**Renewing Relations**

***North Yemen may restore relations with Egypt***



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Cairo has acted to clarify its relations with the Arab states. The Egyptian People's Assembly voted yesterday to withdraw from the federation agreement of 1971 with Libya and Syria although it emphasized that this action does not imply any lessening of Cairo's commitment to Arab unity. President Mubarak said publicly that Cairo was merely acknowledging that the union does not exist except on paper.

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Mubarak warned "tenfold retaliation" against Libya if Tripoli carries out its rumored attack against the Aswan High Dam. He made clear that the Assembly action was not directed against Syria and expressed confidence that Egypt soon will have normal relations with all Arab states. He emphasized that restoration of relations with Cairo would not mean an endorsement of the Camp David accords nor would it mean that Cairo is canceling them.

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**Comment:** The North Yemenis probably see renewed ties with Egypt as a way to counterbalance relations with Saudi Arabia and to obtain help in maintaining their Soviet-supplied military equipment. North Yemen, the last Arab state to break relations with Egypt, upgraded relations last May by appointing a senior diplomat to head its Interests Section in Cairo.

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Mubarak had been planning for months to break the tripartite federation agreement of April 1971, which was signed but never enacted. He fully expects that other Arab states eventually will follow the precedent of Jordan and restore relations. Mubarak hopes to encourage them by making clear that acceptance of Camp David is not part of the package.

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**USSR-MOROCCO: Warming Relations**

The US Embassy in Rabat says a visiting Soviet trade delegation is receiving unusually prominent press coverage and attention from high-level Moroccan officials. The two sides reportedly signed protocols to revive both a previous trade agreement and a joint venture to develop Moroccan phosphate. Meanwhile, discussions are continuing on a broader oil supply arrangement and an agreement to increase trade. The USSR accounts for 4 percent of Rabat's foreign trade but supplies 20 percent of its oil. [redacted]

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**Comment:** Soviet trade delegations have made annual visits to Morocco for many years. King Hassan probably arranged the increased press attention this year to demonstrate his eagerness to address deteriorating social and economic conditions. He also wants to improve trade with Moscow, particularly the sale of phosphates—Morocco's primary export—because of the growing trade deficit with Moscow and the weak international market for phosphates. [redacted]

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**JORDAN: King's Gesture Toward Arabs**

King Hussein used his address at the opening of the Jordanian parliament on Monday as a response to Arab criticism of his decision to restore diplomatic relations with Egypt. He emphasized that Arab disarray was a major factor in Israel's ability to act with impunity and that a strong Arab front was needed to counter Tel Aviv. He cast doubt on Israeli willingness to negotiate, insisted that an exchange of land for peace be the basis of any talks, and repeated his charge that the US partiality toward Israel undercuts Washington's credibility as a mediator. [redacted]

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**Comment:** Hussein probably expects little help from Israel or the US in restoring momentum to the peace process. He may, however, hope to develop a united Arab front that could take the lead in peace diplomacy. Hussein also is worried Jordan's military weakness and what he sees as a lack of US support leave him vulnerable to Syrian intimidation. [redacted]

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**JAPAN: Pressures To Raise Defense Spending**

Pressures from within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, the Japanese Defense Agency, and Japanese industry, combined with encouragement from the US, are pushing the Liberal Democratic leaders to raise defense spending by redefining the present limit. Press reports, apparently leaked by senior party officials, indicate the ceiling may be changed from "below 1 percent" to "about 1 percent" of GNP, possibly as early as late October. [redacted] Japanese companies want the change in order to increase sales to the Defense Agency [redacted]

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**Comment:** Tokyo—facing political, business, and bureaucratic pressure—probably will revise the defense spending limit by early next spring. The Defense Agency needs more funding to meet procurement objectives. The Liberal Democrats already are trying to minimize the political repercussions of a revision by intimating that the limit will not exceed 1.5 percent of GNP [redacted]

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**YUGOSLAVIA: Measures Against Ethnic Albanians**

A proposed toughening of laws on ethnic intolerance will increase resistance among Albanian nationalists in Kosovo Province. Several changes would make national, religious, or racial intolerance a federal crime and would void property sales concluded under the threat of ethnic violence. Other new laws would overturn Kosovo's bilingual employment policy and limit the public use of the Albanian flag. [redacted]

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**Comment:** The new measures, now being considered by the legislature, are aimed at pacifying the Serbian and Montenegrin minorities in Kosovo, who increasingly are motivated to emigrate because of violence and discrimination. The draft measures reaffirm Belgrade's harsh stand against Albanian nationalists and will make tensions in Kosovo Province worse. Limits on the use of the Albanian flag, if pressed, could cause a new round of local defiance and new strains with neighboring Albania. [redacted]

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
**USSR-ANGOLA: Possible Soviet Disinformation**

Recent stories appearing in the West European press allege that Angolan Politburo member Kito Rodrigues and another senior Angolan official associated with negotiations with the West on Namibia are involved in a petroleum scandal. One story also claims CIA involvement. The Angolan Government has denounced the stories as false and says they were "launched by imperialism" and aimed at government figures negotiating with the West.




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**Comment:** The Angolan treatment of the story suggests that Luanda's criticism is directed at the Soviets. There is no information to confirm Soviet involvement, but the story may have been planted to discredit Rodrigues, whom the Soviets and Cubans regard as one of the architects of Angola's policy of compromise over Namibia.



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**WESTERN EUROPE: Delays in Satellite Launches**

Arianespace, the commercial operator of the Ariane space launch vehicle, has released a revised launch schedule listing only one more launch this year and a maximum of six next year. Two geosynchronous communications satellites are to be launched by an Ariane-3 on 9 November. The new Ariane schedule shows that one launch has been delayed from 1984 to 1985 and three launches from 1985 to 1986.

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**Comment:** Refurbishment of the launch pad between missions is taking longer than expected and is the primary reason for these slippages. The entire program probably will be delayed by at least six months unless Arianespace develops new launch procedures to reduce launch pad damage. If launch pad refurbishment continues to take three months or more rather than the planned two months, however, Arianespace could be at least a year behind schedule by the end of the decade. These delays would benefit the US commercial space-launch industry if US launch vehicles such as the Delta and Atlas-Centaur remain on schedule. Customers for satellite launches, facing revenue losses from the delays, would switch from Ariane to US launches.

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**USSR: Meat Production Up**

Published production figures for the first eight months of this year indicate that Soviet meat production increased 7.6 percent over the comparable period in 1983. The growth in meat output this year is due largely to a record harvest of forage crops last fall, a second consecutive mild winter which reduced the demand for feedstuffs, record livestock inventories, and near-peak grain imports.

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**Comment:** Meat production is almost certain to reach or slightly exceed government goals for the second consecutive year. Nearly three months remain in the year, and feedstuff availability and Soviet livestock management policies can still affect the final outcome. The Soviets could achieve a slight increase in consumer meat consumption if meat imports remain high, but they may choose instead to rebuild low meat inventories. The impact on meat production of this year's poor grain crop—now estimated at 180 million tons, 15 million tons below last year's estimated output—will be largely felt next year.

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


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**In Brief**




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**Middle East**


— **Soviet** television yesterday reported meeting between Chernenko and visiting **South Yemeni** President . . . suggests talks went smoothly . . . as expected, Moscow criticized **US** policy in Middle East, called for international peace conference and Indian Ocean zone of peace.



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


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### Special Analysis

#### NICARAGUA: Mixed Prospects for the Insurgents

***Anti-Sandinista guerrilla groups are becoming more unified both politically and militarily, but growing logistic problems cloud their future. Guerrillas based in the north have kept the regime on the defensive, but groups in the south currently are incapable of mounting a serious challenge. Meanwhile, the insurgents' increasing ties to the political opposition have improved the guerrillas' political legitimacy.*** [Redacted]

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The Nicaraguan Democratic Force and the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance brought the Miskito Indians of the Misura into their partnership in late August to form the Nicaraguan Democratic Unity. Several leaders traveled together to Europe last week, and the Democratic Force reportedly is sending food and military supplies to its smaller allies [Redacted]

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All of the insurgent groups supported the civil opposition's demands for a free election in an appeal to the meeting in San Jose last week of EC and Central American foreign ministers. Edan Pastora, who split from the Revolutionary Alliance in June in opposition to the insurgents' unity accord, also signed the document [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

#### Democratic Force Bearing the Burden

The Democratic Force, which claims to have over 10,000 men, has engaged in heavy fighting in the northwest and appears to be inflicting many more casualties than it is losing. After a lull of several months, the insurgents renewed air attacks with a raid on Santa Clara on 1 September. [Redacted]

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small numbers of militia members and grantees continue to desert to the insurgents. [Redacted]

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The guerrillas reportedly are suffering severe shortages of ammunition for support weapons, which are causing them to avoid head-on clashes. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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**Reduced Operations on Caribbean Coast**

The Misura, which reportedly carried out numerous successful attacks in late August and September, still appears to dominate the countryside in the northeast. The Misura reportedly depends on the Democratic Force for supplies, however, and [redacted] some Indian bases have had no food for days. The troop strength of Misura reportedly has dropped from over 2,000 to some 1,100 since the beginning of the year, probably because some groups have been disbanded for lack of supplies as well as from some desertions. [redacted]

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Robelo's Democratic Revolutionary Alliance reportedly had only some 300 men along the Costa Rican border in early August and has not conducted many operations. Several of Pastora's dissatisfied commanders reportedly have expressed interest in joining Robelo, who hopes the Alliance might grow as a result of defections from Pastora [redacted]

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Pastora's forces, nonetheless, probably number more than 2,000 and have conducted sporadic raids in the south. Their Miskito allies—estimated at less than 1,000—have been active along the coast near Bluefields [redacted]

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[redacted] According to the US Embassy, the Sandinistas recently sent an emissary to Pastora in an apparent attempt to exploit the deterioration of his position. [redacted]

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**Prospects**

The Democratic Force and the Misura probably can continue their current pace for several months and are likely to retain the initiative. Some Sandinista tactics, such as indiscriminate shellings, probably will continue to cause Nicaraguans to join the guerrillas [redacted]

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The insurgents' increasing contacts with the political opposition are reflected in the San Jose declaration and in their offer of a cease-fire if the regime would conduct free elections. A demand by the civil opposition that the insurgents be included in a national dialogue increased the insurgents' hopes for political recognition, even though the demand subsequently was dropped to offset Sandinista electoral concessions. It probably will be renewed after the election [redacted]

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


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**Special Analysis**

**TURKEY:**


**Resurgent Terrorism**

***A new outbreak of terrorist activity throughout Turkey is the latest evidence that the military and civilian governments in power since the coup of 1980 have not eradicated extremist violence. Despite nearly six years of martial law, the longest and toughest state of siege in the Republic's history, many of the militant groups responsible for the chaos of the late 1970s remain intact. Security forces probably can avert a major threat to public order, but violence is likely to be a continuing feature of Turkish life until the social and economic factors contributing to terrorism are eased*** 

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The transition to civilian rule, following the election last November of the government headed by Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, has taken place under fairly calm conditions. Recent attacks by Turkish leftists and Kurdish separatists, however, mark the strongest challenge to public order since 1980. They indicate that terrorist groups still pose a serious threat. 

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Kurds in southeastern Turkey launched simultaneous raids on several government outposts in mid-August. The attacks were unprecedented in timing and scope 


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
In mid-September, a Marxist group called Dev-Sol claimed responsibility for several bombing incidents in Istanbul. 

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**Ankara's Ability To Cope**

Ozal agrees with President Evren and senior military officers on the need for stronger measures to counter terrorism. Ozal and Evren apparently intend to move slowly in reducing martial law, which still exists in 41 of Turkey's 67 provinces. The government has at its disposal several laws passed by the former military government, including "state of emergency" powers for provincial governors to use in an intermediate stage between military and civilian rule. 

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The resilience of Turkey's 25 or so active militant groups derives in part from their fragmentation. Terrorist groups are prone to factionalism and shifting leadership. They are often small and dedicated to violent action rather than development of a broad base of support. 

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
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
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These characteristics multiply the problems of the security forces. Senior police officials reportedly are pessimistic about their ability to eradicate clandestine groups despite having more funds for equipment and training. 


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Turkey's extremists appear to have little difficulty recruiting followers because of the country's acute social and economic problems. These include endemic unemployment, one of the highest rates of population growth and urban migration in the world, land distribution and income inequities, an outdated educational system, and festering ethnic and sectarian tensions 

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
In addition, a majority of the country's convicted terrorists will be released within the next few years. Most probably remain strongly committed to radical causes. 

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Even though terrorism is mainly indigenous, the government also must deal with some foreign subversion. Officials reportedly are increasingly concerned about foreign support for Turkish and Kurdish militants, particularly by Syria. Another phenomenon, too, is the use of Turkish soil by Middle Eastern neighbors to attack each other and Western enemies 

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### Outlook

A gradual increase of terrorism is likely during the next year or so, but short of levels that would threaten political stability. The authorities may adopt more stringent policies that risk slowing Turkey's democratic development. Tougher police or military action alone will not solve the problem because the social and economic conditions that caused violence in the first place still exist. Ozal's economic reforms—if they take hold—will help ameliorate these conditions, but he will need to go further in order to solve the problem of extremism over the long term. 

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Extremists almost certainly view the US as the key supporter of the coup of 1980 and of the military regime. Even a modest revival of terrorism will lead to new threats to US servicemen and facilities in Turkey. According to the US Embassy, the Turkish police claim to have information that militants may be planning attacks   


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**Special Analysis****ZIMBABWE:****Mugabe Consolidating Control**

***Prime Minister Mugabe's strong criticism of US policy on southern Africa and charges of US collusion with Pretoria reflect increased self-confidence but do not presage basic policy changes.*** [redacted]

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Mugabe consolidated his control over the party at the second congress of the Zimbabwe African National Union in August. He appointed all of the members of a new Politburo that essentially runs the party and the government. Half the members are from Mugabe's subtribe of the country's Shona-speaking majority, which has long dominated the party [redacted]

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The biggest loser was the largest Shona-speaking subtribe, which had held a third of the positions in the old Central Committee [redacted]

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**Prospects**

If Mugabe emerges as the consensus candidate for the OAU chairmanship in November, which now appears increasingly likely, he may become a bolder and more independent critic of the US [redacted]

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He will remain committed to socialist goals. He most likely will continue, however, to let the realities of the Zimbabwean economy constrain radical ideologues [redacted]

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The Prime Minister is likely to press for a one-party state and an executive presidency, probably after elections early next year. He is unlikely to get the necessary unanimous approval of Parliament, however, because 20 seats are reserved for whites until at least 1987. [redacted]

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Mugabe's commitment to a one-party state and to a "socialist transformation" could cause instability in Zimbabwe by aggravating relations with the country's Ndebele and white minorities and with South Africa. Nevertheless, some whites profess a new confidence because they believe that a cohesive party can deal with unrest and that realists remain in control [redacted]

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
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