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## **National Intelligence Daily**

Saturday 13 March 1982

<del>Top Secret</del>

CO NID 82-060JX

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I El Salvador: Status of Gover	nment Offensive	1	
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


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	EL SALVADOR: Status of Government Offensive	_
	The large-scale Army operation launched early this week in	
8	central El Salvador has encountered only light resistance.	(b)(1)
Ý	The leader of one of El Salvador's major rightist parties has offered a plan for defeating the insurgents and fostering economic recovery.	(b)(3)
	The Salvadoran military has begun another operation	
1,	in the west near Santa Ana against an insurgent base area  Meanwhile,	(b)(1)
Y V	the guerrillas have destroyed the bridge over the Torola River in northern Morazan Department. As a result, much	
73	of the sparsely populated area near the <u>Honduran</u> border is isolated from the regional capital.	/b\/Q\
_	Comment: Other new Army campaigns also are likely	(b)(3)
_	against guerrilla base areas as the elections approach.	
9	As the destruction of the bridge in Morazan demonstrates, however, the insurgents can still score successes in	(1.)(2)
•	hit-and-run raids. Establishing polling places in northern Morazan will now be difficult.	(b)(3)
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26	2	
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	Rightist Plan	
7	Ultraconservative leader Roberto D'Aubuisson has informed US officials that he would immediately impose a "state of war" if his National Republican Alliance wins a majority in the elections. He contends that this	
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	would facilitate increased military action insurgents. He also would institute univertion.	against the rsal conscrip-	(b)(3)
7	In addition, D'Aubuisson indicated the grant unconditional amnesty to all guerril gested that the US assist by offering temporate devocated confiscation of property below immediate families of proved insurgents uncooperate with the government.	las and sug- orary asylum. nging to the	(b)(3
7	D'Aubuisson believes economic recovery tied to a "free market" policy designed to greater private sector investment and produ noted that he would make additional low-in- available to businesses.	encourage uction. He	(b)(3)
/	Comment: A government headed by D'Auk further polarize the country, force some polarize into hiding or exile, and almost cer international backers. He would ultimately guerrilla challenge more openly supported by governments.	olitical mod- ctainly alienate	(b)(3)
1	Prospects for economic improvement will until foreign and domestic lenders and invector convinced that the insurgency is no longer that the political situation has stabilized proposed increases in low-interest credit when the terms of a recent agreement between Sarthe IMF, jeopardizing a key three-year aid totaling \$300 million for 1983-85.	estors become a threat and d. D'Aubuisson' vould violate n Salvador and	s (b)(3)

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


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
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
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
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