



**Director of
Central
Intelligence**

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National Intelligence Daily

*Monday
2 March 1981*

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
Intelligence Sources
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Contents

Situation Report

El Salvador 1



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SITUATION REPORT


EL SALVADOR

The lull in sustained guerrilla military operations continues, but the insurgents are inflicting heavy damage to the economy and they remain capable of launching an offensive in the coming months.



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The diminished level of guerrilla operations is attributable to several factors. Some units reportedly are suffering spot shortages of arms and ammunition, suggesting problems in supply distribution and a possible temporary slowdown in arms deliveries from abroad. The guerrillas also lack medicines, clothing, food, and other supplies and apparently are having difficulty recruiting new personnel.



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Despite these problems, guerrilla hit-and-run attacks on the electrical power system in recent weeks have caused a virtual total blackout of the eastern half of the country. Some 65 electrical towers have been destroyed or damaged since the first of the year.




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The guerrillas remain strong in Chalatenango department, where they hold several small villages as well as some larger, abandoned towns. The Salvadoran military has only 250 permanently garrisoned, combat-ready troops to counter heavily fortified insurgent strongholds in the area. Low troop morale worsened by almost constant contact with the guerrillas is affecting the military's ability to conduct offensive actions.



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the guerrillas have enough weapons to sustain a higher level of activity. Guerrilla casualties during the January offensive--perhaps 400 to 500 full-time cadre killed--have not crippled the estimated 4,000-man insurgent force.

[Redacted]

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Military's Views on Negotiations

[Redacted]

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most officers oppose negotiations between the junta and leftist opposition leaders. Junior officers are particularly strident about what they perceive as ill-conceived efforts by Christian Democrats to seek political accommodation with spokesmen of the Revolutionary Democratic Front. [Redacted]

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Hardline rightists in the military are attempting to turn the recent arrest of former junta member Colonel Majano into a test of the military's willingness to deal harshly with those few officers still disposed to compromise with the opposition. [Redacted]

[Redacted] that they are opposed to General Torrijos' efforts to foster negotiations. The officers said the Salvadoran military generally views Torrijos as an ally of Cuba and the insurgents.

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
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








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



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








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