




Director of Central Intelligence

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*National
Intelligence
Daily*

CIA/CAS - WED 96-2208

Thursday, 19 September 1996



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
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


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
SOUTH KOREA: Reaction to Infiltration Attempt

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
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North Korean Submarine Infiltration, 16-18 September 1996

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[Redacted]

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Developments

SOUTH KOREA: Reaction to Infiltration Attempt

[Redacted]

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South Korean officials are talking tough after a North Korean submarine ran aground on the east coast yesterday. The director of operations at the Joint Chiefs of Staff called the incident a grave provocation, and a Unification Ministry statement said it was a direct threat to Seoul's security, according to press reports.

— *The rhetoric probably is meant to preempt domestic pressure for a stronger response and avoid creating new obstacles to dialogue with P'yongyang.* A midlevel Foreign Ministry official [Redacted]

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[Redacted] that Seoul wants to "minimize" the impact on "already bad" North-South relations. [Redacted]

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South Korean leaders probably would be forced to take a harder line if there were violent clashes between infiltrators and security forces or revelations that P'yongyang was targeting South Korean leaders.

— The last detected infiltration involved two agents infiltrating by sea in late October. The media afterward sharply criticized President Kim Yong-sam for his efforts to improve relations with P'yongyang, and the incident coalesced public opposition to provision of additional food assistance to North Korea. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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