

Director of Central Intelligence

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NORTH KOREA:	Public Relations Offensive Over Incursion	- 1	(b)(3)
	P'yongyang's international wireservice yesterd statement accusing the South of killing "unarme" in cold blood" after their submarine ran agroun mission." The North repeated its demand that Se submarine, survivors, and bodies of those killed	ed" North Korean soldiers ad during a "routine training eoul immediately return the	
	 North Korean leaders accused Seoul of a "accident" peacefully and warned that ' retaliate a hundredfold or a thousan 	"we have the right to	
	 Press reports say South Korean officials five remaining North Korean infiltrator 		(b)(3)
	North Korean Army representatives at P'anmur the same message during a meeting on Thursday UN command. The North Koreans called on "th submarine and crew, warning that the North wo "decisive measures" if the demand was rejected	with representatives of the ne US side" to repatriate the ould take unspecified	(b)(3)
	P'yongyang probably is combining aggressive threats in an effort to dissuade Seoul and Was Security Council condemnation of the armed i probably also reflects concern that internation other economic aid will dry up if Seoul's account and the second and the second and the second are second as a second and the second are second as a second and the second are second as a second and second as a second are second as a second as a second are second as a second are second as a second as a second are second as a second are second as a second as a second are second as a second are second as a second as a second are second as a second as a second are second as a second as a second as a second are second as a second are second as a second as a second are seco	hington from seeking UN incursion. The campaign aal relief donations and	
	— In addition, the Army's threat to take ' intended in part to divide <u>Washington o</u> responses to the incident.		(b)(3)

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