


PCB

~~TOP SECRET~~

(b)(3)



The National Intelligence Daily

Published by the Director of Central Intelligence for Named Principals Only

Copy No. **169**

SATURDAY OCTOBER 12, 1974

VOLUME I, NUMBER 233

TCS 668/74

NR Record

~~TOP SECRET~~

(b)(3)

An Assessment of the Prospects for Guerrilla Warfare on Cyprus

Greek and Greek Cypriot leaders continue to talk of beginning a guerrilla campaign if a reasonable settlement is not reached with the Turks. The prospects for such a campaign are examined in the following article. The Greek Cypriots, out of frustration, may undertake guerrilla warfare, but we believe several obstacles make it unlikely that they could manage a sustained campaign.

by [redacted]


There are three major political-military groups on Cyprus capable of conducting guerrilla or terrorist operations against the Turks.

The EOKA-B is a right-wing terrorist organization dedicated to enosis. This group can count on the support of rightist Greek Cypriots, but would not have the backing of the Clerides government or of leftists on the island. Moreover, EOKA-B has been weakened by the Karamanlis government's formal repudiation of enosis.

Leftist forces consist of the non-communist EDEK and the communist AKEL organizations. Both groups probably would be inclined to go it alone in mounting insurgency operations, in hopes of stealing a march on their rivals. Although their participation in a united front against the Turks cannot be ruled out, neither of these groups would be likely to receive support from the EOKA-B or from mainland Greek officials.

The group best prepared to mount a prolonged guerrilla campaign against the Turks is the Greek Cypriot national guard. The guard sustained heavy losses in last summer's fighting and its morale is poor, but it is relatively well equipped and well disciplined. With support from Athens, it could serve as the nucleus of a broad-based guerrilla effort. Some EOKA-B militia men reportedly have been already integrated into the guard.

Cyprus' relatively long distance from Greece would hinder Greek support for a



guerrilla campaign involving large units. The 350-mile supply route from Greece is vulnerable to Turkish interdiction by air and sea. The island's small size, its proximity to the Turkish mainland, and absolute Turkish superiority in the air would make it easy for the Turks to blockade Cyprus.

The division of Cyprus along either the first or second Attila lines would hamper Greek abilities to infiltrate guerrillas or terrorists into Turkish territory. Except for a wooded area on the northwest coast, both lines extend through a wide belt of open, cultivated fields, thus facilitating Turkish monitoring of personnel movements.

Resources

The supply of arms, ammunition, and demolition equipment from many years of fighting on Cyprus is sufficient to support sporadic Greek raids and terror campaigns. Although the Greek Cypriot national guard lost most of its tanks and much of its artillery in the fighting last July and August, a few antitank and anti-aircraft weapons have been acquired from Greece.

Ankara is concerned about the

possibility of guerrilla warfare on Cyprus. Turkey's already overwhelming military strength on Cyprus has been augmented by the addition of several battalions of troops specifically trained for population control and antiguerrilla operations.

Another advantage for the Turks is the fact that the population of Turkish-occupied areas consists mainly of Turkish Cypriots, who would resist bitterly any Greek guerrilla activity. Turkish authorities are maintaining tight controls over the movement of people throughout the occupied area. Greek refugees who have been allowed to return to their homes have been rigorously screened. Few male Greek Cypriots of military age have been permitted to return to their villages in the north.

Political

The Greek Cypriot factions are badly divided. An appeal by either rightist or leftist groups for a united guerrilla campaign is unlikely to win general Greek Cypriot support. Only the Athens government, working through the Greek Cypriot government and the Greek Cypriot guard, offers any real hope of uniting the Greek community behind a course of action.

A guerrilla campaign directed from Athens would present several dangers for Greeks and Greek Cypriots:

- A Greek-sponsored insurgency effort might goad the Turks into seizing the entire island. Militarily, the Greek Cypriots could not expect to expel the Turkish forces or even to prevent another Turkish advance.

- The Greek islands in the Aegean, already in a precarious position, would face increased danger of Turkish attack. A Greek-sponsored guerrilla war on Cyprus might provide Ankara with a rationale for seizing such coastal islands as Limnos and Lesbos, both of which are in the area of the disputed Aegean oil concessions.

- Prompted by Ankara, the Turkish population in Greek Thrace could start its own sabotage activities.

Outside Support

The Greek Cypriots could expect little outside support for a guerrilla struggle, even though international public opinion would probably be sympathetic to their cause. There is limited contact between EDEK and a few Arab governments, but the Arab states and the various Palestinian organizations probably would be reluctant to support the Greeks because of the risk of offending their fellow Muslims, the Turks.

Were Greek Cypriots to begin a guerrilla war, the prospects for a successful campaign would be poor. It is unlikely that any of the various groups capable of conducting such operations would adequately support one another.

The dangers of Turkish retaliation on Cyprus or in the Aegean Sea are so great as to deter unrestrained Greek support. The geopolitical and demographic situation on the island, the limited military resources available to Greek Cypriot forces, and the overriding threat of massive Turkish retaliation weigh heavily against anything other than small-scale harassment efforts against Turkish forces.

(b)(3)
(b)(6)

(b)(3)

