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Intelligence Information Cable

● ROUTINE

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WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

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STATE/INR JCS/MC (DIA) CIA/NMCC SWS NSA TREAS NSC/S SDO NIO CRS

WH/SITRM FBI

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CITE [redacted] (b)(3)

DIST 24 MARCH 1977

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INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE

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TO FOREIGN NATIONALS-- [redacted]

[redacted]

M

COUNTRY: ARGENTINA/NORTH KOREA

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

DOI : [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

SUBJECT: MORE INTENSE INVESTIGATION OF POSSIBLE ILLEGAL

ACTIVITIES OF THE NORTH KOREAN EMBASSY IN

ARGENTINA

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

ACQ : [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

SOURCE : [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

1. [redacted] THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTRY

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

WAS INSTRUCTED TO SEND A FORMAL, WRITTEN REQUEST TO THE

STATE INTELLIGENCE SECRETARIAT (SIDE) URGING A MORE INTENSE

INVESTIGATION OF POSSIBLE ILLEGAL OR IMPROPER ACTIVITIES OF

NORTH KOREAN OFFICIALS IN ARGENTINA. A DRAFT REPORT HAS

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SUBSEQUENTLY BEEN PREPARED FOR THE APPROVAL OF NAVY CAPTAIN
GUALTER A L L A R A, SUBSECRETARY OF FOREIGN RELATIONS,
WHICH SUGGESTS THE FOLLOWING OPERATIONS SIDE MIGHT UNDERTAKE
IN THIS REGARD.

- A. SURVEIL THE MOVEMENTS OF NORTH KOREAN
DIPLOMATS IN ARGENTINA, BOTH IN THE FEDERAL CAPITAL AS
WELL AS IN THE INTERIOR.
- B. INVESTIGATE WHETHER MEMBERS OF THE NORTH
KOREAN MISSION MAINTAIN OR HAVE MAINTAINED CONTACTS WITH
ARGENTINE LEFTIST SUBVERSIVES OR HAVE HELPED FINANCE
LOCAL SUBVERSIVE GROUPS.
- C. DETERMINE WHETHER THE NORTH KOREAN EMBASSY
IS OR HAS BEEN UTILIZED AS A RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING
CENTER FOR LOCAL TERRORISTS.
- D. DETERMINE WHETHER BOTH THE ITEMS BROUGHT
INTO ARGENTINA BY NORTH KOREAN OFFICIALS AND THE NUMBER
OF THESE ITEMS WOULD NORMALLY BE NEEDED BY THE NORTH
KOREAN REPRESENTATION.
- E. INVESTIGATE WHETHER THE ARTICLES BROUGHT
INTO ARGENTINA DUTY FREE WERE SUBSEQUENTLY SOLD ILLEGALLY

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ON THE LOCAL MARKET, E.G., LIQUOR, CIGARETTES, CIGARS, ETC.

F. ASCERTAIN WHETHER ANY NORTH KOREAN DIPLOMAT MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN PURCHASING LARGE QUANTITIES OF ARGENTINE PRODUCTS TO SEND TO ANOTHER DIPLOMATIC MISSION IN NORTH KOREA.

G. DETERMINE WHETHER THE NORTH KOREAN EMBASSY IS UTILIZING ITS DIPLOMATIC CHANNEL TO BRING IN PROPAGANDA MATERIAL OR WHETHER THE EMBASSY ITSELF MAY BE PRINTING SUCH MATERIAL.

H. INVESTIGATE WHETHER THE NORTH KOREAN MISSION HAS DISTRIBUTED BOOKS, MAGAZINES OR OTHER PUBLICATIONS LOCALLY, PARTICULARLY WITHIN ACADEMIC AND CULTURAL CENTERS. THERE IS PARTICULAR INTEREST IN DETERMINING WHETHER THE NORTH KOREANS HAVE DISTRIBUTED IN ARGENTINA THE "MANUAL OF GUERRILLA TACTICS" BY KIM IL SUNG AND THE NORTH KOREAN MAGAZINE "KOREAN NEWS".

I. PERIODICALLY CHECK THE NUMBER OF PIECES OF HAND LUGGAGE AND PACKAGES OF NORTH KOREAN OFFICIALS BOTH WHEN THEY ENTER AND LEAVE ARGENTINA.

J. NOTE THE ATTITUDE ASSUMED BY NORTH KOREAN

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DIPLOMATS SHOULD THEY BECOME INVOLVED IN TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS.

K. IN GENERAL, DETERMINE ANY TYPE OF ACTIVITY WHICH MIGHT BE CONSIDERED ILLEGAL OR OUTSIDE THE NORMS OF APPROPRIATE DIPLOMATIC BEHAVIOR.

2. [Redacted] COMMENT: IT IS UNKNOWN WHO REQUESTED THE FOREIGN MINISTRY TO SEND THE REPORT TO SIDE URGING A MORE INTENSIVE INVESTIGATION OF THE NORTH KOREANS. IT MAY WELL HAVE BEEN PROMPTED BY ADMIRAL EMILIO MASSERA, COMMANDER OF THE NAVY AND A JUNTA MEMBER, WHO IS KNOWN TO FAVOR A BREAK IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH NORTH KOREA AND WHO MAY BE LOOKING FOR A SOLID REASON TO EITHER BREAK RELATIONS OR TAKE SOME OTHER ACTION AGAINST THE LOCAL NORTH KOREAN MISSION.) [Redacted] COMMENT: [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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(b)(3)

[Redacted] NOTED THAT MASSERA AND THE NAVY FAVORED A BREAK IN RELATIONS.)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

3. [Redacted] DISSEM: EMBASSY, DEFAT, FBI AT BUENOS AIRES: SENT TO CINCSO, CINCLANT, [Redacted]

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