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75-2009

23 April 1975

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

David Belin tells me that you are not scheduled for another appearance with the Commission after Monday, the 28th.

You will be asked questions along the line of your depositions.

You will be asked about the assassination business and you will almost certainly be asked by some of the Commissioners for your views on counterintelligence and the "Angleton RIF."

Since this is the last scheduled appearance for you, you will want to take the opportunity to re-cap whatever recommendations you will want to make.

Some ideas for your recommendations follow:

- a. Improved external controls
 - Joint Committee
 - Enhanced PFIAB (auditing function, plus an annual issuance on the state of intelligence)
 - An annual DCI report to the President, perhaps unclassified
 - Perhaps GAO auditing (under security controls, but in a manner that makes CIA less exclusive)
- b. New legislation
 - foreign intelligence
 - sources and methods
- c. Improvement in defining CIA-FBI territory. (NSCID #9)
- d. Welcome Commission views on adequacy of internal controls. Ours are based on '73-'74 directives, regulations, chain of command, OGC and IG. Always room for improvement, but help us avoid concentrating so heavily on what must not be done that we lose effectiveness in doing what we must do.

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
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- e. Help define what is essential about intelligence. To us, it is vital that our policy-makers plan and act on basis of knowledge and informed judgement. And it is vital to have the capability to mount appropriate covert action when diplomacy lags or war seems an alternative.
- f. Do not foreclose our ability to collect against foreign targets in the U.S. This, if anything, should be expandible. (Even more delicate issues are looming, e.g., what is permissible for US intelligence in following the activities and impact of multinational corporations?)
- g. Define guidelines, develop philosophy and set limits to intelligence activities, but avoid concentrating on structural changes in CIA and the Community. Let such changes evolve from the nature of your recommendations.
- h. Aware of vividness of the Watergate experience and the desire to curb Executive excesses, but do not dilute Presidential control of DCI and CIA. Creating controls that make DCI and CIA more independent is not the answer.



E.H.Knoche



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