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United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

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November 7, 1975

The Honorable  
William E. Colby  
Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Colby:

During your testimony before the Select Committee last Friday on CIA paramilitary activities, you indicated the Agency would answer additional questions from the Committee on this subject. These questions are attached.


You also indicated that the Agency would forward a complete record of discussions of [redacted] forces in Laos with Members of Congress including times, places, and summaries of what was discussed.

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

A response by Friday, November 14, would be appreciated.

With kind regards,

Sincerely,



Frank Church  
Chairman

Attachment

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TS-204012

via copy #1

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QUESTIONS FOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REGARDING  
PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES

Indonesia

1. What roles, specifically, did individual leaders of the 1957-1958 outer island dissidence play in the political upheavals of 1965-1966?
2. What were the principal patterns--and the pace--of Sukarno's relations with the PKI, Russia and China, following the 1957-1958 outer island rebellion, and how did these compare with the patterns and the pace of such pre-1957-1958 events?
3. CIA documents made available to the Committee indicate that in July 1959, General John E. Hull, who was then the Chairman of the President's Board of Intelligence Advisors, gave the DCI a post-mortem paper which criticized the [redacted] for having been based on faulty military command structures and procedures. Would you please comment on Gen. Hull's criticisms. (b)(1)  
(b)(3)
4. Would you please inform us what the pattern and content were of CIA meetings with Congressional and Executive oversight in the Indonesian case.

The Congo

1. How did U.S. policy makers perceive the threat to U.S. interests posed by political and military instability in the Congo from 1960 to 1968?
2. In planning [redacted] in the Congo, did the CIA differentiate between internal rebellion and rebellion supported externally by the USSR and the Communist bloc? (b)(1)  
(b)(3)
3. At the time CIA began funding various moderate Congolese politicians in 1960, did senior U.S. policy makers and/or the CIA foresee the need for additional assistance?

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4. When CIA Headquarters and State Department authorized [redacted] in November 1962 to fly unarmed Congo aircraft in support of the Central Government, did they consider or foresee an eventual combat role for these pilots?

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(b)(3)

5. At what point did U.S. covert action in the Congo shift from psychological activities to major combat operations? Was the change effected by the December 1962 [redacted] and therefore precede the outbreak of rebellion in 1964?

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

Issue: Command and Control of CIA's Covert Actions in the Congo

6. Air Operations: In June 1964, [redacted] in opposition to U.S. policy. Some [redacted] indicate that Ambassador Godley gave the order; others cite Col. Dodds. [redacted] has testified that it is inconceivable that either Godley or Dodds ordered these officers to fly missions without instructions from Washington.

(b)(1)  
(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

Question: How and why did this breach of U.S. policy occur?

7. Maritime Operations: In March and April 1965 the U.S. provided equipment and personnel for [redacted]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

[redacted] was formally changed to include this maritime activity and 303 approval was given.

Question: Was there a specific 303 decision authorizing CIA's maritime program prior to September 1965? If not, by what authority did CIA [redacted]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

Angola

1. Was the CIA the dissenting voice in the "non-unanimous" decisions on Angola? If so, why?

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2. Given that other so-called "Marxists" regimes in Africa pose no "national security" threat to the U.S., why is the political complexion in Angola regarded as important to our national security?

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(b)(3)

Laos

Thai nationals were involved in paramilitary operations in Laos from 1960 onward, in three principal ways:

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

--as members of regular RTG military units;  
e.g. artillery and infantry battalions;

--as "volunteers" making up guerrilla formations fighting as units.

With respect to each of these groups (and any other category of Thai involvement in Laos), please describe:

1. Numbers of personnel involved and pay and allowance costs annually, commencing in 1960;
2. The relationship of the Thai nationals to the Thai government, the Lao government and the CIA, before and after their entry into Laos, including arrangements for their command and control, pay and allowances, future employment rights and eligibility for veterans benefits.
3. Dates of briefings provided members of Congress on Thai involvement and scope of information provided. The list of briefings provided to the Committee suggests that no Congressional Committee was informed of the Thai irregular program before April 5, 1972, nearly two years after the program began. CIA documents provided the Committee indicate that Senator Symington,

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visiting Laos, raised the issue of "U.S./ Thai involvement in Laos" in September 1970. In view of your contention that this constituted consultation on the Lao irregular program, please provide all Agency cables reporting on the visit in any way.

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