

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

BYE 111589-75

Copy 3 of 7

2 Sept 1975

The Honorable Otis G. Pike
Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence
2428 Rayburn Building
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Pike:

During my testimony before your Committee on 4 August 1975, I was asked to provide more detailed information on the organization of the Intelligence Community. The Committee was particularly interested in advisory boards and committees, titles of key officials, flow lines of command and coordination, and a narrative that will permit better understanding of the Community organization. I was also asked to expand on intelligence-related activities.

Attached is my response which I hope you will find helpful.

Respectfully,

W. E. Colby

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Attachment


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
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US FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

(Organization and Structure)

August 1975
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U. S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
(Organization and Structure)

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US FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
(Organization and Structure)

INTRODUCTION

The *Community* includes several national and departmental organizations assigned by law or national-level directive to collect and produce sensitive information relating to the foreign environment in support of decisionmakers on matters of US foreign policy and military defense. They include:

- Central Intelligence Agency
- Department of Defense
 - Defense Intelligence Agency
 - National Security Agency
 - Intelligence Branches of the Army, Navy, and Air Force
- State Department/Bureau of Intelligence and Research
- Treasury Department
- Federal Bureau of Investigation
- Energy Research and Development Administration

In serving jointly the requirements for foreign intelligence at both the national policy level and departmental level, the resources and efforts of the CIA, State INR, and Defense organizations collectively represent what is referred to as the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP). Because only a very minor portion of their resources are used abroad, the FBI, Treasury, and ERDA are considered members of the Community, but do not have resources reflected in the NFIP. In addition, other US government intelligence-related activities contribute frequently and significantly to the total foreign intelligence effort. Among these are general reporting from embassies abroad and intelligence activities that are integral to the US military force structure ("tactical intelligence").

The Community and its National Foreign Intelligence Program reflect the basic concept for intelligence contained in the National Security Act of 1947 which ...

- established the CIA under the National Security Council to advise the Council concerning foreign intelligence activities of other US departments and agencies, to recommend

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to the Council the coordination of US intelligence activities, and to perform services of common concern centrally.

The Act provides, however, that other departments and agencies continue their individual collection, evaluation, correlation, and dissemination of intelligence that serve the specific operational needs of each department. The Act provides also for their coordination and collaboration with the CIA toward best service to the National Security Council.

Summary statements of mission and functions of each component within the Intelligence Community are at Tab A of this document.

The *National Foreign Intelligence Program* consists of the following individual, special purpose efforts centered jointly on national intelligence requirements.

Central Intelligence Agency Program (CIAP)
State/Bureau of Intelligence and Research (State INR)
Defense:

General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP)
Special Reconnaissance Vehicles (SRV)
Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP)
Advanced Program Support (APS)
National Reconnaissance Program (NRO)
Special Systems (Navy)

Descriptions of programs are at Tab B.

LEADERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, AND GUIDANCE

Leadership of the Intelligence Community is charged by the President to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) who serves also as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The DCI is specifically instructed by Presidential Memorandum, 5 November 1971--reaffirmed by President Ford, October 9, 1974--to: (See Tab C.)

- assume leadership of the Intelligence Community;
- improve the intelligence product; and
- review all intelligence activities and recommend the appropriate allocation of resources.


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In his leadership role for the Community, the DCI's direct authority for resource allocation and application includes the CIA only. However, as the recognized authority on national substantive intelligence issues and as Chairman of several of the senior deliberative bodies on matters of intelligence, the DCI influences more than anyone, the shape and direction of US foreign intelligence. Guided by the President, the National Security Council (and its committees), and the Office of Management and Budget on matters of national policy, the DCI leads the US intelligence effort with the assistance of several instrumentalities--boards, committees, staffs, and guidance documents. These instrumentalities are designed to facilitate his management role for substantive intelligence accomplishment and resource responsibility.

Figure 1

National Foreign Intelligence Community Structure



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Substantive Intelligence:

United States Intelligence Board (USIB). Chaired by the DCI, the Board advises him on all matters of substantive intelligence. The Board meets on a weekly basis (more than 700 meetings to date) and assists him in the production of national intelligence, establishing requirements and setting priorities, supervising dissemination and security of intelligence, and in his protection of intelligence sources and methods. The Board is in turn, supported by 12 subordinate committees organized along functional lines (e.g., signals intelligence, overhead (aircraft and satellite) photoimagery, guided missiles and astronautic intelligence, economic intelligence, and others). Additional information on the USIB is at Tab D.

National Intelligence Officers. This is a staff (established in October 1973) of senior intelligence experts to replace the former Board of National Estimates. Each National Intelligence Officer is assigned a geographic or functional area of intelligence responsibility. The NIO office is headed by a Deputy to the DCI for NIOs. The NIOs provide continuous expertise to the DCI and ensure that the Community is doing everything possible to meet the needs of national intelligence consumers. The primary task of NIOs is to stimulate intelligence production. Together, they develop and formulate key questions to be answered by the Intelligence Community. They develop and review intelligence collection and production strategies, ensure that intelligence production is responsive to customer needs, and they play a significant role in evaluating Intelligence Community performance against objectives. NIO personnel are listed at Tab E.

Intelligence Resource Management:

Intelligence Community Staff (ICS). This staff, headed by a military officer of three-star rank (Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community) was established in 1972 as a replacement for the former National Intelligence Programs Evaluation (NIPE) staff. It is comprised of professionals drawn from Community organizations and from private industry to assist the DCI in his overview of Community resource management. In the main, the IC Staff ...

- advises the DCI on resource problems;
- prepares the DCI's annual recommendation to the President for the National Foreign Intelligence Program;

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- makes recommendations for product improvement;
- conducts studies of major collection and processing systems;
- assists the DCI in his coordination of Community-wide affairs; and
- develops recommendations for consideration by the USIB and the DCI's Intelligence Resource Advisory Committee (IRAC).

At Tab F is an organization chart of the ICS, indicating key personnel.

Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee (IRAC). This Committee, chaired by the DCI, was established as a result of the Presidential Memorandum of 5 November 1971. Senior officials of CIA, State INR, Defense/ASD(I), and OMB are its members. Since its inception, the DCI has invited regular attendance and participation of observers--particularly, the Director, NSA and the Director, DIA in their roles as national intelligence program managers. A representative of the NSC participates regularly as an observer as well as other Community program managers as appropriate.

The IRAC meets quarterly with extra sessions near the end of the calendar year when formulation of the annual budget requires extensive coordination and review.

The principal role of IRAC is to advise the DCI on ...

- the use and allocation of intelligence resources; and
- the formulation of the DCI's National Foreign Intelligence Program Recommendation to the President.

Additional information on the IRAC and its IR&D Council is at Tab G.

Intelligence Research and Development Council (IR&DC). The Council provides a high level of technological expertise to the IRAC. Established by the DCI in 1973, the Council, chaired by the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, brings to IRAC a broad base

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of technical knowledge which spans several areas of the R&D world in solving intelligence problems. Currently, the Council is pursuing solutions and opportunities in such key problem areas as ...

- tactical and near-real time use of intelligence;
- mass-memory technologies for data systems;
- improved methods for information processing, analysis, and presentation of intelligence to users; and
- application of the Space Shuttle to intelligence problems.

Other Guidance and Management Vehicles:

In shaping and implementing the National Foreign Intelligence Program, the DCI issues annually several documents designed to facilitate the collective efforts of a non-hierarchical intelligence community.

DCI Annual Objectives for the Intelligence Community. These are cast into two groups. The first group, termed "Substantive Intelligence Objectives" stress and define the output that should be expected of the Intelligence Community during a given year on matters of priority concern to the making of US foreign policy.

The second group, termed "Resource Management Objectives" deal with the means for achieving substantive objectives and the DCI's perceptions of what intelligence must be able to achieve. They include specific milestones for achievement in all categories of resource management that should be met within a given year and serve as a base measure of Community performance. A copy the Objectives for FY 1975 is at Tab H.

Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs). In each of the past three years, a technique has been applied (experimentally in the first year--operationally, in succeeding years) to develop and apply a more precise means to relate substantive intelligence needs to intelligence resource capabilities. While the KIQ process is still in the formative stage, it is proving useful in managing intelligence assets against a better set of intelligence problem criteria. For example, the broad substantive intelligence objective concerning

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Soviet policies, intentions, and capabilities is amplified with greater specificity in the form of several KIQs--"what are the prospects, stagnation, or cooling in bilateral Soviet-US relations?"--for one. These constitute a driving force of the US national intelligence effort. Performance against KIQs is evaluated (KIQ Evaluation Process or KEP) to adjust procedures and levels of effort for the follow-on year(s).

DCI Perspectives for Intelligence. Issued annually by the DCI, this document articulates perceptions of the DCI for intelligence five years into the future. It serves as general guidance to all elements of the Intelligence Community. In particular, his statements are designed to stimulate early action and planning for programs which require substantial amounts of time for development prior to execution.

The Perspectives provide a general overview of the international, economic and security environment anticipated in the years ahead followed by a broad statement of needs the Intelligence Community will be expected to meet during the period. And, it provides guidance with respect to activities which should be initiated, or on which planning should commence, in order to meet those needs. A copy of the "Perspectives" for 1975-1980 is at Tab I.

National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs) and Director Central Intelligence Directives (DCIDs). As a result of the Presidential Memorandum of 5 November 1971, the NSCIDs which provide policy level guidance (e.g., NSCID 1--Basic Duties and Responsibilities) to the DCI and the Community were updated extensively. The entire set was re-issued in February 1972. These are supplemented by DCIDs in greater specificity and detail concerning the policies and procedures established by NSCIDs--and are promulgated throughout the Intelligence Community. Each Agency then develops its internal regulations in conformity with these policies.

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT

Executive Branch

Along with the continuous role of the Office of Management and Budget on matters of intelligence resource requirements and the NSC Intelligence Committee for national substantive intelligence requirements and policy, the President has two additional bodies for assisting him

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in on matters of intelligence. They are the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) and the NSC "40 Committee".

President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). The Board is charged by the President (E.O. 11460, March 1969) with the responsibility of being able to assure him at all times of the quality, responsiveness and reliability of intelligence provided to policy-making personnel.

Within this charge, the President looks to the DCI to continue to provide coordination and guidance to the total foreign intelligence activities of the United States with the view to assuring a comprehensive and integrated effort on the part of US Government agencies.

Along with keeping the President informed on matters of US foreign intelligence, the Board is assigned a special responsibility to make a yearly, independent assessment of the nuclear threat, supplementing regular intelligence assessments made thereon by the Intelligence Community.

At the end of each fiscal year, the DCI submits to the President (through the PFIAB) a comprehensive report on accomplishments of the Intelligence Community for the year. This includes not only the achievement (or non-achievement) of specific objectives for that year, but steps taken to improve the management and capabilities of US foreign intelligence, e.g., planning and management initiatives.

The Forty Committee. This committee of the NSC convenes as necessary to provide policy guidance on activities relating to intelligence affecting national security as directed by the Council; specifically covert operations. It is chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and includes as members, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

These oversight and advisory bodies are standing instrumentalities relating to the conduct of US foreign intelligence. From time to time, as deemed necessary or appropriate, special groups are commissioned by the President (or jointly with the Congress) to look into particular aspects of the intelligence business and report their assessments and recommendations to him, e.g., the Hoover Commission, the Murphy Commission and many more over the years.

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The Congress:

The Community keeps the Congress informed of intelligence activities through an established mechanism; designated subcommittees of both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and Appropriations Committees. Appearances are made regularly before the subcommittees to report and discuss US foreign intelligence programs and to explain in detail the budgetary aspects of each program. Through formal executive session presentations, testimony, and question and answer sessions, senior intelligence officers provide information to the appropriate level of detail desired by Committee members. For example, in considering the FY 1976 Intelligence Community program now before the Congress, the DCI appeared before the Defense Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on six separate occasions--four times on the Community program and twice on the CIA budget. In addition, written responses to more than two hundred questions were submitted by the DCI for the record. Other senior officials of the Community also provided extensive testimony.

In addition, the DCI appears regularly before other Congressional Committees and Subcommittees to provide briefings and insight to intelligence analyses of world affairs. The DCI's Legislative Counsel maintains daily liaison with the Congress for responses to questions posed by the Congress in the normal course of business.

INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS

The number and variety of intelligence products (publications primarily) produced by the Community are extensive. The complex nature of intelligence which serves a wide range of intelligence consumers at several echelons of government on diversified matters call for products in several formats, general or specialized content, brief or in-depth, and at several levels of security classification. Some are coordinated national intelligence products involving use of "all source" materials; others are products from a single intelligence organization or are based on a single intelligence collection source (e.g., signals intelligence, photoimagery, attache report, etc.)

The following are a sampling of major products of the Intelligence Community.

National Estimates. These are prepared and coordinated among appropriate elements of the Community under sponsorship of the appropriate National Intelligence Officer. There are four main types:

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National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). The NIE is intended for NSC-level policy-making authorities. Topics selected for treatment are limited to those of high policy concern and are structured in a way to illuminate policy issues and the choices which may be open to policy authorities.

Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE). These address specific policy problems immediately on the horizon. They are shorter than an NIE and are prepared more quickly.

National Intelligence Analytic Memorandum (NIAM). The NIAM is intended for officials involved in policy support activity below the NSC level. Topics selected for treatment are important to policy concern but do not usually have the high priority of NIE topics.

Interagency Intelligence Memorandum (IAM). The IAM is a coordinated effort of several agencies which addresses relatively broad and complex issues intended for a high level audience. A particular difference between an IAM and a NIE or SNIE is that an IAM does not require USIB consideration.

Defense Estimates. These too, are produced in four main types and focus primarily on military subjects. They are addressed primarily to National and DoD consumers. *Defense Intelligence Estimates (DIE)* are coordinated with intelligence chiefs of the military services whereas *Defense Intelligence Estimate Memoranda (DIEM)* are not so coordinated. DIEMs are most often used as vehicles for more immediate estimative responses than is possible with DIEs. *Special Defense Intelligence Estimates (SDIE)* generally address subjects or issues that are narrower in scope or more specific in impact than the subject of DIEs. SDIEs are coordinated between services. *Defense Intelligence Analytical Memoranda (DIANM)* are not coordinated with the services and are used to address major analytical problems and often include an historical review. They do not necessarily include a forecast per se.

State INR Analytical/Estimative Papers. These reports produced by INR provide State officers with background information on policy-related subjects or draw their attention to phenomena of potential importance for security or US foreign relations. Social and

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political factors shaping the outcome of a national election, changing patterns of third world cooperation and competition, implication of trade agreements are examples of matter that is typical of these reports.

Current Intelligence

Dailies:

National Intelligence Daily. A tabloid compilation of key items of current intelligence produced six days a week by CIA's Office of Current Intelligence. To the extent possible, it is prepared in consultation with all appropriate elements of the Community and disseminated on a highly selective basis.

National Intelligence Bulletin. The Office of Current Intelligence, acting as the executive agent of the DCI, publishes NIBs six days a week through an interagency editorial board and disseminates the product to a relatively wide readership.

Other dailies include *Defense Intelligence Notices*, *DIA Intelligence Appraisals*, and *DIA Executive Summaries*.

Weeklies:

CIA and DIA weekly publications are for the most part, a compilation of items of current intelligence interest issued on Fridays. They are general or special in substance and include:

- DIA Weekly Intelligence Summary*
- CIA Weekly Review*
- CIA Weekly Surveyor*
- Economic Intelligence Weekly*
- International Oil Developments*

Warning:

Intelligence Alert Memorandum (IAM). An interagency publication issued by the DCI to alert US intelligence principals. It warns of possible developments abroad on matters of major concern to the US and is prepared normally under the direction of the appropriate NIO.

Strategic Warning Notice. Issued by the Special Assistant to the DCI for strategic warning to the DCI, who will notify the President and NSC or take such other action as he deems necessary.

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Beyond these major products, other products are published to serve the on-going operational needs of Intelligence Community programs and organizations.

A separate paper on "The Purpose of Intelligence" which is closely related to the foregoing discussion of intelligence products is at Tab J.

THE BUDGET PROCESS

NFIP

The process of planning, developing, coordinating, and costing resource aspects of the NFIP and related intelligence activities is an orderly but highly complex task involving several separate budget authorities within the national program. The complexities will not be defined here in detail.

The intelligence budgetary process follows prescribe US Government budget procedures and is responsive to guidance from the President through OMB and to the recently formed Congressional Budget Office.

Under direction of the DCI and his Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee, the NFIP resource management is conducted jointly by the following:

- Intelligence Community Staff
- Resources Staff of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence)
- National Intelligence Program Managers

In addition, the DCI chairs two Executive Committees (ExCom); each dealing with highly technical, sensitive, and relatively expensive intelligence collection systems (reconnaissance)--Air Force and Navy special programs. The year-long programming-budgeting cycle of the Intelligence Community is shown at Tab K.

Intelligence-Related Activities

Not included in the National Foreign Intelligence Program are variously related US intelligence activities on which the DCI provides comments in his NFIP. In order to bring these into proper view, it is important to focus first on intelligence in terms of the national

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effort, and in terms of the distinction between activities that are in being for the principal purpose of supporting US military forces in wartime and those that provide a peacetime intelligence service.

To fully define intelligence and its role, several factors must be considered. First, intelligence is a product that serves many and varied users--from the tactical commander in the field to the President. Thus, the ultimate determination of whether any single intelligence product is national or tactical, depends upon the use to which it is put.

Secondly, intelligence information, which provides the grist for the production mill, originates from many and varied sources--from front line troops to highly sophisticated space collection systems. Any single item of information, from whatever source, may be critical to and find its way into intelligence products serving consumers at several different levels.

Thirdly, the Department of Defense has a wide variety of intelligence units and activities because they must serve a variety of purposes at several levels. Many of these activities exist solely to support the operating forces in wartime. Thus, the combat missions, doctrine, tactics, and composition of the supported forces drive their organization, capabilities and resource requirements. Depending on their mission and location, however, these activities can and often do make significant contributions to national intelligence requirements in peacetime, which, in turn, helps them maintain intelligence skills essential for combat readiness.

Similarly, some non-intelligence activities, including combat forces can play an important intelligence role in peacetime. One of the best examples of this, as mentioned during the Director's testimony, is the intelligence role of certain Navy combatant vessels. As part of their regular combat equipments, they carry a variety of sensors for detecting targets and identifying enemy threats. Moreover, normal combat readiness needs keep them at sea for long periods. Thus, by giving them additional equipment to adapt their basic sensors for peacetime intelligence collection and scheduling some of their normal training patrols into areas of intelligence interests, the Intelligence Community gets a very significant capability to collect information on Soviet naval ship characteristics and related tactics.

The cost of the vessels, crew salaries, and operating and maintenance costs for normal training patrols are funded by the Navy as a combat asset in the regular force structure budget. These costs would be required whether or not they undertook peacetime intelligence missions. The intelligence-peculiar equipment, program management and the technical specialists who go along on the missions, however, are funded within the intelligence budget.

A similar situation exists with respect to certain activities of other US Government departments and agencies. The State Department's Foreign Service Officers are a good case in point. Their normal economic and political reporting also contributes significantly to national intelligence. This reporting, however, is simply a product of the Foreign Service Officer's normal responsibilities. Thus, the cost is borne by the Department of State.

These kinds of intelligence relationships, and the lack of explicit criteria, make it extremely difficult to decide which and to what extent certain activities should be included within the National Foreign Intelligence Program.

Decisions on what should and should not be included within the National Foreign Intelligence Program depend largely on the extent to which the DCI should be responsible for resource recommendations for military intelligence activities that support operating forces. The President's 5 November 1971 directive charges the DCI with responsibility for providing the effectiveness of all intelligence activities, including "tactical" intelligence and recommending the appropriate allocation of resources to be devoted to intelligence. The JCS and the military services see potential in this directive for conflicts with the statutory responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for management and operational command of the military forces.

The Secretary of Defense and the DCI have agreed that while military intelligence force support activities and activities in the national program must be mutually supportive, they are best judged in the context of the primary missions they support. They have also agreed, however, that the DCI will advise the Secretary of his judgment on how intelligence force support units can be used in peacetime--such as the SIGINT direct support units that work in tandem with our overall cryptologic effort under National Security Agency tasking. The DCI also advises the appropriate Congressional Committees each year of the

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general size and scope of the more nationally significant of these units and activities to insure that it is clear that they exist, even though they are not included in the National Foreign Intelligence Program.

The DCI, and the Secretary of Defense have jointly undertaken a study to examine the relationship between national and tactical intelligence needs and capabilities. A pilot study to size the problem is nearing completion. The DCI hopes that follow-on work will provide a basis for determining more clearly the appropriate division of responsibility between him and Department of Defense for intelligence activities of the military forces. Once this matter of responsibility is resolved and firm criteria are established, it will be possible to be more definitive as to what costs of intelligence-related activities are appropriate for inclusion in the intelligence budget.

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