

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Ad Hoc Staff
75-235

Executive Registry
75-1561

27 March 1975

The Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller
Chairman, Commission on CIA Activities
Within the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500


(b)(3)

Dear Mr. Vice President:

Attached hereto for the Commission's records are certain details which update my 13 January and 27 January statements to the Commission. As you know, the Agency has had certain of its activities under continuing review by its Inspector General and the updating is necessary for purposes of accuracy.

First, in my statement of 13 January, I described the nature of CIA programs to survey and open selected mail between the U.S. and certain foreign countries. I said there has been no mail survey in this country by CIA since February 1973. For purposes of clarity, the words mail openings are more accurate than mail survey. The latter activity, i.e., surveying, is not improper when falling within the proper charter of the Agency, and there have been a few such since that date.

The second area concerns files on members of Congress. Over the past eight years, the Agency's counterintelligence program holdings have included files on four members of Congress, one deceased. These files are all inactive. Two of them were destroyed in 1974--one in October, the other in early December. None contained any information that originated in CIA, with the exception of (a) a travel cable from a CIA Field Station listing the names of Congressional participants in a conference abroad and requesting Headquarters guidance concerning a Station briefing for the Congressmen if it were to be requested; and (b) two cables regarding the holding of an international conference which quoted foreign press comments on the impending event.



EXECUTIVE REGISTRY # 3
RC files

~~SECRET~~



(b)(3)




Surveillance of aliens was usually carried out in connection with determining their reliability for a possible operational relationship with CIA. Foreign defectors were surveilled to check on their authenticity as defectors and, in some cases, to ensure their protection.

I attach, as annexes, the changes we wish to make in my two January Statements to the Commission. Also attached are updated copies of the Statements with changes inserted and underlined.

We will keep you advised of any further updating as may be required by our review, which continues.


Respectfully yours,


W. E. Colby
Director

Attachments

1. Annex A and 13 January Statement
2. Annex B and 27 January Statement

□




(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)

~~SECRET~~

Annex A

13 January Statement

1. P. 26, first line, change Interagency to Intelligence.
2. P. 26, fifth line, delete State.
3. P. 28, fifth paragraph, change Interagency Domestic Intelligence Unit to Inter-Divisional Information Unit.
4. P. 28, last paragraph, fourth line, delete inserted ten agents...Washington, D.C. area. Substitute: used ten agents to monitor the activities of dissident organizations operating in the Washington, D.C. area. The monitoring involved attendance at meetings, demonstrations, and protest marches.
5. P. 32, delete last paragraph on the page, beginning Mr. Chairman, our findings....Substitute: Mr. Chairman, over the past eight years, our counterintelligence program holdings have included files on four members of Congress. With the exception of one file on a deceased Congressman, these files are inactive. Two of them were destroyed in 1974. None contained any material that originated in CIA, except for one travel cable and two cables quoting press announcements of conferences abroad.
6. P. 33, mid-page paragraph beginning "Our internal investigations...." It should be noted that CIA's continuing review since 13 January has revealed additional instances of surveillance activities. Details are contained in a classified summary (Summary Report of Domestic Surveillance Activity) forwarded to the Staff of the President's Commission on 21 March 1975. An addendum to this summary is currently in process.
7. P. 34, revise the last paragraph to read:



8. P. 36, first paragraph, first sentence, add: or that they might be involved in activities that could make them susceptible to blackmail leading to the disclosure of sensitive and classified information.
9. P. 36, last paragraph, line 5, change two to four..
10. P. 37, first paragraph, line 3, change two Communistt to foreign, primarily Communist.
11. P. 37, first paragraph, line 6, delete sentence beginning "One other..." and the remainder of the paragraph. Substitute:

One of a limited nature took place in 1954. The primary purpose of these activities was to identify for counterintelligence purposes individuals in active correspondence with Communist countries, the results being shared with the FBI. They also were designed to shed light on the nature and extent of foreign governments' censorship techniques and to give leads to persons (foreign and American) who would be interested in cooperating with CIA in foreign intelligence operations. In addition to the above, international mail passing through an American port was opened for a brief time in August 1967. I repeat there has been no mail opening in this country by CIA since February 1973.

The Huston Plan was not implemented, but an ^{Intelligence} ~~Interagency~~ Evaluation Committee, coordinated by Mr. John Dean, the Counsel to the President, was established. The Committee was chaired by a representative of the Department of Justice and included representatives from CIA, FBI, DoD, ~~State~~, Treasury, and NSA. Its purpose was to provide coordinated intelligence estimates and evaluations of civil disorders with CIA supplying information on the foreign aspects thereof.

Pursuant to this, CIA continued its counterintelligence interest in possible foreign links with American dissidents. The program was conducted on a highly compartmented basis. As is necessary in counterintelligence work, the details were known to few in the Agency.

We often queried our overseas stations for information on foreign connections with Americans in response to FBI requests or as a result of our own analyses. Most of these requests were for information from friendly foreign services, although there were instances where CIA collection was directed. In most cases the product of these queries was passed to the FBI.

In the course of this program, the Agency worked closely with the FBI. For example, the FBI asked the Agency

abroad and would be initiated only in response to requests from the FBI or in coordination with the FBI, and that any such information obtained as a by-product of foreign intelligence activities would be reported to the FBI.

In the course of this program, files were established on about 10,000 American citizens in the counterintelligence unit.

About two-thirds of these were originated because of specific requests from the FBI for information on the activities of Americans abroad, or by the filing of reports received from the FBI.

The remaining third was opened on the basis of CIA foreign intelligence or counterintelligence information known to be of interest to the FBI.

For the past several months, we have been eliminating material from these files not justified by CIA's counterintelligence responsibilities, and in this process about 1,000 such files have so far been removed from the active index but could be reconstituted should it be required.

In 1967, the Department of Justice established an Inter-Divisional Information Unit ~~Interagency Domestic Intelligence Unit (IDIU)~~. In May 1970, the Department of Justice provided us with a machine-tape listing of about 10,000 Americans developed by the IDIU. The listing could not be integrated in CIA's files and was destroyed in March 1974.

I should note that concurrent with the counterintelligence program beginning in 1967, the CIA Office of Security--acting on the basis of concern for the safety of Agency personnel and installations in the Washington, D.C. area--

The initial responses and our review of them culminated in fresh policy determinations and guidance issued in August 1973. This guidance is a matter of detail in the classified appendixes I will provide to this Commission.

As I have said, Gentlemen, this review continues in order to insure that our activities remain proper.

Let me discuss our findings with respect to the press allegations.

(1) The New York Times article of December 22, 1974 declared:

"At least one avowedly anti-war member of Congress was among those placed under surveillance by the CIA, the sources said."

Our findings are that there is no--and to my knowledge never has been--surveillance, technical or otherwise, directed against any member of Congress.

The New York Times article also indicated that "Other members of Congress were said to be included in the CIA's dossier on dissident Americans."

Mr. Chairman, ^{over the past eight years, our counterintelligence} ~~our findings are that~~ program holdings have included files on four members of Congress. ~~except for one former Congressman, no member of the~~ With the exception of one file on a deceased Congressman, these files ~~96th Congress which commenced on 19 January 1967, or~~ are inactive. Two of them were destroyed in 1974. None contained ~~of any succeeding Congress, up to and including the~~ any material that originated in CIA, except for one travel cable and ~~94th Congress, is included in our counterintelligence~~ two cables quoting press announcements of conferences abroad. ~~programs files.~~

-33-

We do have other files on current or former members of Congress. These fall into categories such as ex-employees, some who were granted security clearances in pre-Congressional jobs, some who were sources or cooperated with us, some who appear as references in applications or security clearance procedures on our personnel, and some whose names were included in reports received from other Government agencies or developed in the course of our foreign intelligence operations.

(2) The New York Times article also referred to "break-ins," and said no "specific information about domestic CIA break-ins" could be obtained.

Our internal investigations to date have turned up a total of three instances, which could have been the basis for these allegations. Each of the three involved premises related to Agency employees or ex-employees.

In 1966, a new Agency employee, inspecting a Washington apartment he was thinking of renting, saw classified documents in the apartment, which was the residence of another employee. The new employee advised the CIA Security Office. Subsequently, the new employee and a security officer went to the apartment, were admitted as prospective renters, and removed the documents.


The second instance occurred in 1969. A junior Agency employee with sensitive clearances caused security concern by appearing to be living well beyond his means. Surreptitious entry was made into his apartment in the Washington area. No grounds for special concern were found.

Item
Annex A

-34-

The third instance occurred in 1971 in the Washington area. An ex-employee became involved with a person believed to be a Cuban intelligence agent. Security suspicions were that the two were engaged in trying to elicit information from Agency employees. A surreptitious entry was made into the place of business occupied jointly by the two. Results were negative. An attempt to enter the suspect agent's apartment was unsuccessful.

(3) The New York Times article also referred to wire-taps and said no specific information could be obtained.



-36-

(4) The New York Times article also alleges physical surveillance of American citizens.

The Agency has conducted physical surveillance on our employees when there was reason to believe that they might be passing information to hostile intelligence services, or that they* This was done on rare occasions, and in recent years only three times -- in 1968, 1971, and 1972. In 1971 and 1972, physical surveillance was also employed against [redacted]

[redacted] We had clear indications that they were receiving classified information without authorization, and the surveillance effort was designed to identify the sources of the leaks.

Also, in 1971 and 1972, a long-standing CIA source -- a foreigner visiting in the US -- told us of a plot to kill the Vice President and kidnap the CIA Director. We alerted the Secret Service and the FBI and we carried out physical surveillance in ^{four} ~~two~~ American cities. The surveillance came to involve Americans who were thought to be part of the plot -- and the mail of one suspect was opened and read.

*might be involved in activities that could make them susceptible to blackmail leading to the disclosure of sensitive and classified information.

-37-

(5) The New York Times article also refers to "surreptitious inspection of mail."

From 1953 until February 1973, CIA conducted several programs to survey and open selected mail between the United States and ~~to foreign, primarily Communist, /no Communist~~ countries. One occurred in a US city from 1953 to February 1973, when it was terminated. One took place during limited periods in one other area in November 1969, February and May 1970, and October 1971. ~~One of a limited nature /no other~~ took place in 1954. The primary purpose of these activities was to identify ~~occurred in August 1957. The purpose of the first and extended~~ for counterintelligence purposes individuals in active correspondence with ~~activity was to identify individuals in active correspondence~~ Communist countries, the results being shared with the FBI. They also were designed ~~with Communist countries for presumed counterintelligence~~ to shed light on the nature and extent of foreign governments' censorship techniques ~~purpose, the results being shared with the FBI. The others,~~ and to give leads to persons (foreign and American) who would be interested in ~~were designed primarily to determine the nature and extent of~~ cooperating with CIA in foreign intelligence operations. In addition to the above, ~~censorship techniques. The August 1957 case was to try to~~ international mail passing through an American port was opened for a brief time in ~~learn the foreign contacts of a number of Americans of counter-~~ August 1967. I repeat there has been no mail opening in this country by CIA ~~intelligence interest. I repeat that there has been no mail~~ since February 1973. ~~survey in this country by CIA since February 1973.~~

The activities discussed above were reported as a result of the Director's 9 May 1973 notice and were reported to the Chairmen of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees-- the Congressional bodies responsible for oversight of CIA-- in May 1973.

Annex B

27 January Statement

1. Page 7, first full paragraph: Delete second sentence beginning "Several times each year ..." and substitute the following:

Several times each year, in cooperation with the Metropolitan Police Department, a "student" from the Agency is arrested by an Office of Security employee in the presence of a high-ranking Metropolitan Police official. The student is charged with a serious crime; escorted from the scene of his arrest in a police vehicle; interrogated for several hours at Police Headquarters; and generally made to feel uncomfortable.

2. Page 9, Lines 2-7. Delete the sentence beginning "With my approval..." through to the end of the paragraph. Substitute the following:

With my approval, two exceptions were made in connection with attempts to enhance the intelligibility of the White House tapes. In one instance, the equipment and a technician to act as a technical adviser in setting it up were loaned to the National Security Agency. In the other instance, our equipment (but not our personnel) were loaned to Judge Sirica at his request.

3. Page 21. To the first full paragraph, beginning "From December 1971....", add the following sentence:

Some booking slips on calls between the U.S. and the Soviet Union were received from February 1972 until May 1973, but none thereafter.

~~SECRET~~

conditions, accidents, and safety recommendations relating to the Headquarters compound. Fairfax County Police and the United States Park Police have concurrent jurisdiction over the roadways adjacent to the Agency grounds and are periodically called upon for support and assistance, for example, to investigate accidents which occur at the compound.

Finally, the Office of Security presently receives assistance from the Washington Metropolitan Police Department with respect to an Agency training exercise which prepares our operational officers for overseas assignments

Several times each year, in cooperation with the Metropolitan Police Department, a "student" from the Agency is arrested by an Office of Security employee in the presence of a high-ranking Metropolitan Police ~~ment arrests one of our CIA trainees who has been previously~~ official. The student is charged with a serious crime; escorted from the ~~identified to them by the Agency, charges him with some~~ scene of his arrest in a police vehicle; interrogated for several hours at ~~sort of serious crime; escorts him from the scene of his~~ Police Headquarters; and generally made to feel uncomfortable. ~~arrest in a police vehicle, interrogates him for several~~ hours, in the presence of an Agency official, at Police Headquarters relative to the violation with which he has been charged; and generally makes life uncomfortable for him. The CIA trainee, who does not know his arrest is not for real, is eventually told of the ruse and is graded on his performance under pressure. He is emphatically made aware he might run into this type of harassment during an assignment abroad, and several have in fact been subjected to it.

7

Secret

~~Secret~~

is limited to assistance in speech-processing techniques only, and not to processing the tapes themselves. ^{With my approval,} ~~With~~ two exceptions were made in connection with attempts to enhance the intelligibility of the White House tapes. In one instance, the equipment and ~~the National Security Agency in pursuit of foreign intel~~ a technician to act as a technical adviser in setting it up were loaned to the ~~Agency and in another at the request of Judge Sirica.~~ National Security Agency. In the other instance, our equipment (but not our ~~In the latter, our equipment was in fact used in an~~ personnel) were loaned to Judge Sirica at his request. ~~attempt to enhance the White House tapes.~~

Voice enhancement equipment is a natural subject for CIA research and development. Our collection of foreign intelligence abroad includes use of audio surveillance devices, and we often profit from an ability to amplify and enhance voice sounds resulting from such collection.

In December 1970, the Director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) asked the DCI for assistance in spotting suspected corruption in his organization. He wanted help in recruiting a net of informants within his organization to work against these elements.

In February 1971 the DCI, after discussions with the Attorney General, agreed to help. Through a proprietary in the Washington Metropolitan Area, U.S. citizens were recruited, cleared, and trained. They were then employed by BNDD/DEA to monitor illegal activities of other employees of that agency. In August 1973 I directed that CIA will not take part in operations to penetrate another

~~Secret~~

dissident organizations in the Washington area to gather information on efforts by such groups which might endanger CIA personnel and facilities. In addition, from December 1967 to June 1973 the Office of Security, in its field offices, collected clippings from campus newspapers, radical "underground" publications and other press sources. Again, the purpose was to identify potential threats to Agency personnel and installations. Over the course of years, our personnel recruiters in the field had been subjected to some abuse and harassment. It should be noted, however, that under this clipping project no attempts were made to recruit informants or sources. The project was terminated in June 1973.

From December 1971 through May 1972, the Domestic Contact Service received from an (b)(3) telephone booking slips for calls between the United States and China. These of course identified the maker and recipient of the call, but not its substance. The purpose of this exercise was to develop operational leads for our Far East Division. In late March 1972, the operation was terminated. Some booking slips on calls between the U.S. and the Soviet Union were received from February 1972 until May 1973, but none thereafter.

Far East (now East Asia) Division conducts a project using long-time agents directed against foreign intelligence