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SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

PLAN FOR BRIEF  
JFK -- all sorts of  
new versions!

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: C/WH/4/P&P

NO.

DATE 17 Nov 60

1. Use two  
600 man group  
to run to  
interior

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

91

RECEIVED 17 NOV 1960 FORWARDED

1. C/WH/4

[Signature]

2. Joint support  
of allied govt. for  
the op.

2. Chief WHD

yes

3. Evidence that  
what became Zopeta  
was here ruled out.

\*NOTE

4. Assistance had  
been given Zedaira  
Fuentes to Gulf coast  
(11-13 Nov 60)

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FORM 1 DEC 56

610

USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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16 November 1960

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: JMARC Meeting with DDP

PARTICIPANTS: Messrs. Bissell, Barnes, King, Esterline, Eisemann,  
Hawkins, Drain, Gaines, Beerli.

1. The meeting was held to bring the DDP up-to-date as to JMARC operational planning on the eve of the DCI/DDP briefing of the President-Elect. On the day previous, a JMARC staff meeting had crystallized a new concept, as set forth in the attached memorandum.

2. At the outset of the meeting, C/WH/4 raised two related but separate problems: the loan to Guatemala and the provision of military assistance to quell the revolt.

3. The DDP heard out the JMARC presentation and raised the following questions:

a. Would the effort now contemplated be enough? (JMARC personnel put it that the success of this effort depended in large part on the internal reaction thereto. That reaction should not be importantly different whether our operation consisted of a 600-man mountain-top perimeter or a 1500-3000 man beachhead with airstrip. A more meaningful contrast would be between either of those actions on the one hand and a major joint CIA/DOD action on the other.) The DDP requested that JMARC planning encompass an additional 600-man force, for possible use in a second mountain area.

b. What policy clearances were necessary? The following were enumerated:

(1) Approval to use a ZI installation for up to 800 men. (JMARC undertook to provide the DDP by Friday noon a specific recommendation complete with installation blueprint and cost estimate.)

(2) Approval to use the Canal Zone facility for up to 200 trainees.

(3) Approval to launch strikes from Nicaragua.

(4) Approval to launch air resupply from U.S. bases.

(5) Approval for one LST, refitted for the purposes of this operation.

Cuba from 8 Oct 60

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
4. It was understood that the general reaction of the President-Elect would perhaps determine the further progress of the project. Subject to his indicated general agreement, the DDP undertook to get answers to the above policy questions next week. JMARC undertook to proceed at once to establish directives and instructions to accomplish the revised plan, the date of launching to be 1 February.

5. In general discussion of JMARC problems, it was agreed that consideration would be given to:

- a. Gaining internal approval not to polygraph Army increments to the training program.
- b. Establishing an officer-in-charge, with full responsibility in the field, in connection with any Nicaragua construction.
- c. Reducing substantially the requirements for internal staff clearances.

6. At the close of the meeting the Chief, WH/4, having earlier made passing reference to the possible requirement for U.S. and allied recognition of a provisional government, also stressed the possible requirement that allied governments jointly support the operation from its inception.

7. Very tentative budget figures (in the order of a \$42,000,000 total) were left for the DDP's review.



  
Richard D. Drain  
C/WH/4/P&P

Attachment:

Pre-DDP Staff Meeting

WH/4/P&P: R. D. Drain:jss (17 Nov 60)

Distribution:

- 1 - C/WH/4
- 1 - COPS/WH/4
- 1 - Mallard,   Barkley, File

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15 November 1960

PRE-DDP STAFF MEETING

1. Our original concept is now seen to be unachievable in the face of the controls Castro has instituted. There will not be the internal unrest earlier believed possible, nor will the defenses permit the type strike first planned.

2. Our second concept (1,500-3,000 man force to secure a beach with airstrip) is also now seen to be unachievable, except as a joint Agency/DOD action. Our Guatemala experience demonstrates we cannot staff nor otherwise timely create the base and lift needed.

*This was ZAM in ER  
But if not achieved in mid-Nov 60 what made it possible in ER*

3. Our present concept:

Land a force of 600 men by LST on beaches from which they would at once move inland and create a safe area in a mountain fastness. These, and those who joined them from within, to be resupplied by airdrop. To launch in late January.

4. Needed to bring the above about:

- a. One LST from Navy, to be outfitted by Navy at our direction.
- b. 200 new recruits, in addition to the 70 in pipeline. Believed that the recruiting would take 5 weeks, the training 4 more.
- c. Use of the Nicaragua airstrip (with repairs thought to take 10 days).
- d. Use of Panama for either training the 200 new recruits, or for holding 200 from JMADD while the new recruits are trained there.
- e. Use of [ ] or comparable area for final, Case Officer type training of up to 60 men going in as small groups.
- f. Permission to resupply the 600-man lodgment from U.S. bases (best: Opalocka).
- g. Clear delineation of DPD-JMARC command lines so that the latter can issue orders to the former.
- h. An intimation to the State Department that part of the support for the 600-man lodgment may have to be in the form of U.S. (and allied) recognition of that force and its nominal leadership as a provisional government.

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