

**EYES ONLY
SECRET**

*The 600
not enough
I'm now
interested*

*Chris
Ray esp*

29 November 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : JMARC Meeting with DDP

**PARTICIPANTS: Messrs. Bissell, Barnes, Flannery, Esterline, Drain;
for budget discussion: Eisemann, King**

1. The DDP briefed the participants as to the President's meeting with Department and Agency representatives, and reviewed the JMARC budget and staff paper in preparation for the Special Group's 30 November meeting.

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2. Following a session with Mr. Pawley, the President had called a conference with Messrs. Dillon, Merchant, Gates, Douglas, Gray, Goodpasture, Dulles and Bissell.

a. The President made it clear he wanted all done that could be done with all possible urgency and nothing less on the part of any Department.

b. The Director outlined JMARC's paramilitary concept and timing, emphasizing that our first choice for training continued to be Guatemala but that it seemed feasible to use Saipan if necessary. There was general agreement that training in the U.S. was out of the question.

c. Mr. Dillon outlined the State Department's general diplomatic offensive, designed primarily to enlist the support of other American republics to back an OAS move for a total economic squeeze on the target, under which the U.S. could invoke its Trading with the Enemy legislation and extend its present limited sea patrol. It was agreed that such a development would create the kind of international atmosphere which would allow our covert action more latitude. There are three impediments to the development of this offensive:

(1) Most republics are awaiting the new U.S. administration

(2) There is a similar attitude towards Brazil

(3) Mexico is likely to hold out

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d. The President led a discussion as to how best to organize the total U.S. effort against the target. There was some feeling that an overall coordinating executive might be desirable, but it was left that the Director would make Mr. Barnes available to work closely with a State Department officer to be designated. It was also felt desirable to use Mr. Pawley's services, initially in connection with Argentina's possible covert assistance.

3. For the Special Group meeting, the DDP proposed to stress the following:

a. We will train an absolute minimum of 600 in Guatemala, taking up the San Jose finca, moving out 60 to Randolph, and building up to the 600 number as fast as recruiting and additional construction will permit.

b. We will need at once 38 Special Forces trainers, "sheep-dipped" from the active troops.

c. Our budget is high, but a sizeable portion of the cost represents reimbursements to the DOD.

4. The DDP stressed the unanimous belief of the other Departments and of the Agency's leadership that we must set our strength goals higher than 600. To train substantially more will involve an additional site and other considerations which can perhaps best be seen after we are farther along with the 600. Accordingly, it was agreed not to conclude as to additional strength for several weeks, and to keep the Saipan facility on a contingency basis.

Richard D. Drain
C/WH/4/P&P

WH/4/P&P:RDDRAIN:jss (30 Nov 60)

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