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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

Acting Director of Security
4-E-60

NO.

XAAZ-22605

DATE

27 October 1964

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS: (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1992
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

Document Number **920-922**
for FOIA Review on JUL 1976

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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL

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5. The article is considered a serious compromise of a highly sensitive document; however, damage to clandestine sources and methods would be nominal. The Soviets are now aware that the U. S. possesses information as to some of the methods and operations of the KGB toward high foreign Government officials. More important, however, the article reflects upon the integrity of the Agency in the eyes of the general public particularly as it bears upon the Warren Commission report. There has been a world-wide interest in the Commission report and the Agency has been downgraded in its support of the Commission.

6. Further inquiry will be made in this matter and you will be informed of the results.

Harlan A. Westrell

Harlan A. Westrell
Acting Director of Security

Attachments:

As stated above

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Analysis of

Article by Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott entitled:

"Secret Report Under Wraps," appearing in the

22 October 1964 issue of the Northern Virginia Sun

Paragraphs of Article

Comments

Para. 1. "The Central Intelligence Agency withheld vital intelligence information from the Warren Commission during its investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy.

These paragraphs are false in that the Warren Commission has been fully briefed by CIA on all known aspects of Soviet plans to remove from public office Western officials who actively opposed Soviet policies. On 28 February 1964, CIA furnished the Warren Commission a detailed, 26 page report entitled: "Soviet Use of Assassination and Kidnapping" (Tab C). This report was an updated and more comprehensive version of an October 1961, 13 page report entitled: "SOVIET STRATEGIC EXECUTIVE ACTION (A Preliminary Survey)" (Tab D), classified SECRET--NOFORN/NO DISSEM ABROAD/LIMITED/BACKGROUND USE ONLY, from which the authors quoted paragraphs 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 of their article. It should be noted that the author

Para. 2. "Despite the commission's written request for all documents that might shed light on the assassination, CIA authorities failed to turn over a national intelligence estimate warning that it is Kremlin policy to remove from public office by assassination Western officials who actively oppose Soviet policies.

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Paragraphs of Article

Comments

omitted the words "(A Preliminary Survey)" when citing the title of the above October 1961 report.

A total of 32 copies of the October 1961 report were disseminated outside of CIA. (Tab E)

The document referred to in paragraphs 2 and 6 was not a National Intelligence Estimate but the above mentioned October 1961 report published by the DDP.

Para. 3. "Titled 'Soviet Strategic Executive Action,' the suppressed CIA document went into the shocking details of how agents of KGB, the Soviet secret police, are trained to do away with Western leaders, including officials in the U. S., and to make their deaths appear due to natural causes.

This paragraph is accurate and it refers to the very sensitive, highly classified October 1961 report, cited above, and published by the DDP.

Para. 4. "One of the KGB's newly devised assassination weapons is 'a pneumatically operated poison ice 'atomizer,' which leaves no wound or other evidence of the cause of death."

This paragraph is accurate and contains a portion quoted from Page 5, paragraph 4 of the above cited October 1961 DDP report.

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Paragraphs of Article

Comments

Para. 5. "While this deadly weapon has yet to be used against any high Western official, hundreds of KGB agents covertly operating outside of Russia have been supplied with this pocket-size gun, awaiting only orders from Moscow to use it.

This paragraph sets the tone for launching a dissertation by the writers in later paragraphs. Makes certain implications which document did not intend.

Para. 6. "Highlights of the suppressed intelligence estimate, which is locked in a security area within the tightly-guarded CIA, are as follows:

The document, as stated above, is not an intelligence estimate.

Para. 7. "It has been reported that the KGB endeavors to remove the threat to Soviet interests posed by certain members of Western governments, sometimes arranging for the dismissal of such persons from public office, at other time even having them 'eliminated' physically.

These paragraphs are accurate and are verbatim quotes from page 5, paragraph 4, of the October 1961 report, with the exception of paragraph 7, sentence 1, wherein the authors, after the word KGB, omitted the words "and the GRU" in the article. In addition, the authors used the word "endeavor" in the plural whereas in the October 1961 report, the word was used in the singular.

Para. 8. "Such activities are known to be undertaken against other types of persons in the West, notably defectors from the U.S.S.R. and from other countries of the Soviet bloc.

Experts believe the deletion of the phrase "and the GRU" and the plural use of the word "endeavor" was a deliberate attempt by the authors or their briefer to focus attention on the KGB which tends to distort the document.

Para. 9. "One recently reported assassination technique is to electrocute an individual by luring him to use a telephone, connected to a high-voltage wire, during a thunderstorm.

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Paragraphs of Article

Comments

Para. 10. " 'Another involves the use of a pistol which projects a poison gas in liquid or compressed form. The gas is fatal within seconds and an autopsy would not reveal its use. Non-traceable poisons have been reported which do not take effect until several hours after being administered, thus allowing an assassin to be far from the scene when his victim dies.

Para. 11. " 'A knowledgeable source has described a pneumatically operated poison ice 'atomizer' which leaves no wound or other evidence of the cause of death. '

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Paragraphs of Article

Comments

Para. 12. "Congressional investigators, who have asked that the name of their committee be withheld for security reasons, report that CIA Director John McCone made no mention of this explosive document in his secret testimony before the Warren Commission.

There is no comment on this paragraph other than to state that the Warren Commission was furnished a complete report on 28 February 1964, as mentioned previously. There was no reason for the DCI to bring the matter up unless specifically questioned since the Agency had furnished the report.

Para. 13. "While McCone furnished the commission with the CIA's secret surveillance reports on Lee Harvey Oswald's eight days in Mexico City before the assassination, including details of Oswald's contact with the head KGB agent in the Soviet embassy there, the CIA chief gave no hint of the Kremlin's assassination policy.

This paragraph is accurate with the exception of the last phrase. As stated above, the Warren Commission was furnished a complete report on 28 February 1964 concerning Soviet policies and methods.

Para. 14. "Other U. S. intelligence experts, very dubious of Russia's co-existence line, stress that the Warren Commission's findings might have been different if this CIA estimate and other documents suppressed by the State Department had been available for study.

This paragraph is inaccurate and merely reflects an erroneous inference by the authors. The Warren Commission had all the deductive facts needed.

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Paragraphs of Article

Comments

Para. 15. "They point out that the State Department suppressed evidence linking Oswald with one of its employees who, according to security files, 'presented strong pro-Soviet views on every question that came up in the Department's U.S.S.R. country committee' while he was a member.

The accuracy of this statement is not known. It appears to be an unfair inference since experts advise Department of State officials complied strictly with Departmental regulations in their dealing with Oswald.

Para. 16. "This State Department official's name also appeared in the address book of a suspected Soviet agent who arrived in the U. S. in 1943, according to government files.

The accuracy of this paragraph is not known.

Para. 17. "Congressional investigators also have been shocked to discover that the CIA's assassination documents was never shown by administration officials to Speaker John McCormack (Mass.), next in line to succeed President Johnson.

No comment on these paragraphs. OGC is not aware of any contacts by Congressional probers with the Agency. DDP documents are not disseminated by them to members of Congress.

Para. 18. While FBI officials warned Speaker McCormack, a dedicated anti-Communist, that he is on the list of Western officials feared by the Kremlin, no CIA authority has shown the No. 2 man in government the CIA report listing these secret Soviet assassination methods.

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Paragraphs of Article

Comments

Para. 19. "Instead, McCormack learned about the report only recently from congressional probers who are trying to determine why the document has been suppressed.

Para. 20. "The investigators also are trying to determine why the CIA in its pre-assassination report to the State Department on Oswald's trip to Mexico City gave details only of the defector's visit to the Russian Embassy and not the Cuban Embassy. The CIA did not report the latter visit until after Kennedy's assassination in Dallas."

Experts consider this paragraph to be very important since it indicates how well informed the authors were when writing subject article. The paragraph is accurate. However, the authors infer in the last sentence that the CIA knew of Oswald's contact with the Cuban Embassy before the assassination of President Kennedy. This inference is not true. It was known before the assassination that an American had visited the Cuban Embassy; however, the identity of this individual was not known until 25 November 1964, three days after the assassination, that Oswald was the individual in question.

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Northern Virginia Sun
22 October 1964*Len-Scott Report***Secret Report
Under Wraps**By ROBERT S. ALLEN
AND PAUL SCOTT

Mr. Allen

1 The Central Intelligence Agency withheld vital intelligence information from the Warren Commission during its investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy.

2 Despite the commission's written request for all documents that might shed light on the assassination, CIA authorities failed to turn over a national intelligence estimate warning that it is Kremlin policy to remove from public office by assassination Western officials who actively oppose Soviet policies.

3 Titled "Soviet Strategic Executive Action," the suppressed CIA document went into the shocking details of how agents of KGB, the Soviet secret police, are trained to do away with Western leaders, including officials in the U.S., and to make their deaths appear due to natural causes.

4 One of the KGB's newly devised assassination weapons is "a pneumatically operated poison ice atomizer," which leaves no wound or other evidence of the cause of death.

5 While this deadly weapon has yet to be used against any high Western official, hundreds of KGB agents covertly operating outside of Russia have been supplied with this pocket-size gun, awaiting only orders from Moscow to use it.

6 Highlights of the suppressed intelligence estimate, which is locked in a security area within the tightly-guarded CIA, are as follows:

7 "It has been reported that the KGB endeavors to remove the threat to Soviet interests posed by certain members of Western governments, sometimes arranging for the dismissal of such persons from public office, at other times even having them

8 "Such activities are known to be undertaken against other types of persons in the West, notably defectors from the U.S.S.R. and from other countries of the Soviet bloc.

9 "One recently reported assassination technique is to electrocute an individual by luring him to use a telephone, connected to a high-voltage wire, during a thunderstorm.

10 "Another involves the use of a pistol which projects a poison gas in liquid or compressed form. The gas is fatal within seconds and an autopsy would not reveal its use. Non-traceable poisons have been reported which do not take effect until several hours after being administered, thus allowing an assassin to be far from the scene when his victim dies.

11 "A knowledgeable source has described a pneumatically operated poison ice atomizer which leaves no wound or other evidence of the cause of death."

12 Congressional investigators, who have asked that the name of their committee be withheld for security reasons, report that CIA Director John McCone made no mention of this explosive document in his secret testimony before the Warren Commission.

13 While McCone furnished the commission with the CIA's secret surveillance reports on Lee Harvey Oswald's eight days in Mexico City before the assassination, including details of Oswald's contact with the head KGB agent in the Soviet embassy there, the CIA chief gave no hint of the Kremlin's assassination policy.

14 Other U. S. intelligence experts, very dubious of Russia's co-existence line, stress that the Warren Commission's findings might have been different if this CIA estimate and other documents suppressed by the State Department had been available for study.

15 They pointed out that the State Department suppressed evidence linking Oswald with one of its employes who, according to security files, presented strong pro-Soviet views on every question that came up in the Department's U.S.S.R. country committee" while he was a member.

16 This State Department official's name also appeared in the address book of a suspected Soviet agent who arrived in the U.S. in 1943, according to government files.

17 Congressional investigators also have been shocked to discover that the CIA's assassination documents was never shown by administration officials to Speaker John McCormack (Mass.), next in line to succeed President Johnson.

18 While FBI officials warned Speaker McCormack, a dedicated anti-Communist, that he is on the list of Western officials feared by the Kremlin, no CIA authority has shown the No. 2 man in government the CIA report listing these secret Soviet assassination methods.

19 Instead, McCormack learned about the report only recently from congressional probers who are trying to determine why the document has been suppressed.

20 The investigators also are trying to determine why the CIA in its pre-assassination report to the State Department on Oswald's trip to Mexico City gave details only of the defector's visit to the Russian embassy and not the Cuban embassy. The CIA did not report the latter visit until after Kennedy's assassination in Dallas.

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SOVIET USE OF ASSASSINATION AND KIDNAPPING

SAME AS 570-254

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17 February 1964

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Reducing and keeping to a minimum the potential threat to the regime represented by these emigres is one of the functions of the state security service. Soviet intelligence seeks to neutralize, discredit and destroy anti-Soviet groups by luring emigres back to the USSR, by penetrating emigre organizations, and by kidnapping or murdering individual emigres considered to be particularly dangerous.

Emigre leaders who participate in anti-Soviet activities have been primary targets of Soviet abduction or assassination operations. Such operations are sometimes designed to demonstrate that the Soviet regime can strike its enemies anywhere in the world. The Soviets hope thereby to create fear, unrest, confusion and dissension within emigre organizations and at the same time deter other emigres from joining their ranks. The planned assassination of NIS leader Georgiy S. OKOLOVICH in February 1954 represented a particularly significant step toward achieving this goal, but the act was not carried out because of the defection of state security Captain Nikolay KHOKHLOV.

On the other hand, assassinations of some emigre leaders have been carried out so skillfully as to leave the impression that the victims died from natural causes. Details of some of the techniques used to achieve this were brought to light in 1961 when professional KGB assassin Bogdan STASHINSKIY defected to the West and revealed that he had successfully

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans

**SUBJECT: Comment on Allen and Scott Article,
"Secret Report Under Wraps"**

1. A report by Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott was published in the Northern Virginia Sun on 22 October 1964 entitled "Secret Report Under Wraps" (see Attachment A). The report contains two elements of significance:

a. Allen and Scott allege that CIA withheld from the Warren Commission significant information on Soviet State Security organization and capability to perform assassination abroad. Specifically it cites by title and quotation an "estimate" produced by CIA, "Soviet Strategic Executive Action".

b. The contents of the Allen and Scott report reveals knowledge of most sensitive, though dated, CIA finished counterintelligence research and warrants vigorous follow-up by the Security Committee of USIB.

2. The allegations that CIA withheld any information from the Warren Commission regarding Soviet intelligence capabilities to conduct assassination abroad is false. A detailed study was submitted to the Commission by CIA on 28 February 1964. The

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report was entitled "Soviet Use of Assassination and Kidnapping", was dated 17 February 1964, 26 pages in length (see Attachment B). This report is a balanced, comprehensive, up-dated survey; it replaced and amplified an October 1961 study - this was not an "estimate" - entitled "Soviet Strategic Executive Action (A Preliminary Survey)", 13 pages.

The October 1961 publication was distributed to the intelligence community on a very limited basis as GSCI-3/768, 041 (see Attachment C). The CIA covering memo clearly pointed out the interim nature of the study. Distribution was as follows: FBI - four copies, AG of S, I (Army) - eight, Office of Security (Department of State) - one, INR (Department of State) - six, ONI - three, NSA - two, OSI - three, AG of S, I (USAF) - three, AEC - one. One copy of the publication was sent to the White House for General Taylor who had previously expressed an interest in Soviet paramilitary organization. The Agency refused to permit the dissemination abroad of the study in its original format. A request by the OSI early in 1962 was denied. The 1961 study was classified Secret/No Foreign Dissem/No Dissem Abroad/Limited and Background Use Only.

3. The quotations which appeared in the Allen and Scott report, with one significant exception, are an accurate version of paragraph 4 of the 1961 study. The original version of paragraph 4 refers to "KGB and the GRU". In the Allen and Scott version the phrase "and the GRU" is omitted. This deletion tends to concentrate attention on the KGB alone and therefore is an erroneous representation of the 1961 paper. There is no doubt that the 1961 study or portions thereof, were leaked to Allen and Scott. It is most probable that the source of the leak is among the original recipients of the 1961 study. The Warren Commission did not know the existence of the 1961 publication.

4. The last paragraph of the Allen and Scott report contains another reference which may serve to narrow the possibility of the source of the leakage. In that paragraph Scott and Allen allege that

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CIA provided information on Oswald's contact with the Cuban Embassy in Mexico after the assassination whereas its pre-assassination report had signalled only Oswald's contact with the Soviets in Mexico City. The Scott and Allen write-up suggests that CIA withheld information. This was, of course, untrue. The fact is that information regarding Oswald's contact with the Cubans was developed after the assassination, there was no hard information that linked Oswald by name with the Cubans before 22 November. The CIA dissemination on 10 October 1963 on Oswald's contact with the Soviets went to the State Department, ONI, FBI and I&NS. Although Allen and Scott are erroneous in their imputations, they are correct with respect to their facts about CIA reporting regarding Oswald and the Cubans in Mexico City. The two reporters were, obviously, informed by someone who was knowledgeable.

Raymond G. Rocca
Chief, CI/R&A

Attachments - a/s

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~~28 Feb 64~~ 28 Feb 64

Mr. J. Lee Rankin
General Counsel
President's Commission on the
Assassination of President Kennedy
200 Maryland Avenue, N. E.
Washington, D. C., 20002

Dear Mr. Rankin:

Forwarded herewith are the originals and two carbon copies each of two papers prepared by this agency for the Commission.

The first paper is entitled "Soviet Use of Assassination and Kidnapping." It sets forth information from a variety of sources on KGB employment of assassination and kidnapping techniques to eliminate enemies of the USSR abroad.

The second paper is entitled "Soviet Press Reaction to the Assassination of President Kennedy." It is an analysis of the coverage of the assassination and its aftermath in the major Soviet newspapers during the period 23 November - 31 December 1963.

We hope that these papers will assist the Commission in completing its work.

SAME AS 569-255

Sincerely,

(Signed) Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Deputy Director for Plans

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Enclosures: 6 as stated above.

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~~SECRET~~Introduction

It has long been known that the Soviet state security service (currently the KGB) resorts to abduction and murder to combat what are considered to be actual or potential threats to the Soviet regime. These techniques, frequently designated as "executive action"¹ and known within the KGB as "liquid affairs" (likvidnyye Dela), can be and are employed abroad as well as within the borders of the USSR. They have been used against Soviet citizens, Soviet emigres and even foreign nationals. A list of those who have fallen victim to such action over the years would be a very long one and would include even the co-founder of the Soviet state, Leon TROTSKY. Several well known Soviet assassination operations which have occurred since the rise of KHRUSHCHEV attest to the fact that the present leadership of the USSR still employs this method of dealing with its enemies.

The sudden disappearance or unexpected death of a person known to possess anti-Soviet convictions immediately raises the suspicion of Soviet involvement. Because it is often impossible to prove who is responsible

1. Strictly speaking, the term "executive action" encompasses diversitary activities (such as sabotage) as well as terroristic activities. This paper, however, discusses only the terroristic aspect of Soviet executive action, namely kidnapping and assassination.

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for such incidents, Soviet intelligence is frequently blamed and is undoubtedly credited with successes it actually has not achieved. On the other hand, even in cases where the Soviet hand is obvious, investigation often produces only fragmentary information, due to the KGB ability to camouflage its trail. In addition, Soviet intelligence is doubtless involved in incidents that never become officially recognized as executive action, such as assassinations which are recorded as accidents, suicide, or natural deaths.

All of the factors cited above have helped to obscure Soviet practices in regard to assassinations and abductions outside the USSR. Certain observations can be made, however, which will help to put these practices into their proper perspective. These observations are set forth in the following paragraphs and are based on information produced by the investigation of known or suspected Soviet operations which have occurred since World War II, as well as from information supplied by defectors during this period.

Targets

The large numbers of former citizens of the USSR (and of Imperial Russia) living abroad in protest against the Soviet regime have been a continuing cause for concern to the Soviets since the early twenties.

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performed two such missions. In 1957 he killed Ukrainian emigre writer Lev REBEY in Munich with a poison vapor gun which left the victim dead of an apparent heart attack. In 1959, the same type of weapon was used on Ukrainian emigre leader Stepan BANDERA, although BANDERA's death was never fully accepted as having been from natural causes. These cases are discussed in more detail later in this paper.

Executive action is also triggered by any signs of possible disloyalty on the part of Soviet officials abroad. The Soviets have gone to great lengths in the past to silence their intelligence officers who have defected, as evidenced by the assassination of former state security officer Ignace REISS in 1937 and the unexplained "suicide" of former Soviet military intelligence officer Walter KRIVITSKY in 1941. In the post-war era, their determination to prevent such defections was vividly demonstrated by the unsuccessful attempt to force the wife of Vladimir PETROV to return to the Soviet Union from Australia after his defection in April 1954. The practice of physical restraint applies with equal force to other Soviet officials who attempt to defect or are suspected of being on the verge of doing so. Examples were witnessed in Calcutta, India in January 1958 and Rangoon, Burma in May 1959. The respective victims, Aleksandr

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F. ZELENOVSKIY and Mikhail I. STRYGIN, were both portrayed by the Soviets as mental cases, were taken into custody by means of strong-arm tactics, and were forcibly removed to the USSR in a matter of days.

Foreign nationals are sometimes victims of Soviet executive action. The targets who fall into this category may be indigenous agents who have become suspect or former citizens of Satellite countries who have turned against the Soviet regime. In the latter case, actions against such individuals are usually carried out through the corresponding Satellite intelligence service, aided and abetted by soviet state security. The abductions of Dr. Walter LINSE and Bohumil LAUSMAN exemplify this type of operation. LINSE had fled East Germany in 1947 and later became a leader of the "Society of Free Jurists," an anti-Communist organization that the Soviets considered particularly dangerous. He was kidnapped from West Berlin in July 1952 by agents of the East German security service, with the full knowledge and approval of soviet state security; he was later turned over to Soviet authorities in Karlsruh, East Berlin and eventually sentenced

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to imprisonment in the USSR. LAUSMAN, a prominent Czech anti-Communist who had fled to the West in 1949, disappeared from Vienna in 1953. It was later learned that he had been kidnapped by agents of Czech intelligence, with the official sanction of Moscow. The Soviet state security rezidentura in Vienna also had been directed to assist the operation by supplying a car for transporting LAUSMAN to Prague and arranging for the vehicle to have free passage through the Soviet Zone of Austria.

Foreign political leaders are also potential targets of Soviet executive action operations and, according to recent information, the KGB's executive action component includes such persons among its targets. There is, however, no evidence proving that any Western leader has been the victim of Soviet executive action.

2. LINSE died in a Soviet prison camp 15 December 1953, according to a statement issued by the Soviet Red Cross on 8 June 1960, a virtual admission of Soviet responsibility for the kidnapping. The cited date of his death is at variance, however, with information from fellow prisoners of LINSE who reported having seen him in 1954 and 1955.

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The executive action component of the Soviet government is currently designated the Thirteenth Department of the KGB intelligence directorate (First Chief Directorate). The earliest known predecessor of the Thirteenth Department was the so-called "Directorate of Special Tasks" reportedly established within the NKVD in December 1936 for terror purposes. During World War II terror missions were performed by the NKGB Fourth Directorate, which was responsible for partisan activity behind German lines. In late 1945 or early 1946 this directorate was replaced by a unit of the KGB known as Spets Byuro #1 which was organized to retain Fourth Directorate personnel to support and direct partisan activities behind enemy lines in the event of a future war. In the summer of 1952, however, the long-range aspects of Spets Byuro #1's mission were abandoned, and emphasis was shifted to using all available agents for sabotage and other violent activities. Spets Byuro #1 was given a new, and at present still unknown, designation sometime in 1953 and assigned to carry out "special action tasks," such as sabotage, political murders and kidnappings. With the creation of the KGB in 1954, the executive action component was redesignated as the Thirteenth Department. Although the jurisdiction of the department is global, its main target areas are the United States and members of Western treaty organizations. There

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is no evidence of the existence of any unit within the Soviet military intelligence component (the GRU) responsible for the type of executive action discussed in this paper, although the GRU reportedly can undertake such operations under certain circumstances.

The Thirteenth Department is believed to be divided into sections (otdeleniya) or directions (napravleniya) by countries or groups of countries, such as, for example, the United States ("the principal enemy"), England, Latin America, etc. At Moscow headquarters the department has approximately 50-60 experienced employees, and was last known to be headed by General (fnr) ROBIN, who under the alias KOROVIN had previously been the KGB resident in Great Britain. Secrecy about the work of this department is maintained through the careful selection and training of its personnel; the officers do not discuss their experience among others; department documents are not circulated.

In addition to headquarters personnel, the 13th Department has its own support officers in legal residences in Western countries and in some Satellite countries. Such support officers work under the instructions of the legal resident and the 13th Department. One of the more active groups is a unit in East Germany which numbers perhaps 20-30 persons. As of 1968 there was a group in China, but it probably no longer exists. Prior to 1955 there was also a group in Austria. In a country in which a support

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officer of the 13th Department is stationed, the legal resident and the headquarters department for that country are aware of the targets of the 13th Department in that country, although they are not aware of illegal agents who are in direct contact with the 13th Department.

Although the Thirteenth Department is the KGB's executive action component, the Emigre (Ninth) Department directs all operations, including assassination operations, against Soviet emigres. The Emigre Department's assassination operations, however, are believed to be conducted jointly with the Thirteenth Department and sometimes other KGB components; for example, the counterintelligence directorate (Second Chief Directorate).

The 13th Department also supports the Disinformation (12th) Department of the First Chief Directorate in the latter's covert propaganda campaigns aimed at the creation of confusion and panic in Western countries. An example is the campaign conducted, in 1959 and later, for the purpose of creating adverse world opinion toward West Germany. This campaign included setting fire to synagogues and painting swastika signs in public places and attributing these acts to West Germans. Other operations in which both the Thirteenth Department and the Disinformation Department are involved include attempts to remove the threat to Soviet interests posed by certain members of Western governments. Sometimes this entails arranging for the dismissal of such persons from public office, but, in theory at least, it could mean "eliminating" them physically.

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The defector, KHOKHLOV, described two laboratories associated with the executive action department. One produced special weapons and explosive devices, whereas the other developed poisons and drugs for "special tasks." The explosives laboratory was located near Kuchino, outside Moscow, and was responsible for the development and production of weapons, from drawing up blueprints to melting and pouring bullets. In no case was assistance obtained from military ordinance or other outside agencies.

The laboratory for poisons was supposedly a large and super-secret installation. No agents were permitted access to it or even knew of its location. KHOKHLOV could provide no first-hand information on it. Other sources, however, have reported the existence of this type of laboratory dating back to the purges in the late 1930's. A report from one source in 1954 described an experimental laboratory within Spets Byuro #1 known as the "Chamber" (Kamern). This laboratory conducted experiments on prisoners and persons subject to execution to test the effectiveness of different powders, beverages and liquors and various types of injections, as well as research on the use of hypnosis to force prisoners to confess. Besides its staff, only certain high-level persons were permitted to enter its premises. Although its existence officially was kept a secret, it was generally suspected or known by many state security functionaries that a unit of this sort was maintained. The Soviet government allegedly abolished

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the "Kamera" in October 1953, according to an announcement made to selected state security and Party officials, attributing the establishment and operation of the laboratory solely to BARIYA and his cohorts. Whether or not this step actually was taken does not rule out the possibility, however, of the same type of unit continuing to exist in some other form.

Training for executive action operations was conducted at a base in Moscow by a staff of instructors who specialized in such subjects as the use of small arms, judo, code, wireless, driving, surveillance, and photography.

Although executive action operations outside the USSR are planned, directed, and sometimes carried out by state security staff personnel, a mission may also be performed by one or more agents recruited specifically for this purpose. KHOKHLOV himself, for instance, was categorically forbidden to assassinate OKOLOVICH personally. Two German agents, Hans KUKOWITSCH and Kurt WEBER, were to carry out the deed under KHOKHLOV's supervision. This reflected Soviet theory that indigenous personnel would have better access to the target, and also had the advantage of avoiding direct Soviet attribution. It appears from the STASHINSKIY case, however, that security considerations ruled out the involvement of non-Soviets in more recent operations.

Even though some sources have made statements to the contrary, it appears that the agents (as opposed to staff employees like STASHINSKIY) who perform executive action for the Soviets may be used for more than one

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mission of this nature. KNOXLOV spoke of special executive action units known as "boevaya grupa" (literally, combat groups) which consisted of indigenous agents and/or Soviet illegal staff officers situated outside the borders of the USSR on the territory of hostile governments or in close proximity thereto. Such groups were armed and prepared to perform executive actions when required to do so, either in time of peace or war. A group of this type under the direction of the executive action department base at Karlshorst ostensibly was involved in the kidnapping of Dr. Alexander TRUSHNOVICH, an NTE leader in West Berlin, in April 1954. KNOXLOV believed the abductors to have been recruited and organized by the East German security service at the request of the KGB chief at Karlshorst. The same type of group was mentioned in connection with the abduction of Dr. LIXSE; the actual abduction was reportedly performed by four German members of a "boevaya grupa" from East Germany. It is probable that such teams are a modern variation of the "mobile groups" described by a pre-war source as units dispatched from Moscow to foreign countries to assassinate Trotskyites and state security officers who refused to return to the USSR, as in the case of REISS and possibly HAVITSEY.

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~~SECRET~~Techniques

Many known or suspected executive action cases in the post-war period have involved the use of poisons rather than guns or explosives. It is conceivable that the Soviets tend to favor poisons because murders can be accomplished more surreptitiously in this manner and in some instances without leaving easily recognizable traces of foul play. Drugs are also used to incapacitate a person temporarily for abduction purposes, as reportedly happened in the TRUSHKOVICH case and in the kidnapping of another NTH member, Valeri P. TREMMEL, from Linz, Austria in June 1954. There are, however, many unknown, uncontrollable factors in the use of poisons and drugs which limit and often preclude their usage. Probably the most important is the narrow span between a dose that will cause disability and one that will cause death. Dosages vary from one individual to another depending upon the person's weight, state of health, and the way the poison enters the body. The type used obviously is determined by the result desired. It is no problem to cause death, but often difficult to control dosage successfully when the objective is to incapacitate an individual only temporarily.

There appears to be no consistency in the use of poisons by Soviet intelligence to cause disability or death, or in the repetitions use of any one drug. Chemicals which have been used in cases known or suspected

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to be Soviet instigated include arsenic, potassium cyanide, scopolamine, and thallium. Other likely substances are atropine, barbiturates, chloral hydrate, paraldehyde and Warfarin. Combinations of two or more substances may also be used, which further complicates diagnosis and tracing.

One well publicized poisoning case involved the defector Nikolay KHOKHLOV. KHOKHLOV suffered a sudden and severe illness while attending an anti-Communist meeting in Frankfurt, Germany in September 1957. A positive diagnosis was precluded by the initial treatment given him at a German hospital, but there was evidence of his having been poisoned by a thallium derivative of arsenic and/or other chemical agents, and a strong possibility that the poison had been administered at KGB instigation. KHOKHLOV himself believed, and allegedly had supporting medical opinion, that he had been poisoned by radio-activated thallium. He believed that the poison was of Russian origin because it was such a complicated substance that it was difficult to analyze and had been carefully prepared to leave virtually no trace. A unique mechanism for administering poison was described by a knowledgeable source as a pneumatically operated poison ice "atomizer" which leaves no wound or other evidence of the cause of death. The equipment and techniques used in the poisoning of ELBERT and BANDERA are treated below in some detail as examples of the most recent and sophisticated methods in use by the KGB.

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COPY~~SECRET~~Specific CasesL. STASHINSKIY

In November 1961 a Soviet intelligence officer, Bogdan STASHINSKIY, surrendered to the West German police, stating that he had, acting under official orders, assassinated two individuals during the previous few years: Lav REBET, a Ukrainian emigre writer; and Stepan BANDERA, a leader of the Ukrainian Nationalist movement. In both cases, a similar type of weapon had been used: a gun which fired vaporized poison which killed almost instantly upon being inhaled. The properties of the killing agent were such that, until the defection of the assassin, both victims were officially believed to have died from heart attacks. In the case of BANDERA, however, there was some unconfirmed suspicion of potassium cyanide poisoning although there was insufficient evidence to prove it.

The Weapon

The weapon used to assassinate REBET was a light-weight aluminum cylinder, 15-16 cm. long and approximately 3 cm. in diameter, and weighing about 200 grams. The cylinder was divided into three separate chambers, one of which contained liquid poison sealed hermetically into a plastic-type ampule container under low pressure. (At normal temperatures the poison would evaporate, disappearing without trace in about two minutes.) The three components could be assembled by means of a thread which allowed

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one part to screw into the other. The first component was the poison ampule portion, the front end of which had a fine metallic screen. The poison ampule fitted solidly against the walls of the metal cylinder. The center component contained a piston and a piston arm which extended into the third or activating component. The latter contained a spring-mounted activating arm which, when drawn back, armed the weapon. A releasing arm was appended to the third component at an angle and was attached to the activating arm by means of a releasing catch. A small safety arm permitted the weapon to be placed in the safety position. The third component also contained a few grams of powder.

The maximum effective range of the weapon was about one-half meter; at one and one-half meters the effect of the vapors would be questionable; and at two and one-half meters, the vapors would be totally ineffective. (The assassin was instructed to fire the weapon only inches from the face.)

The weapon was activated as follows: The activating arm was pulled back and the safety released. The weapon was then activated. It was held in the palm of the hand in such a fashion that it fired when the user pressed the releasing arm towards the activating arm. The releasing arm, when pressed, acted upon the releasing catch, permitting the spring-held

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activating arm to fly forward against the small charge of powder. The exploding powder (which made a noise approximating the sound of a loud handclap with the hands cupped) drove the piston arm forward, causing the piston to strike against the poison ampule. The poison was thus driven out through the fine screen in the form of a liquid spray.

The weapon used for the second assassination was similar, except that it was double-barrelled. Each barrel contained a charge of poison similar to that contained in the single-barrelled weapon; however, the two barrels could be discharged separately or together as a unit. Thus, in the event the first charge did not kill the victim, a second attempt could be made. The two barrels were welded together and the weapon had two releasing arms, two releasing catches, two safeties, and two activating arms. The effect of the poison was the same.

Utilization of the Weapon

For maximum effective results it is recommended that the liquid poison be shot directly into the face of the victim, in order to introduce the vapors most quickly into the respiratory system. Since the vapors rise upwards very rapidly, the poison is still effective when aimed at the chest; conceivably, this would be sufficient time to allow the victim time to scream.

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~~SECRET~~Effects of the Poison

The effect of the poisonous vapors is such that the arteries which feed blood to the brain become paralyzed almost immediately. Absence of blood in the brain precipitates a normal paralysis of the brain or a heart attack, as a result of which the victim dies. The victim is clinically dead within one and one-half minutes after inhaling these poisonous vapors. After about five minutes the effect of the poison wears off entirely, permitting the arteries to return to their normal condition, leaving no trace of the killing agent which precipitated the paralysis or the heart attack.

Allegedly, no foreign matter can be discovered in the body or on the clothes of the victim, no matter how thorough an autopsy or examination. The liquid spray can be seen as it leaves the nose of the weapon, however, and droplets can also be seen on the face of the victim.

STABINSKIY claimed that, before using the weapon on his first victim, he tested it on a dog. He fired the gun directly into the dog's face, holding his hand approximately one and one-half feet from its nose. Almost immediately after the liquid spray had hit its face the dog rolled over, without making any sound whatever. It continued to writhe for almost three minutes, however. STABINSKIY was told that the poison affected a human much sooner, causing death within one and one-half minutes.

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~~SECRET~~Safety Precautions for the User

STASHINSKIY was told that neither the poisonous liquid nor the fatal fumes affected any portion of the body other than the respiratory system, and that, since it could not enter the body through the skin or the pores, one could safely place his hands into a pail of the poison. Inasmuch as the weapon was held at arm's length when fired and the liquid spray ejected forward in a conical pattern, the user, under normal conditions, is safe from the effects of the poisonous vapors. Nevertheless, as an extra precaution, STASHINSKIY was provided with counteractive agents to use if he so desired.

Concealment Methods

For transportation, the weapon was transported hermetically sealed in a container, and inserted between sausages in a can which was itself hermetically sealed. It was suggested to STASHINSKIY that he should carry the weapon to the site of the planned assassination wrapped in a light newspaper, in which he had torn a small hole to enable him to reach the safety quickly just before using the weapon.

Method of Attack

In the first assignment, STASHINSKIY observed REEBT debarking from a streetcar at about 9:30 hours. Observing that the victim was heading for his office, the assassin preceded him into the building and climbed the

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circular staircase to the first floor. On hearing REBET's footsteps on the staircase, STASHINSKIY turned and started walking down, keeping to the left, and carrying the weapon, wrapped in newspaper, in his right hand. The two met about halfway between the two floors. Firing directly into REBET's face from a distance of approximately one-half meter, STASHINSKIY continued walking downstairs without even breaking his pace. The victim lurched silently forward and fell on the staircase. While still in the building, STASHINSKIY shook off the liquid drops from the weapon and put it in the breast pocket of his suit. (A laboratory examination of the suit later revealed nothing of significance.) Although he had no reason to believe that he had inhaled the poisonous fumes, he used the counteractive measures provided. He later disposed of the murder weapon in a shallow canal in the city.

In carrying out his second mission, STASHINSKIY used a similar approach. Having previously abandoned an attempt to corner BANDERA in the latter's garage, the assassin gained entry into the victim's apartment house by reproducing a key which he had observed being used in the front door lock. On the day of the assassination, having seen BANDERA drive into his driveway, STASHINSKIY let himself into the apartment building and waited. BANDERA, carrying several packages of fruit and vegetables in his right hand, entered the front door with the aid of a key which was on a key ring together with other keys. As he was attempting to disengage the

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key from the lock, STASHINSKIY moved away from the elevator, where he had been standing, toward the front door. The weapon was in his hand with the safety released. As he walked past the victim, who was still trying to extricate the key from the lock, the assassin took the door handle with his left hand, as if to assist BANDERA, asking him: "Doesn't it work?" By this time, BANDERA had succeeded in pulling the key out of the lock. Almost at the instant he replied "Yes, it works," STASHINSKIY fired both barrels simultaneously into his face at almost point-blank range. Seeing the victim lurch backwards and to the side, the assassin walked out of the apartment building and closed the front door. Although he did not wait to see BANDERA drop to the ground, STASHINSKIY is certain that, contrary to press reports, the man did not scream or otherwise call for help. STASHINSKIY later threw the murder weapon into the same canal in which he had discarded the first weapon.

Although the press reported that BANDERA had been attacked physically before he was poisoned, STASHINSKIY insisted that he had used no force, since it had not been necessary to do so. Some newspapers also reported that BANDERA had died of potassium cyanide poisoning. STASHINSKIY claims that he was told, and believes, that the chemical was not potassium cyanide, since (1) he thinks that substance could not have been introduced into the body by the method employed, and (2) he believes the KGB would have no reason to

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deceive him on this matter, especially since he had to be provided with counteractive precautions. STASHINSKIY claimed that one of his Soviet contacts was pleased to learn that the police suspected potassium cyanide, since this allegedly indicated that the true cause of the victim's death was not evident.

II. RADIO FREE EUROPE

The New York Times reported on an attempt to poison the staff of RFE on November 21, 1959, by placing atropine in the salt shakers of the cafeteria used by RFE personnel. Atropine is a derivative from the deadly nightshade plant; it can cause paralysis or death if taken in sufficient quantity. The amount of poison in each salt shaker was said to be 2.5% by weight of the contents. White crystalline alkaloid is indistinguishable from salt. (Unclassified, from NYT, 17 December 1959.)

III. STEIN

In March 1955, Lina STEIN, an interviewer with RIAS, the American propaganda radio station in West Germany ("Radio in American Sector"), was fed candy containing the highly dangerous poison scopolamine. (Scopolamine is used in the so-called "twilight sleep." Given in small doses it induces a kind of euphoria; in larger doses it is supposed to be a deadly poison.) It was intended that Fran STEIN would become ill and would be abducted. The plan was that the agent - someone whom Fran STEIN trusted and with whom

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she was meeting in a West Berlin cafe - would offer the poisoned candy toward the end of the meeting. The lady was expected to become ill while walking from the cafe to her nearby residence. On becoming unconscious, she was to be picked up by a waiting car which would appear to be passing by chance. The plot was not carried to fruition, however, because Frau STARK did not become ill until she was near her apartment, at which point neighbors came to her aid and she was moved to a hospital. She was severely ill for 48 hours, after which an antidote was found. (Unclassified, from the testimony of Theodor HAHN, formerly with US Military Intelligence, Germany, September 21, 1950, before a Congressional investigating committee.)

IV. OTHER

Another weapon used is described as a noiseless gas pistol, powered by a 300 volt battery, which fires a lethal, odorless unidentifiable gas. The gas acts in two or three seconds, and is effective up to 15 or 20 meters. The pistol has three buttons: one for arming, one for firing, and the third for recharging the battery. (After 50 firings the battery may be recharged by plugging a transformer into normal house power source.) The pistol is normally fired 20 times, very rapidly and automatically -- "Bzzz." Although one squirt could kill, 20 squirts are emitted in order to saturate the area.

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since the gun is fired at a silhouette, rather than at a point.) The gas shot by the pistol would penetrate the victim's clothing and enter the skin. There is allegedly no danger to the user.

Trends

Since World War II, and especially in the years since Stalin's death, assassination attempts abroad have become increasingly rare. Currently the emphasis in the executive action field is placed on sabotage and sabotage planning rather than terrorism against individuals. The Soviets now apparently resort to murder only in the case of persons considered especially dangerous to the regime and who, for one reason or another, cannot be kidnaped. A kidnaped person is obviously more valuable inasmuch as the Soviets may be able to extract from him information of interest, as well as use him for propaganda purposes by making it appear that he defected to the Soviet side of his own free will. This course was followed in the case of Dr. TRUSHNOVICH. It is also likely that the Soviets find it increasingly difficult to find persons willing to undertake murder assignments, while the same may not be true of abduction operations. It can further be conjectured that the Soviets are now more concerned about the adverse publicity generated by Soviet assassinations in general than they were in previous years.

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In this connection, comments made by state security defectors Boris DERYABIN and Yuri RASTVOROV in 1954 about what the Soviets would or would not do are still of interest. Both believed that the Soviets would murder one of their officials on the verge of defecting if that were the only way of preventing the act. The same would apply to a Soviet official who had just defected if thereby state secrets could be preserved and if they believed that killing him would not bring about a more adverse situation in terms of politics and propaganda than already existed. DERYABIN and RASTVOROV doubted, however, that the Soviets would murder an official who had been in non-Communist hands long enough to have been exploited for intelligence and propaganda purposes. While both granted that in particular cases the Soviets might go to any extreme, they both believed, generally speaking, that the adverse propaganda resulting from such an act would negate its original purpose. On the other hand, IGOR KHLOV, who might have been in a better position to know, has stated without qualification that the Soviets would continue to assassinate defectors in the future. The threat of Soviet executive action against defectors is also considered a real one by Reino HAYHANEN, who defected from the KGB in 1957. A still more recent Soviet intelligence source also believes that standard Soviet practice is to mount a kidnapping or assassination operation "through all intelligence opportunities" against defectors from the Soviet intelligence services.

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DERYABIN and RASTVOROV further agreed that the Soviets, without hesitation, would forcibly return to the USSR someone on the verge of defecting at a mission abroad. This was borne out by the aforementioned STRYGIN and ZELENOVSKIY cases. DERYABIN and RASTVOROV also believed that the same policy would apply to a Soviet official who had just defected, or one who had been in non-Communist hands long enough to have been exploited for intelligence and propaganda purposes, if the capability existed for returning him physically to the USSR.

Lastly, DERYABIN believed that the assassination of an Allied official would be highly unlikely and probably unprofitable. He also doubted that the Soviets would attempt to kidnap any U.S. officials unless they were particularly knowledgeable. Such an incident would not be worth the trouble for an average official, but an important person conceivably would have sufficient information to make it worthwhile.

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SOVIET STRATEGIC EXECUTIVE ACTION

(A Preliminary Survey)



Document Number 918922 B

for FOIA Review on JUL 1976

October 1961

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SOVIET STRATEGIC EXECUTIVE ACTION

(A Preliminary Survey)

Foreword: A report that Soviet-trained saboteurs were stationed "in critical areas" as of April 1961 and had received their assignments, has given impetus to the immediate publication of this preliminary survey of information, together with some tentative conclusions, on Soviet strategic sabotage and other forms of "executive action" (i. e. political action, assassination, kidnapping). This survey is based on fragmentary evidence from several sources, some of them occupying positions which offer only peripheral access to data on the subject. Although certain historical details are included for background purposes, the emphasis of the survey is on current aspects of Soviet strategic executive action. Portions of the survey have not previously been disseminated to the addressees.

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for FOIA Review on JUL 1976

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I. Introduction

1. The two Soviet intelligence services -- the Committee for State Security (Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopastnosti: KGB) attached to the USSR Council of Ministers and the Chief Intelligence Directorate (Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravleniye: GRU) of the General Staff, Soviet Ministry of Defense -- undertake peacetime and wartime sabotage missions, political action, assassinations and kidnappings in response to requirements levied by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and by the Soviet Ministry of Defense. They perform these "strategic executive action" tasks in addition to their better known function of conducting espionage. The long-standing Soviet capability for strategic executive action is not limited to the clandestine and paramilitary facilities of the KGB and GRU, for in the absence of such assets the KGB and GRU can transfer particular assignments to the Satellite countries in accordance with a directive relating to collaboration between the two Soviet services and the Satellite intelligence services.⁽¹⁾ According to one source, Soviet wartime executive action missions are designated as being in the so-called "Letter A" category, peacetime missions in the "Letter B" category.

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II. Participants

2. Responsibility for executive action by the KGB rests with a single component of the First (Foreign) Directorate. Within the GRU, however, the arrangement is somewhat different in that one directorate⁽²⁾ coordinates the strategic executive action carried out by other GRU elements, namely, the three area directorates (Anglo-American, European, and Eastern Directorates) and the Illegals Directorate.⁽³⁾ Also, as noted in Paragraph 7 below, this GRU directorate for strategic executive action has a role in the training and allocation of Soviet paramilitary forces to be used in wartime. From another standpoint, too, the mission of the GRU directorate is broader than that of the KGB executive action component: It assists the Soviet General Staff in the selection of enemy targets which must be destroyed and in the determination of whether these targets are to be destroyed by the clandestine assets of the GRU, in other words by sabotage, or by more conventional military means.⁽⁴⁾ Whereas KGB executive action is believed to be under the direct supervision of the CPSU Central Committee, the GRU's work along the same lines is controlled through two intermediaries between the GRU directorate and the Central Committee, in that propaganda and allied activities require prior concurrence on the part of a special department⁽⁵⁾ of the

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Chief Political Directorate, Ministry of Defense, the CPSU arm within the Soviet Armed Forces, while the rest of the GRU's executive action tasks are fulfilled on orders from the First (Operational) Directorate of the General Staff. (6)

III. Specific Missions

3. There is a fairly solid evidence that the KGB and GRU currently perform political action missions. In several "low-level" cases, the KGB has used agents to plant articles in pro-Western or neutralist publications. Such articles are not necessarily pro-Soviet in tone, but are designed to further Soviet interests in some fashion. On a higher level, it has been reported that in June 1960, two senior KGB officers travelled to East Berlin to assist in the organization of a program of "aid" for Cuba. A satellite intelligence official resident in East Berlin also assisted in the formulation of this program, designed to prepare the Castro regime to resist an "American invasion" of Cuba. Arms, supplies and military intelligence experts were to be made available to the Cubans. Shortly after the KGB delegation left Berlin, a Cuban group arrived there ostensibly to discuss "economic matters." An unidentified Cuban intelligence official is reported to have been among this group. Actual shipment of arms and ammunition to Cuba and to Southeast Asia insurrectionists has been accomplished through overt channels.

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NOT IN NEWSPAPER ARTICLES

LETTER "S"
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4. It has been reported that the KGB and the GRU endeavor to
remove the threat to Soviet interests posed by certain members of
Western governments, sometimes arranging for the dismissal of
such persons from public office, at other times even having them
"eliminated" physically. ^P Such activities are known to be undertaken
against other types of persons in the West, notably ^P defectors
from the USSR and from other countries of the Soviet Bloc. ^P One
recently reported assassination technique is to electrocute an
individual by luring him to use a telephone, connected to a high-voltage
wire, during a thunderstorm. ^P Another involves the use of a pistol
which projects a poison gas in liquid or compressed form. The gas
is fatal within seconds and an autopsy would not reveal its use.
Non-traceable poisons have been reported which do not take effect
until several hours after being administered thus allowing an assassin
to be far from the scene when his victim dies. A knowledgeable source
has described a pneumatically operated poison ice "atomizer" which
leaves no wound or other evidence of the cause of death.

5. More substantial information is available on the role of the KGB and GRU in sabotage operations. Initially, they gather information on the targets of strategic sabotage, paying particular attention to the vulnerabilities of enemy defenses, defense industries, and railway and other transport action complexes. In this context, one

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source has stated, agents are ordered to submit "reports, documents, maps, sketches, drawings, and descriptions" pertaining to strategic sabotage targets. Planning the destruction of strategic objectives on a world-wide basis and city by city is a continuing process. (Washington, New York City, and West Berlin were recently cited as examples of cities for which the Soviets had "long ago" drawn up sabotage plans; details of the plans are not known). For the GRU directorate for strategic executive action the procedure apparently is to recommend to the Operational Directorate of the General Staff what sabotage and other destructive tasks should be imposed regarding each country. Presumably a similar procedure is followed by the KGB with respect to the CPSU Central Committee, in which is vested the ultimate authority for ordering KGB as well as GRU sabotage operations. Mass poisoning of water reservoirs, bacteriological warfare, and mass infection with typhus -- using bacteria supplied by the Chemical Directorate of the Ministry of Defense -- have been mentioned as representing one type of clandestine destructive technique available to the GRU. One source has offered two hypothetical examples of clandestine sabotage: first, an illegal could be given instructions to blow up a tunnel, together with precise directions on how to do so; second, a legal residency could be ordered to have a Communist Party member in the West

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destroy the plant in which he is working. The first determination to be made by Soviet authorities, however, is whether to sabotage the target prior to the outbreak of hostilities, to sabotage the target during wartime at the outset of war, or to employ conventional military weapons against the target. To date only one source has been able to provide any indication of the degree to which the Ministry of Defense now relies upon sabotage. According to this source, whose knowledgeability of the subject is open to some question, "out of 100 targets selected three targets will be destroyed by agents and illegals, while 97 will be destroyed by fire -- by missiles, by the Air Force, or, if the coastline is long, by the Navy. There are a million alternatives." It would seem that the considerations in deciding upon sabotage as a means of destruction are the importance of the target as a threat to Soviet interests, the vulnerability of the target to sabotage, the accessibility of a clandestine asset to the target, the availability of destructive means to that asset, and in peacetime the non-attributability of the sabotage operation to the Soviet Union.

IV. Paramilitary Training and Operations

6. During the one year that he was Chief of the GRU, beginning in October 1956, Colonel General Sergey Matveyevich SHTEMENKO established a sabotage-diversionist school near Tula or Tambov with an

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enrollment of 200 "specialists" (by inference, paramilitary troops) who would eventually be assigned to sabotage-diversionist groups. The school was created on SHTEMENKO's own initiative, although with the concurrence of Marshal ZHUKOV, then Minister of Defense, but without the knowledge of KHRUSHCHEV. Later, fearing that ZHUKOV planned to use these specialists against him, KHRUSHCHEV had ZHUKOV retired from active duty and SHTEMENKO demoted to the position of Deputy Commander of a military district. Officially SHTEMENKO was censured by the political apparatus for having conspired with ZHUKOV to establish the school without the permission of the Central Committee.

7. At the time of its formation the school reportedly was closely affiliated with, if not subordinate to, the GRU Operations Directorate (See Footnote 6). Despite SHTEMENKO's ouster, the school has continued to operate and is now believed to be under the subordination of the GRU directorate for strategic executive action, which participates in the allocation of its graduates to units in the field. These graduates are assigned to "stay-behind" sabotage groups located in the Satellite countries as well as the USSR, presumably in readiness to be dispatched on sabotage and diversionist tasks in support of the operations of wartime Soviet military fronts. (7)

Transfer of the subordination of the school for saboteurs-diversionists to the GRU directorate for strategic executive action,

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and perhaps also their subordination in the field to this directorate, may reflect an amendment in Soviet military doctrine. Executive action by paramilitary forces, then, may no longer be considered as having tactical application and instead could now be considered in effect one of the strategic implements available to the Operational Directorate of the General Staff.

V. Other Training

8. Lectures on the establishment and training of clandestine assets for executive action are included on the curriculum of the GRU's Military-Diplomatic Academy, reportedly the only strategic school of the Soviet intelligence services in recent years. (Strategic intelligence officers specializing in various procurement techniques are believed, however, to undergo training at KGB and possibly other GRU installations). The KGB as well as the GRU benefits from this orientation, since some graduates of the academy are assigned to KGB positions (several years ago up to one-half of the students annually left the academy to join the KGB, but according to one recent estimate, only about 20 to 30 per cent of the graduates now enter the KGB). It is not known what other facilities for executive action training the KGB may have, nor is it known whether the GRU conducts other training for its clandestine assets beyond that given to illegals. Before their dispatch to the West, one

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source has reported, illegals receive instruction in sabotage that is tailored to the particular countries to which they are being assigned.

FOOTNOTES

- (1) The CPSU Central Committee, moreover, can call upon Satellite and Western Communist Parties to fulfill clandestine political action tasks.
- (2) There is some evidence to suggest that the title of this GRU unit is the Fifth Directorate (Pyatoye Upravleniye) and that its Chief is Lieutenant General Mikhail Andreyevich KOCHETKOV. One source has reported that a "Directorate for Weapons (or Means) of Mass Destruction" was on the GRU Headquarters table of organization in 1958. It is now thought that this is more accurately a description of one of the functional elements of the "Fifth Directorate" than it is the designation of this directorate. The directorate is believed to be the latter-day successor to the Special Missions Department (Otdel Osobykh Zadaniy) which in 1953 was said to be independent of, but co-equal to, the GRU Headquarters directorates. From at least 1936, the state security service (now the KGB) has had an executive action

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component in its Foreign Directorate. During World War II, it carried out sabotage, assassination and other terrorist missions behind enemy lines. In the summer of 1952, as "Special Bureau # 1", it was directed to concentrate on sabotage preparation and other activities involving violence. After the death of Stalin in March 1953, the Special Bureau curtailed its activity for a while but by September of that year it had been reactivated and reorganized as the "Ninth Department" of the Foreign Directorate. The current designation of the KGB component for executive action is not known but it is certain that such a component still exists.

- (3) The GRU area directorates, like their counterparts in the KGB, conduct operations abroad through so-called "legal" residencies. A legal residency is composed of Soviet intelligence service staff personnel stationed abroad as overt representatives of the Soviet Union, such as military attaches, TASS correspondents, members of trade missions, diplomats, etc. An "illegal" residency likewise is composed of staff personnel from the Soviet intelligence services, but its members reside in the West semi-permanently while posing, and documented, as non-Soviets; illegals are ultimately subordinate to the Illegals Directorate of the GRU or the Illegals Directorate of the

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KGB First Directorate.

- (4) Another, and possibly not the only other, task of this GRU directorate is to coordinate the GRU's collection of information on enemy terrain and on localities which might be used as bridgeheads for large seaborne landings, as dead zones for paramilitary forces, and as reception areas for airborne troops. This information, collected by GRU residencies abroad as part of their annual procurement assignments, is collated by the directorate and then forwarded to the Operational Directorate of the General Staff (See Footnote 6). Conceivably this GRU directorate assures that provision is made for clandestine support, such as activating light signals and discharging flares, in landing areas.
- (5) This is apparently the unit reported in 1959 as the "Department for Work Among the Armed Forces of the Enemy". Members of this department studied enemy morale and weaknesses for exploitation in wartime, and they occasionally lectured to Soviet troops on enemy morale.
- (6) The Operational Directorate of the General Staff should not be confused with the Operations (Transborder) Directorate (Operativnoye Upravleniye) of the GRU. The latter directorate,

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formerly headed by KOCHETKOV (See Footnote 2), at one time was in charge of the training and deployment of sabotage and diversionist assets, paramilitary and clandestine, which were to be used in support of wartime operations by military fronts and lower military echelons.

- (7) It seems possible that these sabotage groups, or paramilitary forces, would be dispatched with false documentation as Westerners, when circumstances call for behind-the-lines sabotage on a comparatively massive scale.

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 for FOIA Review on **JUL 1976** Inspector General
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SUBJECT: Publication, "Soviet Strategic Executive Action
 (A Preliminary Survey)"

1. Transmitted herewith are copies of a publication entitled "Soviet Strategic Executive Action (A Preliminary Survey)" prepared by this Agency.

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Although not a comprehensive study, the survey is being disseminated at this time in view of the fact that Soviet-trained saboteurs are now reportedly in place in "critical areas" abroad and have received their assignments. Certain historical details are included for background purposes but the emphasis of this survey is on current aspects of Soviet strategic executive action--sabotage, political action, assassination and kidnaping.

2. The publication was prepared for the U.S. intelligence community as part of this Agency's counterintelligence responsibilities. It is requested that recipients forward comments on it to CIA and also any additional information on the subject.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

Approved: [Signature]

JAMES H. ANGLITON

CNOI-3/765,641

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SOVIET STRATEGIC SABOTAGE OPERATIONS

1. Soviet sabotage operations, in time of war or peace, are planned and mounted by the security/intelligence services, State Security (KGB) and Military Intelligence (GRU). Requirements for sabotage operations and other executive action tasks (kidnapping, assassination, political action) are levied on these services by the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Ministry of Defense. Such operations are carried out by designated components of the security/intelligence services, or, on occasion, are assigned to similar services in the Satellite nations under Soviet control.

2. Strategic sabotage operational plans to be mounted abroad in time of peace or on the outbreak of hostilities are constantly in preparation or undergoing revision. Agents of both Soviet services are required to submit information for use in such planning. Presumably, if ordered to carry out sabotage missions, the Soviet services would use their own personnel and members of local Communist Parties, as appropriate.

3. One defector reported several years ago that he had at one time been engaged in the organization of a deep-cover ("illegal")

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sabotage network to be used in Central Europe for peacetime operations. When not actively engaged in sabotage operations, agents of this network were to collect information on sabotage targets. It is highly probable, therefore, that the agents have been recruited, trained, and placed in areas throughout the Free World that the Soviets consider to be critical to their purposes. Use of sabotage in wartime will undoubtedly depend on the availability of suitable agents. In time of peace, avoidance of attribution to the Soviet Union will be a governing factor.

4. Both Soviet services achieved excellent results with tactical sabotage operations against the Germans in World War II. It must be assumed, therefore, that their training facilities are adequate to planning future missions, and that sabotage doctrine is revised as Soviet foreign development policy and the discovery of new sabotage devices require. Lectures in strategic sabotage are known to be given at the Military-Diplomatic Academy, the GRU school for training future strategic intelligence officers of both the KGB and GRU. Details of the training of "illegals" in sabotage are not known, but they are believed to receive training appropriate to their operational needs. The threat presented by unidentified "illegal" agents and their activities is a serious one and should be taken into account.

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