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(U) REF: JN2011144298 AMMAN AL-'ARAB AL-YAWM IN ARABIC 25 OCT 98 P 11 ///
PEACEFUL TAMMUZ REACTOR.

(U) SOURCE: AMMAN AL-'ARAB AL-YAWM IN ARABIC 25 OCT 98 P 11 TEXT:

(U) STAFF GENERAL 'ADNAN KHAYRALLAH, DEPUTY COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES AND DEFENSE MINISTER WHO HEADED THIS COMMITTEE, CONVEYED THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF'S DIRECTIVES THAT THE TASK OF THE MISSILE CORPS WAS TO SELECT MILITARY AND INDUSTRIAL TARGETS IN THE ZIONIST ENTITY, IF IT ATTACKED OUR MILITARY AND INDUSTRIAL INSTALLATIONS. WE WOULD ALSO NOT REPLY WITH OUR STRATEGIC MISSILES UNTIL THE ZIONIST AIRCRAFT HAD RETURNED. THIS WAS ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO AVOID OUR GROUND DEFENSES. OUR AIRCRAFT WOULD THEN REPLY FIRST. THEN THE MISSILES WOULD PLAY THEIR ROLE, DEPENDING OF COURSE ON THE TIME NEEDED FOR PREPARATION. I EXPLAINED THE FACTS ABOUT THE TECHNICAL AND LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS THAT WERE NEEDED FOR AN EFFECTIVE STRIKE. I SAID THAT THE TIME NEEDED BY EACH BATTERY TO CARRY OUT THE STRIKE IS EIGHT HOURS FROM THE TIME OF RECEIVING ORDERS. THIS WAS ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ALL THE EQUIPMENT NEEDED WAS CLOSE TO THE LAUNCHING SITE. BUT, IF A DECISION WAS TAKEN TO PACK THE MISSILES IN ADVANCE, THE TIME WOULD BE SHORTENED BY TWO HOURS. IT MUST BE

(b)(3)

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2

POINTED OUT, HOWEVER, THAT THE MISSILES WOULD BE USED AFTER ONE MONTH. WE HAD TO DECIDE ON THE NUMBER OF MISSILES NEEDED FOR EACH TARGET WHEN SEVERAL TARGETS WERE TO BE ATTACKED AT THE SAME TIME SO AS TO ASSIGN THE FIRING CREWS. I EXPLAINED THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO INSURE DIRECT COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE GENERAL COMMAND AND THE LAUNCHING SITES FOR QUICK ACTION. THIS WAS IN ADDITION TO COMMUNICATION WITH THE EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS. AND, TO PROTECT OUR MEANS OF FIRING, I SAID THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO ESTABLISH FIXED BASES. FINALLY, I SAID THAT IT WAS ALSO ESSENTIAL TO INSURE ACCURATE AND DETAILED MAPS OF THE TARGETS, CARRY OUT FIRING TESTS FROM EAST TO WEST TO CHECK ACCURACY, AND TO CONSIDER THE MEANS OF CAMOUFLAGING, CONCEALING, AND STOCKPILING MISSILES. MY PROPOSAL CONCERNING FIXED BASES WAS INFLUENCED BY MILITARY INDUSTRIALIZATION ORGANIZATION (MIO) PLANS. THEREFORE, I EXPLAINED THE NEED TO COORDINATE WITH MIO FOR MORE FLEXIBILITY. THIS WAS ESSENTIAL DUE TO THE DIFFICULTY OF MOVING MOBILE IRAQI LAUNCHERS IN A VERY SHORT TIME AND THE NEED TO INTENSIFY THE FIRING ON ENEMY TARGETS. IT WAS PROVEN LATER DURING THE IMMORTAL MOTHER OF BATTLES THAT THE PLAN WAS USEFUL IN DELUDING THE ENEMY AND THWARTING THE DANGER TO OUR MOBILE FORCE. NEVERTHELESS A BIG PART OF THE FORCE WAS DESTROYED BY ENEMY BOMBING. MIO WAS ABLE TO MAKE NEW LAUNCHERS. HOWEVER, THEY WERE NOT, FROM THE ASPECT OF FLEXIBILITY AND MANEUVERABILITY, UP TO THE STANDARD OF THE ORIGINAL LAUNCHERS, WHICH WERE CLOSED TO THE FIXED BASES. THEREFORE, WE ONLY USED THEM ONCE FROM THE WESTERN REGION. STILL, THEY DID A SPLENDID JOB. IT WAS A QUIET EVENING. AND MY THOUGHTS WENT BACK TO 1964 WHEN I ENTERED A STRONG COMPETITION FOR ADMISSION INTO THE MILITARY TECHNICAL COLLEGE IN EGYPT AND SUCCEEDED WITH HONORS. BUT, I ALSO WAITED FOR THE RESULTS OF MY ADMISSION INTO THE IRAQI MILITARY COLLEGE, WHICH I WANTED TO JOIN VERY MUCH. MY FATHER DID NOT INTERFERE WITH MY CHOICE. GOD FULFILLED MY WISH AND I JOINED THE COLLEGE. MY MOTHER'S PRAYERS MUST HAVE BEEN WITH ME ALSO. I ALMOST FLEW WITH JOY. MILITARY SERVICE SUITED ME. IT BROUGHT ME CLOSER TO PALESTINE. I WONDERED: WOULD I EVER FIND THE RECORD WITH THE SONG THAT CREATED OUR AWARENESS OF THE PALESTINE QUESTION; THE ONE THAT SAYS: JERUSALEM WILL REMAIN ARAB?! 8 NOVEMBER 1988 I AND A GROUP OF OFFICERS STUDIED A REPORT AND A MAP FROM THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE-12TH BRANCH EXPLAINING ENEMY MILITARY TARGETS IN OCCUPIED PALESTINE, AS WELL AS OTHERS WHICH WERE NOT ON THE MAP. THE PURPOSE WAS TO GIVE US AMPLE TIME FOR PLANNING. WE HAD REQUESTED THIS INFORMATION THREE WEEKS AGO. AND WHEN WE GOT THE INFORMATION WE FELT THAT ONE REQUIREMENT HAD BEEN FULFILLED. THE REPORT INCLUDED INFORMATION ON NUCLEAR REACTORS, MILITARY AND CHEMICAL FACTORIES, AIR BASES AND AIRPORTS, NAVAL BASES, AND TARGETS THAT GIVE SUPPORT TO ENEMY MILITARY EFFORT. 24 JANUARY 1989 THESE COORDINATES ARE NOT ACCURATE, I TOLD THE OFFICER FACING ME. WE DISCOVERED THAT THE COORDINATES WE RECEIVED ON SOME OF THE TARGETS WERE NOT ACCURATE. ACCURACY WAS OUR MAIN OBSESSION. MAPS KEPT PILING UP IN THE OPERATIONS ROOM. THE SEARCH, INVESTIGATION, AND VERIFICATION CONTINUED FOR FIVE CONTINUOUS MONTHS. IN MAY 1989, WITH THE HELP OF THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE AND THE MILITARY SURVEY DIRECTORATE, WE REACHED THE MOST ACCURATE COORDINATES. MY THOUGHTS, AS I CARRIED ONE PARTICULAR MAP TO THE MILITARY SURVEY DIRECTORATE, WERE WITH MY WIFE WHO WORKED HARD FOR DAYS TRYING TO ORGANIZE A ROOM WE ASSIGNED FOR OLD THINGS IN THE TOP FLOOR. I REMEMBER SPREADING EVERYTHING ON THE FLOOR OF THAT ROOM TO FIND A MAP OF PALESTINE WHICH I HAD WHEN I WAS TEACHER AT THE MILITARY STAFF COLLEGE. TAKING THAT MAP WITH ME TO THE MILITARY SURVEY DIRECTORATE TODAY

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3

WAS A BIG EVENT. IT HELPED US APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2018/10/09 C06765420 MISSILES
DIRECTORATE, DEPENDED ON OUR OWN DISCRETION WHEN IT CAME TO DECIDING
WHETHER GEOGRAPHICAL OR QUADRANGULAR COORDINATES WERE ACCURATE. THE
SHAPE OF THE TARGET WAS IMPORTANT WHEN DETERMINING THE ACCURACY OF THE
FIRING. FOR THIS REASON, WE ASKED FOR TOURIST MAPS IN MAY 1989. AND NO
SOONER THAN THE MILITARY SURVEY DIRECTORATE SUPPLIED WITH MAPS OF A 150-
200 SCALE, WHICH WE FOUND ACCEPTABLE, ALTHOUGH WE CONTINUED TO STRIVE
FOR SOMETHING BETTER. 15 JUNE 1989 ANOTHER JOINT EFFORT BEGAN WITH THE AIR
FORCE AND AIR DEFENSE COMMAND. WE HAD TO CLEARLY DEFINE OUR
RESPONSIBILITIES IN THIS JOINT EFFORT. WE SPENT MANY HOURS OF TECHNICAL
DISCUSSION ON THE FIRST STRIKE. FOR EXAMPLE, SHOULD IT BY FOR THE MISSILE
CORPS OR THE AIR FORCE? AND HOW OFTEN SHOULD THE STRIKES BE REPEATED?
(MORE) END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED

- JN2011144298 AMMAN AL-'ARAB AL-YAWM IN ARABIC 25 OCT 98 P 11 /// PEACEFUL
TAMMUZ REACTOR.

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