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(U) REF: JN2511081498 AMMAN AL-'ARAB AL-YAWM IN ARABIC 3 NOV 98 P 11 /// 3 NOV

(U) SOURCE: AMMAN AL-'ARAB AL-YAWM IN ARABIC 3 NOV 98 P 11 TEXT:

(U) 2--THE PREPARATION OF THE WESTERN OPERATIONS THEATER BY DEPLOYING FIXED ROCKET LAUNCH PADS SO AS TO ENSURE THAT THE SET TARGETS IN THE ZIONIST ENTITY ARE ATTACKED ACCORDING TO PLAN. 3--CLOSE COORDINATION WITH THE DIRECTORATES OF THE GENERAL MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AND MILITARY SURVEY

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DEPARTMENT TO GET RELIABLE INTELLIGENCE AND ACCURATE MAPS. 4--WE HAD TO STUDY THE NATIONAL DAYS OBSERVED IN THE ZIONIST ENTITY AND ALSO TO TAKE INTO FULL ACCOUNT OUR OWN NATIONAL DAYS SO THAT OUR UNITS ARE NEVER TAKEN UNAWARES. 5--WE HAD TO UNDERTAKE DRILLS IN WHICH OUR UNITS AND FORMATIONS ENGAGE IN TRIAL COMMUNICATIONS IN PREPARATION FOR THE BATTLE. 6--WE HAD TO REORGANIZE THE ROCKET HEADQUARTERS SO AS TO SECURE GOOD RUNNING OF THE ROCKET UNITS. 7--WE HAD TO UNDERTAKE EARLY RECONNAISSANCE OF POTENTIAL TARGETS AND MAKE US AWARE OF ANY PIECE OF INFORMATION THAT WE MAY OBTAIN ABOUT THEM AND WE HAD TO ENSURE THAT OUR MILITARY UNITS SHARE SUCH INFORMATION. 8--WE HAD TO MAKE SURE THAT OUR STOCKPILES OF ROCKETS WERE KEPT IN GOOD WORKING ORDER AND TO DEVISE A PLAN WHEREBY THEY WOULD BE DEPLOYED. 9--WE HAD TO MAKE SURE THAT WE COLLECT INTELLIGENCE ABOUT OUR INTENDED TARGETS AND ANALYZE THE USEFULNESS OF ATTACKING THEM USING VARIOUS MILITARY AND CIVILIAN MAPS AND AERIAL PHOTOS. WE HAD TO MAKE USE OF COORDINATES TAKEN BY OUR PILOTS. 10--ATTENTION MUST BE GIVEN TO THE ISSUANCE OF ORDERS TO VARIOUS FORMATIONS AND UNITS AND THE USE OF PASSWORDS AND CLEAR CODE WORDS SO AS TO SAVE THE TIME. 11--WE HAD TO CONTINUE CONDUCTING ROCKET LAUNCH EXPERIMENTS IN COORDINATION WITH THE MILITARY INDUSTRIALIZATION ORGANIZATION WITH A VIEW TO IMPROVING THE PRECISION OF THE ROCKETS. 12--WE HAD TO PLAN THE POSSIBLE PROGRESS OF THE BATTLE IN DETAIL TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION EACH OF THE STAGES OF THE WAR. 13--WE HAD TO EXTEND TRANSPORT ACROSS AS WIDE AN AREA AS POSSIBLE AND MAKE SURE THAT THE TRACKS ARE COVERED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. 14--WE HAD TO MAKE SURE THAT SPECIFICS OF IMPLEMENTATION ARE REVIEWED WITH SUBORDINATES WITH A VIEW TO CORRECTING MISTAKES AND CALLING ATTENTION TO IMPORTANT POINTS. 15--WE HAD TO MAKE PREPARATIONS FOR BUILDING UNDERGROUND SHELTERS AT EVERY LAUNCH SITE MAKING SURE THAT THESE ARE SET AT SUCH DISTANCES FROM EACH OTHER THAT WOULD NOT LEAD TO THEIR BEING DISCOVERED. 16--SECURITY ASPECTS OF THE WAR COULD NOT BE OVERSTATED. 17--WE SHOULD MAKE AS MUCH USE OF LIAISON OFFICERS AS POSSIBLE. THEY PLAY A CRUCIAL ROLE IN COMMUNICATING ORDERS AND URGENT INFORMATION. 18--WE HAD TO BEWARE OF THE ENEMY GUIDANCE SYSTEMS (BAYKANAT AL-DALALAH), WHICH POINT I HAD GUARDED AGAINST FOR YEARS. 19--WE HAD TO MAKE SURE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ELEMENT OF BOOSTING THE MORALE OF THE RANKS ON EVERY POSSIBLE OCCASION. 20--WE NEEDED TO FORM A FIRST LEGION FOR THE FIRST DUTY IN THE WESTERN REGION AND THE SECOND LEGION FOR THE SECOND DUTY IN THE SOUTH FOR PURPOSES OF CAMOUFLAGE. WE ALSO NEEDED TO SET UP CAMOUFLAGE LAUNCHERS AND EXPLAIN HOW THESE COULD BE USED. 21--WE NEEDED TO ANALYZE THE CAPABILITIES OF THE ENEMY IN LINE WITH INCOMING DATA FROM THE DIRECTORATE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AND WORK OUT PLANS TO FORESTALL THE ENEMY. 22--WE HAD TO KEEP SHIFTING THE SITES OF SHELTERS AND TO MAKE USE OF NATURAL AND OTHER CURTAINS AND TO INTENSIVELY USE CAMOUFLAGE EQUIPMENT AND MAKE SURE THAT RELEVANT PROCEDURES ARE APPLIED. 23--WE NEEDED TO SET OUT THE SEQUENCE IN WHICH THE ROCKET ATTACKS WILL TAKE PLACE. WE ALSO HAD TO SET THE PRIORITIES UNDER WHICH THE STRIKES MUST TAKE PLACE SO AS TO ECONOMIZE ON TIME. FOR EXAMPLE, IN AUGUST 1990 WE WERE ABLE TO CUT THE TIME THAT WE NEEDED TO RESPOND TO THE FIRST WAVE OF AGGRESSION ON IRAQ WITH ROCKETS TO JUST FOUR HOURS. 24--OUR FIGHTERS HAD TO BE MADE ADEQUATELY CONSCIOUS OF THEIR TASKS. I MADE SURE THAT ALL CONCERNED KNEW ABOUT MY IDEAS AND WHAT THEY SHOULD DO IN AN EMERGENCY. 25--WE HAD TO MAKE SURE THAT ELECTRONIC CALCULATORS WERE USED IN THE FIELD AND THAT A SHOOTING TIMETABLE WAS DRAWN UP. 26--WE HAD TO MAKE SURE THAT A SUMMARIZED MODEL WAS PREPARED TO REGULATE THE SENDING OF REPORTS

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ABOUT THE STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL ROCKETRY AS WELL AS THE TROOPS SHOULD BE TRAINED IN THE SENDING OF EASY AND SIMPLE CODES. 27--WE HAD TO MAKE SURE OF FLEXIBILITY IN AMASSING TROOPS SO AS TO ENSURE THAT OUR LIMITED RESOURCES ARE MADE TO SERVE THE FUNCTION SET FOR THEM. (MORE) 3 NOV [REDACTED] 28--WE HAD TO ENSURE SMOOTH COOPERATION BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND THE MILITARY INDUSTRIALIZATION ORGANIZATION WHENEVER THERE WAS A NEED FOR THAT. 29--WE HAD TO PLACE THE FIRST ROCKET MAINTENANCE UNIT, ASSIGNED TO AL-HUSAYN ROCKET UNIT, UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE COMMAND OPERATIONS SO THAT THEY WOULD BE RUN DIRECTLY BY ME. AS TO THE OPERATIONAL ROCKET UNITS IN THE SOUTHERN SECTOR, THAT SET ME THINKING ABOUT THE PREPARATIONS THAT WE HAD PUT IN PLACE: A--WE PREPARED NUMEROUS LAUNCH SITES FOR EVERY ROCKET UNIT AT THE RATE OF 10-15 IN THE AREAS WHERE THEY WERE DEPLOYED SO AS TO ENSURE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMBAT DUTIES AND SUFFICIENT PROTECTION FOR EQUIPMENT. B--WE ENGAGED IN RECONNAISSANCE PRACTICE AND DAYTIME AND NIGHTTIME MOVEMENTS UNDER ALL KINDS OF CIRCUMSTANCES. (MORE) END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED

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
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