

**Identifiers:**

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

Document Number: WA2311083398

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

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**Dates:**

Date Published: 23-Nov-1998 07:33:00

Date Received: 23-Nov-1998 02:35:53

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**Coverage:**

CIA Country Code: IRQ

Region: MIDDLEEAST

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**Publisher:**

Agency Acronym: RESTON VA

Office Name: FBIS

[Large Redacted Area]

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(U) SERIAL: WA2311083398

(U) COUNTRY: IRAQ SUBJ: TAKE 3 OF 4--IRAQI COMMANDER MEMOIRS ON MISSILES (4)

(U) REF: JN2311082098 AMMAN AL-'ARAB AL-YAWM IN ARABIC 1 NOV 98 P 11 /// TO 50 MINUTES.

(U) SOURCE: AMMAN AL-'ARAB AL-YAWM IN ARABIC 1 NOV 98 P 11 TEXT:

(U) SO, WE TRIED TO SHORTEN THE TIME BY HOLDING MORE TRAINING, AND WE ASKED THE UNITS TO GIVE ONLY 35 MINUTES TO AL-HUSAYN MISSILE AND 15 MINUTES TO THE OPERATIONAL MISSILES AND TO SHORTEN THE TIME USED TO ENTER THE POSITIONS WITH THE MINIMUM QUANTITY OF EQUIPMENT AND CHANGE THE SHELTERS AND POSITIONS. WE ALSO BANNED THE USE OF WIRELESS EQUIPMENT DURING THESE ACTIVITIES, STRESSING THE NEED TO WITHDRAW IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE MOMENT OF FIRING, USING NO VEHICLES. WE SAID THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT PART OF THESE ACTIVITIES WAS THE LAUNCHERS AND THE MISSILES. THEREFORE, WE BANNED THE ENTRY OF ANY OTHER EQUIPMENT. WE ALSO RELIED ON NIGHT ACTION AND OTHER MEASURES TO SECURE PROTECTION, CAMOUFLAGE, AND CONCEALMENT, INCLUDING THE PAINTING OF EQUIPMENT WITH A SPECIAL PAINT. IN ORDER TO INSTALL THE CAMOUFLAGE BASES IN THE WESTERN REGION AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE, I REQUESTED THE ELECTRIC MECHANIZED ENGINEERING DIRECTORATE TO CARRY OUT THIS DUTY QUICKLY. THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF WELCOMED OUR MEASURES AND ASKED FOR THEIR IMPLEMENTATION. I INFORMED THIS TO THE CORPS AND MISSILE UNITS ON THE SAME NIGHT. 17 SEPTEMBER 1990 (SUBHEAD) I TRIED TO FIND A MORE EFFECTIVE WAY TO FILL MISSILES WITH FUEL, ASKING A TECHNICAL COMMITTEE TO DO THE WORK. AN APPROPRIATE WAY WAS ACTUALLY WORKED OUT. AS A RESULT, THIS PROCESS TOOK ONLY 30 MINUTES. I THANKED THE COMMITTEE FOR ITS EFFORTS. 20 SEPTEMBER 1990 (SUBHEAD) I SHOULD CONGRATULATE STAFF LIEUTENANT GENERAL HUSAYN RASHID, ASSISTANT TO THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF, ON ASSUMING HIS NEW POST AS ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF. HIS FORMER POST WAS OCCUPIED BY STAFF LIEUTENANT GENERAL SULTAN HASHIM AHMAD, WHO BECAME ASSISTANT TO THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR

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OPERATIONS. TODAY, WE SENT <sup>Approved for Release: 2018/10/09 C06765436</sup> A NORTH OF BAGHDAD TO THE SOUTH TO REINFORCE OUR MISSILES IN KUWAIT. (MORE) 1 NOV [REDACTED] NO MEASURE WAS TAKEN REGARDING THE SAUDI TERRITORY MAPS THAT WE ORDERED ON 29 AUGUST. THERE WAS A PROBLEM. THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE HAD NOT DRAWN UP MILITARY MAPS FOR THE ARAB COUNTRIES AT A TIME WHEN IT HAD MAPS AND INFORMATION OF THE WHOLE WORLD. THIS SHARPLY CONTRASTED WITH THOSE STANDING IN THE SAME TRENCH WITH IRAQ'S ENEMIES, AND I WAS FILLED WITH PAIN AND BITTERNESS. ONCE AGAIN, I WAS OBLIGED TO WRITE TO THE OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT, EXPLAINING THAT WHAT HAD BEEN DONE BY THE MILITARY SURVEY DIRECTORATE COULD NOT BE RELIED ON AND THAT IF IT HAD NO OTHER CAPABILITIES, IT SHOULD HAVE CLARIFIED IT SO THAT WE COULD RELY ON OUR OWN EFFORTS. I URGED THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS CHARGED WITH CHECKING COORDINATES TO PROVIDE ACCURATE INFORMATION AFTER I SECRETLY PREPARED A LIST OF TARGETS AND OTHER POINTS. THE COORDINATES COULD NOT BE CHECKED FOR THEY WERE NOT NEAR THE BORDER BUT IN THE DEPTH. I AND THE MILITARY SURVEY DIRECTORATE CHIEF DISCUSSED THE ISSUE WITH THE ASSISTANT TO THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF AND FOUND OUT WAYS TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM. IN THE EVENING, I HELD A MEETING TO STUDY THE RESULTS OF THE CHECKING OF THE IRAQI AL-NIDA' LAUNCHER. IN FACT, THIS LAUNCHER IS NOT AS FLEXIBLE AS THE FOREIGN-MADE ONE CALLED TIL, WHICH STANDS FORM TRANSPORTATION, INSTALLATION, AND LAUNCHING. AL-NIDA' LAUNCHER, HOWEVER, HELPED US INTENSIFY THE FIRING BUT WAS NOT SUITABLE FOR TACTICAL MANEUVERING BECAUSE IT FAILED TO MEET TRANSPORTATION, INSTALLATION, AND LAUNCHING REQUIREMENTS. WHAT WAS EVEN MORE DANGEROUS WAS THAT IT WAS LOADED ON THE SITE IN CONFLICT WITH MY ORDERS TO SHORTEN THE TIME USED FOR THE ENTRY INTO THE POSITION. MOREOVER, CHECKING THE MISSILES BY ACTUALLY INSTALLING AND PREPARING THEM TECHNICALLY BEFORE BEING TAKEN TO THEIR LAUNCHING SITE, NEEDED LAUNCHERS AND OTHER COMPLICATED PROCESSES. WE SUBMITTED THE RESULTS OF THE CHECKING TO THE MIO, WHICH STARTED TESTS ON THE ISSUE OF FLEXIBILITY THAT WE HAD PROPOSED FOR THESE LAUNCHERS. WE ALSO ASKED FOR INCREASING THE NUMBER TO SIX LAUNCHERS. AS A RESULT OF MANY TECHNICAL PROBLEMS, I DECIDED TO USE THESE LAUNCHERS ONLY IN THE SOUTH, WHICH ENJOYS MANY NATURAL ELEVATIONS SUITABLE FOR THAT PURPOSE. 22 OCTOBER 1990 (SUBHEAD) WE STARTED THE EXERCISES TODAY IN THE WESTERN REGION OF THE COUNTRY, WHICH WOULD BE OUR PRINCIPAL OPERATIONS FIELD. IN THE EVENING, I WAS VERY BUSY ISSUING ORDERS AND RESPONDING TO OTHERS. THE MISSILE ATTACK ON THE ZIONIST ENTITY STARTED AFTER THE ENEMY CARRIED OUT A TREACHEROUS STRIKE AGAINST BELOVED IRAQ. OUR MISSILES RAINED ON IMPORTANT MILITARY TARGETS AND OTHER TARGETS FEEDING THE ENEMY'S WAR MACHINE. I WAS PLEASED BY THE SUCCESS OF THE MISSION. THESE WERE THE DETAILS OF A BATTLE BY TELEPHONE, WHICH WE APPLIED FOR TRAINING PURPOSES BETWEEN OUR HEADQUARTERS ON THE ONE HAND AND BRIGADES 223 AND 224 AND THE OTHER CONCERNED UNITS ON THE OTHER. LIEUTENANT COLONEL MAHMUD WAHIB, AN OFFICER OF OUR DIRECTORATE HEADQUARTERS, ENTERED MY ROOM AND SHOOK HANDS WITH ME, CONGRATULATED ME ON THE SUCCESS OF THE EXERCISE, AND HANDED ME SOME OBSERVATIONS. I IMAGINED FOR A WHILE THAT THE ARAB MASSES HAD COME INTO MY ROOM CHANTING FOR IRAQ AND ITS BRAVE LEADER SADDAM. (MORE) END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED

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- JN2311082098 AMMAN AL-'ARAB AL-YAWM IN ARABIC 1 NOV 98 P 11 /// TO 50 MINUTES.

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**Creator:**

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
Agency Acronym: RESTON VA

Office Name: FBIS

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**Description:** (U) None

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**Language:** eng

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**Precedence:** ROUTINE

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**Source:**

Attributions: SOURCE: AMMAN AL-'ARAB AL-YAWM IN ARABIC 1 NOV 98 P 11

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**Subject:** --

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