# (U) IRAQI COMMANDER MEMOIRS ON MISSILES (2)

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(U) REF: 1. JN2011144298 AND ADDS AL-'ARAB AL-YAWM IN ARABIC 25 OCT-- (b)(3) COMMANDER 2. MEMOIRS ON MISSILES (1)

(U) SOURCE AL-'ARAB AL-YAWM IN ARABIC 27 OCT 98 P 12 TEXT:

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(U) (PART TWO OF BOOK OF MEMOIRS ENTITLED "FORTY-THREE MISSILES ON THE ZIONIST ENTITY," BY STAFF LIEUTENANT GENERAL HAZIM 'ABD-AL-RAZZAQ AL-AYYUBI, COMMANDER OF THE IRAQI SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE CORPS DURING THE GULF WAR)

(U) (FBIS TRANSLATED TEXT) CHAPTER 2: THE ZIONISTS' THREATS 1 JANUARY 1990 (SUBHEAD) THIS IS A NEW YEAR, AND WE HAVE NEW WISHES OF PROGRESS. I BELIEVE THAT OUR SCIENTIFIC TESTS TO DEVELOP OUR MISSILES ARE IMPORTANT TO ALL THE ARABS WHO ARE AWARE OF THE ENEMY'S PLOTS. NOTHING HAS MADE ME MORE UNHAPPY THAN ARAB INATTENTION TO THE ATTACK THE ZIONIST ENTITY CARRIED OUT AGAINST THE IRAQI TAMMUZ REACTOR ON 7 JUNE 1981, ALTHOUGH IRAQ IS NOT A NEIGHBORING STATE. SO, THE ATTACK IS PART OF A ZIONIST PLAN TO APPLY THE SLOGAN OF "FROM THE EUPHRATES TO THE NILE," WHICH THE ZIONIST ENTITY STILL ADOPTS AND WHICH IS DISPLAYED BY THE ZIONIST FLAG. THIS WAS STATED IN THE SPEECH PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSAYN ADDRESSED TO THE CONFERENCE OF SOLIDARITY WITH IRAQ HELD ON 12 JUNE 1981 IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE ATTACK ON THE IRAQI NUCLEAR REACTOR. HE SAID: "THE ATTACK AGAINST THE NUCLEAR REACTOR IN IRAQ MEANS THAT THE ZIONIST ENEMY GIVES ITSELF THE RIGHT TO ATTACK ANY PART OF THE ARAB HOMELAND, ANY FACTORY OR PROJECT, OR ANY ARAB PROGRAM ANY TIME IT LIKES UNDER THE PRETEXT THAT ITS SECURITY IS ENDANGERED. IT ALSO GIVES ITSELF THE RIGHT TO DETERMINE THE COURSE OF DEVELOPMENT, GROWTH, AND POLICIES, THIS IS THE MOST DANGEROUS, HOSTILE THEORY IN THIS AGE AND IS EVEN MORE DANGEROUS THAN FASCISM AND NAZISM. THOSE WHO CLOSE THEIR EYES TO THIS REALITY DENY HUMAN PRINCIPLES AND ETHICS." HENCE, IN LIGHT OF THESE WORDS SHOWING THE EXTENT OF THE DANGER. SOME ARAB RULERS SHOULD REALIZE THE NATURE OF THE AGGRESSION AGAINST THE ARAB NATION AND IRAQ INSTEAD OF BACKING THE ZIONISTS' PLAN TO HARM IRAQ. MOREOVER, THIS MUJAHID COUNTRY SHOULD ACCEPT THE CHALLENGE AND KEEP ITS EFFECTIVE WEAPONS TO DEFEND ITSELF AND THE ARAB NATION. 9 JANUARY 1990 (SUBHEAD) | LIKE HEGIRA DATES. TODAY IS 12 JUMADA AL-AWWAL 1410 HEGIRA. FOR SOME IMPORTANT REASON. I WAS SUMMONED FROM INSIDE A CONFERENCE. HELD AT MIO (ABBREVIATION NOT FURTHER EXPLAINED) TO STUDY THE SECOND PHASE OF AL-'ABID MISSILE. I WAS SUMMONED TO ATTEND ANOTHER MEETING. ON THE WAY, I THOUGHT THAT NOTHING WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAT THIS CONFERENCE EXCEPT A MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT. THIS WAS WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED. THERE WAS ANOTHER MEETING UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, ATTENDED BY THE DEFENSE MINISTER, THE INDUSTRY AND MINERAL RESOURCES MINISTER, THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF, THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER, AND THE DIRECTOR OF THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OPENED THE MEETING WITH A QUESTION ON HOW TO PREPARE OURSELVES TO CONFRONT THE ZIONIST THREATS AND HOW TO DEPLOY OUR MISSILES IN AND PROTECT THE WESTERN REGION. WE EXCHANGED VIEWS FRANKLY, AND WE DISCUSSED THE ISSUE WHETHER IT WAS BETTER TO FIRE MISSILES FROM FIXED OR MOBILE BASES. THE INDUSTRY AND MINERAL RESOURCES MINISTER SAID IT WAS BETTER TO FIRE FROM FIXED BASES AND TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF MOBILE BASES. WHILE THE DEFENSE MINISTER AND THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF SAID THAT THE MOBILE BASES WERE MORE SUCCESSFUL. THE PRESIDENT MADE HIS DECISION. ORDERING THAT BOTH FIXED AND MOBILE BASES BE USED ALONG WITH CAMOUFLAGE AND THAT MORE MISSILES BE PRODUCED. HE ALSO ORDERED THAT THE AREAS FOR THE FIXED MISSILE BASES BE CHOSEN. WE SPENT THE DAYS FROM 21 TO 25 JANUARY 1990 TRYING TO CHOOSE AREAS FOR THE FIXED MISSILE BASES. WE SURVEYED NINE AREAS LOOKING LIKE A SEMICIRCULAR TABLE AND SUITABLE FOR FIRING AL-HUSAYN MISSILES AT HOSTILE TARGETS AROUND TEL AVIV AND HAIFA IN OCCUPIED PALESTINE IN ORDER TO AFFECT THE ZIONIST ENEMY'S MILITARY AND WAR EFFORT. 17 JANUARY 1990 (SUBHEAD) WE ASKED THE OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT TO OBTAIN THE ARMY STAFF'S AGREEMENT TO FORM A WORKING TEAM INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES OF A NUMBER OF DEPARTMENTS, COMMANDS, ARMY CORPS, AND OTHER APPARATUSES TO MEET WORK REQUIREMENTS IN THE WESTERN REGION OF THE COUNTRY. AMONG THESE REQUIREMENTS WERE SECURITY TELECOMMUNICATIONS, ENGINEERING EFFORT TO IMPROVE ROADS AND SHELTERS, CAMOUFLAGE, THE PROTECTION OF THE LAUNCHING PADS, CHECKING THEIR SECURITY AND THAT OF ROADS TO THEM, AS WELL AS OTHER ISSUES NECESSARY FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE MISSION. ON 29 JANUARY 1990, OUR PROPOSALS WERE APPROVED, AND WE HAD TO CONDUCT A LAND AND AIR SURVEY OF THE AREA IN WHICH WE WOULD WORK. (MORE) 27 OCT 31 JANUARY 1990 (b)(3) (SUBHEAD) WE WERE BUSY TRYING TO ATTAIN ACCURACY FOR AL-HUSAYN MISSILE, AND WE HAD TO CONDUCT A NEW FIRING TEST. WE WENT TO THE CITY OF AL-'AMARAH

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IN MAYSAN GOVERNORATE AND FIRED FOUR MISSILES TOWARD THE WESTERN REGION. ON THE SAME DAY, WE MADE ANOTHER SCIENTIFIC ACHIEVEMENT BY CONDUCTING A SUCCESSFUL TEST ON A MISSILE ENGINE IN AL-HABBANIYAH IN AL-ANBAR GOVERNORATE IN COOPERATION WITH THE MIO. TESTS ON AL-HUSAYN MISSILE FACED MANY DIFFICULTIES, INCLUDING THE PROBLEMS OF GUIDING THE MISSILE AND SEARCHING FOR FALLING SHRAPNEL OVER LARGE AREAS. THE R-17 MISSILE, WHICH THE ENEMIES CALL SCUD IS NOT AL-HUSAYN MISSILE. IT MAY BE USEFUL TO MENTION THE FOLLOWING SPECIFICATIONS OF THE SCUD MISSILE, COMPARED TO AL-HUSAYN MISSILE:

(U) 1. THE SCUD MISSILE WEIGHS 5,860 KG, WHILE AL-HUSAYN MISSILE WEIGHS 6,533 KG. (MORE) END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED

- 1. JN2011144298 AND ADDS AL-'ARAB AL-YAWM IN ARABIC 25 OCT--COMMANDER

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