

(U) IRAQI COMMANDER MEMOIRS ON MISSILES (3)

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(U) REF: JN2211063398 AMMAN AL-'ARAB AL-YAWM IN ARABIC 29 OCT 98 P 11 /// COVERS AND NETS.

(U) SOURCE: AMMAN AL-'ARAB AL-YAWM IN ARABIC 29 OCT 98 P 11 TEXT:

(U) THE FIRST RAYS OF SUNBLIGHT PENETRATED MY ROOM. LIEUTENANT DR. MA'AN 'ABD-AL-RAHMAN, THE RESIDENT DOCTOR AT THE MISSILE DIRECTORATE, CAME IN. AND THE MOMENT HE GLANCED AT MY FACE, HE SAID: YOUR ARE TIRED, SIR. YOU MUST HAVE SOME SLEEP. I LAID DOWN IN MY MILITARY UNIFORM IN AN ADJOINING ROOM AND WAS SOON SOUND ASLEEP AND DREAMING. I DREAMED I WAS TAKING PART IN A CONCEALMENT AND PROTECTION OPERATION WITH OTHER FIGHTERS IN THE WESTERN REGION. 13 AUGUST 1990 I SENT A REPORT ON MISSILE DEPLOYMENT AND TARGET ANALYSIS TO THE PRESIDENT. IT CONTAINED AN ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIC ENEMY TARGETS AND A COMPARISON BETWEEN OUR VIEWPOINT AND THAT OF OTHER EXPERTS. I TOOK INTO CONSIDERATION THE QUALITY OF OUR WEAPONS, THE POSSIBILITY OF SCORING DIRECT HITS, AND OUR CAPABILITIES AND CONDITIONS AT THE TIME. I REFERRED TO WHAT I BELIEVED WAS THE MOST SUITABLE TARGET AND PROPOSED DIRECTING A COLLECTIVE STRIKE BY 10 MISSILES ON THIS TARGET. BUT, I ALSO SAID THERE WAS ANOTHER LESS IMPORTANT TARGET WHICH MUST NOT BE OVERLOOKED. SO, I PROPOSED DIRECTING A COLLECTIVE STRIKE AT BOTH TARGETS SIMULTANEOUSLY. I EXPLAINED THE UNITS UNDER MY CONTROL, INCLUDING THE MISSILE BATTERIES. WE HAD A COMMANDO BRIGADE, TWO ANTI-AIRCRAFT BATTALIONS, AND AN ENGINEERING COMPANY. THEY WERE ALL IN THE WESTERN REGION. ALL THE LAUNCHERS ALSO WERE IN THE SAME REGION AND AIMED IN THE DIRECTION OF THE ZIONIST ENTITY. I ALSO EXPLAINED THE MISSILE RESERVE AND THE PLACES OF THEIR DISPERSION AND CONCEALMENT. MY REPORT INCLUDED THE MOST

SUITABLE LAUNCHING SITES, BUT ALSO REFERRED TO THE NEED FOR MORE UPDATED MAPS. I CONCLUDED MY REPORT BY ASSESSING OUR POSITION AS FAR AS PREPARATION TIME WAS CONCERNED. I SAID THAT WE NEED 18 HOURS AT THE MINIMUM. BUT, IF WE HIT THE ZIONIST ENTITY AND THEN RETURN TO THE SOUTH, WE WILL NEED 30 HOURS. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE NEED TWO DAYS IF WE USE NIGHT HOURS ONLY, AND THAT THERE WILL BE AN INTERVAL OF 10 HOURS BETWEEN ONE STRIKE AND ANOTHER. THE PRESIDENT REMARKED ON THE REPORT AS FOLLOWS: "THE DIRECTOR OF THE MISSILE CORPS SHOULD BE GIVEN ALL HE NEEDS TO IMPROVE HIS POSITION." THE PRESIDENT ALSO INSTRUCTED THAT THE TWO TARGETS I SELECTED BE ADDED TO THE ONES PREVIOUSLY SELECTED IN THE ZIONIST ENTITY, PROVIDED GOOD PREPARATIONS WERE MADE. AS FOR IMPLEMENTATION, HE SAID, THIS WILL TAKE PLACE UNDER A SUBSEQUENT ORDER, DEPENDING ON THE DEVELOPMENTS OF THE SITUATION. WE MUST NOT TRY TO MANEUVER WITH THE LAUNCHERS PRESENTLY, AS THIS WILL AFFECT OUR ABILITY WHEN PREPARING THEM TO RESPOND TO ISRAEL, THE PRESIDENT CONCLUDED. 14 AUGUST 1990 ANOTHER GREAT GESTURE BY THE PRESIDENT WAS HIS DIRECTIVE TO THE DEFENSE MINISTER AND THE DIRECTOR OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE TO PROVIDE ME WITH WHATEVER I NEEDED TO IMPROVE MY POSITION. IN THE MEANTIME, I CONTINUED MY COORDINATION WITH THE AIR FORCE AND AIR DEFENSE COMMAND TO OBTAIN AIR PHOTOS OF CERTAIN TARGETS. I ALSO REQUESTED INFORMATION ABOUT ANY ZIONIST ATTACK OR THAT THE ENEMY HAD DISCOVERED OUR LAUNCHING SITES SO WE COULD KEEP THEM SAFE AND SOUND. I ALSO COMMUNICATED WITH THE SECOND AND THIRD AIR DEFENSE SECTORS IN THE WESTERN AND SOUTHERN SECTORS. AT THE SAME TIME, WE CONTINUED TO COORDINATE TASKS WITH THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE IN THE AREAS WHERE OUR UNITS WERE DEPLOYED. WE ASKED THE DIRECTORATE FOR MORE AIR PHOTOS, INFORMATION, AND TOURIST MAPS SO WE COULD BENEFIT FROM THEM IN UPDATING THE MAPS WITH THE MILITARY SURVEY DIRECTORATE. THE SHAPE OF THE TARGET, AND NOT JUST ITS SIZE, IS IMPORTANT IN DETERMINING THE ACCURACY OF THE STRIKE. SO, I NEEDED TOURIST MAPS FOR THIS PURPOSE. IN IMPLEMENTATION OF AN ORDER BY THE PRESIDENT, THE OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT INQUIRED ABOUT OUR NEEDS. I SAID THAT OUR NEEDS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

(U) 1. UPDATING MAPS OF THE LANDS THAT ARE IMPORTANT TO US.

(U) 2. REPLACING THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT BATTALION 588, WHICH WAS SECONDED TO US, BY A MORE INTEGRATED ONE.

(U) 3. PROVIDING SEVERAL DRILLING MACHINES (SHOVELS) AND CRANES.

(U) 4. INSURING TELEPHONE LINES IN CERTAIN AREAS IN SOUTHERN IRAQ.

(U) WE WERE IN A HURRY, WHILE THE MILITARY SURVEY DIRECTORATE WAS SLOW. I ALSO NOTICED THAT THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE WAS JUST AS SLOW IN PROVIDING US WITH THE INFORMATION WE WANTED. ON THIS DAY ALSO, I ISSUED SPECIFIC WORKING PLANS FOR THE SPECIAL (CHEMICAL) WARHEADS IN COORDINATION WITH AL-MUTHANNA ENTERPRISE. I SAID THAT STORAGE AND PREPARATION WILL BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE FIRST MAINTENANCE UNIT. I HAD TO GIVE CLEAR AND PRECISE INSTRUCTIONS, BUT ALSO IN GREAT SECRECY, AND DEFER OTHER TOPICS TO A LATER STAGE. IT WAS ANOTHER EVENTFUL DAY AS 11 AUGUST 1990. SOME OF THE THINGS WE ACCOMPLISHED ON THIS DAY WERE MOVING THE SECOND MISSILE BATTALION, A BATTERY FROM TARIQ (ASTRAS) BATTALION OF BRIGADE 226, AND A MIXED GROUP FOR STORAGE AND TRANSPORTATION FROM MASHRU' AL-MUSAYYIB SUB-DISTRICT TO KUWAIT. I OBTAINED THE RESULTS OF THE

RECONNAISSANCE WHICH WAS CARRIED OUT BY THE THIRD GROUP. IT CHOSE SITES IN AL-JABAYISH, SUQ AL-SHUYUKH, AL'AZIZ, AND QAL'AT SALIH ACCORDING TO MY RECOMMENDATIONS ON 13 AUGUST 1990. (MORE) END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED

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