

(U) IRAQI COMMANDER MEMOIRS ON MISSILES (3)

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(U) REF: JN2211063398 AMMAN AL-'ARAB AL-YAWM IN ARABIC 29 OCT 98 P 11 /// 13
AUGUST 1990.

(U) SOURCE: AMMAN AL-'ARAB AL-YAWM IN ARABIC 29 OCT 98 P 11 TEXT:

(U) I WAS BUSY FOR A WHILE WITH THE PEOPLE FROM AL-MUTHANNA ENTERPRISE AND MIO. I THEN HELD A LONG CONFERENCE TO STREAMLINE AND SPECIFY MORE REQUESTS FROM THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE, THE AIR FORCE AND AIR DEFENSE COMMAND, AND THE OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT. 15 AUGUST 1990 I SUMMONED COLONEL GHANIM AHMAD, DIRECTOR OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF OFFICE, WHO SAT DOWN AND WROTE THE ORDERS TO BE GIVEN TO BRIGADES 223 AND 224, THE MISSILE MAINTENANCE COMMAND, AND THE SECURITY SECTION IN THE MISSILE DIRECTORATE ON THE CONCEALMENT AND PROTECTION OF MISSILE UNITS. THE ORDERS SAID THAT THE UNITS MUST BE PROTECTED BY CHANGING SHELTERS AND ASSEMBLY POINTS TO AVOID THEIR DISCOVERY BY SPACE PHOTOS. THEY MUST ALSO BE COVERED, AND MOVEMENT MUST BE BY NIGHT ONLY. THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF AND HIS ASSISTANT FOR OPERATIONS OFTEN EMPHASIZED THESE MATTERS. SO, WE PREPARED EVERYTHING THAT WOULD HELP MAINTAIN THE CAMOUFLAGE, SUCH AS CLOTH MATERIALS, OLD TENTS, AND OTHER CREATIVE MEANS OF CONCEALMENT. 16 AUGUST 1990 I SET UP A MISSILE CONTROL BRANCH FOR OPERATIONAL PURPOSES IN KUWAIT COMPOSED MAINLY OF PERSONNEL FROM BRIGADE 225 HEADQUARTERS AND SUPPORT UNITS AND A REPRESENTATIVE FROM OUR OWN HEADQUARTERS. THIS BRANCH WAS FIRST LINKED TO THE REPUBLICAN GUARD COMMAND AND I CALLED IT OPERATIONAL MISSILE CONTROL CENTER-REPUBLICAN GUARD. LATER, IT BECAME MISSILE CONTROL CENTER FOR ALL OPERATIONAL MISSILE UNITS IN THE SOUTHERN SECTORS OF THE SECOND, THIRD, FOURTH, SIXTH, AND SEVENTH ARMY CORPS. THIS

STEP WAS SUBSEQUENTLY FOLLOWED BY A COORDINATION CENTER FOR FIRE SUPPORT WHICH WAS SET UP ON 10 SEPTEMBER 1990. 17 AUGUST 1990 THE DEFENSE MINISTER RECEIVED ME IN HIS OFFICE AND I GAVE HIM A FULL BRIEFING ON THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE MISSILE CORPS ON THE PAST FEW DAYS. I ASKED FOR MAPS OF THE ARAB STATES WHICH MASSED HOSTILE FORCES AGAINST IRAQ AND ANY INFORMATION ON TARGETS, EVEN TOURIST MAPS. I WAS SURPRISED TO LEARN THAT THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE DID NOT KEEP MAPS OR ANY USEFUL INFORMATION ON THE ARAB STATES CONCERNED. THIS IS BECAUSE THEY ARE ARAB STATES AND THEREFORE THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR HAS NO MILITARY INTEREST IN THEM. IT DID NOT EXPECT ANY MILITARY CONFLICT WITH THEM AS IS HAPPENING NOW FOLLOWING THE STATIONING OF HOSTILE FORCES ON THEIR TERRITORIES TO THREATEN IRAQ'S SECURITY AND SAFETY. WE WERE GREATLY RELIEVED, HOWEVER, WHEN THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE INFORMED US ON 19 AUGUST 1990 THAT IT HAS ITS OWN MEANS TO ALERT US IN GOOD TIME ABOUT ANY STRIKE BY THE ZIONIST ENTITY SO WE CAN RETALIATE. I ASKED THE AIR FORCE AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES TO INFORM US IMMEDIATELY ABOUT ANY AGGRESSION, THEY, IN TURN, ASKED SECRET SERVICE SOURCES TO PROVIDE US WITH THE RESULTS OF MISSILE STRIKES BY THE ZIONIST ENEMY, JUST AS THEY DID WHEN WE ATTACKED TARGETS IN IRAN. BUT, THE LITTLE INFORMATION WE HAD ON THE SOUTH WAS NOT SUFFICIENT FOR FULL PLANNING. I EXPRESSED MY GRATITUDE TO THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE FOR ITS CONCERN ABOUT OUR REQUESTS. I SAID I WAS RELIEVED THAT THERE WAS SOMEONE TO ALERT US. MY WHOLE CONCERN WAS TO GAIN TIME AND FIND SOMEONE WHO COULD GIVE US INFORMATION TO HELP US RECTIFY OUR STRIKES WHEN THE TIME CAME. 24 AUGUST 1990 WORK HAS PROVED INVIGORATING. HERE I AM ON A HELICOPTER HEADING FOR KUWAIT. I ONLY HAD ONE HOUR SLEEP. BUT, I MUST NOW INSPECT THE SITES OF OUR MISSILE UNITS THERE AND TACKLE THEIR PROBLEMS. IRAQI VILLAGES LOOKED BEAUTIFULLY GREEN FROM ABOVE. AND WHEN THE SCENE BELOW TURNED SUDDENLY BARREN, I KNEW WE WERE FLYING OVER THE KUWAITI DESERT. 26 AUGUST 1990 WHILE IN KUWAIT, I VISITED ALL THE MISSILE UNITS UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE OPERATIONAL MISSILE CONTROL CENTER, WHICH WAS THEN NO LONGER LINKED TO THE REPUBLICAN GUARD. OUR UNITS THERE CONSISTED OF TWO RA'D (LUNA) MISSILE BATTALIONS, ONE TARIQ (ASTRAS) BATTERY, TWO METEOROLOGICAL BATTERIES, A TECHNICAL REPAIR WORKSHOP, A MIXED GROUP FOR TECHNICAL AND TRANSPORTATION TASKS WHICH THE SECOND AND THIRD OPERATIONAL MISSILE MAINTENANCE UNITS SENT TO THE HEADQUARTERS OF BRIGADE 225, AND THE SECOND SPECIAL TASK GROUP FOR CAMOUFLAGE. FOR A SECOND CAMOUFLAGE GROUP WAS FORMED IN THE SOUTHERN REGION ON 25 AUGUST 1990 SIMILAR TO THE ONE IN THE WESTERN REGION. THE QUESTION OF PROTECTION WAS ALWAYS IN MY MIND. SO, I DID NOT OVERLOOK THE NEED TO PROVIDE CAMOUFLAGE FOR OUR MISSILE UNITS IN KUWAIT ALSO. I SPENT THIS DAY UPDATING THE COORDINATES AND IMPROVING PLANS FOR MISSILE STRIKES BY CHECKING THE ACCURACY OF INFORMATION. I EXPLAINED ALL THAT IN A PLAN WHICH CLEARLY POINTS OUT THE TARGETS FOR FURTHER KNOWLEDGE AND FULL PREPARATION. 28 AUGUST 1990 WHEN I DISCOVERED THAT OUR UNITS IN THE KUWAITI SECTORS ALSO NEEDED ANTI-AIRCRAFT SUPPORT AND THAT THIS WAS NOT AVAILABLE FROM THE ARMY, I IMMEDIATELY OBTAINED TWO ANTI-AIRCRAFT BATTERIES FROM BATTALION 1039 BELONGING TO BRIGADE 224 AND SECONDED THEM TO THE OPERATIONAL MISSILE CONTROL CENTER. 30 AUGUST 1990 WE FUELED 10 MISSILES ON 8 AUGUST 1990. IN THE MEANTIME, ZIONIST THREATS INTENSIFIED. BUT, SINCE THE VALIDITY OF THE FUEL EXPIRED ON 6 SEPTEMBER, WE HAD TO EMPTY THE MISSILES. (MORE) END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED

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