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# Intelligence Report

Directorate of Intelligence

12 December 1996

TIER

## Intelligence Monitoring of North Korea's Implementation of the US-DPRK Agreed Framework (21 October-21 November 1996)

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### Status of the Facilities at Yongbyon

In a climate of worsening North-South tensions, Chief Engineer Li announced the shutdown of spent fuel canning for the 4-10 November "winter preparation" period. North Korean First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-chu—in a letter to US officials on 11 November accusing Washington of supporting Kim Yong-sam's efforts to use the Agreed Framework to pressure the North—linked the resumption of spent fuel canning to construction work on the LWR project. He stopped short, however, of officially threatening to end the nuclear freeze.

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Canning operations have not yet resumed, nor has the North committed to doing so at any set time.

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This report was prepared by analysts throughout the Directorate of Intelligence and was coordinated within the Intelligence Community. This is a monthly report that updates policymakers on developments related to North Korea's implementation of the US-North Korean nuclear agreement. Information available as of 6 December 1996 was used in this report. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to

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
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
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**Implementation of Light-Water Reactor (LWR) Agreement**

In the absence of an apology by North Korea for the submarine intrusion incident, Seoul continued to oppose formally initialing the draft protocols on site and services concluded in late September. Alleging concern for the safety of South Korean workers, Seoul also temporarily suspended direct support for the LWR project and indefinitely grounded South Korean teams scheduled to travel to North Korea to begin site preparation work.

- In response, P'yongyang on 15 November threatened, through its official wire service, to end the freeze on its nuclear facilities unless the US ended its alleged delay in implementing the US-DPRK Agreed Framework, including the light-water reactor project.
- The warning, although undoubtedly approved by the leadership, was not issued as an official policy declaration by the Foreign Ministry or other national authority. 

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**US-North Korean Liaison Offices**

No developments to report.



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**North-South Dialogue: The Gap Widens**

The North Korean submarine incursion of 18 September has continued to dominate North-South relations. A massive manhunt to track down the infiltrators ended on 5 November when two of the three remaining infiltrators were shot and killed by the South Korean military.




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- In total, 24 North Koreans were killed, one captured and one remains unaccounted for. Seoul presumes the final infiltrator died of exposure.
- The manhunt also resulted in the deaths of 14 South Koreans and the injury of 16 others. Among the dead were four South Korean civilians.



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possible to resolve the submarine incident directly with the South for two reasons:

- The precedent that security-related issues be resolved through military channels at P'anmunjom.
- Kim Yong-sam's alleged "maldeeds" (sic) of two years ago—an apparent reference to Kim Yong-sam's refusal to issue condolences on Kim Il-song's death. [Redacted]

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In the aftermath of the submarine incident P'yongyang initially signaled greater flexibility to US diplomats over conditions for accepting a joint briefing on the four-party talks proposal, but reversed course when told that without a resolution of the submarine incident, the joint briefing would not be possible unless the North agrees to participate in the four-party talks themselves.


- The North Korean Foreign Ministry's spokesman on 11 November publicly noted that Washington was now refusing to provide a joint briefing, and that P'yongyang was interpreting this "change in (the US) position" as "revocation" of the four-party talks proposal.
- First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-chu in an 11 November letter to US officials charged that South Korean President Kim Yong-sam "remains opposed to the dialogue for reunification...as long as he stays in power, there cannot be a remotest possibility about North-South dialogue." [Redacted]

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South Korea, for its part, continued to demand an apology for the submarine incursion as a precondition for further contacts with the North. Kim Yong-sam, in a 9 November interview with The Washington Post, stated that the South will not conduct any dialogue or exchanges with the North until P'yongyang apologizes directly to Seoul and promises no further incidents.



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
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- Suspended contacts include investment plans by South Korean businesses and discussions related to both food and financial assistance. Seoul also canceled participation in multilateral negotiations over opening a corridor through North Korea's air space. 

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P'yongyang on 18 November announced in an official wire service report that it would "tentatively" close its North-South Liaison Office at P'anmunjom. Subsequent attempts by South Korea to test the phone links between the liaison offices have not been answered by the North. In a 19 November "authorized" communiqué, the North cited as justification for the move Seoul's "policy of closing the door on North-South relations" and asserts that the liaison office had "lost its reason for being." 

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**Implementation of the North-South Denuclearization Declaration (NSDD)**

No new developments to report. 

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
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
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
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