

*What Douglas says will work all this. (al.)*

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11 December 1957

*FILE* *stiff* *ALMS*

Draft Notes on Princeton Consultants' Meeting of Friday, 6 December 1957

A. Dulles  
A. Smith  
R. J. Smith

Cremeans

Matthias  
Stoertz (*Thurs. only*)

Armstrong  
Black  
Bowie  
Hoover  
Knerr  
Linder  
Strayer

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1. Soviet Foreign Policy (questions growing out of [redacted] (b)(3) briefing of the group on the November 0/NE London discussions with the J.I.C.). BOWIE asked whether the USSR was in fact pursuing a total military effort, or was it attempting to give the impression of a greater military capability than it actually possesses. In short, was it attempting to deter the US and still not have to allocate all the resources which a full defense effort might require. A. SMITH stated that BOWIE's view is roughly what the majority view of NIE 11-4-57 says, that is, that the Soviets are making less than a total effort. KNORR asked if Soviet leaders might conceivably estimate that they could reduce expected Soviet general war casualties, through prior technological developments, and a defense effort relatively much greater than the US, to say, about 8 million casualties. Would this tempt them to overlook the deterrents? BOWIE's feeling on this score was that no leadership could be that certain; no one could estimate the consequences of all out war. Such a premise would be too shaky and too high a gamble for Soviet leadership.

2. Will Khrushchev turn outward? BOWIE asked what does "turn outward" really mean? What kind of internal problems would give rise to such a foreign course? What kind of external adventures might in fact be undertaken? He felt that NIE 11-4-57 was somewhat unresolved on this point and that the estimate doesn't really discuss the full significance of such questions. ARMSTRONG stated that certain people

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held the thesis that Soviet actions in Syria were in part caused by internal Soviet problems. KNORR strongly doubted this thesis, holding that such an economic incidence would be extremely small with respect to total Soviet GNP. A. SMITH explained the treatment of this question in NIE 11-4-57: that on the one hand, Soviet problems will probably not pile up to such a point as to cause collapse; yet competing demands on Soviet resources will pose greater problems to Soviet leadership than they have in the past. Thus, what is this in-between-level of troubles and how will it be manifested? HOOVER felt that the Soviet people were used to disappointment, and that, therefore, even if Soviet economic goals do fall somewhat short, there will have still some economic gain and this will redound to Khrushchev's advantage. A. SMITH stated that Soviet announced economic goals were not the kind which result in a great, immediate jump in GNP, as was the case in the immediate post-war years, and that, therefore, Soviet economic difficulties were not likely to become dramatic. BLACK agreed, feeling that such economic troubles will remain within the regime's capabilities to manage. STRAYER doubted that economic difficulties will give rise to a need for an adventurous foreign policy. There was general consensus <sup>on</sup> with this view.

3. Problems relating to the impact of intelligence assessments on our policy makers. The DCI stated that he wished to raise two inter-related questions which had arisen out of his recent discussions with the Johnson Committee of Congress. The first of these questions related to how best to call the active attention of our policy makers to disturbing trends abroad. DCI felt that the intelligence community had somewhat failed over the past few years in bringing the close attention of our policy makers to the build-up of Soviet missile capabilities. We had had good, hard intelligence since 1955 on Soviet missile development. Our documents had discussed these questions. He himself had discussed Soviet missile build-up at the NSC, and before the Atomic Energy and Armed Forces Joint Committees of Congress. Despite these efforts, it took a sputnik and a dog to surface awareness of the problem in America.

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This was in fact a kind of Pearl Harbor. The question thus is how to bring out our intelligence findings with sufficient force and vigor to spur necessary policy action without sputniks or dogs.

4. The second, related, question relates to the fact that, except for NESC, the Intelligence community does not prepare net evaluations as to where we stand relative to the USSR. DCI stated that this point was very forcefully demonstrated in his appearances before the Johnson Committee, in that the senators were amazed to find that he knew much more about Moscow's air defense installations than he did about those of Washington, D. C. DCI thereupon asked the consultants if there would be benefit in preparing net evaluations in such fields as missiles, nuclear developments, bombers, general economy, chemical warfare, bacteriological warfare, and etc. Should not there be some organism or mechanism that could make such net studies and then inform the NSC that we stand thus and so ahead or behind the USSR? ARMSTRONG asked if this were not the province of the NSC itself. Why didn't the NSC ask the JCS or their own staff for such studies? LINDER asked if a comparative study of missile development had been in our net evaluation paper. A. SMITH explained that this question was ground in but is always placed in the future tense at some date which the paper sets, and the difficulty is that the last such paper's future date was not set far enough ahead to grind in interim Soviet development in missiles. (Abbott: not sure I got that last point correctly).

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5. BOWIE stated that the NSC had taken a basic decision two years ago that our missile program was to have a number one, over-riding priority. DCI questioned whether this decision had in fact been that clear-cut. BOWIE maintained that it had, adding that this decision had been taken over the protest of the military. In retrospect, there had been a bad miscalculation of our satellite program in that it was looked on merely as a scientific program. The Planning Board had seen it also as a psychological question and had tried to drive home this point of view in "its paper", but that somehow this view did not register.

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BOWIE stated that there was a proclivity among (unnamed) high-level US officials to discount intelligence warnings again and again. These people feel that the intelligence community overrates Soviet capabilities, even though its warnings have proved correct in the past. Our question, therefore, is how to combat such highly placed, influential optimists. DCI, without commenting directly on BOWIE's statements, recalled that there had been great doubts in the minds of many people when the missile programs were in their infancy because it seemed inconceivable that a missile could some day/go five thousand miles <sup>in fact</sup> and then come down with any degree of accuracy.

6. There was general consensus in the group that net evaluations should be done, but no agreement as to who should do them. BOWIE tended to defend past NSC efforts on this score, recalling that the NSC had asked the Killian Committee to prepare an estimate of Soviet missile potential, and then had in addition the estimates of our own missile planners as to the US potential. BOWIE thought that there were certain advantages in such a procedure, in that perhaps harder estimates could be made in each of the two independent papers, whereas a net estimate might tend to fuzz up certain questions. DCI and ARMSTRONG disagreed with BOWIE's view, feeling that it was just such a system which had failed and had not had the necessary dramatic impact.  agreed, stating that whatever priorities had been set by the NSC on our missile program, the crucial point was that there had been no push behind such decisions. KNORR asked how can we "red flag" or manipulate the receptivity of the consumer. Who sticks on these "red flags"? How many "red flags"? LINDER recalled the earlier statement of ARMSTRONG that the problem lies not in the intelligence community but in the executive. Who follows up on NSC decisions to make sure that things get done?

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7. BOWIE pointed out certain difficulties in giving programs the desired push. For instance, how can one set up a crash, Manhattan-type project in a context where Congress wants to cut expenses? Secondly, we had a crash program on bombers in the past that was voted by Congress over the Administration's objections. (DCI interjected that he had been accused on this score of having been responsible for a \$900 million

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~~deliberate~~ boch). BOWIE's third example was Air Force infatuation with a crash ICBM program, to the detriment of an IRBM program. NSC stressed the political implication in Europe of having IRBMs, whereas Air Force wished to make only about 60 IRBMs, wish them off on the British, and then be done with the matter.

8. HOOVER wondered if, rather than ad hoc or Killian-type net evaluations, there might be merit in preparing a net study every six months. He recognized the dangers herein of such routine netting, and also the fact that "this pill won't cure the disease" of not having a commander's estimate. STRAYER felt that the impact problem was a greater one than that of netting, and that two procedures might improve impact: a) cut-down on the volume of intelligence production that goes up to, and bogs down, the policy maker, and b) make the conclusions and format of NIEs less stodgy. Why not tableid presentation, instead of ~~the~~ doctoral dissertation? HOOVER felt that the product's impact could be improved by indicating the hardness of the intelligence judgment: i.e., tell when certain judgments were based on photographs, ~~on~~ electronic data, etc. BOWIE felt, however, that even if we had Shakespeare writing our NIE's, the written word would not and could not have the dramatic impact of an actual event. Furthermore, impact and speeding up of programs is no cure-all in itself, since our capabilities depend also on ideas re thrust, re-entry, etc. A. SMITH added that it also depends on who makes the net evaluation. For example, the impact of Soviet bomber production was other than would have been done had more significance been pointed out, in ~~comparing~~ <sup>netting</sup> the Soviet and US bomber production, than merely a comparison of numbers.

9. Significance of missile development for our relations with our allies. DCI raised a number of questions in this regard. Could the USSR nullify Europe-based IRBM's by not hitting Europe and, instead, hitting the US? How can we guard against possible future Soviet political approaches to our NATO allies in which the Soviets may say, "Look, get rid of US bases and we won't attack you"? How does the intestinal fortitude of the British compare with our other allies? What kind of operational arrangements should we have with our non-British allies?

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To what extent are our bases in Europe and Africa now being neutralized by the existence of operational Soviet 750 n.m. IREMS? DCI felt that such problems as these were just around the corner for NATO.

10. KNORR asked if the existence of missiles fundamentally altered the basic question, that of a greater awareness of the implications of nuclear war. DCI answered that this problem was now directly pointed up for Europeans by the existence of sputnik. BOWIE agreed, stating that the problem is that Europe recognizes that the US is now coming under direct threat of Soviet missile attack. The question in Europeans' minds is one of whether our strength will be sufficient and will be committed in a future crisis situation in which we are not directly threatened. STRAYER felt that the missiles had made a psychological impression that bombers could not do: that is, that as long as the question is simply one of bombers, there is a human tendency not to worry and to feel that somehow we can retaliate; the new factor, however, is an impression that a missile attack is unanswerable.

11. KNORR felt that a decline in confidence in US retaliatory determination may, within such countries as France and Belgium, lead to a desire to have their own possession and control of missile retaliatory means; whereas, formerly, as long as they had confidence in the US ability to counter, their rational course was one of not wanting to have anything to do with missiles. BOWIE felt in this regard that there were dangers involved if all the NATO countries did get deterrent powers. If there were a fortress Britain, France, Germany, etc., each might want to get out of NATO and of collective security if it thought it had enough deterrent power of its own. This, he felt, was a danger underlying the British White Paper.

12. STRAYER felt that Soviet uncertainties and suspicions re the West would continue to deter Moscow, since there would be no assurance that "taking out Germany" would not bring in England and other powers. BOWIE agreed, stating that whatever arrangements are made with our allies, it may be better to keep the Soviets uncertain

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as to who among the allies might pull the triggers. This kind of question is not a chess game, and the Soviets could not compute such risks with any degree of accuracy. **HOOVER** felt that another deterrent to the USSR would be the fact that even if certain of our allies did opt out, there might still be some NATO members who might exercise their missile capability against the USSR. **DCI** added that Soviet troubles in this regard might be aggravated by the existence of a number of floating missile bases: i.e., destroyers fitted for launching IREMs.

13. **A. SMITH** asked what difference, if any, there might be in neutralist feeling among our allies now that the US, as well as themselves, are under the gun. How will such sentiments express themselves in situations short of war? **STRAYER** felt that as time passes our allies would probably feel that the US would become more reticent to see a general war situation develop. This would probably increase sentiment toward neutralism and toward getting rid of our bases. However, our allies would probably hang on to these bases so that they would at least have something to sell at such time as they might sell out. Our problem, therefore, might be what our allies will ask us as a price for maintaining these bases. In short, our relations with our allies and the existence of our bases in their territory would go on about as before. (Not sure I got this correctly) There was general agreement with this judgment.

[ not this ]

14. **DCI** raised the possibility that "hard bases" might be established in such out-of-the-way places as eastern Greenland and Libya. Being thus removed from crowded cities, political problems with our allies might not be too great. **KNORR** somewhat disagreed, feeling that the Soviets might nullify such bases by threats to destroy that country's capital city. The point was raised that there might be increasing dangers to our non-European bases as a result of Soviet tactics of attempting to turn popular opinions against their own governments, either before the outbreak of war, or upon its outbreak.

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BOWIE felt that the question of bases turned on the psychological question as to whether our allies felt that the bases were to joint advantage. There would be danger if an image ever developed that the US intended to use such bases only to protect the US, or if the Soviets were ever able to create the impression, in such places as North Africa, that there was no joint advantage derived from such non-NATO real estate. (I have a few notes on the last stuff, about economic recession in the West, if you want them -- though nothing much was said.)

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