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652

3 September 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with Secretary Rusk at lunch at DCI residence
this date

1. Ball visit to Pakistan reviewed and Rusk agreed that it is more important to preserve our assets in Pakistan than to insist upon expansion of USA-60 as a condition precedent to continuing aid. DCI agreed and stated this understanding reached with Ball during Rusk's absence. Rusk feels Ayub is seeking new connections with friends of the United States. Present Pak Foreign Minister is in trouble and probably will be removed which would be good because he is definitely not friendly to the United States. Rusk was generally optimistic on the outcome of the Ball-Ayub discussions.

2. Regarding South Viet Nam, stating he was not really in on DepTel #243 but since the Telex was discussed with him on the telephone, he assumed responsibility. He appeared critical of Hilsman and somewhat critical of Harriman. Agreed with me that we should go slowly; that there was no apparent acceptable successor to Diem. Rusk was pleased that today's cable was toned down. Also agreed that Lodge had been taken in by State Department advisors and lower echelon officers and had probably gone too far too fast. He was most complimentary of the reporting and the judgment of Carter, Helms and Colby in the meetings of last week.

3. Rusk raised the question of Dunlop; felt this defection most serious; believes NSA security must be improved; expressed surprise that NSA did not have security procedures at least equal to CIA's. Urged that DCI give consideration to a uniform security clearance procedure for all personnel throughout the Intelligence Community. Raised the question of desirability of tighter security procedures within State, including the use of polygraph.

4. Discussed the De Gaulle problem at considerable length. Rusk ventured the opinion that De Gaulle would lose out and that the ultimate strong trio in Free World defense would be Britain, U. S. and West Germany. I questioned this because of De Gaulle's nuclear development, indicating it would be formidable within 10 years. Rusk felt that De Gaulle could offer no security to Western Europe

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that would equal that offered by the U. S. I countered by stating that De Gaulle was not inhibited by U. S. policy or the McMahon Act and therefore might easily resolve his problem by offering special nuclear materials or weapons assistance to West Germany or other countries. Rusk felt this not a probability, however he did not fully discount the idea.

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

5. With regard to the future of South Viet Nam, Rusk raised the question of a possible split between Ho Chi Minh and Peking. I was to explore the possibilities of an independent, unified Viet Nam which would be neutral but free of ChiCom influence. This apparently is a French idea and if it could be accomplished would be a very stabilizing influence on all of Southeast Asia.

NOTE: I have discussed this with Helms who is going to study prospects.

JAM/mfb

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