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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

## OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

4 June 1957

STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 29-57

SUBJECT: Discussion of the Estimative Process and End Product at Princeton Consultants' Conference, 22-23 May, 1957. (Note: The remainder of the discussion at the May Consultants' Conference is reported in a separate Memorandum.)

## 1. Participants:

Consultants

Hamilton Fish Armstrong  
Cyril Black  
Calvin Hoover  
Klaus Knorr  
Col. G. A. Lincoln  
Harold Linder  
Philip Mosely  
Raymond J. Sontag  
Joseph Strayer  
T. Cuyler Young

CIA Representatives

Allen W. Dulles  
James Cooley  
Wayne Jackson  
James Graham  
Willard Matthias  
Maurice Williams  
Charles Cremeans

2. The afternoon session on 23 May was chaired by the Director who asked the Consultants to address themselves to a consideration of the estimative process and the improvement of its end product. He introduced the discussion by quoting from a memorandum by Mr. Armstrong recommending that NIEs be written so as to give greater emphasis to the statement of possible alternative developments and rely less upon flat and undocumented predictions.

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3. The discussion that followed centered around four principal topics: (a) replacement of conclusions in the form now customary with a three or four page narrative summary, (b) changes in the form and content of the NIE Discussion, (c) the handling of differences of opinion among the contributing agencies, and (d) the question of policy recommendations in intelligence estimates.

4. The consensus among the Consultants on these topics was: (a) that consideration should be given to the publication of a separate summary, not coordinated among the IAC agencies, of each National Intelligence Estimate, (b) that attention be given to the inclusion of more data in, or attached to, the text of National Intelligence Estimates and more consideration of alternative possibilities, (c) that every effort be made to inform the NIE reader of the existence of differences of opinion within the Intelligence Community, and (d) that more attention should be given to US courses of action as a factor in all estimative problems.

5. Topic A. Narrative Summary

The DIRECTOR commented favorably on the terseness and conciseness of [ ] appreciations. He suggested replacing the present form of NIE Conclusions with a three or four page narrative

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(b)(3)

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summary in place of the present conclusions composed of sentences excised from the NIE text. STRAYER suggested that it would be desirable, when time permitted, to consider the conclusions the day following acceptance of the text; this would make it possible to have the conclusions a more effective and integrated document than can be produced at the end of a long and tiring discussion of the text. SONTAG said that, while recently reading over the entire O/NE product of the past year, he had felt the need for a crisp and stimulating summary attached to each NIE. He suggested that an uncoordinated summary be issued by the DCI, that it be written with conclusions implicit, and that it be bound separately and apart from the NIE text. LINCOLN suggested that such a summary might be written by one man and not put through the coordination process. LINDER reminded the consultants that the present practice with respect to conclusions has been followed because other types of conclusions are difficult to coordinate with the IAC agencies. At the same time he reminded the consultants that a recent poll of readers of NIEs showed that the majority felt that the most important feature of the NIE was that it represents the agreed position of the Intelligence Community.

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6. Topic B. Suggestions for changes in present form of the text of NIEs.

SOMTAG proposed that consideration be given to the issuance of two related papers on each National Estimate, the first to be a concise summary as discussed above and the second to be a more detailed study of the problem, similar to the text of present NIEs, but possibly with more documentation. HOOVER said he felt that frequently NIEs did not have enough data to make the estimates that they contained understandable and useful. He suggested that it be made a practice to indicate within the text something of the quality and quantity of data available on the problems dealt with. STRAYER expressed his approval of the practice of attaching appendices to the text in order to make factual data available without unduly lengthening NIEs.

The Consultants expressed approval of ARMSTRONG'S recommendation of the practice of stating alternative possibilities before making the final estimate of probable developments.

7. Topic C. Handling of differences of opinion.

ARMSTRONG gave strong expression to the belief that it is dangerous to allow differences of opinion within the Intelligence

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Community to be submerged in the standard "compromise consensus" and proposed that where differences exist, their existence should be made clear. SONTAG suggested weaving dissenting opinions into the text of NIEs rather than submerging them in footnotes. The DIRECTOR expressed the opinion that a footnote was most often the best way to record dissents from the DCI position. MOSELY suggested that less space be devoted to items on which agreement prevailed and more attention be given to areas of disagreement. The DIRECTOR pointed out that although there are many problems on which intelligent and informed men disagree, there have actually been very few basic differences among the IAC agencies on the interpretation of political and economic data. COOLEY, LINDER, and HUIZENGA pointed out that contributions to the last Soviet paper revealed differences on Soviet military capabilities, which were quite clearly stated in the NIE, but that there were no important differences on the Soviet political and economic situation. SONTAG suggested that members of the Board of National Estimates could frequently speak out more clearly and emphatically if they knew the Director's precise position on specific issues. The DIRECTOR indicated his willingness to be consulted on his position whenever desirable.

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8. Topic D. Treatment of US Policy in National Intelligence Estimates

The DIRECTOR observed that the Intelligence "Watchdog Committee" has recommended that he play a more active and aggressive role in the Intelligence Community. He recommended that more attention be given to the role of US policy in NIEs and expressed the opinion that this can be done without violating the rules defining and limiting Intelligence activity. LINDER pointed out that O/NE and the Consultants had always been very conscious of the standing rule against estimating probable US courses of action and expressed the opinion that there would be great interest in the Director's recommendation.

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