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DO/P-2-2837

Executive Registry


E.O. 62-4192

18 June 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Director's Meeting with the Secretary of Defense

1. At 11:30, 18 June, the Director met with Secretary McNamara and Deputy Secretary Gilpatric to report on his trip to Southeast Asia. The meeting lasted until 12:40. The Deputy Director (Plans) also was present.



(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

3. After considerable discussion of Chiang's plan for a return to the Mainland, it became clear that there was some misunderstanding on the part of Messrs. McNamara and Gilpatric as to whether the United States had decided to withhold logistic support from any military effort which Chiang was planning to make. It also became clear that there was no consensus in the United States Government on what it conceives Chiang's role to be: a) whether it is solely to protect

(b)(3)



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Taiwan, or b) whether it is to attempt the liberation of China from the Communists at an appropriate time.


4. The Director advocated the equipping of five C-123 aircraft and the positioning of amphibious gear for use by the ChiNats with the understanding that it would all remain in United States hands pending a policy decision about its use. Secretary McNamara did not seem to feel that amphibious equipment should be stockpiled

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)



5. The Director then discussed the places he had visited in

South Viet-Nam



(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

The Director concluded this part of the meeting by saying that although he did not want to depreciate the efforts being made in South Viet-Nam, he was not optimistic about the success of the whole United States program.

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(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

6. [redacted] the

Director explained the training of Border Police and Royal Thai Army units by United States forces in Northeast Thailand. He underlined his belief that United States Military Forces in Thailand should have training as their basic mission, and touched on the problem the United States may have in maintaining them there if pressure is applied by the Communists for their withdrawal in the context of the Laotian settlement.

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

[redacted]

He stated that he feared Thailand would move toward neutralism and seek accommodation with the Communist camp if the United States position in the area showed additional signs of weakness.

7. The Director concluded the meeting by saying that he thought United States programs in Southeast Asia were essentially holding actions which would buy time. He said he did not think that they would succeed over the long run, pointing out that we were merely chipping away at the toe of a glacier from the North. He read the "General Conclusions" from the paper prepared at the end of our trip. Secretary McNamara commented that he did not feel it had yet been proved that United States actions were not capable of rolling back



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the Communist push. It was agreed that the United States should continue to support programs and projects which would buy time.

*RH*  
Richard Helms  
Deputy Director (Plans)

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